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AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS

A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945

IN NINE VOLUMES

Selected and edited by
Roger Daniels
University of Cincinnati

GARLAND PUBLISHING

AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS

VOLUME 9 June, 1942–November, 1945

Raising Japanese American Troops

Edited with an introduction by
Roger Daniels

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American Concentration Camps

On August 10, 1988, President Ronald W. Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which probably closed the last legislative chapter of the World War II removal and incarceration of more than 120,000 Japanese Americans, almost all of them residents of the West Coast. Under the terms of that act, each surviving victim—there were then perhaps 60,000 such persons—was entitled to a one-time, tax-free payment of $20,000. This redress, as it has been called, stemmed from the findings of the federal Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC, established 1980) as expressed in its 1983 report, *Personal Justice Denied*, and its subsequent recommendations in June of that year. The CWRIC's basic conclusion is worth quoting:

> The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II. (*Personal Justice Denied*, p. 18.)

The documents printed here trace and explicate not only the decision to submit a whole people to internal exile but also delineate the execution and modification of that policy during the course of the war. The documents are drawn largely from the archives of the government department chiefly responsible, the War Department, and from the archives of the United States Army. Eventually many other agencies of the executive branch were accessories after the fact and the Congress was intimately involved as well. (So was the Supreme Court of the United States, but its decisions are not directly treated here.)

In addition, as these documents make clear, the incarceration of the Japanese Americans enjoyed widespread public support. During the war there were more complaints that the government was being too soft on "Japs" than there were complaints about the very real harshness of their treatment.

In signing the 1988 act President Reagan refused to make any judgments about the past: ". . . it's not for us today to pass judgment upon those who may have made mistakes while engaged in that great struggle." ("Remarks by the President at the Signing Ceremony for Japanese Internment Legislation," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, August 10, 1988.) One of his recent predecessors was willing to make those kinds of judgments. "We know now what we should have known then," said President Gerald R. Ford in a 1976 proclamation, "not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans." (Proclamation 4417, "An American Promise," February 19, 1976, *Federal Register*, Vol. 41, No. 35—Feb. 20, 1976.)

The views of both chief executives merely echoed what scholars had been saying for some time. Just before the war ended Eugene V. Rostow, in a brilliant article in *Harper's*, had dubbed the relocation "our worst wartime mistake." Nearly twenty years later, the late Stetson Conn, a civilian who was the Army's chief military historian, published, in an official history, a detailed account of the Army's role in the evacuation. He demonstrated that the decision was not dictated by "stern military necessity" as the Army and its defenders had claimed. As striking as Conn's conclusions were, he had been inhibited if not absolutely prevented from publishing some of the evidence. He generously allowed me to use his notes and files and even checked my notes to make sure that I found several items that he had not used and which we today might call "smoking guns." My own findings have been published in several books and a number of articles.

I argued in 1972 that

> the general tendency of educated Americans, including historians, to write off the evacuation as a "wartime mistake" is to obscure its true significance. Rather than a mistake—which, according to the dictionary, is "an error in action, calculation, opinion or judgment caused by poor reasoning, carelessness, insufficient information . . . a misunderstanding or misconception"—the legal atrocity which was committed against the Japanese Americans was the logical outgrowth of over three centuries of American experience, an experience which taught Americans to regard the United States as a white man's country in which nonwhites "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." These infamous words, from Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's 1857 decision in *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, were merely echoed by the United States Supreme Court during World War II. (*Concentration Camps, USA,* p. xiv.)

The documents presented in these volumes are selected from literally tens of thousands of sheets of paper which document the government's role. As noted, the point of view from which the documents are presented is chiefly that of the Army and its civilian masters in the War Department. Most of the non-Army/War Department archival documents printed here were either sent there or sent elsewhere in response to their actions. An equally large group of documents could be presented from the archival remains of the War Relocation Authority, the custodial agency set up to warehouse the Japanese American people. The documents presented here are not just "decision papers" but rather have been structured not only to tell a story but also to try to show the kinds of complex matrices from which governmental decisions flow. We Americans habitually speak of government as if it were singular and monolithic—and nothing is more monolithic than the resentful "they" or "them" that one hears so often. Yet, as I believe these documents demonstrate clearly, there were constant differences of opinion within the government—and often within the War Department itself. These differences grew as the war went on and the decisions of early 1942 looked more and more like a "mistake" to growing numbers of officials.

Many historians complain that the advent of the telephone has made it more difficult to trace decision making and the information flow upon which it is based. The War Department, however, recorded large numbers of telephone conversations. These were not surreptitious wire taps, but actual recordings made on wax cylinders and made with the knowledge of the caller and the called. (At least this was the case among the Army officials involved: it is not clear whether outsiders—Justice Department officials or scholars, such as Morton Grodzins—knew that they were being recorded.) The wax cylinders were transcribed by typists, often the same

day. Transcriptions of important conversations were sometimes circulated rather widely within the War Department and within regional commands, such as General John L. De Witt's Western Defense Command. These transcripts enable us, I believe, to understand the day to day and sometimes hour to hour decision-making process as if we were the proverbial "fly on the wall" taking it all in.

None of the documents printed has been altered or edited in any way. Except for the telephone conversation of February 4, 1942, between Generals Mark W. Clark and Allen W. Gullion, which is printed in Volume II, all are photocopies of original documents or carbons of those documents.

They have been selected and arranged with the research student in mind. There are not only key documents showing how important decisions were made, but also documents showing how conflicting and contrary lines of action were being followed at the same time. Some documents feature major historical figures: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, General George C. Marshall, and Admiral Ernest J. King. More often they feature key subordinates: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Generals De Witt and Gullion, and on down to the middle and lower level bureaucrats who served them, such as Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen. In addition, a number of unsolicited letters and telegrams from the private sector have been included along with some congressional debate and hearings and attempts of government agencies to evaluate public opinion.

The basic arrangement of the documents is chronological, although a number of separate matters are treated topically. The chief of these latter are: the reports of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League (Volume II); letters showing changing relationships between JACL officials and federal officials (Volume IV); a dossier compiled on General De Witt (Volume VII); The War Department and the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study (Volume VIII); the Japanese of Hawaii (Volume VIII); and Raising Japanese AmericanTroops (Volume IX).

Since the point of view is chiefly that of the War Department/Army, sequential correspondence from outside that nexus is usually printed as it was received. Thus a March 28, 1942, telegram from University of California Provost Monroe E. Deutsch to Justice Felix Frankfurter will be found, not under that date, but immediately after the letter of March 30, 1942, from Frankfurter to Assistant Secretary McCloy to which it was an enclosure.Similarly, the letters of April 1, 1942, and April 2, 1942—McCloy to Frankfurter and Frankfurter to McCloy—which refer to that telegram will be found immediately after it with the March documents (Volume III) even though most documents written in April 1942 are in Volume IV.

The archival documents are drawn from the following sources:

National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Record Group 16	Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
Record Group 107	Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (includes records of Asst. Secretary)
Record Group 338	Records of United States Army Commands, 1942–
Record Group 389	Records of the Office of Provost marshal general, 1941–
Record Group 394	Records of United States Army Continental Commands, 1920–1942
Record Group 407	Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917–

Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
Record Group 44 Records of the Office of Government Reports

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
The Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo.
The Papers of Tom C. Clark

Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.
The Papers of John Anson Ford (Reports of the Anti-Axis Committee, Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League)
Bancroft Library, Berkeley, Calif.
The Papers of Hiram W. Johnson, III
The Papers of Culbert L. Olson

Roger Daniels
Cincinnati
September, 1988

Contents

Volume I: July 1940–December 31, 1941

Archival Documents, pre-Pearl Harbor.

These materials deal largely with discussions between the War and Justice Departments over responsibilities for enemy aliens in case of war and with internal Army documents about construction of accommodations for enemy aliens and interned merchant seamen. There is also the famous "Munson Report" of November 1941, dealing with alleged loyalty and disloyalty of Japanese Americans.

Official Proclamations and Other Public Documents, December 7, 1941–April 20, 1942, as printed by the Tolan Committee.

These public documents show the ways in which the lives of enemy aliens in general and of Japanese Americans in particular were affected, and how, over time, most of the options of the latter disappeared.

Archival Documents, December 7, 1941–December 31, 1941.

These demonstrate the growing conflicts between the War Department and the Department of Justice and show the rising concern about internal security in both the government and the nation at large.

Volume II: January 1, 1942–February 19, 1942

Archival documents, January 1, 1942–February 19, 1942.

This sequence shows chiefly how the decision to relocate the West Coast Japanese evolved from conflicting views both outside and inside the executive branch. The terminal date is that of Executive Order 9066, printed in Volume I.

Reports of the Anti-Axis Committee, Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League (JACL).

These documents, found in the John Anson Ford Mss., Henry E. Huntington Library, show the stresses and strains placed on loyal Japanese American citizens, some of whom were persuaded that there were "enemies" among them.

Volume III: February 20, 1942–March 31, 1942

Archival Documents, February 20, 1942–March 19, 1942.

The basic decision having been made and authority delegated to General De Witt and his staff, the problems of how to remove more than 100,000 human beings proved to be more complicated than many officials expected.

Congressional Record, March 19, 1942 (selected pages).

The few pages printed here contain the entire congressional debate over the statute which made it a federal crime for a civilian in an area that was not under martial law to fail to obey the instructions of a commanding general and his deputies. Note the sarcastic remarks of Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Oh.) at *CR*, p. 2726.

Tolan Committee, *Preliminary Report and Recommendations*, March 19, 1942.

This report, although it did *not* make policy, was important because it endorsed what the military wanted to do and was doing. Had it been otherwise, congressional approval might not have been so routine.

Archival Documents, March 20, 1942–March 31, 1942.

These documents show the policy of forced removal being put into effect; in this period the first of General De Witt's Civilian Exclusion Orders (printed in Volume I) was issued, affecting the Bainbridge Islanders of Puget Sound, and the first Relocation Center was opened at Manzanar, California.

Volume IV: April 1942

Archival Documents, April 1942.

In this sequence of documents the growing opposition of western officials outside of the West Coast to having Japanese Americans moved to their localities is manifested. Particularly noteworthy are reports of meetings in Salt Lake City between army officials, Milton S. Eisenhower of the newly-formed War Relocation Authority, western state officials, and representatives of large agricultural interests taken from the Records of the Secretary of Agriculture.

Federal Government Surveys of Public Opinion, January 1942–August 1942.

These thoroughly unscientific attempts to gauge public opinion, done by the federal Office of Government Reports, a forerunner of the Office of War Information, were circulated among high government officials.

The Japanese American Citizens League and the Federal Government, March 1942-November 1944.

Relationships between the oppressed and their oppressors tend to be complex, especially when there are reasons for the oppressed —or some of them—to believe that "appropriate behavior will ameliorate conditions and/or shorten the term of oppression. The leadership of the Japanese American Citizens League, as the correspondence here shows, perceived that the political heads of the U. S. Army, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and particularly Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy and his uniformed staff, were likely targets of a "how to win friends and influence people" approach which even included small gifts. Perceptively, no such approach was made to General John L. DeWitt, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, or their subordnates. In recent years there has been increasing criticism of what some have termed the "over-enthusiastic collaboration" between the JACL and the Army. At the recent (August 1988) biennial JACL convention in Seattle a motion, on which action was deferred, asking that the JACL admit and apologize for its wartime "errors" caused great consternation.

Volume V: May 1942

Archival Documents, May 1942.

These documents show the Army making California and the other West Coast areas "free" of Japanese, as first the Assembly Centers and then the Relocation Centers began to fill up.

Tolan Committee, *Fourth Interim Report*, May 1942.

This report demonstrates, perhaps better than any other single document, the degree of support that existed for governmental policies affecting the Japanese Americans and shows that many felt that the government was not doing enough to keep the West Coast safe.

Volume VI: June 1942–December 1942

Archival Documents, June 1942.

These documents show the first major modifications of relocation policies and depict the resistance by Western Defense Command to any amelioration of the condition of the Japanese Americans.

Congressional Record, June 22, 1942 (selected pages).

This brief Senate debate of a bill to authorize the incarceration of any person of Japanese ancestry anywhere in the United States or its territories is but one more example of the willingness of some members of Congress to go farther than the executive branch was willing to go.

Archival Documents, July 1942.

These documents show, among other things, the increasing uneasiness of officials in the interior western states to which Japanese Americans were being shipped. An important policy document is the joint memorandum to President Roosevelt from General Marshall and Admiral King, July 15, 1942.

Reports of Civilian Agencies to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, June 1942.

These largely self-congratulatory reports are by agencies that assisted the Army in the process of getting the Japanese Americans into camp "humanely."

Army Inspections of Assembly Centers, July 1942.

A collection of documents demonstrating that, even by its own standards, the living and sanitary conditions that prevailed in the Army-run Assembly Centers were often deficient.

Archival Documents, August 1942–December 1942.

These documents are largely concerned with attempts to justify the relocation and include some materials illustrating how the mendacious *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast* was assembled.

Digest of Newspaper Editorials by Western Defense Command, January 31, 1942–December 9, 1942.

A carefully selected group. All are supportive of Western Defense Command policies and some press for even more stringent measures against the Japanese Americans.

Volume VII: 1943

Archival Documents, 1943.

These documents depict the continuing resistance of General De Witt and his subordi-

nates to the "liberalization" of policies toward Japanese Americans—including military service and loyalty "testing," which are covered more fully in Volume IX—and the distinct change of tone that occurred when General Delos C. Emmons succeeded De Witt as head of Western Defense Command. This section also contains the White House response to congressional criticism of the "too liberal" relocation program.

Hearings on *War Relocation Centers* (Chandler Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs), Parts I and II, January 20, 27, 28, and February 11, 1943.

These hearings demonstrate the congressional opposition to the "liberalized" relocation program. In them Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, responds to that criticism. (Parts III and IV, which deal with Arizona and Tule Lake, are not reproduced here.)

Dossier on General John L. De Witt, August 22, 1942–April 29, 1943.

In September 1943, General Delos C. Emmons succeeded General John L. De Witt, who became Commandant of the Army War College. The War Department denied that General De Witt was being punished. This dossier, found in the files of the Adjutant General, was assembled sometime in 1943, and could have been the basis for an official reprimand—or worse—as it shows General De Witt in deliberate and insubordinate resistance to War Department policies. No documents explaining who ordered the dossier compiled or for what purpose have been discovered.

Volume VIII: 1944 and 1945; Japanese of Hawaii

Archival Documents, 1944 and 1945.

These documents depict, in part, the winding down of the relocation program.

Congressional Record, February 23, 1944, and June 23, 1944 (selected pages).

These brief debates resulted in the passage of a statute, requested by the Department of Justice, to facilitate the renunciation of United States citizenship by Japanese Americans as part of the "segregation" program.

Army and Navy Intelligence Reports, 1944–1945.

The reports show that west-coast-based intelligence officers continued to harbor the same kinds of attitudes toward Japanese Americans that triggered the relocation long after such views ceased to prevail at the top of the chain of command.

The War Department and the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study, October 1942–October 1943.

These documents illustrate the possible ethical conflicts involved when scholars bargain for special access to contemporary government documents.

Japanese of Hawaii, August 1941–May 1944.

These documents demonstrate how differently the 150,000 Japanese Americans in Hawaii were treated during the war despite their greater incidence and proximity to Imperial Japanese Forces.

Volume IX: Raising Japanese American Troops, June 1942–November 1945

Archival Documents, June 1942–November, 1945.

This collection of documents shows how, almost from the beginning of the relocation program, some within the military and government establishments were considering the use of Japanese American manpower and special skills. This began with the recruitment of linguists from the camps for the Military Intelligence Specialist School, continued with the formation of the 100th Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, and ended with the reapplication of "normal" selective service procedures to eligible Japanese Americans both inside and outside the relocation centers. The use of this manpower, as De Witt and his key subordinates correctly noted, called into question the validity of the assumptions on which the whole relocation program had been based.

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CONTENTS

1. Archival documents, June 1942–November, 1945

Archival documents
June, 1942–November, 1945

Referred by Lt. Col. Boekel
to Russell 6/25/42

June 12, 1942

SUBJECT: Proposal to determine loyalty of evacuees.

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. Wm. T. Boekel.

1. According to my understanding, there seems to be a general agreement that approximately one-third of the evacuees are definitely loyal to this country, another one-third who will go whichever way the war goes, and the other one-third is presumed to be definitely loyal to Japan. If it were possible to determine just which individuals belong in the latter group, it might be advisable to separate that group from the remaining Japanese and place the disloyal in two or three assembly centers or relocation centers where it would not be possible for them to contaminate the other evacuees. So long as the loyal and disloyal are in the same centers, the disloyal will be able to exploit each untoward incident and convert many of those who are loyal, or on the borderline, to their way of thinking. If all of those who were definitely of doubtful loyalty could be placed together in centers, which would still be operated in the same manner as it is now planned to operate assembly and relocation centers, there could be very little legitimate complaint on the part of the evacuees and yet the loyal group would not be exposed to disloyal propaganda.

2. I have this proposal to make as a means of attempting to determine the identity of the disloyal: There is a device known as the polygraph, commonly called "lie detector" which was developed by a man named Leonarde Keeler. Keeler was for several years head of the quite famous Northwestern University Crime Detection Laboratory. Since the sale of this Laboratory to the Chicago Police Department, Keeler has been in business for himself. His work consists mainly of personnel examinations. During the past twelve or thirteen years, he has trained a number of operators for this device. For several years past, he has examined periodically the personnel of many of the bigger banks in Chicago. He also examines the applicants for these banks. Either Lloyds' of London or a subsidiary of that organization carry the insurance on these banks. Each bank that has its personnel examined on the polygraf gets a 10% reduction in insurance rates which more than pays for the examinations. I cite this merely to indicate that an insurance firm does have confidence in the results obtained.

3. I have personally used the polygraf in Police Departments for a number of years for the purpose of determining which suspects in a particular case may have some guilty knowledge about that case. Its use in this manner has been very successful. This device is used by a number of police departments. The polygraph records in ink on moving graph paper three reflexes - (1) blood pressure and pulse; (2) respiration; and (3) reaction of sweat glands. In operating the device, an

ordinary physician's blood pressure cuff is placed on the arm and an elastic tube around the chest and a clamp is attached to the palm of the hand lightly. None of these devices injure the subject in any manner. The only one which causes any discomfort is the blood pressure cuff if left on too long. When all of these devices are attached to the subject, a motor is turned on which causes the graph paper to move slowly and a stencil records in ink the three reflexes mentioned and a normal is established for that subject at that time. Then a series of ten or twelve questions is asked the subject in a calm even tone of voice. Most of the questions are irrelevant, such as "Is your name William A. Boekel", "Did you have breakfast this morning", "Do you live in Hillsborough", etc. Interspersed in questions of this type are three or four relevant questions, such as, in this case, "Do you want Japan to defeat the United States", or "Are you completely loyal to the United States of America". These latter two questions are my own version of the questions which might be asked. The trained operators might word the questions in a much different way. Ordinarily, the questions asked are framed in such a manner that they can be answered merely by "Yes" or "No" and the subject is instructed to so answer. As a matter of actual fact, he could remain mute throughout the whole series of questions and the recorded reactions would be the same as they would had he answered. The variations from a normal record, if any, immediately after asking relevant questions would determine whether or not that particular subject should be placed in the loyal or disloyal classification. One operator could examine twenty-five to thirty subjects per day.

3. My suggestion is this: That we contact Mr. Keeler and determine whether he would be willing to attempt such an examination and, if so, have him get eight or nine polygraph operators in this country and bring them to Turlock. Turlock has an evacuee population of approximately 3500. We would have every evacuee over the age of 12, 14 or 16, whichever might be desirable, examined. The number over this age probably would not exceed 2500. If ten operators were used, that number could be examined in ten days. On the results of the examinations in this one center could be based a decision on whether or not it would be advisable to examine all evacuees now at Assembly, Reception or Relocation Centers. In the use of this device in police departments it is usually the policy to have an intended subject sign a waiver in which he simply agrees to subject himself to a test of this kind. The results of polygraph tests are not acceptable as evidence in Court although in a very few cases, by a stipulation of the attorneys for both sides, polygraph findings have been entered as evidence.

4. I have not broached this subject in any manner to Mr. Keeler and will not, of course, unless so authorized. Therefore, I am unable to give you any estimate of what such an examination might cost. I should like to advise you also that Mr. Keeler is a personal friend of mine.

5. One other question which might arise if this examination is contemplated is whether we have the legal right to require the evacuees to submit to such an examination. In the use of the polygraph in criminal cases, it has been very seldom that a proposed subject has definitely refused to be so examined. Ordinarily, they feel that they are sufficiently expert in deception to beat the machine.

6. If this examination is made, there would be one by-product which might be of considerable value. There are certain types of mental and nervous diseases which form very definite patterns on polygraph charts. As you know, I have been concerned somewhat in the number of mental cases which have appeared already and this examination would spot for us ahead of time those prople with whom we might have trouble of this kind. It would, of course, be advisable to say nothing of this factor in any publicity which might be attached to such an examination.

Ray Ashworth
Major AUS
Chief, Interior Security Section
W.C.C.A.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL
Office of the Commandant
Savage, Minnesota

July 13, 1942

SUBJECT: Official visit to Relocation and Assembly Centers

TO : Civil Affairs Division, WDC, W.C.C.A.
Hotel Whitcomb, San Francisco, Calif.

1. I have been commissioned by the War Department to canvass the Draft age male population of Japanese assembly and relocation centers now under jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command in order to secure additional candidates for admission to the Military Intelligence Service Foreign Language School here at Savage, Minn.

2. It is my intention to leave Minnesota for San Francisco on or about July 17 and it is my plan to report to you at the Whitcomb Hotel before starting out visiting these centers.

3. Enclosed herewith is a copy of a form letter sent to the directors of the various centers.

RECEIVED
JUL 17 A.M.
WDC &
Fourth Army
WCCA

KAI E. RASMUSSEN
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.
Commandant

KER:hs
Incl: 1

Rasmussen should not have addressed center managers directly---his action in so doing is irregular.

KRB

2

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL
Office of the Commandant
Savage, Minnesota

July 13, 1942

Director in charge of

Dear Sir:

I have been commissioned by the War Department to make a canvass of personel of Japanese ancestry with sufficient Japanese language background to warrant their induction into the Military Service on that account. For that reason I should like very much to visit your center within the next two weeks and give examinations in Japanese to young male Japanese eligible for military service.

Our approximate standards for the admittance of Nisei into the school are as follows: a fair amount of fluency in the spoken Japanese; possession of an elementary knowledge of written Japanese, preferably, however, the capacity of reading newspapers; a good scholastic background in English and Japanese. In respect to this requirement it has been found here at the school that the best students usually are Chūgakkō graduates with subsequent secondary American schooling.

If these candidates are otherwise acceptable to the Service they will be inducted and given basic training and sent to the school here for further technical training. It is our hope, however, that before they are admitted we shall have sufficient time to check the records carefully in order to obviate the necessity of shipping some back again after having been admitted to the school course.

We should appreciate very much if you could possibly make such advance preparations and tentative selection of candidates as may facilitate our work when we will arrive there. I shall inform you by telegram at least 24 hours before my arrival.

Thanking you very kindly for any courtesies you may be able to extend us in this connection, I remain

Very truly yours,

RECEIVED
JUL 17 A.M.
WDC &
Fourth Army
WCCA

KAI E. RASMUSSEN
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.
Commandant

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

A

In reply refer to:
MID 904 (7/14/42)

July 14, 1942

KRB eeg
CAD

Subject: Military Utilization of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

To: Lt. General John L. De Witt
Commanding General, Western Defense Command
City of San Francisco, California

1. A board of officers has been convened in Washington representing G-1, G-2, and Operations Divisions of the General Staff, Army Ground Forces and War Re-allocation Authority, for the purpose of considering the subject of this letter. Consideration is to be given to:

(1) The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry.

(2) The possible methods of utilization.

(3) The utilization as combat troops in active theaters.

(4) The advantages and disadvantages of (2) and (3) above.

2. In view of the General's experience with Americans of Japanese ancestry within the Western Defense Command, the Board considers it of vital importance to have his views on this important subject. More specifically may we ask his opinion on the following:

(1) Should American male citizens of Japanese ancestry be recruited or inducted into the military service?

(2) If the answer to the above is yes, then what should be the size of the unit organized? (Hasty preliminary estimate indicates a sufficient number for a division.)

TAB "A"

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NARS by ___ date 6/13/69

(3) There are now Americans of Japanese ancestry scattered throughout the military service. Should this personnel be concentrated into service units?

3. Any other comments or opinions which the General might care to make in these connections as to loyalty of this class, the effect of present restrictions of military service on future citizenship, etc. will be very acceptable.

THEO. J. KOENIG,
Colonel, G. S. C.
President of the Board

SAD - WCCA

Ediphone Record Nos. 74 Distribution Primarily to Statistics
Date 7-17-42 1942 Time 5.15 PM.
Principals Captain Moffitt & Capt. Shepard & Major Wall
Subject ~~Japanese~~ Statistics regarding Japanese Available for military service
Transcribed by K. Russell Date 7-17-42 1942

Information - Request for action if possible

M Now here's the question asked me to find out if we could; what is the Military potential of American's of Japanese ancestry

M The military potential of

M The military potential of American Japanese, in other words that's means both natural born American Japanese, and also those of Japanese parents.

M I see

M Now the military potential I would assume to be those of military age, who would in the normal course of events be subject to military duty if they were drafted.

M That is citizens

M Well citizens or non citizens, they can be drafted too.

M Citizens and non citizens, in other words, well I don't know how complete our records are, you see, you understand this point I believe and that is, that we have already moved over a third of into Relocation Centers and they are under WRA and I'm not just sure whether I'll have available all of the statistics of these people, because in many instances they were processed directly into WRA centers and didn't pass thru us, other than the initial stages, but I will contact our statistical division right away and will ask them if they have any information , which will indicate either as to citizens or non citizens, those Japanese males who are of military age 18-46.

M Now particularly what I'm trying to get at of course is that, whether I'm talking about 5,000 or 50,000 when I talk about using these people

M Now your name again sir,

W Wall, Major

M And you, will in other words, this information I can give to you over the telephone thru G-1 thru Capt. Shepard.

W That's right, you give it to them and they will give it to me.

M All right and if I can get it to you tomorrow will that be too late you are leaving in the morning?

W You can dig it up for me anytime within the next week and they will get it to me.

M That's fine.

W So there is no, I don't have to take it back with me to Washington, but I want to get it by the time I get back, which will be about a week from now.

M All right sir, we'll get on it right away Major and

W You have a picture of what I want to get at.

M Yes I think I have sir, thank you



July 20, 1942

WFD/me
CAD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Operations Section, T.S.O. Branch

Attention: Mr. Sandquist

1. For the purpose of determining male Japanese eligible for eventual induction into the Army of the United States, and admission to the Military Intelligence Service, or assignment to Japanese language schools in various capacities, the War Department has directed that Lt. Col. K. E. Rasmussen, C.A.C. visit the various assembly centers under jurisdiction of this office. The time available to Col. Rasmussen for this work is extremely limited, and in order to facilitate his activities it is desired that the following information be transmitted by you to each assembly center manager for necessary action prior to the time of his visits to the assembly centers.

a. The following qualifications are to be considered in selecting those eligible:

(1) Candidates must be eligible for the draft.
(2) Candidates should preferably possess the following qualifications:

(a) High school graduates from American High Schools.
(b) Possess a fair degree of fluency in oral Japanese.
(c) Should be capable of reading elementary Japanese, i.e. at least Katakana and Hiragana as well as not less than 500 - 1000 Kanji. They should preferably be able to read Japanese newspapers.

b. From candidates whose qualifications come within those indicated above, it is desired that the following information be elicited:

(1) Name
(2) Age
(3) Profession
(4) Religion
(5) Schooling
  (a) English
  (b) Japanese
(6) Has he been to Japan?
(7) Status of Parents and Relatives.
  (a) Former
  (b) Present
  (c) Sisters and Brothers.

File original delivered



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Executive Order 10501

4

(8) Are close relatives living in Japan?
(a) In Army
(b) In other government work.
(9) Former military training in Japan?
(a) Chūgakkō Kyōren
(b) Any other.

4. The above information should be prepared in duplicate on separate sheets for each eligible, and held pending arrival of Col. Rasmussen. Until released by Col. Rasmussen, no publicity nor information concerning this subject will be authorized. Individuals determined to be eligible will be contacted personally only if the information requested in 1b. above cannot be obtained from records already available.

3. Col. Rasmussen will visit the various centers as nearly in accordance with the attached schedule as possible, and he has been authorized by this office to telegraph the center manager concerned twenty-four hours in advance of his actual time of arrival.

4. It is desired that every facility and courtesy be extended to Col. Rasmussen by the center manager concerned.

W. F. Durbin
Major, C.M.C.
Ass't. AC of S, CAD

1 Incl.
Col. Rasmussen's Itinerary

cc: Col Bendetsen

RESTRICTED

4

NOTES ON JAPANESE MILITARY SERVICE
July 20, 1942

Should American born Japanese be recruited or inducted?

Yes, subject to qualifications.

(a) Separate Kibei from Nissei.

(b) Induction of all Nissei.

(c) Serve in labor battalions particularly for combat labor under fire. Size of unit should be appropriate to the need. Until they have proven themselves under fire should not be employed in tactical units other than combat labor battalions. Issei and Kibei-Nissei should not be inducted or recruited but should be treated as internees. Would not employ them in any active theater where there was a reasonable probability that they would have contact with Japanese troops, but only where their contact would be with other than Japanese.

If the ultimate conclusion is in the negative, viz, against the induction or recruitment of persons of Japanese ancestry into the Armed forces of the United States, it is then only logical that those presently in should be released and transferred to the enlisted reserve corps and placed in relocation projects. Continuance of the present situation is intolerable for the reasons already stated.

The views of the Civil Affairs Division are predicated on the proposition that it is impossible to ~~determine loyalty.~~ segregate loyal from disloyal

NOTE BY CAPTAIN MOFFITT:

Should American born Japanese be recruited or inducted?

No, for the reason which you originally mentioned that there

FW 6

is no test for loyalty.

No, for the reason I believe the President was right in setting up under the Presidential Order for the W.R.A. even though it is stretching the intent a little further, but my feeling is that that work corps which was set up, although it has been kicked around and been allowed to lose some of the importance with which it could be handled, is the method by which the Japanese male citizen should be used in connection with the war effort, then direct that work corps for the establishment of roads, etc., but not right up in the combat zone.

###

Effect of present restrictions.

The present system of treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States is to preclude any possibility of future serviceable citizenship without some intelligent action looking to a change to provide an opportunity to demonstrate fundamentation of loyalty.

By keeping them in relocation projects for the duration without giving them a chance to die for their country in combat, and at the same time maintaining them on the fat of the land is absolutely destructive of any possibility of patriotic morale. The proposition of segregating them into the interior of the United States without an opportunity to prove themselves under combat conditions is also demoralizing. Moreover the fact that there are some of the same kind of people in units that are in relocation camps with no further chance for induction will inevitably result in the proposition that we must get rid of those who are already in because of their close affinity with those in relocation projects because of the deteriorating

FW6

effect of that on those in the service through channels of relationship.

1. The military potential is as shown on the attached list from the Statistical Division, Tab A.

As to the proposition of separating Kibei from Nissei, see Tab B. for method.

note: This problem requires very delicate approach. First it requires you search the ships records of all ports of entry in the United States.

So far as it relates to the aspect of the number of americn Born of Coop age

AHB.

July 20, 1942

SUBJECT: Induction of Persons of Japanese Ancestry into United States Army

TO: Colonel Bendetsen

1. Responsive to your request for recommendations apropos the question whether persons of Japanese ancestry should be inducted into the United States Army and, if so, the conditions thereof, I submit the proposals contained in the following paragraphs.

2. In the consideration of this question, the following premises are postulated:

a. The mass evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coastal area was necessary because it was impossible in the short time available and because of the military situation extant in the Pacific area to segregate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

b. It is not possible even at this time to make a completely valid qualitative segregation of the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

c. It is possible and the time is now to make an empirical quantitative segregation of the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

d. The empirical quantitative segregation would contemplate a division between the Kibeis and Isseis as being potentially disloyal and the Niseis as being presumptively loyal.

e. The presumptively loyal Niseis should be accorded all the rights of citizenship as quickly as possible, inclusive of the right, as well as the corresponding obligation, to serve in the armed forces.

3. Once the segregation has been made, the question whether they should be inducted into units of troops exclusively Japanese or whether they should be absorbed on a population basis through the ordinary draft channels is one, to my mind, of relatively small importance. I would favor the latter procedure because it would be less discriminatory and would conduce more to the Americanization or re-Americanization of the affected Japanese. To place them in segregated units on the theory that they could be better watched, etc. begs the whole question. If they are presumptively loyal it is because they have always been loyal (i.e. have not demonstrated any disloyalty) and they should, therefore, not be obliged to affirmatively demonstrate their loyalty any more than should this be required of German and Italian enemy aliens or naturalized citizens in the ranks. On the other hand, I would interpose no serious objections if, as a matter of expediency (public relations) they were organized into units for service in the combat engineers, pioneer troops, etc.

William A. Bockel
Lt. Col., F. A.
Asst. A. C. of S.

July 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army

SUBJECT: Military utilization of United States Citizens of Japanese ancestry.

1. In compliance with request (TAB A) dated July 14, 1942, in which it was desired that consideration be given the military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry.

2. In the consideration of this question, these premises are postulated:

a The mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coast [redacted] was necessary because of the military situation existant in the Pacific area and because it was impossible, in the short time available, to separate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

b It is not possible, at the present time, to make a wholly accurate separation between the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

c It is possible, at the present time, to make an empirical segregation between the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

d It is accepted that a very high percentage of KIBEI (Persons of Japanese ancestry, born in the United States, educated in Japan, but returned to the United States.) are disloyal. It is believed that a very high percentage of NISEI (Persons of Japanese ancestry born and educated in the United States.) are loyal.

e Presumptively, the KIBEIS are disloyal, therefore, they should not be inducted nor recruited, but should be treated as internees, until proving themselves loyal.

f Presumptively, the NISEIS are loyal, therefore, as soon as possible they should be accorded all the

6

privileges of citizenship, including the privilege of serving in the armed forces, until proving themselves disloyal.

3. Once the segregation has been made, four questions arise:

(a) The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry; (b) the possible methods of utilization; (c) the utilization of combat troops in active theaters; (d) the advantages and disadvantages of (b) and (c).

a "The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry." It is estimated (TAB B) that in continental United States there are 23,000 Japanese males, native born, between the ages of 18 and 45 years, inclusive. In 1944 it is estimated that there will be a total of 26,500 male American-born Japanese between the ages of 18 and 45 years, inclusive. Of this number, it is believed there are between 8,000 and 9,000 KIBEIS. They can be readily identified by examining United States Government reports, such as immigration reports. This would leave, out of an estimated total of 23,000, in 1942, a potential of 14,000 to 15,000.

b "The possible methods of utilization." (1) They could be used to make up a work corps in the construction of roads, buildings, etc., at home as well as abroad; but not in combat zones. (2) Those skilled in the use of the Japanese language could be used as translators, instructors, or interpreters in specially designed language schools. Also, they could be used in the same capacities with troops. (3) They could be used as combat labor battalions.

c "Utilization as combat troops in active theaters." If used as combat troops, presumptively, they would render more effective service in the European theaters because of the traditional animosity of the Japanese people for the German people. Initially when used as combat troops, they should be used as combat engineers or pioneer troops.

d "The advantages and disadvantages of (b) and (c)." The advantages are in the items enumerated. The disadvantage is in the probability that more initial surveillance would be necessary.

"Should American male citizens of Japanese ancestry be recruited or inducted into the military service?"

Yes, subject to qualifications.

a Separate Kibei from Nisei.

b Induction of all Nisei, until, as individuals, they prove themselves disloyal.

c Segregation of all Kibei until, as individuals, they prove themselves loyal. Then, and not until then, recruit or induct them into the military service.

d Those skilled in the use of the Japanese language to be used as translators, instructors and interpreters in special language schools, or in those same capacities with troops.

e Serve as labor battalions, particularly as combat labor under fire.

f Not to be employed in any theater where there is a reasonable possibility that they would have contact with Japanese troops.

g To be employed in the European theater where, presumptively, they would render more effective service because of the traditional animosity between the German and Japanese people.

h Proving themselves in combat labor, to be then used as combat engineers or pioneer troops.

i Initially, they should not be permitted to enter officers' training schools.

j Initially, they should not be permitted to rise higher than the rank of captain.

"What should be the size of the unit?"

Size of unit should be appropriate to the need.

a Initially, this need should find expression in units not larger than a battalion.

b ~~Initially, such battalions should not be combined into a division.~~

c Initially, such battalions should be scattered.

d By scattering such battalions initially, it would permit competition between different Japanese units themselves, as well as between Japanese battalions and Causcasian battalions.

"There are now Americans of Japanese ancestry scattered throughout the military service. Should this personnel be concentrated into the service units?"

Yes, and for these considerations:

a Loyal Japanese recognize that the evacuation was necessary.

b They recognize that because of the short time available it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal.

c They recognize that the evacuation did stigmatize them, as loyal citizens.

d Family ties are strong among the Japanese.

e There is racial pride.

f Fighting, as a group would increase the morale of their families, at home.

g Fighting as a group would increase their morale, as soldiers.

h Fighting as a group would place in American history a compensating offset to evacuation as a group.

Effect of present restrictions.

The present treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States is to preclude almost every possibility of future serviceable citizenship. Some intelligent action looking to a change must be made to provide an opportunity for these persons to demonstrate their loyalty and their right to live as free people in this country after the war. This must be done or they must all be returned to Japan after the war. If this is done then as many as are sent become added to our enemies abroad.

By keeping them in Relocation Centers for the duration without giving them the opportunity to serve their country in time of great need is destructive of any possibility of generating patriotism. The proposition of segregating them into the interior of the United States without giving them the opportunity to prove themselves under combat conditions is also demoralizing.

Moreover, the fact that there are some of the same kind of people in units that are in Relocation Centers with no further chance for induction inevitably will result in the proposition that we must be rid of those who are already serving. Their close relationship in relocation projects will inevitably result in a deterioration of their morale.

However, there is a disadvantage to inducting, or recruiting, these Japanese of proved loyalty in that they will require a higher type of officer to command them, and to lead them.. Certainly surveillance will be necessary initially. More intensive training will be needed and more training along psychological lines probably will be necessary.

Students of the Japanese people all agree that as a people they are very dependant upon leaders. As individuals they lack some of the initiative found in other Americans, but as soldiers the probabilities that as a group they are better educated than other American soldiers, just as a group they probably have a higher intelligence than the average. It follows, therefore, they will make for superior soldiers under proper leadership.

Using them as units would do much to offset the propaganda of the present Japanese government to the effect that this is a race war. That racial lines are being drawn in the United States, as witness the segregation in Relocation as well as in Assembly Centers, of Japanese who are loyal Americans, and whom the Japanese Government recognizes as such. But whom the American Government does not recognize as being good enough to fight alongside Causasian troops.

If the ultimate conclusion is in the negative, viz, against the induction or recruitment of persons of Japanese ancestry into the Armed forces of the United States, it is only logical that those presently in should be released and transferred to the enlisted reserve corps and placed in Relocation Centers. Continuance of the present situation of having some Japanese in the Armed Forces, and many under guard of the Armed Forces is not defensible.

Tab B

Estimated native born Japanese male population 18 to 45 years of age, inclusive for the continental United States, the Western Defense Command Area, and Hawaii, 1940, 1942, and 1944.

Nativity	1940			1942			1944		
	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii
Native born Japanese males	19,000	17,500	25,000	23,000	21,200	29,000	26,500	24,400	28,500
Nisei	13,300	12,250	17,500	16,100	14,840	20,300	18,550	17,080	19,950
Kibei	5,700	5,250	7,500	6,900	6,360	8,700	~~7,950~~ 7,900	~~7,320~~ 7,300	~~8,550~~ 8,700

Estimates of the number of native born Japanese males 18 to 45 years of age, inclusive, are based upon the 1940 Census enumeration and are computed as of approximately July 1st of each year designated. Estimates of the number of Kibei and Nisei are based upon Los Angeles Port of Entry figures to 1942. The estimated percentage of Kibei among continental native born Japanese males has been arbitrarily applied to the Hawaiian native born Japanese males. It is likely that the percentage of Kibei Hawaiian Japanese exceeds the percentage among continental Japanese, but there are no available statistics upon which to base a reliable estimate. In addition, it should be noted that the Hawaiian Nisei are less well assimilated than the continental Nisei and the term, therefore, does not have the same meaning when applied to Hawaiian Japanese.

July 23, 1942

KRB/iaw
CAD

MEMORANDUM for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subject: Formulation of proposed draft of reply for signature of the Commanding General

1. You have advised that the Commanding General has constituted the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3 and Civil Affairs Division, as a Board to propose a draft of reply to a letter dated July 14, 1942, from Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, G. S. C., president of the War Department Board convened to consider the military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Colonel Koenig has asked for the Commanding General's opinion on several aspects of the problem confronting the War Department Board.

2. Herewith a proposed draft of reply for the signature of the General for consideration of the Board. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that in paragraph 2 d, it is not concluded whether the military utilization of Nisei is or is not practicable. It is merely assumed. This in turn must be considered in the light of the available reservoir. The size of this reservoir is as shown in Tab B attached to the proposed draft.

3. Copies have been furnished the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Inclosures - 3
1 - proposed letter
2 - Tab A
3 - Tab B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ____ date 8/14/75

~~Restricted Classification~~
~~Removed Per~~
~~Executive Order 10501~~

July 23, 1942 KRB/law
CAD

Subject: Military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry.

To: Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, C. S. C.
War Department General Staff
War Department

1. By letter dated July 14, 1942 (Tab A), you have requested my views in connection with the formulation by the War Department of a policy governing the military utilization of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry.

2. The views set forth in the subsequent paragraphs of this letter are predicated upon the following premises:

a While it is accepted that some American-born Japanese are loyal, it is impossible quickly to separate the loyal from the disloyal.

b It is accepted that a very high percentage of Kibei (persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States, educated in Japan but returned to the United States) are disloyal.

c It is unknown what percentage of Nisei are disloyal. It must be presumed that their potential for disloyalty is low in comparison with other classes of Japanese. (By Nisei is meant American-born persons of Japanese ancestry, including those persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States who have been to Japan but who have not been educated in Japan and whose presence in Japan has served to accentuate their preference for the American way of life.)

d The military utilization of Nisei is practicable.

e Presumptively, American-born Japanese have dual citizenship. Disloyal American-born Japanese should be regarded as having forfeited United States citizenship. Kibei should be so regarded as having

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ____ date 4/13/79

made an election. Accordingly, they should be interned for the duration and they should not be inducted or recruited into the armed forces. Where practicable, their labor should be otherwise utilized in the war effort. This could include their employment as language school teachers, where qualified, but not as translators of important documents or as interpreters for combat intelligence.

f The segregation of Kibei and Nisei is possible and practicable. A method of so doing is by compiling the data from the ships' manifest records in the possession of the U. S. Immigration Service at all United States ports of debarkation. (This has already been done at San Pedro and San Diego and the information is available.)

g Kibei should be inclusive of those American-born persons of Japanese ancestry who returned to and were educated in Japan for a period of more than one year between the ages of 12 and 20.

3. In paragraph 1 of your letter you have presented four general considerations. I will comment on these in the order mentioned in your letter.

a <u>Military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry.</u>

The military potential of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry is to be regarded from two aspects:

(1) The numbers between the ages of 18 and 45 years as of 1940, estimated for 1942 and projected to 1944;

(2) The military uses for which they may be employed.

The latter is covered subsequently in this paragraph. From the viewpoint of numbers, a tabulation projected to 1944 and separated as to Kibei and Nisei on the basis of available information is attached(Tab B). It is to be noted that Tab B, includes projected statistics for Hawaii.

b <u>The possible methods of military utilization.</u>

For re-emphasis, the point is made that Kibei are

not included in this division, except as set forth incidentally in paragraph 2 a above.

The recruitment and induction of Nisei may conceivably be undertaken for any one, or a combination of any, of the following purposes:

(1) For limited service and limited place of employment (the present policy).

(2) Without restriction as to service or place of employment.

(3) Into all-Japanese-units with unlimited service (combat or services-of-supply branches) and unlimited place of employment.

(4) For combat labor service with unlimited place of employment.

(5) For combat labor service with limited place of employment.

(6) For non-combat service with unlimited place of employment.

(7) For non-combat service with limited place of employment.

(8) Maintenance of the present complement for limited service in the interior of continental United States without further recruitment or induction.

c The utilization as combat troops in active theaters.

There are four possible utilizations of Nisei as combat troops in active theaters. These uses divide themselves generally into two classifications, viz., (a) theaters where contact with enemy Japanese troops is improbable; and (b) where contact with enemy Japanese troops is probable. In each case, utilization may be subdivided into the following:

(1) Unlimited
(2) Limited

6

In my judgment, it is logical to subject them to service under combat conditions. If practicable, they should not be rendered immune or shielded from exposure to the risks of combat. However, their use should be limited to those theaters where contact with enemy Japanese troops is improbable. In view of the proposition stated in 2 b above, viz., that rapid segregation of loyal from disloyal is impossible, unlimited combat usage is unsound. Similarly, their induction for service in mixed units is not considered sound. This is so, notwithstanding the argument that the composition of an all-Japanese unit may play into the hands of enemy design, or place within reach the opportunity for fifth column action in concert.

Of the forementioned possibilities, limited combat service in theaters with low probability of contact with enemy Japanese troops is recommended. Types of limited service in such theaters favorably considered are: as combat engineers; as combat quartermasters; or to perform general service in labor battalions in the combat zones of such active theaters for the construction of such combat works as roads, railroads, airfields, communications, revetments, trench systems, underground storage, depot works, etc. In all events, surveillance, suited to the circumstances, should be constant.

c The advantages and disadvantages of b and c above.

As paragraph b above embodies a discussion of possible methods of utilization, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of mere "possibilities" is obviously not apropos. Accordingly, these comments will be limited to the consideration of advantages and disadvantages of paragraph 2 c above. The present conflict has been characterized as "total War." Hence, the maximum use of available manpower is mandatory. Viewed against the back-drop of this mandate, military employment of the Nisei reservoir is a manifest advantage. Conversely, its rejection for military usage is disadvantageous. However, a disadvantage consequent upon its use, rather than upon its disuse, may result from the opportunity thus accorded for disloyal action. In turn, the degree of opportunity for hostile action is governed by the character of military employment. Under conditions of

b

total war, the opportunity for effective disloyal action by employment for military purposes may be as great in the zone of the interior as it is commonly considered to be in a theater of operations. Therefore this consideration, fundamentally speaking, is resolved into the question of whether to employ Nisei in any military capacity. Perforce, if militarily employed at all, that employment should be to the best advantage. This has not been attained under present policies. Certainly to the same extent that prisoners of war can be employed in any theater under supervision, or that the domestic population of hostile occupied territory can be employed to maintain local economy and industry, Nisei can be engaged in the armed forces under military control. It is only thus that they may demonstrate their protestations of loyalty.

4. Specifically, you have asked for my opinion on three questions set forth in paragraph 2 of your letter. My views follow:

a Responsive to the first question, you are advised that in my judgment this should be answered in the affirmative, subject to the limitations set forth above. Stated otherwise, Nisei, as herein defined, should be recruited or inducted into the armed forces for service (1) in a theater where contact with enemy Japanese is improbable; and (2) in combat labor units.

b In view of the foregoing comments, the organization of a division is not recommended. For the performance of labor under combat conditions, the maximum sized unit should be a battalion to be assigned with corps or army special troops, or GHQ Reserve for employment as the situation requires. Initially at least, the armament issued should be sufficient only for defensive but not offensive action.

c You inquire further specifically as to my opinion on the question whether American-born Japanese now scattered throughout the military service should be concentrated into units. In order to give effect to the views set out above, such action would be essential. Moreover, if their service is to be utilized at all, consideration should be given to the resentment that some non-Japanese soldiers may harbor against serving in the same unit with Japanese. Such resentment will find repercussions in lowered morale among both Japanese and non-Japanese.

3. You have further requested that I make any other pertinent general comments, specifically on the effect of present restrictions on future citizenship.

a If it is concluded that military utilization of Nisei is not practicable, then it is my considered judgment that those persons of Japanese ancestry now in the military service should be released from active duty and transferred to the reserve corps. There are close relationships between Japanese in evacuee centers and those in the service. The recommendation is made that they be transferred to the enlisted reserve in order to maintain military control, should it ultimately become desirable. If this were done, it is believed only sound that the soldiers thus released join their families in relocation centers and be accorded some opportunity to contribute to the war effort in such centers, through organized effort under government supervision.

b Effect on future citizenship.

If no further Nisei are accorded an opportunity to serve in the armed forces, though they may be of troop age and otherwise physically qualified, it is highly probable that a stigma will thus attach which can never be overcome and that the possibility of future useful citizenship will be virtually concluded. If this condition arises and the United States then has within its borders a group of persons whose loyalties have been thus alienated, the solution of the problem must rest with the Congress, because of the social-political aspects of the problem.

John L. DeWitt
Lieutenant-General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Inclosures - 2
1 - Tab A
2 - Tab B

6

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8-1-42 11.45

Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Flaherty

K. Russell 8-1-42

F Say I looked up that endorsement, the first endorsement on the 25th and it is confidential and I think under the regulations we can't make a copy of it Colonel but maybe I can tell you enough about it here, or if you want to send someone out and get the file.

B Suppose you give me just a rough idea.

F All right, paragraph 2, you are familiar with the original letter - - - - utilize the male citizens and so forth, to make use of all available manpower; the big picture only, service elements, unarmed services and so forth

B Who is that the Niesi or the Issei

F The Neissi.

B You won't find interpreters among the Niesi unless you include Kebi. O.K. go ahead.

F No paragrpah 2, that under no circumstances would the organization - - - - - - - - - and recommends no Niesi larger than a battalion then on paragraph 2, the answer was yes. Now we have to - - - - - on that. On paragraph 3, do not consider that any consideration be given the second cousins of those in military service - - - - - -

B I see, now if I send someone out you will let them have it so I can read it.

F Well you will have to get it from the A.G. Colonel

B All right fine, thank you very much

[redacted]

November 6, 1942

INCOMING

Paraphrase of confidential wire received from Military Intelligence Section, War Department, G-2.

AC OF S, G-2
WDC-4A

REQUIRE ALL USEFUL DATA AVAILABLE TO ESTIMATE NUMBER PROBABLY PRODUCED BY VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT AND COMBINATION RESUMPTION CONSCRIPTION IN CONNECTION PROJECT TO RECRUIT COMBAT ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN THEATRE SERVICE MADE UP OF NISEI. ASST SEC'Y WAR INTERESTED PERSONALLY IN RECRUITING LARGEST POSSIBLE UNIT OF SAME. I NOW HAVE FIGURES ON POPULATION AND PRESENTLY AM CHECKING SELECTIVE SERVICE. DESIRE (A) PROPORTION ACCEPTED OF THOSE EXAMINED (FIGURES FROM REPRESENTATIVE BOARD), (B) MOST RECENT LOCATION LIST IN COL. BENDETSEN'S POSSESSION OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS GIVING BREAKDOWN OF MALE CITIZENS BY AGES, (C) HOW MANY RESERVES FURLOUGHED BY WDC BEFORE EVACUATION, (D) ESTIMATES (BENDETSEN'S AND YOURS) ON VOLUNTEERS BETWEEN AGES 18 AND 35 WHO UNDER CONDITIONS GIVEN WOULD VOLUNTEER, (E) AVAILABLE FIGURES ON VOLUNTEERS. UNTIL ADDITIONAL NOTICE PROJECT TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. EXPEDITE. TELEPHONE PETTIGREW IF ANY PROBLEMS.

STRONG

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG FOR 91083

[redacted]

11

CONFIDENTIAL

Records #34-35
Conversation between Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Pettigrew
11-6-42 Time 2.20 p.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECT: Jap Recruitment for 442 Jap Division

B Came in this morning Mac; I have it before me right now.

P Good - I'll tell you what I'm driving at, I want to arrive at just as complete or an actual forcast as possible of the number of _____ first of all and then of course on top of that the number that was voluntary. I know the last is going to be difficult, but I would like to take as much guess work as I can out of the first part.

B I think you know, I mean I know, exactly what you want Mac; I have already started working on it about two weeks ago. I think I have the same idea as you have on the whole affair.

P I would like to figure of course the _____ on the Selective service figures out there; here they are not broken down well, what I mean is that they can tell me what proportion of these _____ ask for but they can't tell me how many _____ been investigated. In other words they don't know or can't tell me how many were put in class three or dependency on occupation but I don't think there were very damn many of them. I can't get those figures here I don't think.

B No they wouldn't have them anyplace else but here.

P I hope you will be able to dig up enough to enable us to make the forcast.

B I think we can I had the same thought you have Mac I have felt all allong that there ought to be a combat organization developed and it ought to be used in European theatres.

P Of course there should, and it ought to be a dam good one. I've been trying to tell these people that for at least two years. Well Mr. McCloy is personally interested in the idea now.

B Yes I know he is, I talked to him the other day about it on the telephone and he said he was very interested in it.

P Very, very much indeed, and he asked me to, a couple of days ago to get out and get him all the facts. He's making plans to put the thing in operation.

B Now I have started to gather those figures; now I can't get them to you in matter of few hours or a few dyas, it will probably be four or five days or a week before it is com leted.

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P It will huh!?

B Yes, it will because it simply can't be developed that fast. We have been working on it for about two weeks already; I started it before Dedrich got back here and when he came back I told him to get busy on it.

P Fine, tell him to put on all possible speed and hurry. Can you give me an approximation?

B I don't think it is going to be as big as I thought it would be. I think there are fewere; I am, here is the way I am setting it up and I think you can use it the same way.

I have asked first to develop t ose between 17 and 18 who will pass the 18 year old mark in the next 12 months; then I have asked for those between 18 and 36 at the present time and so forth.

P There is a pretty good population figure that has been broken down prett well. I can tell how, or what the total prospects were a s based on 1940 and that can be adjusted.

B Well we have the actual figures here, because we know exactly how many people by name, age and have the actual figures, it doesn't need to be adjusted; we know the place, how many and the age, because we have handled everyone of them as an indivudual.

P Here is the biggest thing I'mm facing out here; I can't tell _____ I know say how many there are between say 18 and 35 I think it shows about 17,500 or something like that but I don't know how many are going to be married between then. You can of course from your figures.

B Yes, are you interested in married men?

P Well I tell you initially right now, the 18 - 19 year olds will be frafted but for a little while they will go back and work on nothing but single men. In other words, our initial take will have to be for single men and later on then of course those that are married but without children.

B Yes,

P But what I'd like to know now is how many out of this potential number are single.

B Yes, now also you asked for Colonel Weckerlin's opinion on how many he thinks would volunteer. Then you ask for the opinion of one Bendetsen, for his opinion. Now Colonel Weckerling is not here and will be back in about four days. I am going to leave tomorrow for about five days a d by the time we both get back I think the figures will be developed and at that time unless you think there is a need for mee to get ahold of Weckerling by phone we will send it in all at

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P That will be fine; _____ first of all we will have to figure on single men later on I think we we will have to dig into the married men without children.

B You are viewing it not only from the standpoint of conscription but also from a voluntary basis, both ways.

P Oh yes _____ put the conscription back, but of course too I think a dawn good recruiting campaign will get a lot of them to volunteer.

As a matter of fact, the way conscription is going to work before very long any single man is going to be a prime prospect anyhow. However from a morale standpoint the more people we can get to enlist the better.

B Yes, I would think so, well I will have them put all speed on this, and I note from your message that you want to have it prepared by Center.

P Well I tell you I thought you had some left; they are all gone now aren't they.

B That's right.

P Well I tell you if you are going to be able to get their marital status o.k. then I don't have to bother about centers , they would haveto make a special tabulation.

B Well it would not be up to date anyhow.

P O.K. then I can count on you for all that?

B Yes we have a full statistic plant here and have a complete file on everyone of them; the only one that I know that is in existence.

P The marital status is going to be very important _____. Now I think with those we are working with the single percentage will run much higher don't you?

B I am not so sure that it will, I thought it would for a time but according to the advanced dope that my statitician gives me it is going to be about the same pattern. What do you have in mind; the possibility of a division?

P Yes.

B A square division?

P No a triangular division it only takes about 14500 men you know but you have to figure on replacements too, but we are well of these because _____ have about 2,000 I think that are coming of age every year.

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B Yes, that's right.

P _____ In other words _____ the national figure _____ a tentative amount of a couple of thousand. That right?

I haven't got a breakdown but _____ have a total figure of about 4400 and I have a figure of those aged 20 at about a thousand; now these are all _____ figures and in 21-35 I have a figure of about 11,000. But the married are going to be _____

B Yes primarily; well what, do you have in mind, an infantry division?

P yes a crack infanctry division.

B I think then that unless you want to married men you wouldn't be able to get it.

P _____

_____ APPROXIMately 5000 more.

B Well you also asked to the number furloughed to the reserve by WDC well that of course wouldn't by itself make a great deal of difference except to show that they still have a military status, because those people were evacuated with the others and their names are right in the list with those we are using now, so it wouldn't mean a great deal they are in the enlisted reserve and as such under the present laws you could whip them up but you can also conscript them too, so actually on the basis of the figures anybody who is not still in active service and who resided out here at the time of evacuation will be caught in our statistics and will be caught in the aggregate.

P That's ture, it isn't so important then.

B All right, then if we might be obscure, we might pass that one in view of the fact thaat you can getthem anyway, and then of course, we also have, I established at the start of this program when the military authorities thought that there ought to be some kind of voluntary movement, to which I was opposed to from the start, until March 29th the voluntary movements were allowed, but I established at that time a locator system and about 10,000 people moved on a voluntary basis prior to March 29th, when they were frozen and we also have that dope, because we forded them to report changes of address so we have a locator file on them, so I'll compute that separately and you will get it all or an idea of where they are; they are not under federal control now but at least they are, you would have to count that group.

P You have them registered then?

B Yes we registered them right thru in assembly centers. We had the same registration they had on the outside.

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P Well you see what I'm driving at then?

B Yes I do. Well if they are going to make you Division Commander Moe I'd like to put in my aaplication for assistant division commander.

P Well _____ get up here; first I hafve to get the men to command.

B Well thats right but I don't think you will have to take the married men to do it.

P I think we are going to get volunteers

B Well I don't think on the question of this population group and in view of the problem it has presented to the country and to themselves from the social viewpoint that you need look at it the same way that you do other population groups and if they are married the wives and children are under federal control now, they are in centers and it doesn't make a dam bit of difference whther the husbands are there or not.

P Well the same thing from _____

B That's right. I think so too.

P _____

_____

I imagine if it wasput up to them right they would see the

B That's right. That is true of course.

P _____

_____

B Well based on the normal casualty and the normal replacement you wouldn't have to worry, because unless they got into some particular fight where they were cut to ribbons you'd have enough replacements every year.

P Well that is what I have to prove.

B Well I have been much interested in it every since I got into this deal. you'll get it Moe but it will be the middle of next week.

P O.K.

B O.K. Moe you can get me on the Army full period 312; the phone is on my desk.

P Fine.

B I've also got my own teletype so you can get me anytime Moe.

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November 17, 1942

SUBJECT: Potential Military Service of Nisei Japanese

TO: John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War

Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen
Assistant Chief of Staff, CAD/WDC

1. This memorandum is in response to your request that I assemble data bearing on the enlistment of our native Japanese population in Army service. In addition, there is presented an analysis of certain problems related thereto, and several policy recommendations.

2. How many Nisei are there?

a. The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947; today it is approximately 126,000. The following table summarizes the nativity and sex composition of the present Japanese population of continental United States:

	Total	Male	Female
Total Japanese population	126,000	71,000	55,000
Native-born Japanese	81,200	43,100	38,100
Foreign-born Japanese	44,800	27,900	16,900

Of this population approximately 110,500 have been evacuated from west-coast military areas and are now under the supervision of the WRA.

b. The Nisei or native-born Japanese now constitute 65 percent of the total, 43,100 males and 38,100 females. These are nearly all less than 35 years of age; a large proportion are children. Figure 1 shows the unusual age distribution of the foreign-born and the native-born Japanese. It should be noted that there is a missing generation of males between 25 and 50 years of age, and of females between 25 and 40. This was caused by the reduction of immigration in 1924.

See subsequent page by WRB.

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DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
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c. The following table presents a summary estimate of the native-born Japanese population 18 to 35 years of age for the United States as of April, 1942. (The estimate may be low to the extent that the decennial census of population undercounted the Japanese population.)

	Total U. S.	Evacuated Japanese	Other Japanese
Total, 18 to 35 years	21,250	18,727	2,523
18 and 19 years	4,070	3,745	325
20 to 24 years	8,940	7,649	1,291
25 to 29 years	5,430	4,774	656
30 to 34 years	2,450	2,231	219
35 years	360	328	32

There are approximately 22,330 native born Japanese males 18 to 44 years of age; 21,250 in the 18 to 35 group; and 18,440 in ages 18 to 29. In addition, there are 1,780 youths of 17 who will pass their 18th birthday by April 1, 1943.

d. A more detailed picture of the age distribution of the male native-born group is provided by Figure 2. These data are for the evacuated population only and are presented in detail in Table 1 (Tab A.) Less than the normally expected number of males are in the ages 22 to 25 years. This is probably the result of (1) selective service, (2) voluntary migration from the west-coast prior to evacuation and (3) some migration of Kibei from the United States to Japan.

e. The Relocation Center destination of 18,727 native-born, male Japanese evacuees 18 to 35 years of age is shown in Table 2 (Tab A.)

3. How many Nisei would be available for military service?

a. An accurate answer to this question will require considerable research. Chief among the questions which must be answered are:

(1) How many of the native-born Japanese feel some degree of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan because of education, Japanese military training, Shinto worship, membership in alien organizations, etc.

(2) How many are physically unfit for active military service?

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(3) How many have wives and other dependents?

b. There are no statistical data on loyalty to the United States, or loyalty to Japan. The writer believes that under present circumstances at least one-third of the native-born group would be of doubtful loyalty to the United States. In this one-third would be found the Kibei (educated in Japan), the children of persons detained in Army and INS camps, and those who are embittered by the evacuation. This group is increasing because of the pro-Japanese pressures in Centers.

c. The only data immediately available as to the physical fitness of Japanese, is that compiled from records of the San Francisco Recruiting and Induction Station for the calendar year 1941. Of the 463 Japanese selectees, Class 1-A, who reported for examination, 42, or 9.1 percent, were rejected. During the same period at this station 8.6 percent of the white selectees were rejected. (See Table 5, Tab B.)

d. Twenty-one percent of the native-born Japanese who registered for evacuation were registered with a wife. Most of the group are too young to be married. (See Figure 2.) Those who were evacuated with their wives, and those without wives but with a parent 65 years old or over, are shown separately in the tables in Tab A. Probably more men were married than are shown "with wife" because some men were evacuated later than their families and some families listed daughter-in-laws as daughters.

e. Preliminary estimates. Assuming: (1) That only native-born males from 18 to 35 years of age are desired; (2) that only one-third of these are ineligible because of pro-Japanese sentiment; (3) that one-fifth have wives or other immediate dependents; and (4) that one-tenth of the remainder are unable to pass the Army physical test for combat duty:

Native-born males 18 to 35	21,250
Pro-Japanese	- 7,083
	14,167
Wives and other dependents	2,833
	11,334
Physically unsuited	1,133
Potential recruits	10,201

The writer believes this to be a high rather than an average or low estimate of potential recruits. Of the 10,200 potential

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recruits, 9,200 should be found in Centers for evacuees.

4. Recruitment policy.

a. Any Japanese is now automatically in class 4-C in Selective Service. An order dated March 30, 1942, stopped all induction of Japanese in this area.

b. A resumption of Selective Service induction of Japanese would create numerous problems, because nine of every ten men lived in evacuated areas.

(1) Registrants were at their normal homes for the first three registrations. Many Japanese were in Assembly Centers during the fourth registration last April.

(2) A draftee could not visit his board in evacuated area without a permit and escort.

(3) Substantial numbers of single Japanese men would be called immediately by boards in this area, because these boards have exhausted registers of single men. This would raise an issue of board favoritism, create resentment among many who might be willing to volunteer.

If compulsion must be used—and this writer is opposed to it—then it would be advisable to amend Selective Service regulations to the extent of providing for re-registration (or deposit of original registrations) in special boards at Centers, or in near-by communities.

c. An intensive drive to get volunteers would probably produce the desired results over a period of time. Such an effort would require the direction of an army officer who is thoroughly familiar with the evacuation program, life in Assembly and Relocation Centers, and the psychology of the evacuees. Evidence has reached this office that certain Nisei would welcome an opportunity to volunteer for European service. A petition to the President of the United States requesting permission to volunteer as a unit for European operations was circulated at Manzanar and had 218 names at one time. It is not known whether this petition was forwarded to the White House. The absence of business enterprises requiring personal attention, the assurance that members of the family will be taken care of by a Federal agency, the increased compensation paid to enlisted men, plus the benefits of the Service Men's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, the desire of young men to escape from the domination and economic control of their parents,—these are but a few of the factors which would be

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expected to further successful voluntary enlistment. The principle factor which would work against such a program would be activities of the Kibei, parolees, repatriates, and other pro-Japanese groups in bringing pressure on potential recruits and their families. Such pressure was exercised on the signers of the above-mentioned petition at Manzanar.

d. A successful campaign to secure volunteers must begin with an effort to change the attitudes of the present community toward military service. To do this the following steps are necessary:

(1) The segregation of at least the anti-American elements must be a first step for any volunteer recruiting. Not only must the Nisei be relieved from the jibes and threats of the Kibei and pro-Japanese Issei, but the prospective volunteers must be given the assurance that these groups will not run the Centers and dominate their wives, children, and parents during their absence.

(2) A definite program must be undertaken to stimulate patriotism in Centers by such steps as: Furloughs in the Centers for sons now in the army; encouragement for display of service flags; special functions for parents of men in service; exhibits and contests in schools, art classes, etc.

(3) That there will be a post-war advantage from military service not only for the individual Nisei, but also for the American Japanese as a group, must become a credo in the Center. Issei who acquired citizenship as a result of service in the last war could provide considerable leadership in this.

e. The recruiting of Japanese should be an Army function. There are relatively few Japanese now in the Navy or the Marine Corps according to our best information. On the other hand, there are organized Army units consisting entirely or largely of Japanese in the Army. A letter has been sent to the Adjutant General requesting information as to the number of Japanese in the service and their branch of service.

5. Relocation Center problems for the WRA.

a. The removal of any substantial number of young Nisei males from the Centers would seriously effect the active labor force. As indicated in Chart 1, the labor force 15 years of age and over consists of two distinct groups: (1) The old

Issei, most of whom are between 50 and 65 years of age, and (2) the young Nisei who are between 15 and 35 years of age. Much of the labor force now available for employment outside of Centers is recruited from the young Nisei.

b. The sex-age ratio of the Center would be seriously upset, as is that of any community when large numbers of young men are removed. The very old, the very young and the women require a different Center program of employment, health, recreation, etc., from that adapted to a normal population.

c. Mention has been made above of the probable domination of the community by pro-Japanese Issei and Kibei after removal of the Nisei if a satisfactory segregation program is not instituted.

Issei, most of whom are between 50 and 65 years of age, and (2) the young Nisei who are between 15 and 35 years of age. Much of the labor force now available for employment outside of Centers is recruited from the young Nisei.

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c. Mention has been made above of the probable domination of the community by pro-Japanese Issei and Kibei after removal of the Nisei if a satisfactory segregation program is not instituted.

6. Recommendations.

a. That a special unit consisting of Nisei soldiers under Caucasian command be created for European service.

b. That voluntary enlistment, rather than selective service or other draft, be used to secure the personnel for this unit.

c. That immediate steps be taken to segregate from the Center community those Kibei and other pro-Japanese individuals who might block or seriously hamper the success of this program.

d. That a small staff of officers familiar with life in Assembly and Relocation Centers, Japanese psychology, and Army recruitment procedures be appointed by the War Department to formulate policy and supervise this program. The operations should be performed by the regular staff units.

Calvert L. Dedrick
Chief Economist

Note:

By direction of the General, paragraph 6 was removed, as containing recommendations not within the province of this headquarters.

KRB

Originals
Taken out by Col. Bendetsen 11/21/42
1 pencil + disposted

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 21, 1942

KRB/lew
CAD

MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army (THROUGH: Chief of Staff)

Subject: Potential number of American-born Japanese available for military service.

1. There is enclosed herewith a memorandum reflecting certain statistical data and opinion based on observations of the evacuation program and the effect upon evacuees of assembly center and relocation center residence, prepared in connection with the above subject. There are also enclosed letters of transmittal, for the signature of the Commanding General, submitting copies of the subject memorandum to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Assistant Secretary of War.

2. The memorandum was prepared in response to an informal request of the Assistant Secretary of War, which recently reached this Headquarters. At about the same time as that request was communicated, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, called upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, for the assembly of certain similar data and for the expression of certain opinions in connection with the availability of Nisei Japanese for military service.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Inclosures - 3
1 - statistical report
2 - ltr to C/S with inc. for sig.
3 - ltr to AS/W with inc. for sig.

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Figure I

AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION
JAPANESE POPULATION
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940



SOURCE U S BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
STATISTICAL DIVISION

Figure 2

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE EVACUATED TO RELOCATION CENTERS BY AGE AND MARITAL STATUS: 1942



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copy to [illegible] G-2
C/S US Army
Asst.Sec.War

Incl #1

CLD
KRB/iaw
CAD

November 20, 1942

Subject: Potential number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

1. a. The Statistical Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, has been directed to assemble data reflecting the potential number of American-born Japanese who might be available for military service. This memorandum is in response to that directive.

b. In addition to statistical data, this memorandum includes the expression of certain opinions based on observation of the evacuation program and certain policy recommendations which are predicated on these opinions. In the assembly of the statistics themselves, these opinions have not influenced the compilation of the subject statistical data.

2. How many Nisei are there?

a. The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947; today it is approximately 126,000. The following table summarizes the nativity and sex composition of the present Japanese population of continental United States:

	Total	Male	Female
Total Japanese population (United States)	126,000	71,000	55,000
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Foreign-born Japanese	44,800	27,900	16,900

Of this population approximately 110,500 have been evacuated from West Coast military areas and are now under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

b. The Nisei or native-born Japanese now constitute 65 per cent of the total, 43,100 males and 38,100 females. These are nearly all less than 35 years of age; a large proportion are children. Figure 1 shows the unusual age distribution of the foreign-born and the native-born Japanese. It should be noted that there is a missing generation of males between 25 and 50 years of age, and of females between 25 and 40. This was caused by the reduction of immigration in 1924.

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13

November 20, 1942

Subject: Potential Number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service.

To: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. War Department

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, has requested the compilation of certain statistics to be developed from the records of this Headquarters, with regard to persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from military areas of the West Coast. The request was directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, by confidential teletype. The request indicated that the statistics were desired for use in connection with a study in progress as to the feasibility of organizing combat units composed of American-born Japanese for employment in theaters where no Japanese enemy troops appear. The request also called for certain expressions of opinion as to the number of American-born Japanese who might be expected to volunteer for military service and for a statement of views on the methods which might best be employed in raising such a force from among evacuees and other American-born Japanese.

2. Pursuant to that request, a memorandum has been prepared at these Headquarters and is forwarded herewith. The statements of opinion in the memorandum are chiefly those of the person who gathered the statistics and do not necessarily reflect my own views.

3. The Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of this Command, created by my general order in March of 1942, was the agency through which the evacuation program - particularly the operation of assembly centers, protection of property, etc. - was primarily accomplished. Recently the Chief of the Statistical Division of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was in Washington on official business. At that time he had an informal interview with the Assistant Secretary of War. The Assistant Secretary of War expressed a desire for the development of statistics similar to those requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By reason of that request, a copy of the enclosed memorandum is also being forwarded the Assistant Secretary of War.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Inclosure - 1
Statistical report

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ____ date 6/3/69

CONFIDENTIAL

November 21, 1942

KHB/iaw
CAD

My dear Mr. McCloy:

When the Chief of the Statistics Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration (Mr. Dedrick) was recently in Washington you expressed, during an interview with him, the desire that certain statistical data in the records of these Headquarters be assembled, reflecting the potential number of American-born Japanese who might be available for military service.

About that same time, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, requested through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, that similar statistics be assembled. It was also requested that those participating in the assembly of the data express certain opinions on the number of Nisei who might volunteer.

Accordingly, a memorandum has been developed embodying not only the statistics desired by you, but also the opinions requested by G-2, War Department. I am enclosing herewith for your information a copy of a letter, with its enclosure, forwarded this day to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. I believe the copy of the memorandum accompanying my letter to the Chief of Staff will provide the information you desire.

As I pointed out to the Chief of Staff, the expressions of opinion in the subject memorandum reflect only the views of those who participated in the preparation, and not necessarily my own.

Sincerely yours,

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Inclosures - 2
1 - copy ltr C/S 11-20-42
2 - statistical report

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ___ date 4/13/65

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE EVACUATED TO WAR RELOCATION PROJECTS: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years..	18,727	3,937	21.0	14,790	1,294	13,496
18 and 19 years..	3,745	7	-	3,738	251	3,487
18 years.....	1,802	1	-	1,701	109	1,692
19 years.....	1,943	6	-	1,937	142	1,795
Total, 20-24 years..	7,649	442	5.8	7,207	598	6,609
20 years.....	2,039	23	1.1	2,016	128	1,888
21 years.....	1,974	54	2.7	1,920	159	1,761
22 years.....	1,394	77	5.5	1,317	109	1,208
23 years.....	1,133	105	9.3	1,028	97	931
24 years.....	1,109	183	16.5	926	105	821
Total, 25-29 years..	4,774	1,834	38.4	2,940	312	2,628
25 years.....	1,070	270	25.2	800	70	730
26 years.....	1,075	330	30.7	745	79	666
27 years.....	992	404	40.7	588	60	528
28 years.....	903	427	47.3	476	61	415
29 years.....	734	403	54.9	331	42	289
Total, 30-34 years..	2,231	1,412	63.3	819	123	696
30 years.....	621	372	59.9	249	36	213
31 years.....	480	300	62.5	180	33	147
32 years.....	434	277	63.8	157	21	136
33 years.....	389	255	65.6	134	20	114
34 years.....	307	208	67.8	99	13	86
Total, 35 years.....	328	242	73.8	86	10	76

Table 2

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE, BY RELOCATION PROJECT TO WHICH THEY WERE EVACUATED

Relocation Project	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
All Projects..	18,727	3,937	21.0	14,790	1,294	13,496
Central Utah.....	1,435	332	23.1	1,103	118	985
Colorado River....	2,926	584	20.0	2,342	207	2,135
Gila River.....	1,995	417	21.9	1,578	128	1,464
Granada.....	1,343	315	23.5	1,028	99	929
Heart Mountain....	1,796	405	22.6	1,391	132	1,259
Jerome.....	1,423	317	22.3	1,106	89	1,017
Manzanar.....	1,793	372	20.1	1,421	114	1,307
Minidoka.....	1,778	350	19.7	1,428	88	1,340
Rohwer.....	1,508	314	20.8	1,194	107	1,087
Tule Lake.....	3,275	531	16.2	2,185	212	1,973

Table 3

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 17 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE WAR RELOCATION PROJECTS: 1942

	Total	Parent 65 or more	All others
Total, 17 years...	1,609 *	101	1,507
Central Utah...	113	4	109
Colorado River.	282	20	262
Gila River.....	163	13	150
Granada.....	118	8	110
Heart Mountain.	144	9	135
Jerome.....	128	8	120
Manzanar.....	146	12	134
Minidoka.....	148	7	141
Rohwer.....	121 *	4	116
Tule Lake.....	246	16	230

* Includes one man with wife.

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE EVACUATED TO THE CENTRAL UTAH WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years..	1,435	332	23.1	1,103	118	985
18 and 19 years.	239	-	-	239	20	219
20 to 24 years..	555	42	7.6	513	50	463
25 to 29 years..	394	150	38.1	244	28	216
30 to 34 years..	218	120	55.0	98	19	79
35 years.....	29	20	69.0	9	1	8

Table 4-A

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE COLORADO RIVER
WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years..	2,926	584	20.0	2,342	207	2,135
18 and 19 years..	615	1	-	614	46	568
20 to 24 years...	1,213	68	5.6	1,145	88	1,057
25 to 29 years...	729	278	38.1	451	54	397
30 to 34 years...	327	207	63.3	120	18	102
35 years.....	42	30	71.4	12	1	11

Table 4-B

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE EVACUATED TO THE GILA RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years.	1,995	417	21.9	1,578	128	1,464
18 and 19 years.	408	1	-	407	29	378
20 to 24 years..	804	45	5.6	759	63	710
25 to 29 years..	522	198	37.9	324	25	299
30 to 34 years..	217	137	63.1	80	10	70
35 years.....	44	36	81.8	8	1	7

Table 4-C

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE GRANADA
WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years.	1,343	315	23.5	1,028	99	929
18 and 19 years.	270	1	-	269	19	250
20 to 24 years..	541	41	7.6	500	41	459
25 to 29 years..	328	136	41.5	192	27	165
30 to 34 years..	177	119	67.2	58	10	48
35 years.....	27	18	66.7	9	2	7

Table 4-D

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 to 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE HEART MOUNTAIN WAR
RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years...	1796	405	22.6	1391	132	1259
18 and 19 years...	309	1	-	308	23	285
20 to 24 years....	727	45	6.2	682	63	619
25 to 29 years....	486	188	38.7	298	31	267
30 to 34 years....	241	151	62.7	90	15	75
35 years.....	33	20	60.6	13	-	13

Table 4-E

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE JEROME WAR RE-
LOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years..	1,423	317	22.3	1,106	89	1,017
18 and 19 years..	305	-	-	305	15	290
20 to 24 years...	562	24	4.3	538	46	492
25 to 29 years...	370	158	42.7	212	24	188
30 to 34 years...	166	119	71.7	47	4	43
35 years.....	20	16	80.0	4	-	4

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 to 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE MANZANAR WAR RE-
LOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years...	1793	372	20.1	1421	114	1307
18 and 19 years...	365	1	-	364	26	338
20 to 24 years....	729	39	5.3	690	57	633
25 to 29 years....	466	178	38.2	288	21	267
30 to 34 years....	194	122	62.9	72	9	63
35 years.....	39	32	82.1	7	1	6

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Satatistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE MINIDOKA WAR RE-
LOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years..	1,778	350	19.7	1,428	88	1,340
18 and 19 years..	399	-	-	399	18	381
20 to 24 years...	750	51	6.8	699	41	658
25 to 29 years...	422	156	37.0	266	19	247
30 to 34 years...	190	130	68.4	60	9	51
35 years.....	17	13	76.5	4	1	3

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 to 35 YEARS OF AGE EVACUATED TO THE ROHWER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18-35 years...	1508	314	20.8	1194	107	1087
18 and 19 years...	277	1	-	276	17	259
20 to 24 years....	617	37	6.0	580	54	526
25 to 29 years....	391	140	35.8	251	23	228
30 to 34 years....	188	111	59.0	77	11	66
35 years.....	35	25	71.4	10	2	8

Table 4-I

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE MALES, 18 TO 35 YEARS OF AGE
EVACUATED TO THE TULE LAKE
WAR RELOCATION PROJECT: 1942

Age	Total	WITH WIFE		WITHOUT WIFE		
		Number	Percent	Total	Parent 65 or over	All others
Total, 18 to 35 years..	3,275	531	16.2	2,185	212	1,973
18 and 19 years.....	558	1	-	557	38	519
20 to 24 years.....	1,137	50	4.4	1,087	95	992
25 to 29 years.....	978	252	25.8	414	60	354
30 to 34 years.....	527	196	37.2	117	18	99
35 years.....	75	32	42.7	10	1	9

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

JAPANESE AND WHITE SELECTEES EXAMINED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO RECRUITING AND INDUCTION STATION, BY MONTHS FOR 1941*

Month	JAPANESE Reported	JAPANESE Inducted	JAPANESE Rejected	WHITE Reported	WHITE Inducted	WHITE Rejected
All Months	463	421	42	15,445	14,111	1,334
Percent	100.0	90.9	9.1	100.0	91.4	8.6
January	29	27	2	1,364	1,247	117
February	52	49	3	1,742	1,631	111
March	108	101	7	3,202	2,945	257
April	51	51	-	1,638	1,508	130
May	11	7	4	420	365	55
June	25	22	3	1,232	1,092	140
July	38	34	4	978	848	130
August	18	16	2	626	554	72
September	29	27	2	632	585	47
October	74	61	13	2,101	1,951	150
November	27	26	1	883	815	68
December	1	-	1	627	570	57

*Compiled by WCCA from daily "Report of Inductions and Rejections, by Race" for calendar year 1941, by permission of Colonel G. T. Perkins.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Staff

Washington

January _____, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
The Provost Marshal General (Through CG, SOS)
Director, Bureau of Public Relations
Executive Officer, Assistant Secretary of War's Office

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigations of Japanese-Americans in War Relocation Centers.

1. Upon the request of the War Relocation Authority, the War Department will assist in determining the loyalty of Japanese-Americans under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority. The purpose of this plan is to determine (a) loyalty of Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers, and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or be employed in plants and facilities important to the war effort.

2. The following administrative procedure is prescribed for accomplishment of the plan:

a. Questionnaires will be executed by Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class in war relocation centers.

b. The questionnaires will be distributed in war

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 ~~Sept.~~ Sept. 27, ~~1958~~
NNW by ____ date 4/15/65

Tab A

File

17

relocation centers by teams consisting of an army officer and three enlisted men, including one Japanese-American soldier of the Nisei class. The teams will assist the War Relocation Authority in supervising the execution of the questionnaires.

c. Personnel for the teams will be obtained by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and The Provost Marshal General from Service Commands or other sources. The teams will be trained by The Provost Marshal General.

d. The Bureau of Public Relations will prepare the announcements, training material for the teams, speeches, press releases, and will have charge of all phases of public relations involved.

e. The execution of questionnaires for male Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class within military age limits who are not in relocation centers will be accomplished by the Selective Service System.

f. The questionnaires executed by male Japanese-Americans within the age limits for military service will be forwarded immediately without analysis or evaluation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who will approve or disapprove such individuals for induction into the armed forces. MIS will notify PMGO of the results of its action, and will transmit to PMGO questionnaires for those individuals under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority who

are not inducted into the military service.

g. Copies of all other questionnaires, together with any information possessed by the War Relocation Authority pertaining to the loyalty of subject individuals, will be forwarded to PMGO. A check of FBI and ONI records and an analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires will be made by PMGO except for those individuals inducted into the military service under par. f hereof. A copy of all such questionnaires will be referred to the Western Defense Command for investigation.

h. A Joint Board composed of a representative of the Navy Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, War Relocation Authority, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and The Provost Marshal General will be created. PMGO will transmit to the Joint Board the results of the FBI and ONI record checks; the analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires; and a copy of the reports of the investigation made by the Western Defense Command. The Joint Board will:

(1) transmit the investigation reports and a copy of the questionnaires to the War Relocation Authority, together with its recommendation concerning the release of the subject individuals from relocation centers on indefinite leave; and

(2) will state whether the Joint Board has any

objection to the employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort of any of those Japanese-Americans who are released by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to its recommendation.

3. To prevent duplication of investigation, except where necessary upon receipt of supplementary information or for other cogent reasons, a list of Japanese-Americans recommended for release by the Joint Board and their classification for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort, will be forwarded to the Western Defense Command, the Eastern Defense Command, the Southern Defense Command, the Central Defense Command, and all Service Commands.

4. The procedure prescribed herein is intended to supplement the leave regulations and Administrative Instructions No. 22, Revised, issued by the War Relocation Authority, and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority.

SECRET SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

By Authority of The
A.C.of S., G-2 W.D.G.S.
Date 1-8-[illegible]

MID 291.2 Japanese 1-8-43

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the A. C. of S., G-1,
Attention: Lieut. Colonel E. S. Gibson

Subject: Induction of Japanese-Americans

1. Confirming the telephone conversation between you and Major Lansdale of this Division, the following plan for the screening of Japanese-American inductees for loyalty has been formulated after informal conversations with the Selective Service System and the Office of Naval Intelligence:

2. A questionnaire will be devised which will be filled out by each person who applies for voluntary induction. In War Relocation Projects this questionnaire will be furnished by a specially trained [redacted] who will point out that the induction of these men is [redacted] a larger plan for the release of persons of Japanese ancestry from the War Relocation Projects. For the Territory of Hawaii and the rest of the continental United States outside of the War Relocation Projects, publicity releases will indicate the new policy of the War Department with respect to persons of Japanese ancestry. Forms will be obtainable at recruitment centers.

3. This form will be transmitted to the A. C. of S., G-2, who will set up a special organization to process these forms. The A. C. of S., G-2 will check each name against the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Decision as to whether the individual will be accepted will be made upon the basis of the check of these files and the answers to the questionnaires. This questionnaire will be based chiefly upon the experience of the Office of Naval Intelligence. A copy of the form will be transmitted to National Headquarters, Selective Service System, marked to indicate whether the individual is acceptable or not acceptable. Thereafter, those individuals deemed to be acceptable will be inducted.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
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SECRET

Clotfelter/rlw/3-3-43.

4619

1-8-43

MID 291.2 Japanese 1-8-43

4. It is estimated that the Selective Service System will be ready to begin accepting inductions within thirty days from date. It is estimated that the induction of the necessary number of individuals will be completed within sixty days from the beginning of inductions.

5. The above estimate was arrived at by this Division and the Selective Service System without consultation with the Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply, in conjunction with whom, of course, the details of induction must be worked out by the Selective Service System.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:



W. E. CRIST,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, MIS.

4519

CSOff/ahw/3-3-43

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1

WASHINGTON

WDGAP 320

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1943.

1168

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:
(Through Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply)

Subject: Organization of a Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

The Secretary of War directs that all concerned be informed substantially as follows:

The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces is being directed to activate a Combat Team composed of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Details are as follows:

1. Location - Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

2. Date of activation - Not earlier than February 1, 1943.

3. Date on which fillers will arrive - Not earlier than March 1, 1943.

4. Procurement of personnel, except cadres and officers:

a. Number - 4,500.

b. Source - ~~3~~,000 from continental United States
1,500 from Hawaiian Department.
amended by WDEAP 320 (1-9-43) 3/10/43

c. Type - English speaking, General Service, native-born citizens of Japanese ancestry.

d. Method - By voluntary induction through Selective Service System.

5. Cadres - As prescribed by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

6. Officers - Available qualified officers of Japanese ancestry [illegible] the grade of ~~Lieutenant~~ except for medical personnel will be assigned.

Staff personnel prior to induction will be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, with the Director, Military Intelligence Service, for assignment. Details will be arranged by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

4619

(WDGAP 320 (1-8-43))

Received by Adjutant General's Office JAN 25 1943

Received 24/Oct/43 Adjutant General's Office 13-3-43.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET REGRADED ORDER SEC. ARMY BY TAG PER 8 Z 113 SECRET

SECRET

Selective Service System and the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

8. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will take the necessary action to transfer the men procured in Hawaii to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, by the first available transportation.

9. Publicity - All publicity will be handled by Bureau of Public Relations.

4 A. G. O.
JAN 15 1943
RECEIVED

M. G. WHITE,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

E. C. LYNCH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive

Incl.
MID 291.2 Japanese
Memo to G-1 fr MIS,
1-8-43.

AGO
JAN 25 1943

4613

IMMEDIATE ACTION

33

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY GROUND FORCES
Army War College
Washington, D.C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~RESTRICTED~~

320.2/169 (R)-GNGCT/00742
(1-12-43)

JAN

1239

Memorandum for THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Organization of a Japanese Combat Team.

Air Mail Special

The Secretary of War directs:

I. ~~Constitute~~ the following units:

442nd Infantry (T/O 7-11) (1-1-43)
522nd Field Artillery Battalion (T/O [illegible]) (1-1-43)
232nd Engineer Combat Company, ~~Separate~~ (T/O 5-17) (1-1-43)

II. Issue instructions classifed "Restricted" to Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply, Third Army, and Seventh and Eighth Service Commands, substantially as follows:

1. The Commanding General, Third Army, will activate the 442nd Infantry (T/O 7-11), 522nd Field Artillery Battalion (T/O 6-25) and 232nd Engineer Combat Company, Separate (T/O 5-17) at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, on February ~~1~~, 1943. The new units will be organized according to applicable Tables of Organization and allied tables, including all published changes thereto, except that the Cannon Company and Band of the 442nd Infantry will not be organized. The units are assigned to the Third Army and will be organized as a combat team. Each unit is allotted an initial overstrength equivalent to 15% of the Table of Organization strength of active elements.

Action Taken
Mimeo Letter
1-22-43
SCS/mel

ACTION TAKEN: III
Distribution
complied with.
HJP-2B-939

2. Enlisted cadres conforming to those specified in applicable Tables of Organization will be moved by commanders concerned so as to arrive at Camp Shelby, Miss., prior to February 1, 1943, and will be furnished as follows:

Cadre for:	Furnished by:
442nd Infantry Regiment	~~[illegible]~~, Seventh Service Command
232nd Engineer Combat Company	~~[illegible]~~, Seventh Service Command
522nd Field Artillery Battalion	~~[illegible]~~, Eighth Service Command

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
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Q. M. C. Form 856 (Old Form 493)
Approved December 1, 1922.

12-17-43

0-8424 GPO

IMMEDIATE ACTION

IMMEDIATE ACTION

~~RESTRICTED~~

In addition to the Table of Organization cadre furnished for the 442nd Infantry Regiment, the Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, will furnish the following cadre for the Medical Detachment, 442nd Infantry:

1	Technical Sergeant (673)
3	Staff Sergeants (673)
1	Technician Grade 5, Clerk, record (055)
1	Technician Grade 5, Dental (067)
2	Technicians Grade 5, Medical (123)
3	Technicians Grade 4, Surgical (225)
11	Total

The enlisted cadremen need not hold the grades specified in Tables of Organization but must be capable of performing the duties of the position for which selected. All cadremen must be American citizens of Japanese ancestry who have resided in the United States since birth. The selection of the cadremen will be coordinated with the Director of Intelligence in each Service Command concerned. A complete roster of all cadremen selected will be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, as soon as practicable after selection has been made.

3. Enlisted fillers required to bring the units to full Table of Organization strength plus allotted overstrength will be furnished without requisition by ~~The Adjutant General~~ the proper office through the Selective Service System in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, so as to arrive at Camp Shelby, Miss., not prior to March 1, 1943.

4. Officers:

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will be designated by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

b. The remainder of the officer complement will be furnished, insofar as practicable, from personnel under control of the Commanding General, Third Army.

c. Additional officers required to complete the officer complement will be requisitioned in the usual manner.

~~d. Officers furnished under b and c above will be of Japanese ancestry insofar as practicable.~~ See slip

e. See slip. -2-

~~RESTRICTED~~
IMMEDIATE ACTION

WDGS 9-17-43.

6
5. Supply:

a. These are non-divisional units.

B-2-61.1. May Cummings the office,

b. Priority for distribution of controlled items of equipment is [redacted]. (See WD letter, AG 400 (11-5-42)OB-S-C-M, dated November 9, 1942, subject: "Distribution of Controlled Items of Equipment.")

c. Tables of Basic Allowances are applicable as follows:

(1) For clothing and individual equipment: Table of Basic Allowances 21 (6-20-42) with Changes 1 and 2.

(2) For other supplies and equipment: Tables of Basic Allowances 5 (6-1-42) with Changes 1 and 2 for the 232nd Engineer Combat Company, Separate.

Table of Basic Allowances 6 (7-1-42) with Changes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion.

Table of Basic Allowances 7 (6-20-42) with Changes 1 and 2 for the 442nd Infantry.

7
6. The organization of these units will not be publicized or used for propaganda purposes without approval of the Bureau of Public Relations.

8
7. Direct correspondence between all concerned is authorized. In this connection it is desired that communications and publications of copies of all orders pertaining hereto be kept at the absolute minimum consistant with the efficient accomplishment of ~~requirements set forth~~ actions directed herein.

9
8. Dates of activation will be reported without delay to Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, and ~~to The Adjutant General.~~ this office by letter.

10 Caligate, etc.
9. Costs of Travel: ~~(TAG: Please insert appropriate procurement authority.)~~

xlw/2-17-43

~~RESTRICTED~~

IMMEDIATE ACTION

III. Notify Commanding General, Replacement and School Command, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and all others concerned.

For the COMMANDING GENERAL:

FRANK WARD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Exec., Opns. Div., G-3.

16 AGO
JAN 21 1943
Forwarded
OB-S

Memorandum for Record.

Memo for CG, AGF, fr A/CS, G-3, WDGS, file WDGCT 320 (Japanese) (1-10-43) dtd 1-13-43, subj: "Organization of a Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry". CT to consist of 1 Inf Regt, 1 FA Bn, and 1 Engr Combat Co. To be activated 2-1-43 at Cp Shelby, Miss. No use to be made of 100th Bn. Filler personnel to be furnished by Selective Service after 3-1-42.

Concurrences: Gn G-1 (Lt. Col. Gray)
Gn G-4 (Lt. Col. Steinbach)
A/CS, G-2, WDGS (Lt. Pierce)
CG, SOS (Col. Radcliffe)

Notified: G-3, WDGS (Col. Stevenson)

FILE JAN 25 1943

JAN 21 11 04 AM '43

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IMMEDIATE ACTION

OTAG 3

(71)

555
1635Z Jan 14 1943

Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and General GULLION, PM General, Washington D. C.

General DeWITT: Hello, Gullion.

General GULLION: Good morning, General.

D: Gullion, I've just received a radio from you stating -- it reads as follows:

"Commencing about February 10, War Relocation Authority will request your office for thirty thousand or more loyalty investigations. Colonel O'Rear will arrive the 18th, reference preparation of tentative plans. Now do they mean that the War Relocation Authority is asking the Army to make loyalty investigations?

G: General, it is something that apparently was ordered largely at the instance of the Navy. I don't know what business it is of theirs. But McNarney and McCloy had some meetings at which I was represented by some of my people, and they apparently are going to conduct a loyalty investigation of these people in the War Relocation Centers -- of the American citizens there -- and some they are going to form into a combat team and let them go to war and others they are going to make use of for the manpower that they have by working -- letting them even get into plants. O'Rear can explain it. I don't know when he is going to get there. I'm not for it, to tell you the truth ---

D: I don't see how they can determine the loyalty of a Jap by interrogation. . . or investigation.

G: They've got a questionnaire that the Navy -- some psychologist over there in the Navy sold to them.

D: There isn't such a thing as a loyal Japanese and it is just impossible to determine their loyalty by investigation -- it just can't be done. Of course I don't know what it is all about -- I gather from the radio that the composition of the investigation body -- whatever it may be -- will be Military Personnel. Is that right?

G: Yes sir. We have drawn up -- at the direction of McNarney and McCloy -- a tentative plan -- there is going to be -- I don't know who is going to operate it -- but it will be a Military Investigation by Military people.

D: Military-naval, I guess.

G: Yes.

D: Well I'll find out from O'Rear. I don't know whether I'll be here on the 19th -- I've got to go South for a conference with the Navy -- but if O'Rear gets out here on the 18th, that's all right.

G: I'm a little afraid that it might be taken as admission of mistake and weakness.

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Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

16

D: I know it. It is. Just so that, whatever they do, none of those fellows get back in this area — it is up to them. Of course if it is the Secretary's action, it has to be done, but I thought it was something ——

G: My representatives over there said that the impulse seemed to come from the Navy.

D: Yes. What has the War Relocation Authority got to do with it?

G: They probably would like to get rid of some of these people.

D: The reason I called you up was — the way the radiogram read, would indicate that the War Relocation Authority was going to request me — it says: The War Relocation Authority will request your office for 30 thousand or more loyalty investigations. I thought it was the War Relocation initiation.

G: I really believe the thing came from the Navy — the impulse. I'm not a bit happy over it.

D: No. I think it is a sign of weakness — of course I'd like to know a little more about it — but O'Rear has got all the dope on it.

G: Yes sir.

D: All right. Fine. I just wanted to try and get a background. Thank you very much.

* * *

RECEIVED
JAN 14 P.M.
WDC &
Fourth Army
WCCA

Records #33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Scobey
1-18-43 Time 9.25 a.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECT:

S What have you got on your mind this morning?

B I wondered if you might be able to tell me about a rumor that we have out here to the effect that there will be a request made on the CG here to direct 30M odd loyalty, so called loyalty investigations of evacuees in relocation centers, do you know anything about that?

S Yes,I don't know where the figures came from; I don't know just exactly the developments of your rumors; the WD has authorized the organization of combat troops; an approved paper has passed thru the WD directing the organization of a combat team of Japanese, who will consist of about 4500; they will be inducted into the service and prior to the induction a board of investigators having investigation or representation from G-2, ONI, FBI and WRA will go over these people and their records with a view of determining their loyalties prior to their induction.

They plan to set up that Board in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, for this consideration and approval. In connection with that, clearing the young men to go into the service, the young men will also consider all Nisei who it is desired to have released from these relocation centers for work in connection with and in localities which are doing war projects.

B That has nothing to do with the raising of a combat team.

S It is in connection with the thing; the investigating board will consider both at the same time; in other words, here is a family, they will consider the personnel that are subject to induction as well as the girls, and their parents if they are Nisei, so that they may be released from these relocation centers; the proposition has 2 aspects to it, first is to organize a combat team of about 4M to 4500 since the combat team will have a 15% extra in numbers and second along with that the release of Nisei for employment in war industries.

18

B I see

S The plan is designed to assist the release of hese people from the centers, to expedite the WRA mission. Have I made it clear?

B I think in it's essential features you have who will, in other words who or that will impose no responsibility on this headquarters.

S Yes, to this extent; in certain instances the WDC may be called upon to continue the investigation if ,

B In what way, that is what I am trying to get at, if you can tell me specifically, if you can tell me what

S It is not possible, or if it is not impossible to series an individual by virture of the records and the examination by this Boeard, and it becomes necessary to go into the background of this individual from the fact that the place of his initial home, that is the place that he lived, then I think the WDC may be called upon to conduct the investigation to interrogate the people among whom he lived.

B What kind of agents would they use for that?

S If it was given to the WDC, I think you would probably use the Secret Service.

B In other words the ordinary CIC type of investigation.

S In other words, or yes Karl th t is right.

B What will this board act upon, some kind of a questionnaire that will be filled out or something, in other words then as I understand it the responsibility if any which might be imposed on the CG here will be contingent if at all in those cases where the board is unable to arrive at a conclusion, and in any event there will be no responsibility on the CG to make a recommendation one way or the other as to whether he considers a certain Japanese to be loyal.

He will merely cause an investigation to be made and submit the report to be evalued by that board? Is that right?

S I don't think that is exactly right.

B I don't think the CG would make any recommendations as to loyalty, I don't think he considers it feasible to do so, but

S I don't ei her, in view of the fact that he would have only part of the records before him to make the evaluation,

S On the other hand, it might be entirely possible that in the course of the CIB investigation, something might develop which would indicate to the CG a condition upon which he might make recommendation.

In other words he might discover in the course of the CIC investigation certain acts on the part of this man, which in a statement alone would not give the proper impression and he might feel that he would be able to say that he decided or that the considered this man disloyal; whether he would be called upon to make the recoomendations or not, hasn't been decided and it is not covered in the paper that sets up the Board.

B In other words the present proposal which has been prepared for staff action and is now before the board, and the Deputy Chief of Staff does not impose any responsibility of that nature on the WDD.

S Hold the phone, I'll get a copy of this and read it over,

B Thank you very much

S I got it, I'm looking over this paper now.

Just a second, yes here is one paragraph to prevent duplication of the investigation, except when necessary upon receipt of supplementary information or for other cogent reasons a list of American citizens of Japanese ancestry recommended for release by the joint board, that's theboard I mentioned a minute ago, through the various agencies.

B Yes

S I or they have their classification for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort and they will be forwarded to the Western Defense Command, EDC, SDC, CDC and all seven commands That ends that paragraph.

B Well now as I understand what you read me, a list of the names of those who have been processed by that Board for release to engage in private employment will be sent to all the agencies you named, is that right?

S Yes thats right.

B But that does not impose on those agencies the responsibility for any action on their part.

S Something else in the papers as I remember it, which

V As I understand the paragraph you read, that list is given to those several agencies for their respective information.

S That is right,

S Now there is a letter requirement somewhere, it maynot be i the paper, it was agreed to orally by the members of the Conference that participated in the decisions and agreements in Mr. McCloy's office and that was that Henry Kay of the Board not being satisfied with the development, Henry may ask for a continuing investigati n or a supplementary investigation from the WDC.

B In other words then in cases where the board does not have enought information before it to recheck conclusions, it is implied that they will request in specific cases that WDC through it's CIC or someother suitable agency dig up further information in the locality in which the evacuee formally resided.

S Right here it is; copies of all other questionnaires together with any information possed by the War Relocation Authority pertaining to the loyalty of subject individuals will be forwarded to the PMG office. A check of FbI and ONI records and an analysis of answers given on the questionnaire will be given by the PMG's office except for those individuals inducted into the Military status under Paragraph F_____. A copy of all such questionnaires will be referred to WDC for investigation.

B Well now that sounds like all of them come out.

S No, I don't think so.

B Sounds like all of them except those that join the Army.

S Well I don't believe that's contemplated, my recollection is

B That seems to be the impressi on that General Gullion has, that he will get a list of several thousand maybe 30 or 40 thousand names and he will forward them out here for investigat on just in a bulk form.

S I didn't get that impression at all.

B It sounds like, that it, well it would appear from what you read, to be the case; I wonder if you could like into that; I know that that would be quite a task. An investigation task that we couldn't do out here. I know the General couldn't undertake it, he has only a hundred CIC agents who are already snowed under now and the rum of the mill; well all of the investigations are imposed on CIB these days.

S I must read further on this; hold the line.

B Surely

18

S This paper, I will read you the next paragraph. "A joint board which by agreement with the Department of Justice, the Navy Department, the WRA will be composed of a representative of the FBI, office of ONI, and WRA.

B I can't hear you

S ONI, WRA, Assistant CofS G-2; the PMG's office, will be created that's the joint board. PMGO will transmit to the joint board the results of the FbI and ONI record check. The analysis of the answers given on the questionnaire and the copies of the report of investigation made by the WDC; now let me ask you, just a second here; I guess it's correct that all exept the coldiers will go out to you for investigation.

B Well that might entail 20, 25 possibly 30 thousand cases

S Well I don't believe that the records they have here would show that they are not particularly loyal, I don't believe they would be sent out.

B Well the papers was so; I mean the paper would indicate that they would be sent out. Well that's quiet an ambitious undertaking. looks like it would take several years.

S Well if it took that long, it would serve the purpose for which we made it.

B I mean, it doesn't soulnd like it would be at all feasible;

S I don't know how much personnel you have now or how long it would take to handle one of these lists.

B Well if the investigation contemplated is anymore than a check of files on hand, and in that connection, my impression is that if the files on hand are the very same things that the FBI have, if it is anything more than that,

S I think it is contemplated that the investigation be made at the former home,

B Well what I am getting at, from the paper you read there is no distinction, they are just sent out in bulk for investigation, I know, that General DeWITT is very much disturbed about the whole thing and would like to get what information I can. That is what I'm doing, trying to get it to him specifically.

S The paper hasn't been cleared thru the Deputy chief of staff; it has been agreed to by the various War Department Staffs, it was prepared by G-2 and PMG together.

B Well it hardly seems feasible to impose the responsibility of

B that magnitude on this command, or so far as I can see, on any agencies in the picture.

To me, to make investigations of that number of individuals, is not

S Well listening to the discussions on that, it was not impression that field investigation would be made in all instances.

B Well the point I make is shouldn't that be cleared up in the paper before that is approved by General McNarny,

S It possibly should, although it is part of the mechanics in this plan.

B I know but shouldn't it be

S It should be able to make that determination without putting it in the paper itself.

B Well shouldn't the contemplation be expressed before.

S It doesn't state whether it should be a field check or a card chedk; it is rather open on that point.

B I see.

S The process to be followed I should just should be on what the findings of the board are.

If the findings show conclusive disloyalty there would be no point in going further with the investigation.

B Who distributes the questionnaires.

S By a team composed of representatives of the G-2 and PMG.

The PMG is responsible for the distribution of these papers.

B In WRA centers.

S Yes, and they are to go to these centers.

~~B~~S And distribute the questionnaires there and to supervise the answering of them.

B I see, and in other words WRA doesn't come in on that.

S No, not on that; the idea was that first of all they are trying to get the Japanese inductions into the Army; that was the main purpose; that is where the papers start. Along with that the incongruity of releasing these loyal Japs in the Army and then

S And then not releasing the other loyal Japanese for work in war industries, was so obvious it was decided to tie in the two things and make it one operation.

B Well of course I don't think they are simultaneous operations I don't think they are that closely related; to say that the release of Japanese for private employment would depend upon the availabilities.

S Yes, that's right, but the investigations could be made at the same time; one facilitates the others.

B It seems to me that the type of investigation you would want to make to become satisfied with a potential soldier would be wholly different than that which you would make to release a man for private industry; they are releasing them every day as it is now. without any such

S Only a few

B Well they have released about 18000 I think;

S No they haven't released that many, no where like that; it is around 9000, on those temporary furloughs.

B They haven't; well I think the total number released from the centers, that is those released plus those on furlough would aggregate 18000 I think. Of course we released a lot of them.

I don't know whether this was considered or whether it is too late to suggest it; may e it is too late, here is apoint, to look back on what happened in the evacuation program seems to be very important to me; I think it is important to take into accont what it started out to be in the first place.

In the first place it started out to be a program in which we would permit and encourage the voluntary migration of evacuees from the Pacific Coast to the interior. It was not only permitted but actually encouraged with complete Federal blessing; in other words as long as they got off the coast into the interior that was all that was necessary to meet the military necessity involved.

Now that was stopped only because of a ertain hysteria which developed at that time, which has now apparently disappated, It wasn't stopped because the military necessity changed, it was stoped only because of the hysteria that developed in the interior. Had that not developed it would not have been stopped and many more thousands of those who did move would have gone in that fashion and would never have been in relocation centers. Now,

S Now may this be said; the people in the interior had no knowledge and little information and no contacts with the situation with the Japanese, and when they discovered or informed that they were being evacuated from the West Coast it was their assumption that the evacuation was being made because they were dangerous and therefore they themselves, didn't want to be subject to the danger that the West Coast would be; that is probably what was the cause of the hysteria.

B That probably had something to do with it, because they had not had Japanese and in some places before, but now that they have seen them, the need for

S Well they haven't though, that is it.

B Well they have in most places,

S No only in the areas near the relocation centers,

B Well you see there is quite a few who had moved, there were some 9 to 10 thousand, who moved under the voluntary migration, there are some 9 to 10 thousand out now on furlough and as far as the general public is concerned, they don't know whether they are on furlough or not, that doesn't concern them

S You are a little bit wrong Karl; on January 12th the WRA advised Mr. McCloy that a total of about 900 persons have been granted indefinite leave to date; of this number 350 have been students, about 74 have been the wives of american soldiers who have been granted leave to jointheir husbands and the remaining 475 have been persons going into employment in the defense work.

B Well I wasn't making any distinction between the indefinite leaves and theafurloughs don't you see.

S Well the furloughs have all been grantedin the main to the West on _____Projects.

B Well I wasn't making any distinction in the types of leaves.

S The facts of the case are, though that those people who work in beet crops in large groups would give anybody a proper way to evaluate the Japanese situation.

B That is probably true. It seemed to me that it was a problem on relocation of an educational program in the communities and that the Relocation problem was being pretty highly complicated by the move to raise a combat team.

B It seems to me that the desire to raise acbmbat team is making a problem in relocation a great deal more complicated than it needs to be.

S It was decided by the Secretary of War and Mr. McCloy himsel I think.

As a matter of fact, that the incogruity of getting soldiers into the service without considering the other phase of it, would have a tendency to substantiate the feeling that they were being called up to be cannon fodder.

B I don't question that at all, I think you misunderstand me, Colonel Scobey.

S I guess I must have on that;

B Yes you do, because what I have said is this, that it doesn't seem to me that you need to go thru the motions of arriving at a careful conclusion on each Japanese who is released for private employment, in the same way that you do, when you take him into the Army.

S Yes; yes, for under the present ruling/(some or none ??) these Japanese are cleared for employment in any War Production Plant; that is specifically prohibited. It is not accomplished.

B I see.

S Now if we go the whole scope of the project and say, here you go into the Army and here you who can't go into the Army, you will be given an opportunity to work like any other American works, then it was felt that the examination and investigation should be to the same extent and as complete as the soldiers examination, and maybe a little bit more so.

B I see; in other words you, or they cannot be now employed in any war industry without a complete investigation. I didn't know that. I see, now the people on the outside the other 20 or 25000 Japs who were on the outside and never in the centers can't get work in war industries even though they have never been in war relocation centers?

S No they won't clear them. That is my understanding.

B So that you are going to clear people in centers, but that this will not effect the rather large num er of Japanese who have never been under federal supervision.

S Yes, that is one thing that is causing a great deal of difficulty right now.

B Yes I should think it would

S This mechanism of _____ the people who have not been in the relocation centers and these people who are presently here in the middle and eastern states cannot be employed in that and who have not been thru the recloation centers will not be cleared to work in any plant, because where a man is a Japanese he must be cleared by the service command before he can go in, and the service commanders won't clear them.

B I see, for my own information, just so that I can orient myself, to what extent are Japanese now barred from being employed in or what does it, or I mean is it very general?

S It effects, those plants I believe who have a war production status and more or less of a critical category.

B I see, it is that type of plant that they can't be employed in.

S Yes; I cant really answer that question because I am not fully familiar with it; I can only answer it on what I understand from hearsay evidence on the thing.

B I see.

S It was formed by G-2 and PMg.

B I see

S ------Realize there were many hundreds or probably many thousands of Japanese who had not been through these centers; had not been placed in the centers and who would not have been cleared by this Board, and because they have not been cleared, could or can not get a job in some of these classes.

It was proposed that this Board take over the responsibility of investigating the Japanese who had not been in the centers, as well as those who are in the centers. That point has not been cleared up as yet and that is one of the defects of the statement.

B I see.

S The point was also made that here is a Japanese released from the Center and cleared by the board and working in a war production plant whereas another Japanese who has never been in a center and cannot work in that plant. His position is _____. He is not given the same rights as the other Japanese.

B I seel

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B I think I see the program now. I think I can make a full report to the General; thatnk you very much.

S I might say that here is a paragraph that has been proposed for incorporation in the paper; I'll read it -

"The execution of questionnaires for American itizens of Japanese ancestry who were not in relocation centers and who do not make application for voluntary induction, will be accomplished by the Provost Marshal upon application."

Otherwise the responsibility of getting cleared will rest upon the Japanese themselves. They will be given the same opportunity as an individual now in the relocation centers. The reason that a relocation center person is investigated is because we know who he is exactly, where he is, and we have records on him. Whereas the fellow, the other one, his status is so well defined. He is not so easily contacted as the man in the relocation center.

B I see the point very clearly; Thank you so much, Colonel Scobey.

S I don't know whether I have cleared up the matter satisfactorily or not - there is one thing in addition that I might say.

The War Relocation, I mean the War Department presently has a policy announced by a secret letter of February 9th, prohibiting the employment of any Japanese of any category in any Army installation whatsoever. That policy is being restudied with a view to redrafting it to make it more compatible with the present policy of release.

B I see.

S I don't know whether General DeWITT will want to consider his problems or not out there. We have from Mr. Meyer a list of people whom he has asked to get a statement on from the WDC or rather a permission for them to return.

These fall in the twilight zone of marital status in some instances and these people he wants to get back into their former locality.

In most instances they are wives of, in one instance, the wife of a soldier. Other instances wives of individuals out there. One instance, an infant 6 years old I believe. Things of that kind, but who under your present policyare not permitted out there. I don't know whether your propose to restudy that policy or not.

B I see; I am not familiar with some of the cases you have referred to, but I assume they are on the way out.

S Well they haven't been sent out yet. They are still here.

B I see.

S Mr. McCloy hasn't had a chance to examine them. They just came in yesterday.

B Oh I see; I thought they were already submitted out here by

S No, I submitted one to you, a case of Mrs. Paper whom you turned down and didn't give any reason. I knew the policy, the reply simply quoted the policy and said under the policy she shouldn't be permitted to return, all of which I knew when I sent it out there.

B Well General DeWITT didn't feel that he could make an exception in the Paper case without making the same exception all the other cases, and there were, we found, quite a number of similiar ones, which would mean that he in justice would have had to change te policy and he wasn't prepared to do that, in other words,

S Well how about that, that would be a little bit in deference with the present policy and with Japanese in all instances we may have a policy that the citizens would be permitted to come into centers, yes, But in no instance do we apply that wihtout a special investigation. If the special investigation warrants the individual clearance, or individual retuention, then we act upon the facts in the case as pertains to the individual rather than the general policy. That was the reason I submitted the case.

B I see what you mean.

S A thorough American intention with no disloyalty or possible danger whatever. A man of high repute which was simply turned down because of policy. I don't know that it requires a change in the policy. It seems that an individual case would defend it rather than a broad statement of policy which isn't applicable in the individual case.

B Well up to now Colonel Scobey, the CGs policy has not taken into account the individual; it has not taken into account anything but a category. It hasn't been based on a policy of saying that you could determine loyalty. In other words up to this point the CGS policy has been that you can't determine loyalty so that all of the policies have been applied without any exception in the indivudal case based on investigation.

B Now of course from what you have described this morning, there is a pending paper before the WD which would put the WD on record as saying that you can determine loyalty in individual cases of persons of Japanese ancestry and of course that, if th t is the case, that becomes the WD policy. I don't know that I make myself clear.

S Yes, that's perfectly clear.

B So that up to now don't you see, in the Pape case, there has never been a case under the mixed marriage policy which has been taken out from under the general policy on the basis of an individual investigation.

S That is very apparent.

B That has been the policy, don't you see. So that in order to let Mrs. Pape in there would have to be a change in the policy which the General was not at that time prepared to do. Now he... I can't say that he isn't willing to reconsider his position or that he might not be prepared to change hispolicies - I don't wish to leave that impression, because I can't. He may well be in a position to do it and he may well reconsider it. I don't know. But I wanted to make clear that under his present policy, at the time the Pape case was submitted, it was presented to him and to let her in would have meant that a number of others were also to have been let in.....which would mean a change in policy.

S Yes, of course I think probably (I'm only voicing my personal opinion - I don't want to be cited as authority on it by any means,) but it does seem...as you know, we presently have around 1600 batallions, 12 or 1600 I believe, but at least a batallion of infantry of Japanese. You know that.

B Yes, I do.

S They have been at McCoy, and they were moved last December to Shelby. That batallion is now being trained, given its final training, for overseas service. It is expected some time before June to send that outfit into combat. And along comes this combat team of around 4500 and it does seem that in doing that we have acknowledged that the Japanese is a loyal individual.

Certainly it would be incongruous, it wouldn't be very sound for us to send into combat people that we looked upon as being disloyal to us. And the War Department has made the decision of using these people in combat. And, as I explained in the beginning, that decision to use them in combat was studied in connection with the general decision of releasing people other than soldiers, from the centers.

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S It was felt that simply going into the centers and taking these Japanese out and putting them in the Army to fight without recognizin that other Japanese were not elligible to become soldiers and who were loyal, would make out position and statements of loyalty untenable.

B Oh I see the point very clearly. I see that very clearly and I don't question that a moment. It would be incongruous, no question about it.

S For your information, here's another piece of news that might be interesting to you. Congress has been flooded with petitions from all over the West particularly, for changing the administration of these relocation centers and asking th t the Army take them over.

B I have seen something to that effect in the papers.

S There is the Sons of the Golden West, the Bishop and to say nothing of the flood of individual letters sent in to us from the Congress, by the Congressman, and Senators. Most of whom are in the West, not all, but we had some from Indiana for instance, but most of them were from the West

B Is that so?

S In which they refer to these people as aliens and interned people and dity so and sos expressed dissatisfaction with the administration of the present set ap and asked that the Army take them over.

A committee has decided to investigate that and I think they are going to haveMr. Myer down there some time before long, questioning him about it.

V I've seen in the pape s that the Senate Military Affairs Committee is quite active in it.

S Senator Chandler of Kentucky, and chandler came down here Saturday to find our if the War Department has any views on the thing. Mr. McCloy told him very frankly that it was, the War Department wanted no part in running these centers.

B I should say not.

S That we didn't have or want to have that responsibility. He expressed the opinion that it was a social problem which the WD had no interest in, that we had a job other than that to do now. Senator Chandler said the people had great confidence in the Army to run them; they had done a good job on the West Coast in the evacuation and he felt that a great many people wanted the Army to continue it. I thought it might be interesting to let you know that.

B Yes, that's very interesting. I certainly hope it doesn't come back

B I certainly hope that it doesn't come back to he WD. You don't think there is any chance of that do you?

S Not if Mr. McCloy can help it.

B Well I think that everybody in the department is certainly of the same viewpoint.

S Yes it would be a pain in the neck.

B No question about it.

S He told Senator Chandler that he himself felt that possibly WRA hadn't acted, expeditiously in many instances, however he shouldn't criticise WRA, it was their problem. He himself might have some views about it and he wasn't sure or correct. But from his viewpoint he felt that WRA should have acted with more expiditiousness in the segregation problem alone, if nothing else.

B Well I hope it can be resisted. It would be a pain in the neck to get it back wouldn't it.

Be Yes I think so, very much so. It is a tough problem and it is a very difficult job and it is a social problem. The WD shouldn't have to take it on. It's gotten as you say, it's got so much else to do.

S Well that is Mr. McCloy's viewpoint and I think that is the accepted WD policy.

B I am sure that it must be and I know that General DeWITT feels strongly that way.

S He does? Mr. McCloy does feel that there should be a cleaning out of these places as soon as possible to get the bad effs out of the good eggsa and get the good eggs out of the place if they can. This whole problem of enlistment or induction and release to go to work will constitute one of the steps in cleaning them out.

B All right thank you very much.

S I don't know whether I have helped you or not.

B You have indeed.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNTW by ___ date 4/13/69

#565
wdc
2145Z 18 Jan 1943

Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and Mr. McCLOY, Asst. Secy. of War, Wash., D. C.

General DeWITT: How do you do, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. McCLOY: How do you do, General, how are you.

D: Fine. Mr. Secretary, I just called you up because Colonel O'Rear has just arrived and I am leaving tomorrow morning and he has shown me a copy of the proposed memorandum -- it is not dated -- on the subject of the Loyalty Investigation of Japanese-Americans in War Relocation Centers. After I had read that I sent a radiogram to the Chief of Staff requesting that I be given -- before approval -- an opportunity to comment on it, or at least so much thereof as pertains to the duty that he is apparently going to assign to this headquarters. I called you up to tell you that I had done that and hoped it would be granted.

M: Sure. We can get that. That is easy.

D: Because I feel that I wouldn't be loyal to you or honest to you if I didn't say that it is a sign of weakness and an admission of an original mistake. Otherwise --

we wouldn't have evacuated these people at all if we could determine their loyalty.

M: I don't know whether we are at one on that ---

D: I know we are not one on it --

M: We evacuated them from the West Coast because we thought the front was immediate. We couldn't sort them out immediately. The country is committed to a relocation plan.

D: The only thing is that there is going to be about 40 or 50 thousand investigations and at least 30,000 that will have to be made here in order to determine the loyalty or the disloyalty of a certain group.

M: We are not going to swamp you with something that you can't handle. I mean we are not going to put a burden on you that you can't deal with. But some process has to be made sometime toward relocating these people. I think that everybody is agreed -- at least everybody here is agreed -- that you can't keep them in pens forever. Not without involving yourself in some very serious risk. And furthermore I don't know whether you know, but the Staff has decided to use a substantial number of these on the active front.

D: It indicated that in here.

M: If you put them on the front, you have got to have some sort of a screening process and if you can screen for that purpose, you are in a logical position that you can't escape, that you are going to screen for other purposes. Now the method of how many will be released, remains to be seen. But we certainly are going to form a unit of them. This group that is up in Wisconsin has been inspected and the reports coming

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back from them are very glowing. We are going — the thing has been through a study here by the Staff itself, entirely un-influenced by me, which has come to the conclusion that they are useful as military assets. That having been decided, and it being necessary before you take that into the Army, to work out some sort of a method whereby you can at least prima facie determine that they are loyal to the United States it seems to me that you can't deny that others — screening process for purposes of relocation — That doesn't mean that we are going to throw them back onto your area, but that means to relocatethem in other places within the country.

D: I'm glad to hear you say that because after evacuating from here, we'd have a pretty difficult time trying —

M: . . . have an argument that it takes time to do it — as there might be -- but we haven't crossed the bridge of sending them back to the sensitive areas such as yours. However, we are going to put them — some of them — on the front lines. Alongside of our troops against the enemy. But not in the Pacific Area. But in other areas, and when you once make that decision, it is a pretty fundamental one. You've got to go — almost logically to the extent of applying the same method to other American Citizens that you apply to those —

D: Well, to react to that, you can use them only in a few places where you can use the American Citizen anywhere.

M: Anywhere except certain sensitive areas such as yours — we couldn't expect for the time being, at least —

D: No, I mean to say as a fighting force, you will have to select one of these areas where you can try these fellows to see whether they will fight one of the enemies, but you couldn't have them fight their own people — so you admit practically, there, that they are not Americans.

M: Yes. We admit that we don't want to put them up against the test of — I think it is largely because the war out there is primarily naval — and anyway it would be too much to put them in a jungle fighting against their own ---Remember that we think they are going to be a military asset in other sectors and that was passed around to a great many elements of the Army — I understand that you didn't concur, but many others of high military judgement did. After a great deal of deliberating, they decided that that was the thing to do. Once having decided that, some pretty heavy consequences flow. Once having determined that these people were to be evacuated from sensitive areas — after they had shown that they could behave, they were to be relocated.

D: You've been doing that right along.

M: It's only been going by individuals —

D: We did some of that ourselves.

M: Yes. Those camps are known as Relocation Centers. Personally I think it is sound. To hold these fellows locked up with the bad eggs in with the good ones — they are just contaminating the good ones. . . . . these experts, but we have talked with a good many people here who propose as such, particularly the Navy people, and they all unanimously say that they — there are large groups of them that are loyal. And that we are only spoiling a good portion of our citizenry by tying them up to this barbed wire project. There is this other element that feels that this will have a very profound effect in the far East. One of the most — this racial war — propaganda war.

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M: Another thing that influenced us very strongly was General Emmons' views -- who was here recently. He feels very strongly that these fellows will make grand soldiers. He says that he has had a lot of contact with them -- seen them and he spoke to the Chief of Staff when he was here -- the thing that he urged most strongly was that they be formed into combat units -- the only trouble you will have with them is trying to get them to retreat -- under orders. That is all. Of course it is all a matter of opinion. We are playing for some pretty good stakes -- I think that if the thing does work, we will go a long way toward improving our domestic Japanese problem and we may have a real impact on the enemy by doing it if they are -- if this idea of racial solidarity can be broken down. At any rate they have proven that at least they can fight. That is for their native cause -- the reports that we get -- you get -- as to the tenacity of these fellows in the fox holes at Buna show they have got some stuff in them.

D: No question about it. No question about their fighting ability. . . . as Japanese.

M: A Mikado philosophy only exposed to American chewing gum and moving pictures --

(Continued on next page)

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M. (cont'd) but only opposed to American chewing gum and moving pictures, there is a possibility at least that they may fight well for us. But at any rate, those are some of the considerations which --

D. I get it. I'd just like to comment on so much of that as pertains to me. It's the first I've heard about it and it's a tremendous job.

M. Well, we're not going to do anything that is going to swamp your headquarters. I think the way that thing was written it probably indicated that you might be so swamped.

D. Yes, I got a radiogram from the Provost Marshal that 30,000 at least were involved.

M. Well, we've got to work out some sort of a method -- process that will not tax your capacity and we'll modify that to fit your abilities.

D. It just says I'll do it. It doesn't indicate how it will be done or what type the investigation will be or anything about it.

M. We are working on the methods here now with the Japanese experts from the Navy and our own and we are setting up a board on it and the mechanics of it naturally we've got to work out in such a way that it isn't going to place an impossible burden on you. But that phase of it I don't think you need to worry about.

D. Well that's the only thing I've got to do with it except I hope they are not going to send any of them back here.

M. _____you put in your comments.

D. I have asked for authority to do that but it just went off.

M. I'll tell M_____that I asked you to and then you can go ahead on that.

D. All right, because I was going to be gone tomorrow and maybe gone for a couple of days.

M. _____the fundamental policy which brings about this procedure -- it is fundamental and I think it all flows from the determination or the decision, at least, to use Japanese units. I told _____ -- I don't want to tell you all over the telephone.

D. No, it's an open phone.

M. I heard that you weren't feeling so well.

D. No, I had a little trouble. It is all right now. I never was laid up. I've

been feeling all right.

M. I've heard that you were tied up for a day or two.

D. No, I was just laid up one afternoon.

M. I suppose you are going north.

D. No, I am going south for a conference with the Navy on the subject that you know about, you know what I mean, and I won't go north until certain other things have happened up there that are now going on that you know about.

M. From all I hear up there it is pretty good so far.

D. It's good. We lost some ships.

M. _____it was the weather conditions.

D. It has been awful. There has been a 60 mile gale practically the whole time, but it began to moderate yesterday.

M. All right.

* * * *

SECRET

JAN 21 1943

29/2

WCCA

18 January 1943

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

JLD/tgb

CSWAR

CG0112 COLONEL OREAR HAS JUST SHOWN ME COPY OF PROPOSED MEMORANDUM PRESCRIBING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING LOYALTY INVESTIGATION OF JAPANESE HYPHEN AMERICANS IN WAR RELOCATION CENTERS STOP PRIOR TO APPROVAL REQUEST I BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT THEREON OR AT LEAST SO MUCH THEREOF AS PERTAINS TO THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON THIS HEADQUARTERS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH

RECEIVED WDC & Fourth Army WCCA

DEWITT

CG WDC & 4A

OFFICIAL:

B. Y. READ
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

COPY

COPY FOR: AC OF S G-2:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by [illegible] date 4/13/66

FILE

SECRET

17

Record No. 58--59--60--61
Colonel Bendetsen & Captain Hall
January 19, 1943 Time: 10:25 a.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

H: What have you got on your mind?

B: I thought I'd like to chat with you for just a few minutes on something that is more or less off the record, and for what it may be worth. This plan that has been evolved on determining loyalty, etc.

H: Right.

B: The whole thing scares me to death. I mean it really scares me. But I assume it has gone along pretty far. I thought I'd like to toss a couple of suggestions out for what they may be worth. If you don't think they are worth anything, that is up to you, of course.

1. As I gather it, the plan is in part, is based upon an assumption that the record shows that evacuation was at least in substantial part...due to the fact that there wasn't time to determine loyalty. The record doesn't show that at all. The record shows something very different than that. So that in the development of whatever publicity or public relations - and of course they are two different things - is done, that should be borne in mind, that it doesn't show that. What the record does show is, that here was a concentration of persons on the West Coast -- a concentration that could not be permitted to remain. Not that there wasn't time to determine loyalty. The record shows as a matter of fact that the evacuation would be handled in such a way if there weren't an attack as to take time to insure that there would be plenty of room to receive them at the other end before they were moved. The element of time was not stressed at all. Except that should there be an attack. So I think that's very important to remember. As a matter of fact the record shows that (1) that it was a concentration of a large number of persons of Japanese ancestry in strategic areas near war plants and all that. And that it could not be permitted. And (2) That you couldn't determine loyalty and therefore you had to take the wheat with the chaff. Not that there wasn't time, but that you just couldn't. So that's what the original record shows. So whatever you do, I think you ought to bear that pretty closely in mind. That's what that record shows out here where the main record was made...in the Press and the Periodicals.

H: Well I don't know how well this so-called test is going to work. I think they're going to lean backwards on the strict side. And whether they ever had any connection with Japan or anything like that, he won't be accepted no matter what his other attributes may be. But they think that they have discovered a system which will give you perhaps a 90% result. Probably the 10% will be self-eliminated. In other words they will either become loyal or the loyal people won't have them around.

B: Well I just wanted to make that point. It seemed to be somewhat presumed that the record showed that...

H: I think that's part of the argument that we used here at some time or another. Of course you was here and I was not. But I remember having heard before mention that the justification for the evacuation in mass was that it had to be accomplished in a hurry and that no present solution existed for determining the loyal from the disloyal.

B: That is not what the public record shows...out here. I just wanted to make the point.

H: I certainly think we should be correct on our facts.

B: Yes, I think that's an important thing to bear in mind.

2. I think it is important also - if possible and I don't know that it is possible from the way I understand the plan to have been agreed upon ... I don't know if it is possible, but if it's possible, the War Department should stay out of the Relocation business in view of the record made up to now by the War Department. Now I think you see what I mean.

H: Well the War Department is staying out of the Relocation business except to the extent that it will upon the request of War Relocation Authority examine individual questionnaires and their records and if nothing turns up give their stamp of approval.....on a release. That is to avoid multiple investigations. As it was now, individuals would be released from Relocation Centers under their indefinite leave policy with which the War Dept. was not interfering...in other words they could not say who should go out or stay in, and then these individuals would get to the service commands and the service commands would get worried. They figured investigating the individuals. The individual had already been investigated by WRA and FBI and a study made of such records as were in the hands of WRA. And it was felt than an additional investigation by the Service Command was not proving anything, but to start the fellow off on a bad start...as suspicious individuals.

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B: Of course the War Department is now then putting itself in a position of saying who goes and who stays.

H: No not at all because the other conditions have to be met as to his job, he has to be recommended by War Relocation Authority. All the War Department is doing is making the investigation for the Service Command, so the Service Command won't need to make an investigation.

B: Well as I understand it, the man won't be released unless the War Dept. approves and says he is loyal.

H: No, this is supplementary to the indefinite leave.

B: Supplementary to the indefinite leave?

H: The indefinite leave procedure of War Relocation Authority.

B: Well as I heard the plan, it applies to all the Nisei, or practically everybody. That you will investigate everybody. So that I would think it would probably supersede it wouldn't it?

H: Well, it doesn't supersede it but WRA can take it as an advisory... on an advisory basis, as far as their indefinite leave program is concerned. They take it on a compulsory basis as far as plants vital to the war effort are concerned.

B: I see. So that for that purpose, the War Department is then saying who goes and who stays.

H: As far as war plants are concerned...that's what they do as far as any citizen is concerned.

B: Well, not whether they will be released or not.

H: It isn't a question of release. It is a question of employment in war plants.

B: I see.

H: The War Department...the opinion or recommendation of this Board is simply advisory as far as general release is concerned.

B: How could you keep him out of the evacuated zone, if you said he was all right to work in a war plant?

H: Well, that is I think, going to be limited to the areas outside of the evacuated area.

B: How can you be consistent - do one and say that he can't come in the other?

H: Simply sensitivity of the West Coast to enemy attack. The reasons justifying the original evacuation still exist in certain degree.

B: No, I don't see how they do when you say in your program the plan says that you assume that one of the reasons for evacuation was that there was no time to determine loyalty. One of the primary reasons. So that now that you decide that you can determine loyalty you've erased that reason, haven't you?

H: Well not necessarily. As far as the loyalty of this fellow is concerned, we feel that he is completely loyal. But because of certain military considerations - partly responsible for the evacuation, we feel at least for the present he should not go back into the evacuated area.

B: Kind of beats the devil around the bush, doesn't it? In a way...

H: Well would you think it would be wise?

B: To do what?

H: To re-enter the evacuated areas?

B: No I certainly don't. Not if you don't want to confess...to confess an original mistake of terrifically horrible proportions. That's what in my judgement this plan is pointing toward. Very materially so. I mean with all due respect...perhaps I am so close to the forest I can't see the trees. I've been on the ground too close to it, but ...

H: Seems to me Colonel there are 2 things. Either have the policy of the government to say "these people are no good for all time and we'll get rid of them after the war" or you can say "these people are American citizens like everybody else and give them their chance". --chance to do their part in this war, so that they won't be sufferers afterward. Now if you say the government policy is to get rid of them and send them back to Japan after the war, -- certainly, keep them in relocation centers.

B: I don't advocate that at all. Never have. Neither has General DeWitt. We don't advocate keeping them in centers. We released them for private employment from the beginning. See no reason why you can't. The indefinite furlough policy has been going on and the War Department never stopped it...the public hasn't stopped it. There are lots of jobs beside war plants that are just as important to the war effort as working on a high-explosive shell... raising tomatoes for instance, or potatoes, or beets. I don't say you should keep them pinned up. The idea that you either go whole hog and say that you can determine loyalty as against saying "no work at all"...I don't think anybody advocated that. Not ever, that I know of. That's the point I'm trying to make. Relocation has been going forward, but...

H: But slowly.

B: Very slowly indeed, for a different reason. Not because there hasn't been a demand. There's plenty of demand for agricultural labor. Plenty of it. There are 2 reasons why it has been going slowly. And this plan isn't going to overcome one of them. One of the reasons is that some communities won't take them. And another reason is that WRA hasn't been moving fast enough when there's been places where as I understand it there's a terrific demand for labor in agriculture.

H: WellI think that's true.

B: Well I think this is something so foreign from it;as I understand it, one of the reasons for this whole-hog plan was, the raising of a combat team. It isn't necessary to that. The only persons who'd say it...

H: ...you've got to give certainly opportunities besides fighting. Suppose a guy can't fight. Does he have to be restricted to agriculture?

B: No but there are a thousand and one other jobs he could do. I would think. I mean it's just being so close to it out here and feeling the hot breath of public opinion...

H: That is a very definite fact...I think you are sufficiently alert so that you are able to judge what is sound and what is simply inferior. All the letters that we have gotten about...on these anti-Japanese citizens letters, all against franchisement, owning land and all that. They all come from the Golden West and naturally those are the people that are most familiar with it.

B: Well I think that's true. There's...that's where the greatest incidence comes, naturally. That's where they were. Perhaps my judgement is dulled by having been too close to the picture for too long. I mean that happens often in anything. But I merely wanted to chat with you. Merely wanted to throw out one thing - particularly - what the public says here .... another thing, I sort of have an inmate fear of getting the War Dept. as a military establishment into the relocation business when it has leaned over backwards to stay out, and in the third place, when you come out with a plan and say that you can determine loyalty for working in a warplant around high-explosives, that you can hardly say that "well he can go back to San Francisco... it will be difficult to say that he can't" and when you do that you confess a very original, horrible mistake. I mean those things... those are the points...

H: ...confess an original horrible mistake. Because the possibility of Fifth Column activity of landing of parachute troops dressed as

civilians, the possibility of confusion. I think those are still very real factors. Suppose you have a group of...Suppose we let a number of American citizens of Japanese ancestry...

B: Suppose you drop white troops dressed as civilians. You don't evacuate all the white folks. That's no point. Suppose white people drop dressed as civilians. You don't evacuate all the white people.

H: Your danger on the West Coast is ....Japanese.

B: Well your danger on the East Coast is from Germans and Italians, who are white.

H: Yes but there are too many of them out here.

B: Too many what?

H: Far more assimilated than the Japanese population ever have been.

B: You mean too many white people on the East coast. That's not a point, because the enemy could drop white soldiers dressed as civilians, and could speak English. That...

H: But that would be on the East coast.

B: Well they could do it on either coast.

H: Not so easily on the West Coast.

B: I'm just trying to give you my reaction to the point.

H: There is a logicality there, there's no doubt about it. But I think it might be wise to take this as a first step, perhaps looking toward (if this works all right) to ward eventual return to the evacuated area providing the military situation warrants it.

B: Well I think that's certainly true, when the peace comes. That's when I think the military situation would warrant it with consistency.

H: Your position as I understand it is...

B: Mind you, however, I didn't make the original decision you know.

H: Your position is that there are some loyal Japanese and also that there are some disloyal Japanese and you can't tell them"one from 'tuther."

B: Well the record merely says we didn't know. We didn't make any determination. You couldn't.

H: Dpossible to disseminate.

B: That's right. Of course it is probably true of white people, isn't it? You know that old proverb about "not being able to look into the heart of another"? And "not even daring to look into your own"... well maybe there's something in that. Well, that's about it. I just wanted to talk to you because we haven't had a chat for a long time.

H: Did you speak to Mr. McCloy last night?

B: He called me up, yes. I didn't say much because he was in quite a hurry and he explained the plan to me in detail, but I didn't say much either way. I didn't have a change.

H: Yes he is very anxious that it work.

B: I have no doubt of that, and I don't want you to misunderstand me. I just am scared to death of it for reasons I've given you.

H: Well I don't know how it is going to work.

B: I'm scared to death principally because of the public relations part of it. That's it, to put it in a nut-shell. I don't know that they'll blow up any plants, maybe they won't. Maybe they will. Who knows? Maybe somebody else will blow up a plant using a Jap as an excuse. You know that's an old saw too. But I'm just scared to death of the public relations part of it.

H: I think that probably the net result will be that there probably won't be very many of them in war plants.

B: To go over it again, No. 1. There are millions of jobs other than in war plants that just must be filled.

H: Is the pay ashigh?

B: Pay as high? Sure. Why certainly. Matter of fact if I could get out of my present job I could earn a lot more money as a carpenter. I wouldn't even have to know how to...know what side of the saw the teeth were on. As long as I paid My union dues. Sure there are lots of jobs with plenty of pay. And No. 2, there's no bar to it now. And 3., the War Department is supposed to be out of the re-location business. 4. If they say they now can determine loyalty they're going back on what the public record said originally. And mind you first of all, (1) I think they should not be kept from private employment. I think every ounce of manpower should be used. That's one thing...

H: Even in Western Defense Command. Even in your evacuated areas?

B: No, not in the evacuated area, but anyplace else in Western Defense Command. I wouldn't make the evacuation merely an academic exercise...

...merely a practice gallup, that's what I'm talking about. Absolutely not. Even if the decision was wrong I wouldn't make it a practice gallup. Even in that case. I would find it very hard to justify the expenditure of 80 million dollars to build Relocation Centers, merely for the purpose of releasing them again. That, I would find difficult to do. See?

H: Of course. Part of this program is disbursal. We want to remember that.

B: Right. I see no objection to raising a combat team. I've always been much for it. I'm strong for it because I think it would be a ten-strike on the international relations side. As far a contribution to the winning of the war is concerned, I don't think it amounts to a hill of beans either way and I'm sure nobody else does.

H: I don't know.

B: The size of the force - no. I don't think anybody thinks it will make much difference but I think it will make a lot of difference in the psychological aspects of war which I think are very real. I do - I don't think you have to do all this to raise your cane but maybe the way you are doing it is the better way, in other words there are several methods of raising the combat team and maybe this method is the best one. I don't know. I don't know enough about it. I think it could be done another way without getting yourself into a position of probably being out on a public relations limb.

H: That's my part.

B: And lastly I think that certainly you should not pen up your assets; you've got manpower, you don't have to work them in California. You can work them in Utah or Illinois and you've got lots of agriculture, you've got lots of manufacture and you've got lots of transportation. They are working on the Great Northern Railroad now in Western Defense Command and nobody objects to that. General DeWitt authorized it.

H: Yes, I've got a letter up here.

B: Now you are taking the other side.

H: It was _____ to us by the ex-provost marshal General's office too.

B: Well, even the man who made the great decision out here to evacuate didn't object to that. I am merely trying to think out loud to you why I am scared to death of this proposal, if I understand it. Now maybe I don't even understand it - I must also make that reservation.

H: Well of course you will realize the necessity of avoiding the implication that was not intended that this combat field be used as a camaflouge.

B: There is no problem there, particularly if you put it on a volunteer basis. You will never escape that one, unless you put it on a volunteer basis and by the way, the argument that it shouldn't be put on a volunteer basis because the Japanese themselves have asked you to"conscript us so that nothing will happen,to _____ in Japan,"is an argument to look out for because if that s the case, then you don't want them in the army. Because as I recall it, one of the arguments against the refugees over here was that you couldn't use them because of what the Germans might apply in the way of pressure to their relatives. So look out for that one.

H: ...about 40 questions I understand...just open the man's whole heart and soul.

B: Well if a guy volunteers to fight, if he is American-born...

H: Suppose we don't get enough...

B: Then you've gotten an answer right then. You've gotten a pretty good answer about how good your plan is. If you don't get enough. That is the one ...one of the things you ought to find out. You won't get enough unless you segregate first. I honestly believe that you won't even get proper answers to questionnaires. WRA has had their experiende with questionnaires and has taken it on the chin. Now you're going to circulate them for them and until you segregate, I don't think you'll find out very much.

H: This is a process of segregation at the other end.

B: Yes, maybe it is. I can see that. If you don't get enough thru volunteer methods you've learned something.

H: That is a big question of course. The plan for that is to impose selective service.

B: Then you will be open to the cannon-fodder charge no matter what you do.

H: Well I don't know. You just treat it like every other citizen.

B: They weren't in the first place. They were evacuated. You can never overcome that one.

H: I know. You have to make special provision as far as...

B: How are you ever going to get over the fact that they were evacuated?

H: How are they? How are you?

B: I think that could be overcome when the peace comes by letting them work in various lines of endeavor and raising a combat team to...of volunteers who would carry the name of the American-born Japanese with them and if they do credit to them I think the future will be

well taken care of. Without getting out...

H: ...1500 from the fark far West. The combat team amounts to about 45 or 46. And we hope to get 1500 from the far, far, West.

B: Yes.

H: Leaving 3000 to be gotten from centers in the U.S. and outside. Think that's an impossibility? On a volunteer basis?

B: No, I don't. Not at all.

H: ...the circumstances?

H: Well yes, it is if you don't segregate.

H: Well this is going to go ahead pretty quick.

B: I think segregation could also. All you'd have to do would be to start segregation and let them know that you meant business and I think you could get them.

H: It's going to go this way - these teams are going to be at the centers _____ recruiting teams... _____ be there February 4th.

B: That's making good time. That's clicking right off, of course.

H: _____ as of February 1. And by April 1, the ranks would be full.

B: Yes, well that's good time. Well, I hope everything works out all right. Thanks for your time anyway.

H: I wish you were out here to give us a little bit of advice.

B: I don't think I could make any contribution. I just wanted to record my feelings that I am very worried about the public relations angle.

H: Locally, - on the West Coast, or nationwi de?

B: In the Congress for one place, and in the far West particularly. I don't know that the rest of the nation will quite reach the proportions the Far West will but they might reflect it. I don't know how that willgo. You see up to now we have kept the East and Middle West out of this pretty much by exerting very tight control. And we haven't had so far as I know, a cross-section of what they think.

H: Well, there was a gallup-poll. Did you see the results?

B: Yes, I did. It was a little hard to follow. It was very interesting. But I didn't quite get myself oriented on this one. I think in the

Congress and certainly in the far West--the Western states...

H: ...exists about the whole problem. The thing that appals me. We had several letters from _____ citizens, saying "how can you treat these Japanese that way? How can you give them food when we can't get it? How can you do this and how can you do that..." They have no idea that these are other than alien-enemy...at least some of them.

B: Well it is understandable even though it might apall you. It is understandable.

H: ...job remains to be done.

B: Oh I'm not trying to simplify something that is very difficult...

H: ...communication to the public. And I think if the Japanese-American combat....._____goes well, that willbe a great step forward to be done. (?)

B: I think and I still say, I am very much for it but I think it should be volunteer. At the risk of not getting it, it should be volunteer. Under all circumstances. Well,

H: Well suppose we went to these places and said "well you can come out to fight, but that's all" that would be a pretty poor position to maintain.

B: I think so too. That's why you've got to do some other thing. You've got to segregate.

H: That is fundamentally why we put that "war plant" in.

B: It will be interesting to watch it. Thanks very much. I guess we'd better tie the line up any longer. Good-luck.

H: Good-bye. And thanks for calling.

B: You bet. Good-bye.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" AUTHORITY OF G-2, WDC & 4th Army, FEBRUARY 6, 1943. INITIALS: HDL ?/

AG 291.2 (1-19-43) OB-S-F-M

January 20, 1943

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers.

TO : The Provost Marshal General:
Director, Special Service Division, S.O.S.

1. A Plan has been formulated whereby the War Department will, upon request of the War Relocation Authority, assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under its jurisdiction. The purpose of the plan is to determine (a) loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers, and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or may be available for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort.

2. The following administrative procedure is prescribed for accomplishment of the plan:

a. Questionnaires will be distributed in war relocation centers by teams consisting of an army officer and three enlisted men, including one Japanese-American soldier of the Nisei class. The teams will assist the War Relocation Authority in supervising the execution of the questionnaires.

c. Personnel for the teams will be obtained by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and The Provost Marshal General from Service Commands or other sources. The teams will be trained by The Provost Marshal General.

d. The Bureau of Public Relations will have charge of all phases of public relations involved in the accomplishment of the plan. Material for exclusive use in relocation centers will be prepared for the Bureau of Public Relations by Director, Special Service Division, SOS. In formulating publicity plans and working up material, appropriate representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, The Provost Marshal General, the Office of Naval Intelligence, War Relocation Authority, and Office of War Information will be consulted. No material will be released without the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff.

e. The execution of questionnaires for male American citizens of Japanese ancestry within military age limits who are not in relocation centers and who make application for voluntary induction will be accomplished by the Selective Service System.

f. The questionnaires executed by male American citizens of Japanese ancestry within the age limits for military service who make application

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ___ date ___

CAD. File

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for voluntary induction will be forwarded immediately without analysis or evaluation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, who will approve or disapprove such individuals for induction into the armed forces. The Military Intelligence Service will notify The Provost Marshal General of the results of its action, and will transmit to The Provost Marshal General questionnaires for those individuals under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority who are not inducted into the military service.

g. Copies of all other questionnaires, together with any information possessed by the War Relocation Authority pertaining to the loyalty of subject individuals, will be forwarded to The Provost Marshal General. A check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence records and an analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires will be made by the Provost Marshal General except for those individuals inducted into the military service under paragraph f. hereof. In cases where it appears to the Provost Marshal General that an investigation by the Western Defense Command will be of probable assistance, a copy of the questionnaire will be referred to the Western Defense Command for such investigation.

h. A Joint Board which by agreement with the Department of Justice, the Navy Department, and the War Relocation Authority will be composed of a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, War Relocation Authority, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and The Provost Marshal General will be created. The Provost Marshal General will transmit to the Joint Board the results of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence record checks; the analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires; and copies of the reports of investigation made by the Western Defense Command. The Joint Board will:

(1) transmit the investigation reports and copies of the questionnaires to the War Relocation Authority, together with its recommendation concerning the release of subject individuals from relocation centers on indefinite leave; and

(2) will state whether the Joint Board has any objection to the employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort of any of those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are released by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to its recommendation.

3. To assist in the execution of the plan, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War will coordinate the activities of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff; The Provost Marshal General, and the Director, Bureau of Public Relations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War will also be the point of

contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the formation of the Joint Board.

4. To prevent duplication of investigation, except where necessary upon receipt of supplementary information or for other cogent reasons, a list of American citizens of Japanese ancestry recommended for release by the Joint Board & their classification for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort, will be forwarded to the Western, Eastern, Southern and Central Defense Commands, and all Service Commands [.]

5. The procedure prescribed herein is intended to supplement the leave regulations and Administrative Instructions No. 22, Revised, issued by the War Relocation Authority, and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/S/ J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General

COPIES FURNISHED:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of War;
Deputy Chief of Staff;
Commanding Generals,
Services of Supply;
Defense Commands in the United States;
Service Commands;
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department General Staff;
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff;
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff;
Office of Naval Intelligence, War Relocation Authority;
Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Office of War Information.

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~~WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF~~
DISPOSITION FORM
G-2

AG
G- MID 291.2 Japanese (1-8-43)

SUBJECT: Organization of a Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry

Date 1-20-43

TO	___C/S	___G-1	___G-2	___G-3	___G-4	___Air Staff	
	X TAG	___OPD	___USW	___ASW	___ASWA	___CG	___Army
	___AC	___BLP	___BOWD	___ExRA	___NGB	___CG	___Army Corps
	___INF	___FA	___CAV	___CA	___ENGR	___CG	___CA
	___ORD	___QMG	___CSO	___SG	___FIN	___CG	___DEPT
	___GHQ	___JAG	___CWS	___IG	___B/PR	- - - - - - - - - - - -	

FOR	X S/W directs	___Comment or Concurrence	___Necessary action
	___Draft of reply	___Remark and recommendation	___Information for reply
	___Direct reply	___Inviting attention to	___Ind. approved
	___Approved	___See notation of _____	___Primary interest
	___Disapproved	___Information	___Notation and return
	___File	___Consult_____	___Noted_____

BY ___Spcl Msgr ___Radio ___Air Mail ___Immed. Action Ltr ___Letter.....

That a secret routine radiogram, substantially as follows, be directed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

MEMORANDUM JANUARY ONE TWO ONE NINE FOUR THREE COMMANDING GENERAL

AGF DIRECTS ACTIVATION COMBAT TEAM COMPOSED FOLLOWING UNITS COLON ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT T DIAGONAL O SEVEN DASH ONE ONE CMA ONE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION T DIAGONAL O SIX DASH TWO FIVE CMA ONE ENGINEER COMPANY T DIAGONAL O FIVE DASH ONE SEVEN PD FILLERS TO BE AMERICAN CITIZENS JAPANESE ANCESTRY PD ACTIVATION CAMP SHELBY MISSISSIPPI NOT LATER THAN FEBRUARY ONE ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD CADRE PERSONNEL AFTER CLEARING BY WDGBI FURNISHED PERSONNEL UNDER CONTROL AGF AND SOS PD ONE ZERO ZERO INFANTRY BATTALION NOT TO BE USED THIS PURPOSE PD INITIAL STRENGTH THESE UNITS ONE FIVE PER CENT OVER STRENGTH PD FILLER PERSONNEL

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dlw/2-17-43.

MID 291.2 Japanese (1-8-43)

SUPPLIED THROUGH SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM VOLUNTARY INDUCTION ONLY WITHOUT REQUISITION AFTER CLEARING BY REPRESENTATIVES OF WDGBI PD TO ARRIVE CAMP SHELBY MISSISSIPPI NOT EARLIER THAN MARCH ONE ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD SELECTIVE SERVICE DIRECTED SUPPLY THROUGH VOLUNTARY INDUCTION FOUR FIVE ZERO ZERO MEN WITH APPROXIMATELY ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO COMING FROM HAWAII PD ALL WILL BE GENERAL SERVICE AND SPEAK ENGLISH PD INITIALLY REGIMENTAL BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS WILL BE WHITE AND OTHER OFFICERS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE PD ORGANIZATION THESE UNITS WILL NOT BE PUBLICIZED OR USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WITHOUT ~~THE~~ APPROVAL BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS WD WASHINGTON D C PD APPLICATION DIRECT TO BUREAU THIS PURPOSE IS AUTHORIZED PD DESIRED YOU TAKE NECESSARY ACTION SELECT ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO MEN FROM YOUR DEPARTMENT INCLUDING PREPARATION ~~SUCH~~ PUBLICITY PD ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM TO SUPERVISE COMPLETION SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE EACH CITIZEN OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY WHO MAKES APPLICATION VOLUNTARY INDUCTION FOR SERVICE IN THIS COMBAT TEAM PD FOUR COPIES QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EACH PERSON WILL BE FORWARDED BY STATE DIRECTOR SELECTIVE SERVICE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO G DASH TWO HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT PD DETERMINATION ACCEPTABILITY FOR SERVICE ARMY WILL BE DETERMINED BY YOUR G DASH TWO UPON ~~AN~~ EVALUATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND RECORD CHECK OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE FILES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION PD ONE COPY THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE RETURNED TO STATE DIRECTOR SELECTIVE SERVICE TERRITORY OF HAWAII STAMPED OR MARKED AS ACCEPTABLE OR NONACCEPTABLE AS ~~THE~~ CASE MAY BE FOR SERVICE AUS PD ORIGINAL OF QUESTIONNAIRE IN CASE OF THOSE ACCEPTED WILL BE SENT TO WDGBI OTHER TWO COPIES WILL BE DISPOSED OF

Rec'd 12-17-43.

MID 291.2 Japanese (1-9-43)

AS G DASH TWO HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT DEEMS DESIRABLE PD THREE REMAINING COPIES OF COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE IN CASE OF THOSE DEEMED NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR SERVICE AUS WILL BE DISPOSED OF AS G DASH TWO HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT DEEMS DESIRABLE PD COPY QUESTIONNAIRE WHICH IS MARKED ACCEPTABLE FOR SERVICE AND WHICH HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO STATE DIRECTOR SELECTIVE SERVICE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT WILL ACCOMPANY VOLUNTARY INDUCTEE TO INDUCTION STATION PD DESIRED THAT INDUCTION STATION MAKE FORM PART OF VOLUNTEERS INTELLIGENCE FIELD FILE PD SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM ADVISES FOUR ZERO PER CENT REJECTION FOR PHYSICAL OR OTHER REASONS CAN BE EXPECTED PD RECOMMEND AT LEAST TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY BE MARKED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR SERVICE TO OBTAIN QUOTA OF ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO MEN PD RECOMMEND THAT QUOTAS BE ARRANGED FOR ~~THE~~ VARIOUS ISLANDS ACCORDING TO POPULATION SO THAT ONE SECTION MAY NOT BE PERMITTED PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAM MORETHAN OTHER SECTIONS PD CG SOS HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO TRANSFER MEN PROCURED IN HAWAII TO CAMP SHELBY BY FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION

2500

4 A. G. O.
JAN 20 1943
RECEIVED

HORACE H. FORSTER
Colonel, G.S.C.
War's Evacuation Officer.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

JAN 23 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

This is in accordance with Lt. General McNarney's directive and has the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, and the Bureau of Public Relations, Major General Surles. Mr. McCloy directed that the message go by radiogram rather than by letter.

ACTION TAKEN: 1/22/43 by rad to CG HWN DEPT, Cys to: OPD., WDGS; Mil Per Div SOS. EHB/mjc 2 B 939

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED 1/21/43

3

1/22/43

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Provost Marshal
Presidio of San Francisco, California

January 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

SUBJECT : Investigation of American-Born Japanese for Loyalty.

1. In the event the Commanding General desires to utilize the facilities of the Investigations Division of the Provost Marshal, Western Defense and Fourth Army in the anticipated required investigation of Japanese under the proposed War Department directive, the following plan is submitted for the consideration of the Commanding General:

I.

We will require the following information in questionnaire formfrom each Subject in order to initiate the investigations:

1. Full Name (including any alias).
2. Place and date of birth.
3. All schools, colleges and other institutions of learning attended (including afternoon schools, if any).
4. Marital status, birthplace of spouse, and names of children.
5. List of all residences by town, street and number, for past 10 years.
6. List of all employment (full or part time) for past 10 years, and addresses.
7. Membership (present and past) in organizations, societies, clubs or committees.
8. Church membership (present and past).
9. Names and addresses of relatives residing in the United States or elsewhere including their positions in business and whether they have had military service or have been in the employ of any government.
10. Dates and places of any arrests with statement of offenses and disposition.
11. Serial Number and date of all passports ever issued to Subject.
12. Detailed list of all trips taken outside the United States, including dates, ports of exit and entry, and names of ships used for passage.
13. 3 references (2 of whom are native-born American citizens presently residing in the Western Defense Command, who are not internees.) with whom Subject has been in close contact during the past 7 years.

VV/W
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Original returned to G-2, WDC, on June 2, #1.

14. A photograph of Subject.

NOTE: It would also be desirable to have an agent interview Subject at the time the latter fills out the questionnaire in order to obtain a chronology of Subject's activities. Also, if possible, Subject's fingerprint classification should be obtained for an accurate check of police agencies.
Subject to be advised on the face of the questionnaire that any omissions made by him therein will be unfavorably construed.

II.

The following type of Subject will be automatically rejected on an initial screening of the questionnaires:

1. All Subjects who have made a trip to Japan within the past 15 years.
2. All Subjects who are members of, or previously belonged to, Japanese Societies of unknown loyalty or which were controlled from Japan.
3. All Subjects who furnish inadequate information concerning date and place of birth, and their activities during the past 10 years.

III.

The scope of our investigation will be as follows:

1. Agency Checks: (by submission of lists.)
   a. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
   b. G-2 (CIB), WDC & 4th Army, Presidio of San Francisco.
   c. Office of Naval Intelligence.
   d. Local Police.
   e. County Sherriff's files (except in San Francisco).
2. Birth check. (By mail).
3. Education. (By mail. However, if Subject attended a school or college since 1937 this will be handled by interview and an attempt to contact key instructors.)
4. Employment. (Prior to 1938 by mail, since 1938 by personal interview.)
5. Neighborhood check. (Extent depending on local conditions and may include any of the following: mailman, policeman, merchants, white landlord or white neighbor.)

FWBS

6. Banking Institutions. (By mail or interview depending upon which is most expedient in each case.)
7. Civic Organizations such as YMCA, Church, etc., if pertinent. (By mail or interview, depending on which is expedient in each case.)
8. Unusual Leads. (If pertinent to loyalty. Method to be used to be that most practicable in each case.)
9. References, secondary references. (Mail and/or interview, whichever practicable).

NOTE: Trend of Subject's activities during the past 8 years, including associations, affiliations and investments will carry weight in determining his loyalty.

/s/ Lewis M. Means

LEWIS M. MEANS,
Colonel, Infantry,
Provost Marshal.

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BASIC MECHANICS OF PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR ARMY
RECRUITMENT AND THE DETERMINATION OF LOYALTY OF THE JAPANESE EVACUEES

a. A recruiting team consisting of one Caucasian officer, two Caucasian enlisted men and one Japanese enlisted man will be formed for each Relocation Project. The personnel will be obtained by the AC of S, G-2, and the PMG from Service Commands and other sources.

b. The teams will be trained by the PMG with materials provided by the Bureau of Public Relations.

c. A questionnaire has already been prepared for use in the program. (It is understood that this questionnaire was prepared in the Navy Department.)

d. A recruiting team will go to each Center, explain the program, distribute questionnaires to American-born Japanese, and answer all questions concerning the objectives and the mechanics of the program.

e. Those American-born Japanese who are sufficiently interested in either (1) joining the Army, or (2) being released from the Center will voluntarily return the questionnaire.

f. Those questionnaires from <u>males</u> within military ages will be sent directly to G-2, all others directly to the PMG.

g. Questionnaires from <u>those</u> who wish to join the Army will be retained by G-2 and the cases investigated. The forms for those persons not accepted for the Army will be forwarded by G-2 to the PMG.

h. The PMG will (1) check records of <u>ONI</u>, <u>FBI</u>, and <u>WRA</u> to determine loyalty; (2) <u>examine questionnaires</u> for evidences of disloyalty; and (3) transmit a copy of all questionnaires, except those handled by G-2, to the WDC.

i. The WDC will investigate all cases and report the results of its investigation to the PMG.

j. A <u>Joint Board</u> (representatives of Navy, FBI, WRA, AC of S, G-2 and PMG) will receive a report from PMG on each case. This report will consist of three parts; The results of (1) the record check, (2) the analysis of questionnaire, and (3) the WDC investigation.

k. The <u>Joint Board</u> formulates a recommendation concerning the release of each individual.

l. The <u>Joint Board</u> recommendation is transmitted to WRA for action.

m. Recommendations favoring release will be transmitted to WDC, EDC, SDC, CDC, and all Service Commands for information.

n. American-born Japanese males who are accepted for Army service will be processed entirely by G-2.

TAB A
NOTE: Tabs B, C. D. and E available in General Files.

Record Nos. 85, 86 and 87 and 88
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Scobey & Capt. Hall
January 21, 1943 Time: 1:45 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy - Rosalie Russell

SUBJECT:

S; Here's Hall, hold the phone.

B: Fine.

H: Hello, Colonel.

B: Hello Hall. I wanted to talk about 2 things. 1. I wanted to call you in response to your call. I just got back from Hq., and 2. I wanted to talk about automobiles. I'll speak about No. 2 first, to get it off my mind. You'll recall we sent you the statistical data on the number of Japanese owned cars. We have now..what I want to know, is what more do you want? We have the cards all stacked into classifications, which show what - as of today, this date - the records of the State Motor Vehicle Departments show as to cars owned by persons of Japanese ancestry. They are all classified and sorted, but we have not listed them, don't you see? We can do that if that's what you want. Will you find out from Jeffers what is wanted now? What more he wants?

H: ...hear from him except a form of a letter of thanks for information we forwarded to him.

B: I see.

H: He's taken no action and made no indication of what he wants done. But, I think he expects some final California figures.

B: Well I have some final statistics...

H: ...in California...

B: I can give you the numbers if you want the numbers. By actual count.

H: Do that in the form of a letter, setting forth also your classification and sorting you have accomplished and then we can just send it on to him and say "here we are, we're waiting for orders".

B: Check. I'll do that. It will go from here in a day or so. Probably tomorrow. To Mr. McCloy from Gen. DeWitt.

H: Good.

B: O.K. Fine. We'll send you the actual count and tell you what the classes are and say we're standing by for any further requests. Now on your phone call regarding Dr. D. First, Hall, if I may ask, what did you want him to do specifically?

H: Well specifically it would start out by giving these personnel for these teams that are going to visit all these relocation centers, a little bit of his experience dealing with the Japanese problem. I think probably you might be far more qualified to do that than Dr. Dedrick. I think at least he's had sufficient contact with the problem so that he could be of assistance to these officers and men that are going to visit these centers. He could also give them pointers probably to filling out these questionnaires, securing their executions. As to the minute mechanics of it. Then you will recall, or perhaps you will not recall, but the system provides that all those volunteering for induction into the Army, their questionnaires (and are within military age) their questionnaires are returned to G-2 here for evaluation. Now the number involved is going to be (for relocation centers) approximately 3000. And to process 3000 over (or within) a period of 3 to 4 weeks, is quite a job. To try to do it on an individual basis. I had in mind that perhaps Dr. Dedrick could do a little weighting of answers to questions. There's one question "Do you desire repatriation"? I don't know whether that's one of the questions or not but it, - if it was - obviously that would render a person undesirable for military service. Now there might be other questions of not as great significance as that, or the answers to which may not be as significant but which could be graded on a numberical basis as to their relative significance, if you see what I mean. And you could perhaps arrive at some mathematical formula which would be very helpful. At least if the score ran up against an individual beyond a certain limit you could be pretty damn sure you didn't want to examine him on an individual basis.

B: I see.

H: Now that's highly technical work and requires a good deal of imagination and hard work.

B: I think that's probably within his field. Now I have the picture.

H: As far as addressing these teams in concerned, we'd want him for Wednesday or thursday of next week. Now these questionnaires

will not begin to come in much before the 15th of February.

B: May I ask this: - If I may.

H: You may always ask me anything.

B: All right. I see the picture. Now as Major Moffitt told you, we're trying to whip out this final report. Dr. D. is my editor. I have to go over the whole thing, but he is coordinating the work of the staff and the whole staff's working on it...Try to push it out, get it off and get through with it. By February 15th we will be through with it. Now I don't know how you're going to route these teams at all, but most of the centers are in the far West. Would it be possible for you to route the teams so that he could address them here before they st rted and then they'd go through. Meanwhile he would wind up his final report work and be free of the report to do the rest of the job that you have in mind. Now of course I want you to know this: The Commanding General wants to assist the War Dept. in every way he can in view of the fact that you've made a decision back there on that you're going to do. And anything he has out here naturally, whether he agrees with the decision before it was made or not, doesn't affect it..he's going to support it to the full tilt. And so is everybody else even though prior to that time we didn't agree to what you decided on...we didn't have a chance to discuss it, but all we know about is what Colonel O'rear told us..though we weren't consulted, you've decided it, and we're going to support it with all we've got. So if you need Dedrick, He's naturally yours. Without question. But I merely point to this final report which I know the War Dept. is interested in, as well as WRA and everybody else. So that it is possible that you could accomodate both things?

H: Well I don't think it would be..first of all, all the teams would be here...5 each, 50 in all. They'd all be here. There certainly wouldn't be any point insofar as the Arkansas center is concerned, or perhaps the Wyoming or Colorado, to shoot them out to the Coast. It might be possible so far as Manzanar is concerned and Tule Lake. But I thought...my thought of it was the real opportunity for Dr. Dedrick to be useful was when the returns begin coming in.

B: Well that's all right. I get your picture of how you plan to send them out, so it would not be feasible to rendezvous the

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teams here. I understand. Now...

H: There is also the time element that I neglected to mention. Due to leave here on Sat. January 30th, arrival at the centers on February 4th.

B: I understand exactly what you have in mind. Now if you want him to make the lecture, could he fly back and...fly there and fly right back here?...to finish the report.

H: Well, how would you like to come out and make the speech?

B: Well that would be a matter I would have to discuss with General DeWITT. I don't know, whether he feels I would be available or not or whether I could make any contribution. Of course...

H: You've had a great deal of experience with these people.

B: Well I've been exposed to a good deal but if that is Mr. McCloy's desire, I'll ask the General.

H: Well I tell you what he said...something was in dispute over there in the Provost Marshal General's office ... _____Censor man_____Dr. Dedrick....didn't he have something to do with relocation centers and I said "sure". Seems to me he had some pretty good idea..._____ and then I mentioned it to Mr. McCloy to see what his ideas were on it and whether it was all right to ask you to have Dr. D come on here..and of course you might get Bendetsen too. So there you are.

B: Well...

H: The possibility of your coming was definitely suggested by Mr. McCloy.

B: Yes, well of course if he wants that I will speak to the General. I however raise this one point in the conversation. You may want to mention it to Mr. McCloy and you may not. You can best be the Judge of that. In ivew of the stirring around on Capitol Hill that's been going about these days and of course all we know about that is what we see in the papers, if I were in Washington and it was known it might be that I'd be yanked up on the Hill and is the political situation regarding this relocation business such that that would be prodent? In other words...

H: Colonel Scobey and I were up on the Hill yesterday. Appearing before the sub-committee of the Senate. Military Affairs Committee.

B: I see.

H: Investigation on the War Relocation situation, generally speaking. ...Waldrum shom you doubtless know - from your home state... has introduced a bill on the date of January 18.

B: Well we see all that in the papers. About the bill, etc.

H: Which provides for the transfer...

B: Oh yes, all htat - the whole business is in the newspapers Every day.

H: Much better coverage than we do here.

B: Oh yes sure, it is on the front pages. Been in there for two weeks now.

H: That's the reaction we don't get here at all.

B: That's right. It's been on the front pages for two weeks.

H: Dillon Myer was up there yesterday. And they taxed him pretty severely on segregation. His advances were fairly weak on it.

B: I can imagine they were.

H: However, as far as this program of getting out the good ones, the Committee ended up very much in favor.

B: The only point I was making was that if that is a consideration, well and good. If not, well and good. As far as regards my coming.

H: Yes. As a matter of fact the Committee is going to be on travel one of these days. Might be next week. And if the Committee found you in Washington when they arrived in California, you might have made a smart move.

B: Well there's that too, I didn't know just when they were leaving. Now let's put it like this. As regards Dedrick, that's number 1. If he is to come to make this indoctrination talk, you would have no objection to his going there for one day and coming right back so that he could finish the report, would you?

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H: Certainly not.

B: In other words that's all right, isn't it?

H: That would be a satisfactory solution.

B: So that he could return here for example, spend another couple of weeks and...say a fortnight on his report and then be available to do his work on the questionnaire. Weighting it so that he could work out a numberical formula so that he could do what you suggested. Is that all right, as an outline?

H: That hasn't been taken up with G-2 who will do the evaluation, but, I think they would....and would welcome the service of someone like Dr. Dedrick.

B: Right. Well in order to get it more specific, in other words so he would be available <u>if desired</u> for that work. Is that all right?

H: Yes.

B: So that that much is out of the way. Now on your question as to whether I can come, I would have to take that up with the Commanding General, if Mr. McCloy wants me to come.

H: Well as a possible alternative to Dr. Dedrick's coming for the purpose of giving a little talk, you might find it would be beneficial. And naturally the decision which was made was not made in ignorance of your views. And view of the Commanding General.

(conversation picked up on
page 7 of transcription.)

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B: Well, what do you think Mr. McCloy desires on my coming?

H: Well all that I can tell you is that he suggested.

B: Then shall I speak to the General about it?

H: I think it would be a great benefit myself and I think my feelings about the matter are in agreement with Mr. McCloy.

B: And that would be for next Wednesday or Thursday or Friday and just for the day is that it?

H: That would be just for the day except that probably an additional day could be advantageously employed in discussion of the entire problem.

B: I see, in other words say two days there or at the most three, is that it?

H: I would say so, yes.

B: All right I will take it up with General DeWITT. That would be to arrive there to be available Wednesday. Now tell me this is there any railway priorities that the Wat Department controls on transcontinentals.

H: Yes, I think so.

B: There is a stream liner leaving here Saturday and if I can in view of the terrific weather situation out here I would not fly now. I would be sure to be grounded and I would like to come on the stream liner if I come. Do you control any priorities?

H: Well I think so. I always understood that the War Department had a little_____in each train.

B: OK, well I will take that up with the General and if I come do you also desire Dr. Dedrick?

H: Well I should think would not need him if he came.

B: All right then if I do come the understanding will be that Dr. Dedrick will be made available at the soon as possible time.

H: If desired.

B: If desired in connection with your evaluation activity and if I do not come I will arrange to get Dr. Dedrick there to make a talk before this group and also he will be made available if desired in connection with evaluation activity as soon as practicable with the understanding that he will wind up this report and I think he

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can do it in two or three weeks. Is that O.K.?

H: Yes.

B: All right, fine. I will let you know and I will take it up with the General on my going.

H: Now I've got one further point. Long staple cotton. They are after us again. The suggestion is now as to Maricopa and Penal County. 50% of the cotton is lying unharvested on the fields, furthermore time for planting is approaching, plowying and planting. The suggestion was made, and it was made to me over the telephone by somebody from the farm bureau that the previous disastrous experiment be repeated. Now we've just received a letter from the four congressional and senatorial representatives from Arizona, strongly recommending thatsomething be done and that the Japanese is neither permitted to go out and harvest this cotton that is going to waste.

B: All right, may I make two suggestions?

H: Well let me make the suggestions. I assume that one thing that could be done would be to repeat what happened before even though it was highly inefficient. The 2nd proposition would be to let the people do the work and guard it in those 2 counties and the third possibility would be to change the boundary of the Western Defense Command Area, Military Area No. 1 to not to take in those two counties, that would leave still a county-wide strip next to the Mexican border. Now I am through. What have you got to say?

B: What I had to say was this. Assuming that the proposition is to be actively considered. I have two suggestions. 1. The use of evacuees for labor is a matter for relocation authorities.

H: That's already diverted to us.

B: Well but last time I want to point out that their use was in part unsuccessful because they did not push it.

H: That's right and they just don't want to start it this time.

B: Then I just don't feel that unless they say that they want to do it and ask wehther the War Department can arrange it. Don't you see?

H: That's right.

B: In other words your three suggestions wouldn't work until it was established that WRA would undertake to do it.

H: Do it on a scale commending with the_____ commensurate with the amount of debit) that would be put into it.

B: Right. So I honestly urge that to go through the same thing again would be in my opinion, disastrous.

H: Right. 00 Well I am looking a little bit towards the future and....

B: No. 2. If WRA will do that and you will request the War Dept. to arrange it then, will you send a radio to General DeWITT from the War Department so that we can have a record on this? Would you do that?

H: Yes.

B: Well those are my suggestions.

H: Well now supposing WRA says that they will furnish say...a thous nd. Guarantee a thousand.

B: All right, then if they say that, then the thing to do would be to say "WRA has guaranteed to furnish 1000 evacuees laborers for harvesting Maricopa and Penal long-staple cotton." Query-- is it feasible for Western Defense Command to arrange for their use in that area either (a) by the former method of guarding the boundaries or (b) by letting them go in unguarded or (c) by changing the boundaries of Military Area 1. That's all there would be to it.

H: Cross that bridge_____

B: Right. I think you should, don't you?

H: Yes.

B: I'll take it up informally, but I honestly urge you to....

H: I don't want to take it up even informally. I think that it could be made very clear that the number of people that resulted from the efforts made last time was so small that the program really isn't worth undertaking.

B: Quite right.

H: Unless a guarantee is obtained from War Relocation Authority backed up by tangible evidence that they can get a substantial

number of people to do the work.

B That's absolutely right.

H; O.K.

B: Do we agree?

H Yes sir.

B; Very well, fine; I'll let you know about my coming.

H; Well I'd like to see you.

B; Id' like to see you, too. O.K.

~~SECRET~~

1st Ind.

SPGAE/320.2 (1-8-43)

Hqs. S.O.S., Military Personnel Division, Room 4B 438, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., January 22, 1943.

To: The Adjutant General, Room 4E 794, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

1. The Military Personnel Division will, with the Director of Selective Service and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, publish the necessary instructions in regard to the procurement through Selective Service of the 4,500 enlisted fillers for this combat team.

2. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces is arranging for assignment of officer personnel to this combat team and is taking the necessary steps to comply with the directive in respect to grades and qualifications and the procurement of the cadre.

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL SOMERVELL:

RUSSEL B. REYNOLDS
Colonel, G. S. C.
Director of Military Personnel

E. B. MOOMAU
Lt. Col., A.U.S.
Assistant Executive

A.G.O. JAN 23 1943 Received Rm 4E 794 to be noted - OB-S-5

A.G.O. WAR DEPARTMENT RECEIVED 1943 JAN 25 PM 1

AGO JAN 25 1943 RECEIVED CLASS & REPL

OUT JAN 23 1943 WAR DEPARTMENT SERVICES OF SUPPLY MIL. PERS. DIV.

No action by AGO. Now above is withdrawn & action being taken by others AGO -

7248

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET RESTRICTED
REGRADED ORDER SEC ARMY TAG PER
~~SECRET~~

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Ltr Hdqs 3-3-43.

Record #98
Colonel Bendetsen & General DeWITT
1-22-43 Time 9.A.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECT:

DeW Bendetsen, Mr. Lederman, how about 2 o'clock.

B I think 2 o'clock will be fine sir; may I call him and confirm that; he said he would be glad to come anytime that.

DeW I have a conference at 11 o'clock and I think it would be better about 2.

B All right sir, unless I advise the aide that he can't be there, at that time, it will be 2 o'clock sir.

DeW All right;

now there are a few things I would like you to do if you will about that draft I spoke to you and Weckerling about; Get Watson in on it.

B Yes sir, I have spoken to him this morning all ready.

DeW How about the report; I am not concerned about it, but in view of the fact they want Dedrich in Washington, will that delay the report?

B A little yes sir, I spoke to them yesterday about it; I told Capt. Hall the situation, and here is the arrangement sir. He is to fly back to be there on Wednesday of next week, to make a talk to the teams they are organizing to go out to these Centers and he will fly back here immediately, and remain here until he finishes his task of the report; then he will be made available to them if desired to help them with the evaluation of the questionnaires; they have in mind that he will be helpful in devising some methods on weighting the answers, so that I think that will work out all right; I am going ahead with it actively myself, of course, I have to read it all, and edit it, so that it won't delay it materially, more than two weeks.

DeW That's fine.

B I think the comments should have those legal aspects in and it should be in three parts and Colonel Watson is looking up the third part on the legal aspects.

DeW That's fine old man.

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Lt Col Washburn

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Records No. 2 - 3 - 4
Colonel Bendetsen & Mr. Braum
January 22, 1943 Time: 10:28 a.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

Br: There's a wash-out up the line, so the Moffitts haven't arrived yet and I'm in the office. Your material hasn't arrived yet either. So based upon what I read the other day, plus our conversation, I've been trying to put down here what I understood to be the premises. But I'm up against a couple of snags, so before I went any further, I thought I'd check with you.

1. To draft _____ Japanese-American citizens into the U.S. Army for full combat service. That's the starting point, isn't it?

Be: Well I was just giving that a little thought first. Suppose you go ahead with your premises before I comment on that. I'm not so sure.

Br: All right.

2. To create an Army Board to examine the records of proposed draftees to determine possible disloyal individuals. That's 2. Now I have a 2a.

2a. And/or to determine possible disloyal individuals among all male citizens of draft age and create a pool of potential draftees.

2b. And/or to determine the possible disloyal individuals among all citizens of all ages. I don't know which is which.

Be: I don't either, but I think you'd be safe in leaving both in. I think it is the latter, from what I read. In other words, Mr. McCloy said specifically in his conversation "well, suppose the man is ineligible to serve in the Army because of age or physical condition. Why would you prevent him from working in a war plant...deny him the priveledge accorded other citizens?" So I assume it is 2b.

Br: In otherwords this Army Board is going to examine the record of all citizens of all ages to determine possible disloyal individuals. And from among those there will be a pool of eligible citizens of draft age...from which _____ Japanese will be drafted. Is that about it?

Be: That's about it. But I think I'd leave 2a and 2b in your proposition in the alternative, because...

(2)

Br: It makes a hell of a difference as to which it is.

Be: Well I don't know which it is, but I think it is the latter because they were discussing the incongruity argument, so extensively that it must be the latter. I can't tell from the plan myself because they say in the plan "all on request of War Relocation Authority this Board will determine the loyalties of evacuees". Now there's no limit on age, so I think it's 2b.

Br: All right.

"Those not drafted to be released as loyal citizens and eligible to do any work at any place." In other words given complete freedom of action.

Be: Right.

Br: Then under 3a. (that's 3)"are the families of the same to be also included in the release and the loyalty bill of health?"

Be: The plan doesn't disclose that, but I'm sure they plan to release the families unless there is something affirmatively against one of the members.

Br: In other words, any citizens of any age. Now am I right about citizens?

Be: Yes. Nisei.

Br: They must be citizens.

Be: That's right.

Br: Any citizen of any age upon being having his record examined by the Board and given a clean bill of health, will be released and given complete freedom of action.

Be: Right.

Br: All right. That's what I wanted to know.

Be: Now of course if a family is to be released, it might have to include the Issei. That's another uncertainty in the plan that's not expressed. But of course the Issei wouldn't be given a clean bill of health for work in the war plant. Don't you see? In other words, look: (a) They are going to release anybody they feel like. In that connection however, because of point 1, they feel that any Japanese-American citizen who can be given a clean bill of health on the loyalty side, should be put into an eligibility pool for working in war plants. Now that doesn't mean the others won't be released, but the War Department won't act(as I read the plan) on any group other than American-born.

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Br: All right, now I can see that my No. 1 is in error, because the basic, although it may have started from the standpoint of drafting men for combat service, it has left that and the basic thing has now become the fact that the Army is going to create a board to pass upon, or rather to determine whether any American citizen in the centers are disloyal.

Be: Can I read you the plan?

Br: Yes.

Be: Just a minute...I have to get it.

Br: I just want to get Miss Pearce to take it down.

Be: Yes. I haven't got it here. Just a minute. (Calls Dr. Dedrick and asks that he bring plan down immediately.)
It's coming down from the end of the hall.

Hello? Here it is. This is the way it reads.

"Upon the request of the War Relocation Authority, the War Dept. will assist in determining the loyalty of Japanese-Americans under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority. The purpose of this plan is to determine (a) the loyalty of Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class, to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from War Relocation Centers and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or be employed in the plants and facilities which are important to the War Effort."

Now you'll note that there is no draft age limitation there.

Br: Yes. No, it is all inclusive.

Be: Paragraph 2.

"The following Administrative procedure is prescribed for the accomplishment of the plan:

(a) Questionnaires will be executed by Japanese-American of the Nisei class in War Relocation centers.

(b) The questionnaires will be distributed in War Relocation centers by teams consisting of an Army officer and 3 enlisted men, including one Japanese-American soldier of the Nisei class. The teams will assist the War Relocation Authority in supervising the execution of the questionnaires.

(c) Personnel for the teams will be obtainedd by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Provost Marshal General from service

commands or other sources. The teams will be trained by the Provost Marshal General.

(d) The Bureau of Public Relations will prepare the announcements, training materials for the teams, speeches, press releases, and will have charge of all phases of public relations involved.

(I believe you'll recall that we referred to that word "speeches" before, Ted.)

(e) The execution of questionnaires for male Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class within Military Area age limits who are not in Relocation Centers, will be accomplished by the Selective Service system."

Br: Am I correct in assuming that that's the first time males have been mentioned?

Be: That's right. That's the first time males have been mentioned and it is the first time military age has been mentioned. It also refers to the group who are not in Relocation Centers.

"(f) The questionnaires executed by male Japanese-Americans within the age limits for military service will be forewarded immediately without analysis or evaluation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 who will approve such individuals (correction: who will approve or disapprove) such individuals for induction into the armed forces."

Now there you have the answer to your question. The Military Intelligence Service will notify the Provost Marshal General's Office of the results of its action and will transmit to the PMG questionnaires for those individuals under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority who are not inducted into the military service.

"(g) Copies of all other questionnaires - (that's all others, males, females, etc.) together with any information possessed by the War Relocation Authority pertaining to the loyalty of subjects will be forwarded to the Provost Marshal General. A check of FBI and ONI records and an analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires will be made by the PMG except for those individuals not inducted into the military service under par. (f), hereof. A copy of all such questionnaires will be referred to the Western Defense Command for investigation."

That's the one that.....they don't say what kind of an investigation, but unless it means going into the communities of the persons

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involved, there isn't anything else you can do.

"(h) A joint board composed of a representative of the Navy Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, War Relocation Authority, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Provost Marshal General, will be created. The PMG will transmit to the joint board the results of the FBI and ONI record checks, the analysis of the answers given on the questionnaires and a copy of the reports of investigation made by the Western Defense Command."

Is that clear?

Br: Yes.

Bc: "The joint Board will: (1) Transmit the investigation reports, and a copy of the questionnaires to the War Relocation Authority, together with its recommendation concerning the release of the subject individuals ø from Relocation Centers on indefinite leave, and (2) will state whether the joint Board has any objection to the employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort of any of those Japanese-Americans who are released by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to its recommendation.

(3) To prevent duplication of investigation, except where necessary upon receipt of supplementary information, or for other cogent reason, a list of Japanese-Americans recommended for release by the joint board and their classification for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort, will be forwarded to the Western Defense Command, the Eastern Defense Command, the Southern Defense Command, the Central Defense Command and all Service Commands for information.

(4) A procedure (the procedure) prescribed herein, is intended to supplement the leave regulations and administrative instructions No. 22, Revised, issued by the War Relocation Authority and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority."(The regulations referred to are their furlough arrangements)

That's all of it.

Br: Yes. I've got it now. It is in effect a loyalty board...pure and simple.

Bc: Pure and simple.

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Br: However, so far as I could gather from that, the intention at this moment is to confine the activities of the loyalty board solely to the American citizens.

Be: That's right.

Br: They probably haven't recognized yet that that gets them ihto a hell of a lot of situations so far as the non-citizens are concerned because of family ties.

Be: That's right. Of course there's this to be said for that, that there's nothing in this plan which would prevent the release of a family-tied group of non-citizens. They would merely not have a bill of health clean enough to go into a war plant. But the point that strikes me about it is this, that they expect to be able to induce the communities to accept these people because of the clean...

Br: ....by approval of this board.

Be: Yes, well they can't give the stamp to the aliens. That's the point, I think...

Br: That's the whole point.

Be: That's where they're headed for trouble.

Br: That's the whole point and the reason for the creation of the damned thing.

Be: Yes.

Br: The WRA's release program hasn't worked because the communities wouldn't accept them. So they've got to get some seal of approval on it.

Be: Right.

Br: O.K., I've got it. Thanks.

Be: Thank you. Bye.

Records No. 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10
Colonel Bendetsen & Captain Hall
January 22, 1943 Time: 3:50 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy - Rosalie Ruscell

SUBJECT:

B: Go ahead.

H: "Problems which may be encountered in the accomplishment of the program, and suggested solution."

B: In the accomplishment of the program?

H: Yes.

B: Which program?

H: These teams going out.

B: That is the execution of the questionnaires.

H: Yes. And the speeches that are going to be made and all that.

B: Go ahead.

H: ...that it would be a good idea if he could arrive some time Wednesday and get familiar with what was going on ... the general scheme of things, and deliver his talk on Friday morning and then beat it.

B: Get on the plane Friday night.

h: Yes.

B: Well that's all right. You've already assigned him the topic and that's the topic.

H: Well, as you see, it is very, very broad. In other words he is committed to nothing.

B: I see. Right. O.K. I'll tell him that and he's to talk Friday morning, just make the one appearance, and he can leave Friday night and come back here and complete his work on the report and be held available if desired in connection with any further activities.

H: Right.

B: Well there's a streamliner out of here Saturday. He'd like to take the train...doesn't seem to want to fly this trip, and that would get him in Tuesday. That would keep him away a full week but that would delay the report that much. But I guess it's all right.

H: Yes. Well if he wants to leave...I don't know how much space he can get ahold of, but if he arrived here Thursday it would be perfectly all right.

B: Right, well we'll work it out so that he'll be there not later than Thursday and probably a little sooner than that. O.K.

H: I spoke to Mr. McCloy. He said that he thought that probably you'd better be around in the eventuality that you'd have some visitors out there.

B: Yes. All right, I'll cancel my reservations. O.K. Fine, how's everything else?

H: Well let's see...You're going to get some further questions suggested to you. How about this question of people in uniform armed with suitable leave papers. Is there any reason why they should get a permit from the Western Defense Command?

B: Well, put up the question and we'll...you mean to come into the evacuated zone?

H: Yes.

B: Well the General has been pretty tight on that policy from the beginning. There is something that the War Dept. did that I think was a misunderstanding somewhere along the line. I don't think it ever came up to you at all. But in the War Dept. information directive put out by the Adjutant General, I haven't the citation before me at the moment, but I can get it before we're through, - American soldiers of Japanese ancestry are required to get permits to come into Eastern Washington, Eastern Oregon and Northern Arizona. That is to say Military Area 2. Well we never asked for that. California 2 is a part of the evacuated zone, but in Washington, Oregon and Arizona only Military Area 1 applies, and with the result that under that which is a pure misunderstanding, a Japanese in uniform can't go into Washington and Oregon because of a War Department directive -- not because of any proclamation, whereas any other Jap can.

H: That's pretty stupid.

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B: Well yes, it just doesn't make sense. And I think that could be corrected right on the spot back there. Should I give you the citation? You wouldn't need to do anything about it...I mean you wouldn't need to consult us because we didn't ask for it. It's just got in thru misunderstanding.

H: Yes. Well of course nobody back here except a few chosen people ...myself...know where these damned boundaries are anyway.

B: I guess the proclamations are not prescribed reading. Just a minute...

H: Good. On the whole subject a little bit, we take these people into the Army it seems that if we trust them that much and trust them in war plants, we ought to trust them to go in uniform into the Western Defense Command.

B: You mean into the evacuated zone?

H: Yes.

B: I thought you were coming to that. Well you're certainly where I was afraid you'd get. Hold on just a minute...That's a letter of October 7, 1942. AG 220.71. Repeats... AG 220.71 (9-28-42) OB-S-E. Catch it?

H: Right. Dated October 7th?

B: Yes. That was a secret letter and the classification was reduced to "Restricted". By authority of the Adjutant General, letter of November 19, 1942. Same file. 220.71. Now that was brought to my attention. I think the War Department should fix that one up.

H: They certainly should.

B: The Commanding General would have no objection to that. In other words he never asked for it. That of course you understand relates just to _____ to Washington and Arizona. The _____ parts of those states. So that for example, here's the way it reads - let me read it to you:

"Soldiers of the Army of the United States of Japanese ancestry, may be granted furloughs for the purpose of entering the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona in cases of: (a) extreme emergency, (b) death and (c) other circumstances.

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Well, that paragraph too, should apply only to Military Area 1 of Washington, Oregon, Arizona and all of California. You get it?

H: Yes. I always get used to saying the "California portion of Military Area No. 2".

B: That's what everything...what everyone is used to, so you go on and say it that way. I usually do myself. In response to the second question you popped in regards to as long as you're going to trust them in war plants why don t you let them back into the evacuated zone...I was just afraid that was what you were thinking of.

H: This is soldiers in uniform.

B: Well, what's the difference? If you trust them....look, the argument was, if you were going to trust them in uniform, if you found one you thought was loyal but merely had a physical disability, which alone say prevented him from wearing a suit, what about him, you going to let him in too?

H: This fellow has got ordinary authorized leave papers.

B: I am talking about the 2nd question you asked me. ... That was "What about letting the rest of them in?"

H: No, just soldiers in uniform, with authorized leave papers.

B: Into the evacuated zone.

H: Right.

B: Well you'd better put it up in a request to the Commanding General, because he's been very tight about it, and I feel sure his answer would be "no". I can t tell you with solid conviction, but pretty nearly that, Hall.

H: Yes. I mean I can't see that the permit adds anything to it. You know that the guy is around, perhaps, but what of it? Supposing you do know that he is around. Just worries you a little bit more.

B: Well it is quite a protection for him, I'll tellyou.

H: He's got his leave papers with him.

B: Well that doesn't protect him.

H: Why shouldn't it?

B: Well because the General public has been told there is no one of Japanese ancestry who should be out here. Unless he has apermit.

H: They can be told different, can't they?

B: Well, I think you're asking for something. And if you tell them, I'm pretty sure you're going to get it. Not from anybody but the "dear old public".

H: Yes. Now supposing they are given a regular identification badge.

B: I think something probably could be done. What's the pressure... I mean what's it all about? Why are you worrying about it?

H: When these teams get out to these centers, and start telling them about this thing, they are going to begin to ask questions. One of the questions is "What about the Western Defense Command - the evacuated area?" Now as far as warplants are concerned on the Pacific Coast or any permanent residents, it is my feeling that they should stay away from there for time being.

B: For the time being?

H: Yes.

B: I see.

H: I expect a "clash" there.

B: Well look...now I didn't make this decision, I'm just trying to keep it on the track. Don't misunderstand me.

H: ...soldier in uniform...and by the way the idea of keeping permanent residents out, prohibiting permanent residence in the evacuated area, would apply also to ...similarly to the stationing of soldiers out there. If you simply had fellow visiting temporarily, their families, I should think that would be subject...susceptible to different treatment perhaps.

B: Perhaps it would. Why don't you put the question up formally? Or...I strongly recommend that if the War Dept. wants to do that, they'd put the question up and say they want to do this and "your comment is requested". And that I think, is the proper way for you to do it, don't you?

H: Yes.

B: "The War Dept. believes this is desirable. And requests comment." I see what you're ~~arguin~~ arguing about...pretty fundamental.

H: A lot of these people in these Relocation Centers if they go into the Army, they'll want to know "Well what is going to happen to my family? Do we go back to our homes and all that?" I think it is taking a pretty firm stand, but they are going to raise a good many policy questions and there isn't time to decide them.

B: How are you going to answer them? Aren't you going to tell them the truth and say "No!"?

H: Not for the time being.

B: Aren't you going to be forthright with them ... and say we're not going to undo everything just because this opportunity is being given you? I think you've got to be forthright and right across the table with them.

H: Oh absolutely. But...

B: I wouldn't say that if you do this that probably all these things will be undone, you can go back...I think that would be a hell of a note.

H: Take a specific case of the soldier in uniform who wanted to visit his family in Tule Lake and has to get all sorts of gold braid and permission from San Francisco, that s pretty tough.

B: I think it is myself. We have changed our policy out here, so that anybody who asks for a permit, can get one. Did you get the significance of that?

H: No...

B: Well, let me repeat it for you. Everyone who asks for a permit, can get one.

H: Anyone?

B: Any American-Japanese soldier who wants to come to Tule Lake to visit his folks can get a permit.

H: You mean any American-Japanese soldier can get one?

B: Why of course.

H: You said "anyone". That's what worried me. Any Japanese-American soldier.

B: Yes. For any reason.

H: That is something I am very glad to hear.

B: That we have changed our policy out here so that if he wants to come in, he can come in.

H: What about that poor fellow that got to the doors of Manzanar or something and all of a sudden he was told that he didn't have a permit and he's had to get out?

B: He was told that by the Project Director who didn't even have the sense to call us and ask us what to do about that. So why do you throw that one in our face?

H: Well I am just asking about it.

B: Well I explained it to you once before and it is on the same basis he should have let him in and called us about it.

H: All right now.

B: I mean we are not that unreasonable about it.

H: What is your justification for him coming?

B: The justification for a permit, Hall, is that we have had an evacuation out here and the people have been told that it was a necessity for the evacuation and that no persons of Japanese ancestry would be allowed in this area without a permit and if given a permit they would have to follow prescribed routes and if the military would know where they were at all times. That is the whole story.

H: What are the prescribed routes?

B: Whereverwould be convenient for the particular applicant as long as we know what the route is and then he checks in when he arrives and he arrives at a given destination and when he leaves he surrenders his permit;

H: And you say that is as much for his protection as it is to quit down public apprehension.

B: Well, I think as a matterof practical business I think yes, it is very much for his protection and has much for his protection, as it is for the other. There have been some of them. By jove, let me describe this to you. The Army went in to recruit for the language school, - they went to Manzanar and they got about 8 Japanese, - they were in the custody of American-Caucasian soldiers and when they got to Los Angeles, not so long ago, it put the whole town on its

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ear. Reports began pouring in here that there were several hundred Japanese at large in L.A. The Chief of Police hasn't gotten over it yet.

H: I would like to get out there.

B: You are awfully far from the scene of things out here and I think all of you ought to come out here for awhile.

H: The whole War Department.

B: That's right, it would do a lot of good on this question. Particularly the team you are organizing so that they would have both sides of the picture.

H: Well that is one reason why I thought it was desirable to have Dr. Dedrick.

(Conversation picked up on page 9)

B: Well I can see that but it would be even more valuable if they could come out here but if you can't do it, we will do what we can to send him and I think he will be helpful.

H: The Stary-~~O~~ eyed boy from the Navy, Commander Corrigan, he is a very nice fellows and has had a lot of experience but he hasn't had any practical experience with relocation centers. He has been working in Hawaii where public different situations exist.

B: Some wag out here said it's a fine thing the Navy department telling the Army that they will make good soldiers. ThatIs the current talk.

H: Well the Navy is about to do something itself.

B: Oh, fine

H: Going to use them on Coast Guard, I think. Out around San Francisco.

B: Tell them to go ahead, I won't stop them.

H: Hve them firing away.

B: Well more power to you.

H: The trouble is I haven't had a chance to talk to you for so long that I thought of.....lose the touch you know.

B: Well the phone has been open.

H: Well it isn't my room anymore. If I want to talk to you I have to get and if the Colonel is talking to someone else that isn't promising.

B: No, quiet so. Well I can appreciate that. I think the War Department ought to correct the letter I refered to. I think you can do that. That was based on a misunderstand or misapprehension as to what was wanted.

H: I remember seeing it and I think I know.

B: No. 2, Any American soldier.....

H: You want me to make it doubly sure on this one.

B: No. 2, Any American soldier, Japanese ancestry who wants to go to Tule Lake for instances doesn't have to show that his father or his mother is an extremest, he can go for any reason but he must have a permit to get in.

H: What is the mechanics of a permit?

B He applies to his Commanding Officer for a furlough and his Commanding Officer has the instructions before him, they have been issued by the War Department circulizing all Commanding Officers, and he then gets in tough with Western Defense Command by direct communication and asks for a permit. He gets one by radio.

H In just about two weeks, is it?

B No, if it lands in here this morning, it is out this morning, by radio or telegraph.

H Do they usually come by telegram?

B Well, some of them come in by telegram, that depends on the Commanding Officer.

H Do they have many?

B Not so many. The War Department Directive itself is not very encouraging, but so far as our policy here is, that is to say the circumstances under which we will grant any request for permit is very board and relaxed.

H One of the officers here in the War Department has got a friend down in Robinson training some American Japanese, says they make wonderful soldiers, very enthusiastic, better set than they have ever been in their life, don't get tired, full of pep, snappy, studious, well disciplined brave and will work, will make fine soldiers. They go to bed at night, some of them burst out in tears about their families in relocation centers.

B Well, I have no doubt they would make very good soldiers. I would like to train an outfit myself because everyone seems to agree to that. I mean they train well, and learn and study and apply themselves and it just seems to be a characteristic.

H The file on Masaoka has not come in yet.

B It has not. I think I told you what we replied.

H Yes, you did. We had a letter from VFW...Veterans of Foreign Wars... proposed letter which they intend to write to the Secretary of War saying that it is inconsistent and descriminatory to have Japanese-American students in colleges----------away whereas U. S. citizens of Caucasian derivation are sitting in the mud of Guadal. They also have a press release all sewed up on that..... which the Japanese-American as a "slacker" sort of a guy that prefers college to the fighting grant. So we're going to discourage that approach until this program gets under way.

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Then if the situation changes to the extent that it's not advisable to reopen the selective service, why then the VFW can go ahead with it.

B Why did you abandon a volunteer group?

H That has not been abandoned?

B The program makes it look pretty much that way.

H Has it arrived?

B Well, we got it from Colonel O'Rear, your plan.

H It was completely voluntary.

B This team?

H This combat team?

B Yes.

H Completely voluntary.

B Well, the program we have here doesn't look anything like it.

H Well, the questionnaires are going to be filled out by all Japanese-American citizens, male and female, regardless of age, except we don't go below the age of 16. One of the questions that is asked on the questionnaire, "Do you want to volunteer" - I don't know the exact question, "ARe you willing to volunteer for induction into the Army of the United States?" The ones that answer that question in the affirmative will be processed by G-2, to determine whether their loyalty is of much high degree, that they are acceptable to the armed forces.

B Then what happens?

H They'll be made up of that bunch.

B Well, don't you draft them?

H When?

B To get them in.

H No, military induction.

B Mr. McCloy told me they were going to be drafted and one of the reasons was that the Japanese themselves had urged that so that reprisals wouldn't

H Eventually.

B No, he said they were ....he said that you had abandoned the volunteer plan because the Japanese themselves had requested that that be the case

so that there wouldn't be reprisals against their relatives in Japan.

H Well, that was certainly discussed at one point. The entire plan as now constituted is entirely on a voluntary basis.

B Well, that's very interesting.

H Well, next month will be very interesting, I'm sure.

B I'm sure it will.

H I'll probably end up in.....well, where is a good place?

B Come out here, it's very good out here.

H I might end up in Adac or someplace like that.

B That's all right, too, for an experience. I was up there not long ago.

H Did you have a good time?

B Yes, very good.

H You didn't happen to see a friend of mine named Captain Gwinn, did you?

B No.

H He's at one of those air basis, I don't know which one.

B No, I didn't meet him. If I go up again, I'll look him up. I'll probabl head up that way pretty soon.

To Mr. Peebles
for action

Record No. 13 - 14
Colonel Bendetsen - Mr. Braun
January 22, 1943 Time: 4:45 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

B: Go ahead.

Br: First, for my information, and it may be useful, I tried to boil down the plan into a basic statement; "That all American citizens of Japanese ancestry are to be examined by a joint Board. (a) males of draft age to be certified as to loyalty to the Selective Service and same will be drafted for full combat service. (b) The balance to be certified to War Relocation Authority for release for employment in warplants, etc. and in effect be given complete freedom of action. (c) Certification to be based upon (1) questionnaire (2) record, if any, with ONI, G-2 and FBI (3) Western Defense Command check of those which are doubtful. The basis factor in the plan is the premise that it is now possible to determine the loyalty of disloyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry and that the Board in effect guarantee and accept wholly the responsibility for the future action of those which it certifies as loyal. (Paragraph)

a/ "At the time of evacuation, many elements in our population charged that it was unnecessary and based on hysteria and/or pressure from selfish West Coast interests desiring to ~~be~~ rid ~~(correction: desiring to rid)~~ the West Coast area of Japanese. The Army answered this by positively stating that a Military necessity existed. Critics then questioned the necessity for mass total evacuation and asked why it was not confined to aliens or others known to be disloyal. There was considerable public discussion at the time as to why loyalty boards were not used. These critics were answered by statements, direct and indirect from authorities, that it substantially impossible to determine the loyalty of Japanese. Cited, were ties of race, religion, customs, positions, and the fact that the group had largely been unassimilated. (Paragraph)

b On the other hand, a majority of the public was not critical of the evacuation, but on the contrary whole-heartedly indorsed the mass evacuation and in my opinion still views all Japanese with suspicion. (Paragraph)

c Thus in viewing the public relations of the proposed plan, there are 2 definite problems created. (1) Those elements originally

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At that time the evacuee group was under complete military control and security requirements were satisfied – there was time to determine loyalty without expending 50/ to 60 millions in relocation centers.

critical of mass evaluation will ask: Why was not loyalty determined during the Assembly Center phase if it can be done now? (2) Those major elements in the population that view Japanese with suspicion may or may not now accept them in view of the propsoed certification by the Board. It is doubtful if they will be accepted unless a very substantial and logical selling job is done. And so far as the Western states are concerned, it is probably that this area will remain recalcitrant in spite of such a selling job." That's it.

B: Oh, very good. A darn good statement. Thanks very much.

Br: Well I tried to make it temporate.

B: Well I think you succeeded very well in doing that.

Br: And at the same time to point out the two major things, you see. Of those who were critical and those who were favorable.

B: I think also that the latter paragraph might be expanded a bit by showing that notwithstanding the selling effect of a certificate, that there will be families which must be considered as a unit and there'll be no certificate on the remain der.

Br: That's right.

B: Which would tend to weaken the case, and probably not soften the communities.

Br; Yes. Hub also raises a further point, which I have no basis for judgement on t his one, but he raises the point that there are not now in existence sufficient records either in G-2, ONI or FBI upon which to base a determinatio n of loyalty or disloyalty.

B: Well that's of course...I think Hub is probably right about that, but I don't know that the Commanding General would have any warrant for saying that. He may not have enough records but does he know that they do not exist elsewhere?

Br: That's right.

B: I believe Hub is probably right. If he wasn't right, then why would they want to refer it out here for investigation? Well, very good. I'm a little...I'd like to throw this one at you. In thinking this one over today somewhat, I'd like you to talk it over if you have any time, give it a little thought tonight, maybe you've already thought it thru - I haven t. Looking at

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the evacuation not with hind sight, but viewed in the time, it was a time and space affair. It wasn't entirely that we flat-footedly announced that it was impossible to determine loyalty, it was a location...a space and time affair. We couldn't afford to take the chance - their location was such that they were deployed along very strategic areas of the frontier and great concentrations.

Br: Karl I had thought about that one, which is why I most deliberatly phrased one of the questions which I phrased, namely, - Why was not loyalty determined during the Assembly Center phases? You have there solved both your time and space factor.

B: Perhaps you have.

Br: The fact that it was not done at that point, is the chief hook in this whole business, in my opinion.

B: That goes on to answer the incidental question "Why spend the additional 80 million to build relocation centers?

Br: You had them under control but you had not yet moved them inland --you had not yet spent any 80 million dollars --you had accomplished the main thing as to time and space. And at that point, if you could determine loyalty, it should then have been done.

B: And that will have to be answered.

Br: It will have to be answered.

B: In other words the answer may be that you could have, but that's not such a hot public relations answer.

Br: I've just been talking that overwith Hub and I said "If you fellows were to say to me tomorrow, - that is the big rub, what were we going to do about it? - because we're going thru with this anyway," the best thing I had thought of up-to this moment was for us to be completely honest and say "well maybe we could, though we didn't think so at the time.

B: Right. We still don't think so out here.

Br: No but I'm talking now about suppose we were told "you gotta' do it" and "how are we going to do it?" That's the only answer I could think of that would make any sense.

B: Didn't think so then but we do now. Maybe our ø ideas on the Oriental have been all cock-eyed.

Br: We've got more information now than we had...and that we thought

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we could get.

B: That's right. Maybe he isn't inscrutable. All right thank you, hope you're having a good time.

Br: But there's the big rub -

B: Right. That's the thesis. Not that you couldn't do it. We don't know. Maybe you can. But why didn't you then?

Br: Yes.

B: All right, thank you.

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

January 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

SUBJECT: Comments on the proposed program for Army recruitment of, and the determination of loyalty of Japanese evacuees.

1. This memorandum considers the above subject under ~~four major headings~~:

~~(1) The mission~~

(2) The basic mechanics

(3) The basic assumptions

(4) Comments on the plan and program.

THE MISSION

2. The objective of this program, as I understand it from a careful reading of the available telephone conversations and the letter outlining the plan is (1) to recruit as ~~many~~ American-born Japanese ~~as possible~~ for an army combat team, and (2) to determine the loyalty of American-born Japanese, other than those accepted by the army, in order to facilitate the WRA release program.

BASIC MECHANICS

3. It is my understanding that the following steps will be taken in the accomplishment of this mission:

a. A recruiting team consisting of one Caucasian officer, two Caucasian enlisted men and one Japanese enlisted man will be formed for each Relocation Project. The personnel will be obtained by the AC of S, G-2, and the PMG from Service Commands and other sources.

b. The teams will be trained by the PMG with materials provided by the Bureau of Public Relations.

c. A questionnaire has already been prepared for use in the program. (It is understood that this questionnaire was prepared in the Navy Department.)

d. A recruiting team will go to each Center, explain the program, distribute questionnaires to American-born Japanese, and answer all questions concerning the objectives and the mechanics of the program.

e. Those American-born Japanese who are sufficiently interested in either (1) joining the Army, or (2) being released from the Center will voluntarily return the questionnaire.

f. Those questionnaires from males within military ages will be sent directly to G-2, all others directly to the PMG.

g. Questionnaires for those who wish to join the Army will be retained by G-2 and the cases investigated. The forms for those persons not accepted for the Army will be forwarded by G-2 to the PMG.

h. The PMG will (1) check records of ONI, FBI, and WRA to determine loyalty; (2) examine questionnaires for evidences of disloyalty; and (3) transmit a copy of all questionnaires, except

p2 Tab B

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those handled by G-2, to the WDC.

i. The WDC will investigate all cases and report the results of its investigation to the PMG.

j. A Joint Board (representatives of Navy, FBI, WRA, AC of S, G-2 and PMG) will receive a report from PMG on each case. This report will consist of three parts: The results of (1) the record check, (2) the analysis of questionnaire, and (3) the WDC investigation.

k. The Joint Board formulates a recommendation concerning the release of each individual.

l. The Joint Board recommendation is transmitted to WRA for action.

m. Recommendations favoring release will be transmitted to WDC, EDC, SDC, CDC, and all Service Commands for information.

n. American-born Japanese males who are accepted for Army service will be processed entirely by G-2.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The following basic assumptions are inherent in this plan:

a. That it is desirable to have in the United States Army a combat team consisting of American born persons of Japanese descent.

b. That to get such a combat team it is necessary simultaneously to provide for the release of other American-born Japanese from Relocation Centers.

c. That as a condition of release it is necessary for the Japanese to have a definite stamp of approval as to loyalty guaranteed by a joint board of the Army, Navy, and FBI.

d. That there has now been devised a satisfactory procedure to determine the loyalty of American-born Japanese, and that this plan is acceptable to all of the investigative agencies.

e. That the plan will produce the desired results because, for all practical purposes of the war effort, (1) the records of the investigative agencies are sufficiently complete for all Japanese-Americans, (2) a satisfactory questionnaire has been devised and (3) an investigation of each Japanese person in his former community of residence will produce additional, objective loyalty evidence.

f. That, since no statement has been made indicating that the machinery would be operated for the duration, the basic loyalty determination for all practical purposes can be a "one shot" operation undertaken simultaneously in all Centers.

g. That the program will result in the acceptance by the American community of those Japanese who are given the official stamp of approval as to loyalty — and it is not intended to force a segregation of families, the American community shall accept the uncertain aliens members of their families.

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The information now at hand is not sufficient to even [redacted] to answer the following questions:

a. Will the presence of parents, brothers and sisters, children, etc, in Japan or Japanese occupied territory (i.e. possibility of "pressure" by Japanese Government) be considered in the process of clearance? Same question for father or brother in internment camp in this country.

b. Will the War Department as such undertake the publicity campaign necessary to make the loyal Japanese acceptable in all communities and occupations, including war industries?

c. Will a Japanese whose loyalty has been verified be permitted (1) to return alone to the evacuated area of the West Coast for employment in war industries under exactly the same circumstances as he could be employed elsewhere in the United States, (2) to bring his wife and children and/or his parents with him? Also, will the members of the families of soldiers be permitted to establish residence outside of the Relocation Project, including the return to their former residence in the evacuated area?

d. Will the applicants for loyalty investigations be required to submit pictures and complete fingerprints with their questionnaires?

COMMENTS ON THE PLAN AND PROGRAM

The active mechanics of this program effectively places the responsibility for its succes on the War Department. The teams are Army officers and enlisted men; the questionnaire analysis is an Army function; and the locality-of-former-residence investigation will be done by WDC. However, the Army is neither administratively nor for relocation. Yet this is definitely and conclusively a relocation program. responsible for the operation of Relocation Centers. It was definitely understood at the time the War Relocation Authority was established that this agency would free the Army from responsibility for the relocation of Japanese evacuated from the West Coast area. It was deemed wise to require the clearance of evacuees with all law enforcement agencies, including the Army, in the process of granting releases from Centers. The Army has always given as expeditious treatment as possible to its functions in such clearance, but the responsibility for, and the mechanics of securing the clearance have remained a function of the WRA. Apparently the War Department has now assumed the responsibility for and the active role in the clearance of evacuees. This is apparent in spite of the statement that, "The procedure....is intended to supplement the leave regulations.....issued by the War Relocation Authority, and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority."

7. The active role and renewed interest of the Army in this problem which has been passed to a civilian agency may assist rather than block the efforts of those Congressmen who would have the Army assume the operation of all Relocation Centers.

8. The program is voluntary. It can, therefore, be blocked by any factor which influences the American-born Japanese not to submit a questionnaire. The most active pressure group in each Relocation Center consists of the parent-generation Issei and their Japanese-educated Kibei children. These Kibei, incidently, must be classified as Nisei for purposes of this program since they are American-born and citizens. The program will operate with the Issei-Kibei group still actively in control of the Japanese in Centers, since no segregation is to be made prior to the Army recruitment and the soliciting of questionnaires. Repeated statements have been made by this Headquarters that segregation must be a first step for the successful operation of any actively pro-American program in the Relocation Centers. That is still the view of this Headquarters. As long as the Issei-Kibei group, including many persons who openly requested repatriation to Japan and parolees from internment camps who are actively pro-Japanese, is the dominant force in the Relocation Center, the Army and the WRA, or any other agency which attempts to promote a program within a Center, will be at the mercy of the Imperial Japanese Government.

It is often assumed by those unfamiliar with the pattern of Japanese life in the United States that there are two classes of families, (a) those composed of pro-Japanese parents and children and (b) those composed of American-born citizen Japanese. This ~~does not be the case.~~ ~~National policies have made~~ all foreign-born Japanese are aliens, and all native-born Japanese automatically citizens. This is the consequence of national policy since the first exclusion acts of 1906. In nearly every family, therefore, there are alien parents and citizen children. Among the citizen children will be found those who were educated in Japan, the Kibei. Some of the Kibei have completed a term of training in the Japanese Army. There are also many children who have felt no deep loyalty to any country other than the United States. It must be remembered that the median (i.e., the 50 percent point) of the age of foreign-born Japanese is 53.0 years for men and 43.0 years for women; the median age of their native-born children is 17.5 years for males and 16.8 years for females. Of the 71,896 American-born Japanese in Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington in 1940, only 22,375, or 31 percent, were 21 years of age or older. On the other hand, 99 percent of the alien Japanese were adults. In these states foreign-born Japanese adults outnumbered their adult citizen children 40,524 to 22,375. Though 64 percent of the entire Japanese population were citizens, including all small children, of the adult Japanese population 64 percent were aliens. (See Table 1 and Chart 1, attached.)

D. It is indeed regrettable that the Army teams will go into Relocation Centers without complete information concerning, and an appreciation of, the objectives and mechanics of the evacuation program. The Japanese in the Centers will expect these men, the representatives of the United States Government, to know the answers to their questions concerning the evacuation program. When such questions are not answered, or the answers given prove that the Army man does not know what he is talking about, there will be an immediate loss of face. The Issei and Kibei can be expected to ask embarrassing questions and otherwise confuse the members of the recruiting team. ~~The experience gained by this Headquarters, particularly by members of the staff of the WCCA, has not been used and probably will not be used in the program.~~

Certain WRA project officials assure this headquarters that the pro-Axis Issei-Kibei group is now highly organized to exert pressure and that due to the failure to promptly undertake segregation, the larger percentage of Issei share developed an "Anti-Caucasian" views.

E. Apparently there is no intention to try out the program in one Center as a "dry run" to determine any weaknesses in the proposed approach to the evacuees and to test the effectiveness of the publicity program. While such a preliminary trial might provide the anti-American Japanese with time to organize against the program, it would insure consistency of action and statement by team members in meeting problems in all Centers. Anyone familiar with Japanese psychology knows that they are not easily stampeded by "blitz" tactics and high pressure propaganda. The Japanese in Relocation Centers will be especially suspicious of any such action by uniformed Army men.

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12. Undoubtedly the Public Relations Division of the War Department will prepare releases which will advise the general public, especially the public on the West Coast, concerning the objectives and procedures of this program. Unless this is done with a full knowledge and appreciation of the present state of public opinion on the West Coast, the program may excite so much public controversy on the "Japanese question" (now before State Legislatures) that it will become almost impossible for interviewers from the WDC to secure a fair appraisal from the former associates, employers and neighbors of Japanese.

13. Practically all of the above comments have been critical of this program. The question may logically be asked what would be the suggestion of this headquarters as to a program which would meet these criticisms. For purposes of discussion, there are submitted the following points in such a program:

a. Before undertaking the recruiting of soldiers in Relocation Centers, there should be removed from these Centers all pro-Japanese "bad boys", all who desire repatriation and such others as have from time to time been defined in suggested segregation plans.

b. Following segregation, there should be set up in, or near Centers projects which would give employment to evacuee labor, women as well as men, and which would be definitely identified as contributing to the war effort.

c. Slowly at first but with increasing speed and pressure there should be introduced into the Centers pro-American, patriotic programs.

d. The recruitment of Nisei soldiers for the Army can be undertaken as soon as segregation is accomplished and the Center returns to its normal functioning without pro-Japanese domination. This recruiting should be a steady persuasive process rather than a "one shot", high pressure drive.

e. Following segregation there should be instituted a regular procedure for more rapid release from Centers to providing employment under regulations similar to those now in force. This procedure ~~should~~ could be expedited by a Joint Board of the investigation agencies (similar to that proposed in the present plan) with such staff as might be necessary for the processing of substantial numbers of applications for release. The War Department would be removed from the picture. The responsibility for the investigations should rest on the Joint Board rather than the War Department.

f. Simultaneously, a special section of the Joint Board should be created to consider any additional cases of recommended segregation and to review cases where the initial segregation program was alleged to have worked an injustice.

g. The Japanese population in Relocation Centers does not contain so large a number of potential soldiers or of potential war industry workers as to require impetuous action. In the entire United States, not including Hawaii, there are only 22,330 native-born Japanese males 18 to 44 years of age; 21,250 in the 18 to 35 group; and 18,440 in ages 18 to 29. In addition, there are 1,780 youths of 17 who will pass their 18th birthday by April 1, 1943.

14. No consideration has been given in this memorandum to the rather large task which will face the Western Defense Command in connection with its investigation of all cases in accordance with the general plan (see 3.-i., above). It is assumed that this point will be adequately covered in a report from another section.

Calvert H. Pedrick
Chief, Statistical Division

FEB 1943
WCCA

Records No. 20 & 21
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Watson
January 23, 1943 Time: 11:50 a.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT: Loyalty m/c

W: ...claims officer. There's just one point. I don't see any objection to it in general, but on the question of supplying a special form. Now one of the regulations you quote refers to War Department Form No. 41. Standard Form No. 28 - "Claim for Damages, Accident Motor Transportation" or War Department Form No. 41 may be used whenever practicable. Now I think we don't have any of those 41 here but I think the reference there is to the form that is used in practically all the claims that come through our office here. I wondered if it wouldn't meet your purpose rather than to set up a different form.

B: Certainly. Anything you suggest along that line.

W: Well I've sent out for that form, but I haven't gotten it yet. So I'm not sure about it, but I just wondered if you had any special thing in mind there.

B: No, really nothing special, and anything that has or would conform to the standard practice would of course be desirable.

W: That's what I thought.

B: No, we had nothing special in mind. It was probably thru ignorance that we ...

W: Suppose I just go ahead then and dig this other form up and I'll check it with your suggested form and see if it has all the essentials there, even though it may have other things that don't apply. Still it might be better to use it, don't you think?

B: Sure. And if you concur with the rest of it, just concur with that exception and say that in that connection we have agreed informally. Fine. Thank you very much.

W: All right. Say, by the way! Say, when are you counting on getting in your part of these comments for the General? Do you think you're going to have that ready today?

B: No, I don't think so. I'd rather thought that possibly you and Colonel Wackerling would send yours in and I could look at the whole thing.

FILE
Folder

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W: That's it. I have a rough draft, and I think I'll have mine finished today, all right. Just wondered if you were....

B: I didn't figure on getting it developed until tomorrow or possibly Monday.

W: I think we can probably get it through today anyway. As far as we're concerned.

B: The more I get into it, the deeper I get involved and it is so fundamental that I want to put the General on record without appearing to sound like it's sour-grapes. That's a little hard to do.

W: You know frankly, there are some arguments in favor of it. I thought Mr. McCloy made a pretty strong showing. I don't agree with it from our standpoint out here, but I do think he's got some pretty strong grounds. For action.

B: Which ones do you mean?

W: Well, I mean the necessity for disposing of these people...

B: Well, nobody has ever opposed that. The General has never opposed their use in private employment, and that's not the issue. The issue is that the War Department is undertaking to determine their loyalty and to be responsible for that determination. It is going to be a little hard for the War Department to explain why when they were in Assembly Centers, under control, satisfying all the then requirements, that if it is possible to determine loyalty, they didn't do it then. And save 80 million dollars worth of Relocation Centers that were built. That's the fundamental point.

W: Yes, I see.

B: In other words, maybe it should have been done, but it wasn't done. Now they're getting into the relocation business and I think they are leading with their chin. That's the business. It isn't that there's any debate about the desirability of using them for private employment, but there are an awful lot of jobs besides working in a shell-loading plant to be filled.

W: Yes.

B: They don't have to certify them to work in war plants. They are leading with their chins when they do it. That's the fundamental thing. Nobody debates with McCloy about the fact that you can't keep the people pinned up, but that's not Mr. McCloy's or the Secretary of War's business. That's the Director of War Relocation Authority's business. That's where the fundamental difference comes. The War Department is just getting itself out on a limb and sawing off the limb, in doing this.

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W: Yes. Yes, I see. Well I thihk his arguments of course on them were not directed so much to the justification of the War Dept. doing it as to general proposition.

B: Then he's debating whether Harold Ickes should change the policies on Coulee Dam ... I mean it just isn't the War Department's business. The President created another authority to do that. And the desirability of raising a combat team is no...doesn't have anything to do with it. You don't have to go thru all this rigamaroll to do that. This includes males, females and everybody else. Even beyond draft age. There is no limitation on who is included and it includes everybody born in the United States. It is so utterly silly for the War Department to get into that business.

W: I don't know how in the world they ever decided to get into it.

B: Well the Japs and Mr. Dillon Myer have done very well. They have sold somebody a bill. And one of the difficulties is, as so often when people are terribly busy, they're trouble-shooters. They are not policy makers who look ahead and are willing to follow thru on a long range plan. They have a problem on the desk and they've got to shoot it. So they shoot something, and if it is pushed off the desk today, even though it comes back tomorrow, today's work is well done. That is what happens back there, so often.

W: Yes, I know it. Well I think you are going to have considerable argument if you get it down on paper. I mean the comments.

B: Well, unfortunately it isn't an argument because they've already made up their mind. That is why it is so difficult to get it down without making it look like sour-grapes.

W: That is a little disheartening but then it will put the General on record.

B: It sure will. That is the general tenor of what I'm going to talk about.

W: That's the main purpose. Now for just a minute, going back to this claims situation. I suppose from what you have here that you are fairly familiar now with that claims set-up. You probably didn't work on this yourself, but you read it. You're familiar with it, aren't you?

B: Yes, oh yes.

W: Well I might say that in general we are taking the position, ... we are treating this as an exception in other words, to the general policy of trying to do what apparently the War Department under

what the Judge Advocate's Office wanted to do. That is to take the load of these claims off the combat outfit.

B: Why can't we do that?

W: I think we can, except that I think there is some difference of opinion right in the staff, as to the desirability of doing it. But I recognize the advisability of your case...

B: Of course all the information's out here.

W: I thought this was an exceptional situation, but I just wondered. I also got the impression that you are treating it as an exceptional situation.

B: Oh yes, very much so.

W: ...Doesn't cross up with this other policy. But I just wanted to get your idea of the other policy too.

B: Oh, I'm all for the other policy and remember very well when I was back there there was the policy, but I think this probably is an exception and it is only so-regarded, because of the fact that all the dope or information is out here and it would be quite a burden for the War Dept. agency to get it together. They'll probably have to refer it out to somebody...

W: I don't think there's any question...I have no argument with you on that. I think this is the exceptional situation but I... one thing...I want to get a little support on it - the general phase is that we're getting claims thru from the Ninth Service Command that haven't been investigation, sent down here signed by _____ _____, they have a different administrative set-up, so they have an Administrative Director. Don't have an Adjutant General any more.

B: They have one but they don't use him for much besides keeping the record.

W: That's right, sort of a bookkeeper. But now maybe it is a matter of way out somewhere in some minor outfit in Western Defense Command. They send to us for action and compliance..._____. In other words they are not searching out local Post Commander or somebody here for action, and instead of sending it to their man to do that they are sending it to us and we're going to have to send it say to the So. California Sector. The result will be that when it comes back thru those channels that we adhere to that, that we'll have 2 general court martials _____jurisdictions,

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and each one of them will have a Judge Advocate and each Judge Advocate will have to attach an opinion. Then it will go to the Ninth Service Command who will boss the whole job and their Judge Advocate will have to attach an opinion and it will get to Washington with 3 J.A. opinions. That, to me, is almost....

B: Sure, I think it is too.

W: That is exactly the way it is going to work if the Ninth Service Command runs it the way they are starting out.

B: Well I think that ought to be stopped. I don't think the General will take it.

W: That is the one fight we've got to make, I think. I'd like to get your view on it.

B: I agree with you and I think that that certainly should be stopped. It is rediculous.

W: It is really rediculous and it means you see, Colonel, that it would have just exactly the opposite effect. It will mean that we're doing their work for them on these claims, rather than having them do it for us.

B: Exactly. Sure.

W: Thank you very much.

B: All right, fine. You bet.

Record #22
Colonel Bendetsen & General DeWITT
1-23-43 Time 12.10 p.m
K. Russell

SUBJECT:

DeW Bendetsen, about Malone's release; now you saw that letter from the Governor?

B From the Governor?

DeW Yes, I sent a letter down to you, hold the phone, wait a minute I got a letter from the Governor yesterday, I thought it reached you, it came in yesterday afternoon, I put a note on it and sent it down to you, I want it returned; the last paragraph didn't pertain to the travel bureau.

They are very much pleased with everything, and the first two paragraphs I wanted you to see on that account; apparently Malone has done a wonderfully fine job.

B Yes he has done well up there.

DeW Apparently he has ingratiated himself with everybody; in the tactful way he has done it.

Now Lane is going to take his place?

B No sir, not his place; there is a Major Boebel who has been up there as the deputy officer in charge for about three months; he will become the officer in charge and Capt. Lane will be the assistant; so I am sending Lane up there on the train tonight to be up there for as long as possible before Malone leaves so that they will both get the full benefit of his experience.

They are in the middle of working out the negotiations on the Alaska fishing industy; I was up there last week as you know to help along on it, I'll probably have to go again to close it but they will be all together and I think it can be done sir in two weeks.

DeW That is all right; now the War Department is, I don't like to say no in view of what he is going to be used for, and he is a French student and speaks French and knowing what I do, I can't say no. If he can do it in 2 weeks fine, but if it takes another week I won't hesitate to do it. It has bo be a good reason, so the reason I'm calling you is that I think it would be a good thing

DeW if you went up there and see that everything is going all right before he actually leaves, do you see?

B Yes sir.

DeW And I presume Goebel will carry on, he should be cautioned about carrying on, in the job, with the same tack and patience that Malone has apparently shown.

B Yes sir, I will go up and be there for some time

DeW I want to get the other thing finished yet or before you go.

B Yes sir, we are working on that and I just talked to Colonel Watson; he said he will get his section in today, Colonel Weckerling will I think have his in today and I'll try and h ve a final, either tomorrow or Monday.

The more I look into it the more distrubed I get.

DeW Well I don't want to prejudge anything, because we haven't actually received the letter that they are talking about; the draft of what o'rear talked about, but I want to get my viewpoint as far as this are is concerned back there to them.

B Yes sir.

DeW Whatever decision t ey make well - I want to make the situation here plain to them; now for instance Weckerling said that he had been thinking a great deal about what the job will be in making these investigations; now that isn't really the heart of the proposition at all.

B No, not at all, the heart is very different than that. That is a mechanical problem.

DeW I want to make it a good paper; I want it written in such a tone that I am not putting myself in the position of criticising something that has already been agreed upon, but I don't want them to just stick their neck out so f ar that they will enmesh me in something on this coast, we have it clear now and it must be kept that wayl

B Well the conception that I have of what you want sir is this to point out those features that the WD should be prepared to guard against in the public relations problems primarily in getting out on this limb; in other words to be prepared or forewarned as it is seens from this headquarters of what some of the stumbling blocks are, in the o erall proposal; for instance in determining say the loyalty of all persons who were born here, what all persons , or what will the WD say, for exaple if the question is asked, well if you can do it now, why wasn't it done when they were in assembly

DeW Fundamentally we want to keep them on an even keel.

But what the initial conception is, they just can't swap horses in the middle of a stream.

B No sir.

DeW At least not in less than a year.

B That is right sir, we will have it ready.

DeW All right old man, fine.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WVY 300
Filed 0700Z/14
rlw

INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
January 24, 1943
0040 Z

From: Ft Shafter TH
To: Adjutant General

Number: 664, January 24, 1943

Before securing 1500 American citizens of Japanese ancestry for combat units pursuant your radio 2454 January 22 following requests are made: 1 that approximately 15 capable Reserve officers here of Japanese extraction including 2 or 3 Medicos who have not been ordered to active duty be called in for this purpose and several who are now on active duty here be permitted to transfer for this highly desirable combat duty; 2 at present in Hawaii in non combat units are several hundred American soldiers of Japanese extraction who are well trained and extremely anxious for active combat. Highly desirable for their morale and that of entire Japanese element of population that they be given opportunity to volunteer for transfer to proposed combat team. Those transferred to be carefully selected by this headquarters HDGBI the advantages of this more than outweigh disadvantages and urgently recommend approval.

Emmons

Footnote: 2454 is CM-OUT-7510 (1-22-43)

ACTION: SOS-TAG

INFO: OPD
G-2
CGGN

SOS-TAG	ACT	INF
APT & INDUCTION BR		
ARMY POSTAL SERVICE		
CASUALTY BRANCH		
CL ENL REFL BRANCH		
DECORATIONS & AWARDS		
DEPENDENCY BENEFIT BR		
ENLISTED BRANCH		
MACHINE RECORDS BRANCH		
OFFICERS BRANCH		
OPERATIONS BR AGO		✓
PUBLICATIONS BRANCH		
TRAINING BR AGO		
[illegible]	✓	

DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1957
NWW by [illegible] date 7/18/69

REGRADED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. PARAPHRASED VERSIONS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8Z113

CM-IN-11324 (25-Jan-43) 0001Z mjc COPY No. 18

~~SECRET~~

~~THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN~~

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY

SPGAO/320.2 Hawaii (1-24-43) WASHINGTON, D. C. January 27, 1943.
Room 4B 486,
Pentagon Bldg.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Room 1 A 872):

Subject: Organization of Combat Team composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be informed by radio substantially as follows:

OFFICERS OF JAPANESE EXTRACTION MAY BE FURNISHED BY HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR COMBAT TEAM JAPANESE ANCESTRY YOUR RADIO SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR JANUARY TWENTY FOURTH NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY THREE stop PROCESS THESE OFFICERS IN SAME MANNER AS SELECTEES AS OUTLINED OUR RADIO TWENTY FOUR FIFTY FOUR JANUARY TWENTY SECOND NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY THREE stop OFFICERS WILL BE IN GRADE OF LIEUTENANT ONLY EXCEPT MEDICAL OFFICERS MAY BE ANY GRADE stop NO ENLISTED MEN WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM HAWAII TO THESE NEW UNITS stop ONLY SELECTIVE SERVICE NEW RECRUITS ARE DESIRED FOR HAWAIIAN COMPONENT OF RCT NOW BEING ACTIVATED stop IN ACTIVATION OF FUTURE UNITS OF THIS TYPE comma CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO TRANSFER OF TRAINED SOLDIERS JAP EXTRACTION FROM EXISTING UNITS end SPGAO

II. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, and all others concerned be informed of action taken.

For the COMMANDING GENERAL:

RUSSEL B. REYNOLDS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Director of Military Personnel.

Incl.
Rad fr Ft Shafter T.H.
(1-24-43) to TAG.
(See following page)

ACTION TAKEN: 1/28/43 by rad to CG HAWN DEPT. Cys to: G-1; G-2; OPD., WDGS; CG AGF; Mil Per Div., SOS. mjc - 2 B 939 Cy. to Cl. & Repl. Br. ehb - 2 B 939.

18 AGO
JAN 28 1943
Received

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

UNCLASSIFIED
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED SECRET

JAN 28 1943

FEB - 3 1943

GEO. M. [illegible]
Colonel, G.S.C.
Exec. Mil. Pers. Div. S.O.S.

SECRET

JLD/tgb

27 January 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Crandall:

1. I understand, indirectly - not authoritatively - that the Secretary of War will release to the Press tomorrow at his Press Conference the plan that has been formulated whereby the War Department, upon request of the War Relocation Authority, will assist in the determination of loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.

2. If calls come from any papers with reference to the subject, they will be informed that it is a matter that is being handled by the War Department and War Relocation Authority in the relocation of Japanese in which this headquarters is not involved or concerned and we are, therefore, not in position to comment on the matter; that the Bureau of Public Relations in the War Department has charge of all public relations involving the subject matter.

DeW

1st Ind

HQ WDC & 4A PRES SF CALIF 27 Jan 43

To: AC of S CAD WCCA Whitcomb Hotel San Francisco Calif

For information and guidance.

By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:



J. W. BARNETT
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ___ date 6/6/74

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

January 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

SUBJECT : Loyalty and Disloyalty of Japanese Evacuees

1. All digests of comment and opinion on file have been prepared with emphasis placed on expressions of "military necessity" rather than loyalty or disloyalty of evacuees. A survey of these digests show that no mention has been made in our news releases or in factual news stories that there was "no time to determine loyalty of evacuees". Editorially there were some remarks that time should be taken. These remarks were mainly in periodicals catering to religious groups and social workers. Numerous responsible newspapers stated that it was impossible to select the sheep from the goats. See Tab A.

2. A quick survey of editorial comment following the Manzanar incident shows uniform agreement that General DeWitt's evacuation order was sound as it was impossible to determine the loyal from the disloyal evacuees. See Tab B.

3. A careful check of our news releases reveals that there was never any remark made of the lack of time for determining loyalty or disloyalty. Military necessity was given as the sole reason for evacuation though a collateral remark was made in the first round-up story that protection for the Japanese was considered. This protection angle was also touched on in the Commonwealth Club talk.

4. Consideration can well be given to the editorial comment in Tab B. This comment does reflect the general attitude of the press of the West as to loyalty and disloyalty. It is difficult to believe that the press, and the public, will suddenly believe that some magic formula has been evolved which will now make possible accurate determination of loyal and disloyal evacuees. It appears that the public and the press will only accept such a new formula of selection after the way has been paved by segregation or some logical proceedure which will naturally result in establishing pools of potentially loyal and disloyal.

5. In attempting to evaluate the future attitude of press and public it is difficult to believe that discerning editors will not recognize that the proposed plan to have the Army certify to the loyalty of certain

evacuees will place the responsibility upon the Army while WRA retains administrative decision. Certainly Congress is equally able to recognize the incongruity of such a situation.

Byron D. Box

BYRON D. BOX
Director of Information

Attachments: 2
#1. Tab A
#2. Tab B

January 25, 1943

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigation of American-born Japanese as proposed by PM WDC

TO : Col. K. R. Bendetsen

1. The plan as submitted would appear to propose a second questionnaire in addition to the one prepared by the War Department. In the footnote to section I it is proposed also that an agent of PM WDC interview each subject at the time the questionnaire is filled out. If this is the proper interpretation of the proposal, it would mean a second set of teams would go to each Relocation Center and would interview each American-born Japanese who is not in a Relocation Center. This is not believed to be either desirable or practical, and while it can be fairly safely presumed that all of the items in the questionnaire proposed will appear in the questionnaire prepared by the War Department, it would be advisable to check these items against the War Department questionnaire if time is available. The last sentence of the footnote to section I is important and should appear on the War Department questionnaire but should be elaborated on somewhat as follows: "Significant omissions and all false statements made in answer to these questions will be construed unfavorably".

2. The proposal to fingerprint each individual who fills out one of these questionnaires while advisable in a general way would be of very little benefit in this particular investigation. The number of persons of Japanese ancestry who had been arrested prior to evacuation was quite small and in the main the violations which caused these arrests were in the great majority minor offenses. In addition to this, at least three more persons would be required in each team in each center if the questionnaire interview is not to be greatly delayed. Further than this, the personnel who would take the fingerprints would need to be thoroughly trained if classifiable prints were obtained.

3. In section II of the proposed plan item 2 should read as follows: "All subjects who are now or have been members of pro-Japanese organizations and participated in any significant activities". Item 3 in this section should read "All subjects who make false statements or significant omissions".

4. In section III, item 1, the first three sub-items proposing a record check with FBI, G-2, and ONI are duplications of similar checks which would be made by PMGO and therefore unnecessary provided that when the questionnaires submitted by PMGO to WDC for investigation they have appended thereto the results of these same checks made by the PMGO in Washington. Three other sub-items however should be included; WRA Interior Security files, WCCA Interior Security files, and the files now being built up in the WCCA research project on subversive activity.

DeWitt Earl

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5. Supplementing this proposal and not as an alternate thereto, it is believed that a list of persons of Japanese ancestry who have participated in significant pro-Japanese activities should be compiled and these persons interviewed by a trained "lie detector" operator. This proposal is made because it is believed that the only dependable sources of information about the subject individuals are Caucasian acquaintances, neighbors, and former business contacts, most of whom have not seen these persons of Japanese ancestry for approximately nine months, and practically all of whom have never possessed any specific significant information.

6. The proposal to use the "lie detector" in this investigation is based on the belief that those persons who possess significant information which would, if available, allow the sifting of the loyal from the disloyal, are those individuals of Japanese ancestry who are themselves disloyal and will either refuse to answer the questionnaire at all or will give answers that are false. The ordinary interview or questioning method cannot be expected to tap these sources of information even if such questioning were conducted by a highly trained and widely experienced investigator simply because that investigator's methods and techniques are, whether he knows it or not, based entirely on the understanding of the psychology of Caucasians and will not be effective with the Oriental.

7. If the "lie detector" technique proves to be effective with the Oriental it would not become the bottleneck in this investigation that it might appear at first glance. The list on which this technique might be used would be quite small, probably not over a few hundred at the most, but the information which might be gained in this manner would probably apply to several thousand.

8. With a maximum of approximately 22,000 individuals to be investigated, and 66 agents available in the Investigations Division, PM office, WDC, and assuming an average of one working day per investigation (it is probable that such investigations would take considerably more than one day), the 66 available agents would require more than one year to complete this task. Further than this, the Investigations Division, PM office, WDC, presumably has had no experience in investigating Japanese, and therefore would be considerably handicapped in this project. The only existing agency in WDC which has had any experience with the Japanese is CIB, and it is known that there is not adequate personnel in this Branch to attempt this additional load.

9. Assuming that the completion of this investigation in a period of three months after the questionnaires are submitted to WDC by PMGO would be satisfactory, a personnel of 300 investigators would be required, assuming that each investigation would average one working day per investigator. To do a thorough job would require two days per individual investigator, or six months for 300 investigators or 3 months for 600 investigators. In addition to the investigative personnel, a staff of approximately 30 clerical personnel would be required. The investigative personnel would require at least 2 weeks training before embarking on these investigations.

10. The following alternatives suggest themselves: (whether or not these alternatives are feasible the writer does not know)

a. That the CI Branch, WDC, assign such of its personnel as are most experienced in investigating Japanese and can be made available, and that additional personnel of a high calibre be temporarily assigned by the War Department to the Western Defense Command from other Service and Defense Commands in such number to make up the required total; or

b. That the recent graduates of the Investigative School conducted by the PM be temporarily assigned to WDC for this task.

11. It would seem advisable that whatever the source of personnel that the Civil Affairs Division, WDC, should, because of its experience with the Japanese, have the responsibility of supervising these investigations.

Ray Ashworth
Major AUS
Chief of Miscellaneous Section

Copy given to Dr Dedrick

Record No. 41
Colonel Bendetsen & Mr. Braun
January 25, 1943 Time: 5:45 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

Be: Yes.

Br: And that is, that to do this thing, that is something new and special.

Be: Right.

Br: ...all planned from the beginning and is merely going into the works enough to make enough fuss about it from the standpoint of selling it - but don't sell it as something new. Sell it as something that was in mind from the beginning. Then it will be accepted.

Be: Right. Well you can hang that on this hook: That we tried voluntary evacuation. And we're perfectly willing to go thru with it. But the situation at that time didn't permit it. It was stopped to protect the evacuees, and not the war effort. That wouldn't hurt them any. Now that we've had a chance to look them over and to pen up the ones who have records, we are now going to keep them under ... keep them in custody and release the others.

Br: Those that are eligible for military service will come into military service. Those that aren't will go into other work. (2)

Be: Right. And those who have records will be retained. That's (3) the argument.

Br: But if you do it as something that was planned from the beginning and which is just being carried out, then you don't get into all those questions that have to be answered as to "why did you evacuate them in the first place, and why this establishment of loyalty...?" There are the bugs that are in the thing that they are proposing.

Be: So that to review the proposition now, on this suggested alternative program, it probably ought to read more or less like this:

1. Present a program to the public as one conceived from the beginning.

2. In any event...point 2 would be, before taking any action,

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segregate the bad from the good.

3. Establish projects in or near the centers if necessary, which give employment to men, women, etc....Projects of a nature definitely identified as contributing to the war effort, and allow them to be released for any kind of work except work in war plants.

Br: Except that I'd put the latter first, because if we do the right kind of a sales job, the establishment of special projects might not be necessary.

Be: Right, I get you. Then ....

Br: Let this whole thing be branded as Phase 3, in the original plan.

Be: Right. Then Number 4, point 4.

4. The raising of a combat team should be on a voluntary basis. In other words, any Nisei of a draft age who is willing to volunteer, can either be

(a) brought in through voluntary selective service, or

(b) enlisted.

5. Create a joint board with enough staff attached to handle the work, to operate as a clearing-house to determine who have and who have not "positive" records.

Those who have positive records, are to be retained, either in the Segregee Camp or in other Centers. (Depending on the record.

Those who haven't positive records, are to be released for any work. At the same time, the public is to be told that

1. We had to evacuate (you know why, - they were altogether on the coast)

2. We had to re-settle them off the coast, and re-organize them and find out who was who, and now that we know, we are going to keep the ones that have records and we're letting the rest of them out in the interior for taking part in the war effort. It is a patriotic duty not only of the Japanese who recognize it, but also the public to accept them.

Br: That would all make sense to the public.

Be: Yes. "Now you've got to accept them. . . they did theirs...they did their part, and came along without any trouble.

-2-

Br: You've still got a hell of a selling job. But it makes sense, and it has a hell of a lot better chance of going over... than when you create all these new questions that this other way of doing it would create.

Be: Right. Then the Joint Board would also handle appeals from the segregees who thought they were unjustly treated. That's it. What do you think?

Br: All right.

Be: All right, we'll put that one. Thanks. Bye.

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WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

January 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

SUBJECT: Loyalty investigation of American-born Japanese by the Western Defense Command.

1. Reference is made to the memorandum of January 21 from Colonel Lewis M. Means, Provost Marshal, to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army on the above subject.

2. In discussing this subject, it is assumed that the loyalty investigation under discussion is that which will be required to be done by the Western Defense Command for purposes of the Army recruitment and Relocation Center release plan now under consideration. Apparently a copy of this plan was not available to Colonel Means at the time of the preparation of his memorandum of January 21. For present purposes the mechanics of the proposed plan as understood by this office are summarized in Tab A, attached.

3. The following comments relate to Section I of the memorandum by Colonel Means:

a. According to our understanding of the plan, it will not be feasible for an investigator attached to the Western Defense Command to interview the Japanese in Relocation Centers to secure investigative questionnaires. It is understood that a general purpose questionnaire has already been devised for use in this program. However, no copy of this questionnaire or any documentary evidence of the subjects which it will cover has been received by this headquarters. According to the plan, a team consisting of an officer, three enlisted men, one of whom will be Japanese, will be formed for each Relocation Project; will be trained in Washington; and will go to the project to distribute the questionnaires and handle all interviewing in relation thereto. All of the questionnaires received by the Office of the Provost Marshal General will be forwarded to the Western Defense Command for investigation. It may be assumed that this will require that the questionnaires themselves be forwarded to this Headquarters.

b. It can safely be assumed that the general purpose

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questionnaire will contain practically all of the items listed by Colonel Means, as well as many other questions concerning the individual, his personal history, family and associates. I doubt, however, that the questionnaire will provide either a photograph or a finger-print of the applicant, though it may do so. If finger-prints are taken, there will probably be a complete set on a regulation card which can be checked with the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which now contains some sixteen to twenty million prints.

4. The following comments relate to the proposals of Section II of the memorandum:

a. According to my understanding of the plan, the Western Defense Command will be asked for a factual report concerning each individual. This factual report of the investigation will be transmitted to the PMGO which in turn will submit them to the Joint Board. The Joint Board will analyze the factual information and reports submitted by the PMGO and will formulate its own recommendation in each case. Of course, the Western Defense Command may wish to submit a brief analysis and recommendation concerning each case, but this Headquarters will not be called upon to "screen" or to accept or reject any individual.

b. Naturally a complete report will be made by this Headquarters to PMGO concerning: (1) Trips to Japan, (2) membership in or affiliation with Japanese groups which are known to be disloyal or are definitely suspect, and (3) all cases of inadequate or inaccurate information.

5. The following comments are made relative to Section III of the memorandum:

a. It is understood that the PMGO will examine the records of the FBI, the ONI, and the WRA in Washington and that the field offices of these agencies need not be consulted further.

b. The other investigations suggested in Section III are all desirable and necessary and would be conducted by the Western Defense Command.

6. In addition to the above comments, all of which relate directly to Colonel Means' memorandum, the following general suggestions are submitted as to procedure:

a. Because of the large number of investigations--possibly as many as 22,000--the investigative staff would need to be decentralized but controlled from the main office of the Provost Marshal. The distribution of investigators should be similar to that of our

"team offices" in connection with the evacuation program; i.e., distributed according to the density of Japanese population on the coast. In this connection a study of the attached materials, Tabs B, C, D, and E may prove useful in preliminary planning--until such time as a determination can be made as to the number of questionnaires and their distribution by former residence address.

(1) Tab B describes in general terms the area covered in each Exclusion Order and the number of persons evacuated thereunder. It also shows the exclusion date, the Assembly Center destination and the Relocation Center destination of all, or a major portion, of those evacuated under each Exclusion Order.

(2) Tab C is a map showing the 108 exclusion areas of the Pacific Coast. This map is available in wall-chart size if desired.

(3) Tab D is a complete set of Civilian Exclusion Orders, Nos. 1 to 108. Beginning with No. 7, all of the Exclusion Orders present a map of the area covered.

(4) Tab E contains our statistical bulletins Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, showing the distribution of Japanese population and the number of Japanese heads of families in Arizona, California, Washington and Oregon, as reported in the census of 1940.

b. Because of the magnitude of this task, consideration should be given to the organization of a staff exclusively for this purpose. This staff should be trained for approximately two weeks before being sent to the field and should be thoroughly familiar with Japanese organizations and culture on the West Coast.

c. Probably only one copy of the questionnaire for each individual will be sent by the PMGO to the WDC. Reproduction by photostat (or other suitable means) will be necessary so that the original questionnaire can be retained in a master control file and one or more copies be made available for field use.

d. I am informed that the State Bureau of Vital Statistics is now overloaded with requests for age searches and certified birth certificates. The birth check, therefore, may become a bottle-neck unless funds are provided to the Bureau for the employment of special personnel for this purpose. This comment applies equally to the States of California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona.

e. Because of the magnitude of the task and the desirability in securing accurate answers from respondents, it is suggested that special forms be devised for transmittal to schools, employers, and any large group of informants. Such forms would save a considerable amount of paper work since they could be enclosed with the report to the PMGO.

7. It is my opinion that from two to three agent-days of work will be required for each case, including office work and travel. It should be remembered that many of the Japanese live in rural or suburban areas where considerable travel by car is necessary, neighbors are frequently away from home, and investigations are otherwise time consuming.

Calvert L. Dedrick
Chief, Statistical Division

33

Record No. 43
Colonel Bendetsen & Mr. Braun
January 26, 1943 Time: 10:55 a.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

Mike
Thru Rosen
To Loyalty Papers

Br: There may possibly be a word or two in this that you might want to use.

Be: Shoot.

Dr: Some premises for a PR program to achieve the objectives contemplated in the plan for use of Japanese-Americans in the armed forces and otherwise.

1. To not brand this development as/how...presented as Phase 3 of a total plan conceived in the beginning.

Phase 1. Evacuation
Phase 2. Temporary relocation (or relocation)
Phase 3. Selective Release for work and military service.

2. Do not have Joint Board certify loyalty. Such certification raises question as to why loyalty was not determined during Assembly Center phase of Evacuation. It is also contrary to record made during evacuation period, that positive loyalty of any group could not be established.

3. Do not release for work in war plants or WDC. Release for such purposes necessitates positive loyalty certification and raises questions mentioned in 2 above. Inferentially it also raises question of original necessity for mass total evacuation.

4. Let Joint Board recommend
(a) Segregation and non-release of those suspected of disloyalty because of definite record.

(b) Release of citizens (correction: Release of balance of citizens)

(b) Release of balance of citizens for military service and for work of any kind and at any point except in war plants or in WDC. Release to be based upon citizenship and absence of record of disloyalty.

The foregoing would permit a story like this: "Because these people were concentrated on the West Coast in a sensitive military area and because there was no way to make a positive determination of

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loyalty, it was necessary to evacuate them from the area. However it was known that (blank) thousands of those evacuated were American citizens who are needed in the war effort and who want to assist either through military service or work. A Joint Board of (blank) (blank) (blank) was created to determine which if any of these citizens had a positive record of disloyalty. All others are to be released from Relocation Centers for military service if eligible or for work in designated occupations in area. Alien Japanese and Japanese of the Kibei class will remain in Relocation Centers."

That is different from yours, but....

Be: Yes, yes.

Br: ...what I understood was in the original plan. Now this may be the only important part of this from your standpoint.

"There remains one major inconsistency in these premises and this story, namely: Why are these people O.K. for military service and not for war plants or the WDC? To overcome this, it might be well to announce originally that the military service would be limited. Later announce that due to the close observation possible in the armed forces, it had been determined that those in military service are completely loyal and will be used for full combat service. Since similar observation of those at work would not be possible, it would logical to maintain the restrictions regarding them."

Be: Very good. I think it ought to be put on.

Br: You see...to take that thing in 2 jumps there. . . I ou've got a perfectly good excuse to tell you we've had them in the Army now for 6 months and you know these boys are all right.

Be: Right. Check. Absolutely. Thank you very much. I want to use it.

Br: O.K.

Record No. 43

Br: This is maybe the most important part of this from your standpoint.

"There remains one major inconsistency in these premises and this story, namely: Why are these people ~~4-F~~ for military service and not for war plants for WDC? To overcome this, it might be well to announce originally that the military service would be limited. Later announce that due to the close observation possible in the armed forces, it had been determined that those in military service are completely loyal and will be used for full combat service. Since similar observation of those at work would not be possible, it would be logical to maintain the restrictions regarding them."

Be: Very good, I think it ought to be put on.

Br: You see to take that thing in 2 jumps there. You've got a perfectly good excuse .... tell you we've had them in the Army now for 6 months and you know these boys are all right.

Be: Check. Absolutely. Thank you very much. I want to use it.

Br: O.K.

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Record No. 46
Col. Bendetsen and Gen. DeWITT
January 26, 1943 Time: 4:30
Rosalie Russell

SUBJECT:

Feb
re Selective
Compulsory Re
Legality Plan

B: "We say that the implications of the proposed plan are contrary to the arguments advanced by the government", now doesn't that in itself point out enough?

D: I think so yes.

B: And leave the long statement of say the quotation from Col. Fairman in the _____

D: Yes, I think so, yes.

B: That will shorten it considerably sir.

D: That's all right then.

B: Thank you very much.

JLD/tgb

27 January 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Crandall:

1. I understand, indirectly - not authoritatively - that the Secretary of War will release to the Press tomorrow at his Press Conference the plan that has been formulated whereby the War Department, upon request of the War Relocation Authority, will assist in the determination of loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.

2. If calls come from any papers with reference to the subject, they will be informed that it is a matter that is being handled by the War Department and War Relocation Authority in the relocation of Japanese in which this headquarters is not involved or concerned and we are, therefore, not in position to comment on the matter; that the Bureau of Public Relations in the War Department has charge of all public relations involving the subject matter.

DeW

1st Ind

HQ WDC & 4A PRES SF CALIF 27 Jan 43

To: AC of S CAD WCCA Whitcomb Hotel San Francisco Calif

For information and guidance.

By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:



J. W. BARNETT
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

FILE

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1980
NNdW by ____ date ____

36

January 28, 1943.

KRB
CAD

KRB/rlp
CAD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
(THROUGH: Chief of Staff).

SUBJECT : Comments on Memorandum dated January 21, 1943, from the Provost Marshal to the Commanding General regarding Investigation of American-born Japanese for Loyalty.

1. Reference is made to the memorandum cited above, accompanying this memorandum as inclosure No. 1.

2. In discussing this subject, it is assumed that the loyalty investigation under discussion is that which will be required to be done by the Western Defense Command for purposes of the Army recruitment and Relocation Center release plan now under consideration. Apparently a copy of this plan was not available to Colonel Means at the time of the preparation of his memorandum of January 21. For present purposes the mechanics of the proposed plan as understood by this office are summarized in Tab A, attached.

3. The following comments relate to Section I of the memorandum by Colonel Means:

a. According to my understanding of the plan, it will not be feasible for an investigator attached to the Western Defense Command to interview the Japanese in Relocation Centers to secure investigative questionnaires. It is understood that a general purpose questionnaire has already been devised for use in this program. However, no copy of this questionnaire or any documentary evidence of the subjects which it will cover has been received by this headquarters. According to the plan, a team consisting of an officer, three enlisted men, one of whom will be Japanese, will be formed for each Relocation Project; will be trained in Washington; and will go to the project to distribute the questionnaires and handle all interviewing in relation thereto. All of the questionnaires received by the Office of the Provost Marshal General will be forwarded to the Western Defense Command for investigation. It may be assumed that this will require that the questionnaires be forwarded to this headquarters.

b. It can safely be assumed that the general purpose questionnaire will contain practically all of the items listed by Colonel Means, as well as many other questions concerning the individual, his personal history, family and associates. I doubt, however, that the questionnaire will provide either a photograph or a fingerprint of the applicant, though it may do so. If fingerprints are taken, there will probably be a complete

36 1/W

set on a regulation card which can be checked with the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which now contains some sixteen to twenty million prints.

4. The following comments relate to the proposals of Section II of the memorandum:

a. According to my understanding of the plan, the Western Defense Command will be asked for a factual report concerning each individual. This factual report of the investigation will be transmitted to the PMGO which in turn will submit them to the Joint Board. The Joint Board will analyze the factual information and reports submitted by the PMGO and will formulate its own recommendation in each case. Of course, the Western Defense Command may wish to submit a brief analysis and recommendation concerning each case, but this headquarters will not be called upon to "screen" or to accept or reject any individual.

b. Naturally a complete report will be made by this headquarters to the PMGO concerning: (1) Trips to Japan, (2) membership in or affiliation with Japanese groups which are known to be disloyal or are definitely suspect, and (3) all cases of inadequate or inaccurate information.

5. The following comments are made relative to Section III of the memorandum:

a. It is understood that the PMGO will examine the records of the FBI, the ONI, and the WRA in Washington and that the field offices of these agencies need not be consulted further.

b. The other investigations suggested in Section III are all desirable and necessary and would be conducted by the Western Defense Command.

6. In addition to the above comments, all of which relate directly to Colonel Means' memorandum, the following general suggestions are submitted as to procedure:

a. Because of the large number of investigations - possibly as many as 22,000 - the investigative staff would need to be decentralized but controlled from the main office of the Provost Marshal. The distribution of investigators should be similar to that of our "team offices" in connection with the evacuation program; i.e., distributed according to the density of Japanese population on the Coast. In this connection a study of the attached materials, Tabs B, C, D, and E may prove useful in p eliminary planning - until such time as a determination can be made as to the number of questionnaires and their distribution by former residence address.

(1) Tab B describes in general terms the area covered in each Exclusion Order and the number of persons evacuated thereunder. It also shows the exclusion date, the Assembly Center destination and the Relocation Center destination

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of all, or a major portion, of those evacuated under each Exclusion Order.

(2) Tab C is a map showing the 108 exclusion areas of the Pacific Coast. This map is available in wall-chart size if desired.

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(4) Tab E contains our statistical bulletins Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, showing the distribution of Japanese population and the number of Japanese heads of families in Arizona, California, Washington and Oregon, as reported in the census of 1940.

b. Because of the magnitude of this task, consideration should be given to the organization of a staff exclusively for this purpose. This staff should be trained for approximately two weeks before being sent to the field and should be thoroughly familiar with Japanese organizations and culture on the West Coast.

c. Probably only one copy of the questionnaire for each individual will be sent by the PMGO to the Western Defense Command. Reproduction by photostat (or other suitable means) will be necessary so that the original questionnaire can be retained in a master control file and one or more copies be made available for field use.

d. I am informed that the State Bureau of Vital Statistics is now overloaded with requests for age searches and certified birth certificates. The birth check, therefore, may become a bottle-neck unless funds are provided to the Bureau for the employment of special personnel for this purpose. This comment applies equally to the states of California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona.

e. Because of the magnitude of the task and the desirability of securing accurate answers from respondents, it is suggested that special forms be devised for transmittal to schools, employers, and any large group of informants. Such forms would save a considerable amount of paper work since they could be enclosed with the report to the PMGO.

7. It is my opinion that from two to three agent-days of work will be required for each case, including office work and travel. It should be remembered that many of the Japanese live in rural or suburban areas where considerable travel by car is necessary, neighbors are frequently away from home, and investigations are otherwise time consuming.

8. The plan as submitted would appear to propose a second questionnaire in addition to the one prepared by the War Department. In the footnote to

section I it is proposed also that an agent of the Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, interview each subject at the time the questionnaire is filled out. If this is the proper interpretation of the proposal, it would mean a second set of teams would go to each Relocation Center and would interview each American-born Japanese who is not in a Relocation Center. This is not believed to be either desirable or practical, and while it can be fairly safely presumed that all of the items in the questionnaire proposed will appear in the questionnaire prepared by the War Department, it would be advisable to check these items against the War Department questionnaire if time is available. The last sentence of the footnote to section I is important and should appear on the War Department questionnaire but should be elaborated on somewhat as follows: "Significant omissions and all false statements made in answer to these questions will be construed unfavorably".

9. The proposal to fingerprint each individual who fills out one of these questionnaires while advisable in a general way would be of very little benefit in this particular investigation. The number of persons of Japanese ancestry who had been arrested prior to evacuation was quite small and in the main the violations which caused these arrests were in the great majority minor offenses. In addition to this, at least three more persons would be required in each team in each center if the questionnaire interview is not to be greatly delayed. Further than this, the personnel who would take the fingerprints would need to be thoroughly trained if classifiable prints were obtained.

10. In section II of the proposed plan item 2 should read as follows: "All subjects who are now or have been members of pro-Japanese organizations and participated in any significant activities". Item 3 in this section should read "All subjects who make false statements or significant omissions".

11. In section III, item 1, the first three sub-items proposing a record check with FBI, G-2, and ONI are duplications of similar checks which would be made by PMGO and therefore unnecessary provided that when the questionnaires are submitted by PMGO to Western Defense Command for investigation they have appended thereto the results of these same checks made by the PMGO in Washington. Three other sub-items, however, should be included - War Relocation Authority Interior Security files, Wartime Civil Control Administration Interior Security files, and the files now being built up in the Wartime Civil Control Administration research project on subversive activity.

12. Supplementing this proposal and not as an alternate thereto, it is believed that a list of persons of Japanese ancestry who have participated in significant pro-Japanese activities should be compiled and these persons interviewed by a trained "lie detector" operator. This proposal is made because it is believed that the only dependable sources of information about the subject individuals are Caucasian acquaintances, neighbors, and former business contacts, most of whom have not seen these persons of Japanese ancestry for approximately nine months, and practically all of whom have never possessed any specific significant information.

13. The proposal to use the "lie detector" in this investigation is based on the belief that those persons who possess significant information which would, if available, allow the sifting of the loyal from the disloyal, are those individuals of Japanese ancestry who are themselves disloyal and will either refuse to answer the questionnaire at all or will give answers that are false. The ordinary interview or questioning method cannot be expected to tap these sources of information even if such questioning were conducted by a highly trained and widely experienced investigator simply because that investigator's methods are, whether he knows it or not, based entirely on the understanding of the psychology of Caucasians and will not be effective with the Oriental.

14. If the "lie detector" technique proves to be effective with the Oriental it would not become the bottle-neck in this investigation that it might appear at first glance. The list on which this technique might be used would be quite small, probably not over a few hundred at the most, but the information which might be gained in this manner would probably apply to several thousand.

15. With a maximum of approximately 22,000 individuals to be investigated and 66 agents available in the Investigations Division, Provost Marshal's Office, Western Defense Command, and assuming an average of one working day per investigation (it is probable that such investigations would take considerably more than one day), the 66 available agents would require more than one year to complete this task. Further than this, the Investigations Division, Provost Marshal's Office, Western Defense Command, presumably has had no experience in investigating Japanese, and therefore would be considerably handicapped in this project. The only existing agency in Western Defense Command which has had any experience with the Japanese is the Counter-Intelligence Branch, and it is known that there is not adequate personnel in this Branch to attempt this additional load.

16. Assuming that the completion of this investigation in a period of three months after the questionnaires are submitted to the Western Defense Command by PMGO would be satisfactory, a personnel of 300 investigators would be required, assuming that each investigation would average one working day per investigator. To do a thorough job would require two days per individual investigation, or six months for 300 investigators or three months for 600 investigators. In addition to the investigative personnel, a staff of approximately 30 clerical personnel would be required. The investigative personnel would require at least two weeks training before embarking on these investigations.

17. The following alternatives suggest themselves: (whether or not these alternatives are feasible the writer does not know)

a. That the Counter-Intelligence Branch, Western Defense Command, assign such of its personnel as are most experienced in investigating Japanese and can be made available, and that additional personnel of a high caliber be temporarily assigned by the War Department to the Western Defense Command from other Service and Defense Commands in such number to make up the required total; or

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b. That the recent graduates of the Investigative School conducted by the Provost Marshal be temporarily assigned to Western Defense Command for this task.

18. It would seem advisable that whatever the source of personnel that the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command, should, because of its experience with the Japanese, have the responsibility of supervising these investigations.

Karl R. Bendetsen,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Civil Affairs Division.

2 Incls:
1 - Memo to CG, WDC&4A, from PM, 1-21-43
2 - Tabs A to E, incl.

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~~RESTRICTED~~

Military Personnel Division
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Rm 4B 470

SPGAE/342 Gen (1-28-43)-88 January 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:
(Rm 4E 794, Pentagon Building)

Subject: Induction of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

A communication substantially as follows will be published to the Commanding General, each Service Command, except the Northwest:

1. A combat team composed of English speaking native born (continental United States or its territories) United States citizens of Japanese parentage or ancestry will be activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and will be ready to receive fillers not earlier than March 1, 1943.

2. Beginning February 2[illegible], 1943, 3,000 English speaking native born United States citizens of Japanese parentage or ancestry qualified for general service will be selected in the continental United States by voluntary induction through Selective Service.

3. ~~All~~ Each volunteer will be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, prior to being ordered by his local board to report for induction. Clearances will be indicated on a special form, Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry (304 A), a copy of which will be forwarded by the local board to the induction station with each registrant.

4. Only men qualified for general military service will be inducted. Inducted registrants, if they request it, will be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps and returned to the locality of the local board which forwarded them for induction, recalled to active duty and ordered to report to the nearest reception center seven days hence in the same manner as other registrants.

5. These individuals will be processed at reception centers in the same manner as registrants. They will be assigned to the Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Separate

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
9 AF

JAN 30 1943
WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
MIL. PERS. DIV.

Gorle 12-5-45

~~RESTRICTED~~

reports on number inducted will be recorded at Service Command Headquarters and reported to the War Department upon call.

By Command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL SOMERVELL:

RUSSEL B. REYNOLDS
Colonel, G. S. C.
Director of Military Personnel

GEO. W. BADGER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Exec. Mil. Pers. Div. S.O.S.

JAN 30 1943
Declassified
PK

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, has been directed to activate a combat team of the United States citizens of Japanese ancestry at Camp Shelby, Mississippi as indicated above. The Director of Selective Service (Major Parker) and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Lt. Pierce) concur.

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
RESTRICTED
2

filed 2-5-43

If signed pls mail out &
return file to STE

197

February 1, 1943

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my full approval. The new combat team will add to the nearly five thousand loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry who are already serving in the armed forces of our country.

This is a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of the Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by the evacuation from the West Coast.

No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution — whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work essential to the war effort.

I am glad to observe that the War Department, the Navy Department, the War Manpower Commission, the Department of Justice, and the War Relocation Authority are collaborating in a program which will assure the opportunity for all loyal Americans, including Americans of Japanese ancestry, to serve their country at a time when the fullest and wisest use of our manpower is all-important to the war effort.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable,
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

wdh-mw

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I am glad to observe that the War Department, the Navy Department, the War Manpower Commission, the Department of Justice, and the War Relocation Authority are collaborating in a program which will assure the opportunity for all loyal Americans, including Americans of Japanese ancestry, to serve their country at a time when the fullest and wisest use of our manpower is all-important to the war effort.

Prepared letter for the President to send to the Secretary of War who will announce on Thurs. Jan 28, formation of combat organizations of Japanese American citizens, etc.

Letter asked by Elmer Davis x5015

RESTRICTED

VLS:FE:llr

SPX 342 (1-28-43)PR-I

February 1, 1943.

Subject: Induction of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

To: Commanding General,
First Service Command,
Services of Supply.

1. A combat team composed of English speaking native born (continental United States or its territories) United States citizens of Japanese parentage or ancestry will be activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and will be ready to receive fillers not earlier than March 1, 1943.

2. Beginning February 23, 1943, 3,000 English speaking native born United States citizens of Japanese parentage or ancestry qualified for general service will be selected in the continental United States by voluntary induction through Selective Service.

3. Each volunteer will be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, prior to being ordered by his local board to report for induction. Clearances will be indicated on a special form, Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry (304 A), a copy of which will be forwarded by the local board to the induction station with each registrant.

4. Only men qualified for general military service will be inducted. Inducted registrants, if they request it, will be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps and returned to the locality of the local board which forwarded them for induction, recalled to active duty and ordered to report to the nearest reception center seven days hence in the same manner as other registrants.

5. These individuals will be processed at reception centers in the same manner as other registrants. They will be assigned to the Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Separate reports on number inducted will be recorded at Service Command Headquarters and reported to the War Department upon call.

By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

/s/ WILLIAM L. SAILOR
Adjutant General.

Action based on SOS directive SPGAP 342 (1-28-43)-88, dated 1-28-43.

SAME LETTER SENT TO ALL SC's EXCEPT [illegible]

(See distribution attached)

Comeback copy returned on 2-1-43 with copy of action taken.

Apt. & Ind. Br.,
VLS, 78786.

1605

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET RESTRICTED
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY AGO PER
TAG

AGO

Record No. 2
Colonel Bendetsen - General Barnett
February 1, 1943 Time: 10:30 a.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

Be: This is Bendetsen, sir. We have a request here from the office of the Assistant Secretary to grant 4 permits to 4 soldiers of Japanese ancestry who will accompany the teams going into the 4 centers in the evacuated zone. Now they have asked that we give them a broad permit which would leave these 4 soldiers more or less at the direction of the Captain of the team. That is to exempt them from all restrictions.

Ba: Place the responsibility on the team captain to see that they don't violate too many of our instructions, is that the idea?

Be: Well, more or less to place the responsibility on him to use his discretion in what they do and where they go. I explained to Hall that ordinarily irrespective of what we might say in a permit, that for their own protection they would be well advised not to go...not to allow them to ever go about alone. But of course whatever the War Department wanted, - if that was a War Department request, of course that would be granted here. Well he said it wasn't a directive, it was just a request, and before I sent out a permit of that nature, I felt that was a matter that ought to be decided...

Ba: Well I think we have to give them a permit, don't we? Because they are going to use these Japanese soldiers.

Be: :Oh yes, there's no question about that. We have to give them a permit, it's a matter of form. Here, for example is one draft of form which might be used, which would waive everything. For example: "This telegram is authority for the above named American soldiers of Japanese ancestry to enter and remain in the evacuated areas of Western Defense Command during the period of his temporary duty therein. During the period of said temporary duty, the bearer is exempted from all provisions of Public Proclamation and Civilian Exclusion Orders heretofore issued by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. Upon the bearer's return to his permanent station, this telegram will be immediately returned to this headquarters."

That would waive everything.

FILE

42

Ba: That makes it possible then for them to go everywhere, but isn't that document itself then some protection against local police officers and things of that sort.

Be: Oh yes, there would be no difficulty on that score, whatever, I'm sure.

Ba: How would you word it otherwise, Bendetsen?

Be: Ordinarily permits are given for a spcific destination on a specific route. This merely is a....

Ba: Well now would you suggest that it be possible to word it to go to Tule Lake, Poston, Manzanar and Gila River...in that order or any otherorder?

Be: Well it would be very possible except that they have asked that we...they haven't given us a directive, but merely a request that we take down the bars because of this: For one thing, they stated this - that when the soldier gets in and he answers questions in the center, one of the questions asked will be "Well how did they let you in - what restrictions are you under - can you go anywhere or are you just tied to this point?"

They want the man to come in under a sort of a _____, if we'll go along with it. Well I don't see any harm in it, sir.

Ba: Neither do I. I was just sort of thinking out loud a minute ago, but the more I think of it, if the idea is good at all, it is almost essential that these soldiers be able to tell the Nisei boys that they are talking to - "Here I am--a Jap soldier--with permission to travel anywhere." Without restrictions.

Be: Yessir. I think probably we ought to go along with it.

Ba: I think so too. ...the basis idea of creating these units is sound, then I believe that it would be unsound for us to adopt any other idea than what...than to give these fellows...

Be: I think that's right sir. To put it another way, we have recorded our protest against the whole plan, but the War Dept. has adopted it and now we should do everything we can to support them.

Ba: Exactly correct. That is correct, I think.

Be: Well I'll go ahead and have 4 permits sent. They wanted them to go by wire, right away, back there and signed by the Adjutant

General, or I could sign Gen. DeWitt's name.

Ba: ...Gen. DeWitt's name. His name is signed to all radiograms that go out.

Be: All right sir, I'll put him on it, and have it made official by the AG and send it by wire at once just in that form.

Ba: I don't think we can do anything else but that.

Be: All right sir. Now may I ask if a decision was reached on whether or not that officer should make that talk tonight?

Ba: Oh yes! I thought I called you back on that.

Be: Oh no sir.

Ba: The General said nothing doing, on the talking. I guess I got something else on my mind. The General has been quite busily engaged in another project and he's had me busily engaged also. I probably just neglected to call you. I certainly intended to. No, he doesn't want anybody talking.

Be: All right sir, we'll decline all requests.

Ba: They know all the answers to everything a man could reasonably say....already. And anything else he might say, he doesn't want said. See? If you get what I mean.

Be: All right sir. I understand.

Ba: O.K. I'm sorry I didn't call you back on that because I cleared it with him and thought I called you right back.

Be: All right sir, it wasn't important. Thank you very much.

Ba: O.K.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WTJ 34
Filed 0516/5
ACM



From: Ft. Shafter, TH
To: The Adjutant General

No. 906, February 5, 1943.

Consider it highly desirable that officers in addition to reserve officers not now on active duty be supplied for combat unit Japanese Americans as follows: (A) from University of Hawaii graduates who have completed ROTC courses and were not commissioned because policy recent years was not to tender reserve commissions to boys Japanese ancestry. (B) Several reserve officers not on active duty slightly over age for Lieutenants otherwise well qualified physically and professionally. (C) Can provide 3 white Field Officers and 5 white Captains if desired who have requested detail. All have had extended experience with local Japanese. (HDGBI) request instructions number officers by grade and catagory desired from this Department.

Emmons

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: G-2
SOS-TAG

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 7/14/69

~~RECRADED CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARAPHRASED
CM-IN-2899 (6 FEB 43) 0838Z cen
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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8Z113

~~SECRET~~

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Mil Gov

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD

INCOMING MESSAGE

1SU81
Filed 8/1940Z
hh

URGENT

From: Ft Douglas Utah
To: The Adjutant General

No #, February 8, 1943

Concerning letter SPX 342 (1-28-42) PR-1 subject induction of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry Feb 1, 1943, I strongly recommend that the procedure outlined for processing prospective Japanese inductees in the 9th Service Command be changed so as to direct that those selected proceed to designated local boards near relocation centers where inductees now are and that after processing by such boards they be sent direct to the induction station Salt Lake City Utah thence to the Reception Center Fort Douglas and from that reception center direct to Camp Shelby Mississippi immediate action is requested this recommendation is concurred in by General Dewitt.

Joyce

ACTION: SOS

DIVISION	ACT	INF
T & INDUCTION BR		
MILITARY SERVICE		
BRANCH		
BRANCH		
BRANCH		

AGO FEB 8 1943 RECEIVED

CLASSIFICATION ~~CANCELLED~~ ~~CHANGED~~ ~~PARAPHRASED~~
VERSIONS REGRADED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RESTRICTED
CHANGED BY TAG/9A=1

(8 Feb 43) 2059Z ems

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by _____ date 4/2/69

2-13-43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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COPY No. 3

U 3606

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Returned by

SPX 352 (2-10-43) PR-I

VLS:MVS:llr

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin AGO, Personnel, Apmt. & Ind., Rctg. & Ind., PR-I (Division, branch, section, and symbol)

Date February 10, 1943

Telephone 78786 (Originating officer)

Classification ~~Confidential~~ (Restricted—Confidential—Secret)

Precedence Deferred (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

CG

To: ~~COMMANDING GENERAL~~
NINTH SERVICE COMMAND
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
FORT DOUGLAS UTAH

FOR

1641

COLONEL HAYDEN HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY ON FEBRUARY NINE FORTY THREE FURNISHED REURAD FEBRUARY EIGHT PROCESSING JAPANESE INDUCTEES COLONEL DAVIDSON CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS NINTH SERVICE COMMAND REQUESTED INFORMATION SPXPR DASH I BY PHONE

ULIO
~~THE ADJUTANT GENERAL~~

Official:

Geo F Osborn
Adjutant General.

FILE Recd FEB 13 1943

DISTRIBUTION:

Content and classification ~~CLASSIFICATION DOUBTFUL~~, PARAPHRASED
VERSIONS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/9A-1

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by NN date 6/12/75

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 990
September 3, 1942

16—80828-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Mail 3-15-43

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS NINTH SERVICE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT DOUGLAS, UTAH

342 (SPKIR) February 10, 1943.

Subject: Induction of United States citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference is made to the letter The Adjutant General's Office dated February 1, 1943, file SPX 342 (1-28-43)PR-I, same subject as above.

2. Regarding paragraph 3 of the above mentioned letter, the War Department has approved the utilization of a special local board or a local board in the immediate vicinity of each relocation center to handle the processing of those Japanese who volunteer for induction. This will avoid the necessity of these applicants returning to their local boards of registration. The majority of these local boards of registration are located in restricted areas and the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, will not permit these men to enter restricted military zones under any circumstance.

3. It is therefore requested that the clearances issued by your office on special form "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry" (304 A) be not sent to the local board where the applicant is registered, but, that for all volunteers interned at relocation centers in this service command, they be transmitted to this headquarters for forwarding to the special local board concerned.

4. It is also recommended that the same action be taken with the Seventh and Eighth Service Commands in order to avoid the possibility of any of these men returning to their homes in restricted areas because they will be arrested if they attempt to enter.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ GENE A. ROBENS,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

13-15-43

Records #20 & 21
Colonel Bendetsen & General DeWITT
2-13-43 TIME: 1.40 p.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECTS:
1. Registration of Japanese in WRA Centers
2. Mixed marriage questions
3. Move and General Staff Status of CAD
4. ATC - Commanding General to visit.

DeW I was in an important conference when you called and couldn't break off.

B Yes sir; I have some interesting reports for you, in connection with the progress of these teams that are at the Relocation Centers, which I felt you would like to know about.

DeW Yes, go right ahead.

B These reports are fragmentary, but are direct, in that, there is a Major Marshall here, who is with the SoS in the WD; he didn't come in and report to us, or to this headquarters but rather reported to WRA and Major Astrup called me this morning and said he was here.

He is in touch with the various centers on the telephone, and before I go into the reports, I have learned incidently, that Colonel Scobey has flown out here and has been at Manzanar, and is now flying down to Poston; I understand that he does not intend to come to SF however.

The reports that I have, deal with Tule Lake, Gila River, Central Utah and Manzanar.

DeW That is Delta?

B Yes sir, Delta; they call it Topas; at Topas or Delta they were to have commenced registration on Wednesday - to go back aways, under the instructions which these teams had, they were to conduct the registration on the block system - that was for administrative convenience; the block managers at Topaz, told the Captain of the team, a Lt. Tracy, who happens to be Lee Tracey of the movies,

B that they were not yet ready to register, and wanted to have time to think it over and to put several questions first; they wanted to delay, before they started.

After considering the matter, he told them that they could delay, providing they would agree, unqualifiedly, and without condition, to commence registration on Saturday, today; this morning came and they told him that they were not ready and that they would not start until Monday, and that they were going to have a mass meeting tomorrow to decide by vote of the project whether anybody would register at all.

That is number one.

At Manzanar, the most unusual development of all has occured; they are having no untoward incidents yet there, and while there is an undercurrent and they have gotten more persons to register there than any other place so far, it is reported that over 45% of every block, instead of registering, have asked for repatriation.

DeW Is that so?

B Yes, and isn't that amazing? Apparently the explanation, as I get it, is, that the people there have been convinced by the active Pro-Japan group that they shouldn't go into this; that if they are going in at all, they should be allowed to go in as any other American does, without going into a combat team composed only of Japanese and that this is another dodge and that the best thing for them to do is to ask for repatriation; that if they ask for it they can't be repatriated because there is no repatriation going on, so that this will enable them to keep what they have got now, and when the war is over the United States will forget about it anyway.

DeW I see.

B At Tule Lake, and this is a little on the comical side, they have had their registration going on for five days; in that period 100 persons have registered, out of which a total of 20, have agreed to volunteer.

DeW I had heard something about the Delta one, from General Joyce.

B Yes, Major Bolt is over there and he called in here, too.

DeW He said that they were supposed to register this morning but that no one showed up. He didn't seem to know the details, but it seems the Project Director had asked the Commanding Officer to hold his men together, that he might need them.

4W

B Yes, I was just going to tell you that.

DeW I sent that transcript down to you, now are you making a record of this?

B Of our conversation,? Yes sir.

DeW Well keep them together, we may want to put them in the folder of clippings that the Public Relations Officer is keeping.

B Yes sir, I'll do that; shall I send a copy of this to you?

DeW No, just hold them all together and wait until we see.

B Now I am taking part in no conversations whatsoever, be assured of that sir. But I think I will keep in touch with Marshall so that we will know what is doing.

DeW Oh I think so, for a point of information.

B For information only, he is to talk to several other Projects this afternoon, and I think I will go down there again after he gets the reports.

DeW Yes, keep interested in that.

Now wait a minute, I sent down to you, a letter from Mr. McCloy and it is, or it incorporates a letter from the WRA in which he asked that a change be made (WRA does and Mr. McCloy transmits it with a long letter) on our mixed marriages and Mr. McCloy poses several questions as to whether we shouldn't base it on loyalty and so forth; at least one, which isn't under our policy and the reason we didn't grant that before is because there was no proof of the marriage, but now he said that they had shown that they were married stating when and where and so forth, and I didn't look over all of them, but I put a memo on it to you to read it and we will talk about it Monday, and then for you to prepare your answer, as expressing, prepare a letter to Mr. McCloy in answer to it, as expressing your views, not mine. I wanted to see what you think about it; we think about the same , or along the same lines, but I want you to prepare it.

B Shall I bring it out Monday morning sir?

DeW Bring it out Monday morning, and I put a little note on there that it didn't look like it had been signed by Mr. McCloy, it is signed J.J.Cloy, the Mc is off, and it doesn't look like Mr. MrCloy's signature.

B I see, I'll look at it, I think I would recognize his signature.

I had a point here sir, in regard to our reorganization, and move. As I understood it, you have decided that the CAD would remain as a General Staff section, that is true is it not sir?

DeW That is correct, a General Staff section of the headquarters; I won't call it G-5 but it will be a fifth section of the General Staff and retain it's name, Civil Affairs Division.

B Apparently there has been some misunderstanding on the Staff about it.

DeW The only thing I am not going to do, and I have just decided that, I'll take the chances, I am not going to prepare any detailed plan of civil government or martial law.

B No sir, I understand that.

DeW I think I'll cut that out, I don't think there is any likelihood of it at all, and I think it might be a waste of time ff we developed plans.

B That is right sir; it shouldn't be a make work project because, unless it is needed it would be a waste of time and energy; it would be an extensive task, one involving great detail and much time.

DeW I intend to keep the CAD as a general staff division under the headquarters, a fifth division of the General Staff.

B Yes sir, with

DeW With the Exclusion Board and Travel Agency as operating agencies.

B Yes sir, that was my distinct understanding of your decision.

DeW Now wait a minute, who is the officer in charge of the ATC?

B His name is Goebel, Major Herman Goebel.

DeW Goebel? I may go up there Wednesday and I'm going over to see him if I go up.

B That is fine sir, Major Herman Goebel, and his first assistant is Captain Herbert J. Lane.

DeW How are they doing?

B Good sir, they seem to be in good shape; I was up there as you know to inspedt and we had put in some changes; I think it is oper-

B ating well. I hope you can go in.

DeW I don't know; it depends on the weather, but I think I'll go.

B As soon as the first draft of the report has been approved I plan to go up again and see that it is in good shape.

DeW All right old man.

CONFIDENTIAL

328/14

#690
gjr

0945 14 February 1943

Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and General JOYCE, Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah.

General Joyce: I just wanted to let you know the return I have on this situation. At DELTA, the Center Director there requested them to keep the Company on the alert until Monday as Jap meetings were expected; everyplace else is quiet. Now, here is the list on the thing:

CENTRAL UTAH (that is DELTA) the response was none; the interference by disloyal groups, yes; trouble expected, yes. Well, that means on the part of the Relocation directly, you see.

GILA RIVER, the response was slight; interference by disloyal groups, some; trouble expected, no.

TULE LAKE, response indifferent; no interference; no trouble expected.

MANZANAR, response fair; interference by disloyal groups, yes; trouble expected, no.

MINIDOKA, good response; no interference; no trouble expected.

COLORADO RIVER, good response; no interference and no trouble expected.

So there are three, you see, where there has been interference and three where there has been no interference and the only place where there has been a flare-up indicated was at DELTA. That is the summary that we have on it.

General DeWitt: Thank you. Keep me informed, will you; we haven't got anything. The only thing we have conforms to what you have given us in a general way.

J: Well, all right. However the thing irons out at DELTA, I'll give you word tomorrow.

DeW: General Scobey; have you heard that he was around to these camps?

J: Scobey visited GILA RIVER, MANZANAR and POSTON on the 12th and 13th of February.

DeW: All right, goodbye.



DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NAMW by _____ date 6/12/67

47

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1

WASHINGTON

WDGAP 320

February 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Organization of Combat Team composed of citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be informed by radio substantially as follows:

ADVISE APPROXIMATE NUMBER ROTC GRADUATES JAPANESE ANCESTRY YOU RECOMMEND APPOINTING FOR DUTY WITH NISEI COMBAT TEAM period MEANWHILE COMPLETE PAPERS PRESCRIBED AR SIX ZERO FIVE dash TEN AND PROCESSING IN SAME MANNER AS SELECTEES OUTLINED IN OUR RADIO TWO FOUR FIVE FOUR JANUARY TWENTY TWO NINETEEN FORTY THREE period FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW UPON RECEIPT OF ABOVE REQUESTED INFORMATION period OVERAGE LTS (EXCEPT MEDICAL) NOT DESIRED FOR THIS COMBAT TEAM period YOUR RADIO NINE ZERO SIX FEBRUARY FIVE NINETEEN FORTY THREE period REPORT NAMES GRADES BRANCH OF SERVICE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF EACH WHITE OFFICER FOR FINAL DECISION BY WAR DEPARTMENT end

II. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS



the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, and all others concerned be informed of action taken.

87 A G O
FEB 15 1943
received

WE-S-5

M. G. WHITE,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

E. C. LYNCH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive

Incls
Memo to TAG, 2-12-43,
fr MPD SOS (re-written).
Rad fr Ft. Shafter, TH,
#906, Feb. 5, 1943, to TAG.
Ch/Acn Sheet, 2-6-43, fr
OPD to MPD SOS.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: CG, Haw. in radio 906, Feb. 5, 1943, requests authority to commission Hawaiian ROTC graduates of Japanese descent for the Nisei Combat Team, also to send overage lts not on active duty, and 8 white officers with experience with Japanese. MPD SOS proposes authorize CG, Hawaii to appoint not to exceed 100 of these ROTC graduates; however, Personnel Division, G-1 is of the opinion that the total number involved should be learned in order that CG, Hawaii might be given special procurement objective and assignment instructions should the number involved exceed that which can be absorbed by the combat team. OPD (Lt. Col. Eckhardt) and AGF (Capt. Wooley) informally concurred in MPD SOS action.

ACTION TAKEN: 2/15/43 by rad to CG HWN DEPT. Cys to: OPD; G-1; G-2; CG AGF; OFF BR; AP&IND BR.
EHB/mjc - 2 B 939
Cy. furnished Mil. Pers., SOS, by AGO-SOS Msg. Ctr.
ehb - 2 B 939.

SECRET

FILE FEB 16 1943

FEB 15 1943
2-91-22-Org
WCCA

Record #33
Colonel Meek & Major Moffitt
2-15-43 Time 2.45 p.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECT: Japanese Registration in WRA Centers

Me Poston's response is satisfactory, no opposition, no trouble expected, no alert.

Delta Utah, response is poor; some opposition, trouble is expected and they still ask us to stay on the alert, for two days more at least. The Lt. in Command of the recruit detail has heard this.

Tule Lake, no violece; the response is poor; some opposition, to allay all their troubles they have transferred to Chicago, Ill. Maybe you got the permit, I haven't seen it.

Mo; what is his name?

Me I'm looking for it, it was that Japanese lawyer, who was head of the JACL from Sacramento, they have moved him to Chicago, fearing there might be some trouble there. I don't know why.

Mo I see

Me There is some opporisition there; they don't seem to expect trouble - there is no alert there.

Minidoka is - everything there is satisfactory; things are coming along there very well.

Gila River; there is some opposition at Gila River, possible trouble expected but they are not on the alert as yet.

18

Me Manzanar - the response has been nil. No, or rather some opposition, no trouble expected, we are not on the alert there, although we are still in the camp there, and will be until they get some help there; WRA fell down completely on that one; they have only had one employee there for the ten days.

Mo That's rich.

Me And they wrote the most asinine letter to those Japanese, that is what caused all the trouble; they promised them that they would give them a hearing; they did get a hearing by remote control, back in Washington, but the Japs didn't know about it, and they wrote a letter signed by Mr. Meyer, in which all the damm letter said was

"it had been decided that you will not be returned to Manzan r, " so they started in to raise hell and I don't know that I blame them much

Mo I see

Me Now that is all I can report on that subject.

Mo How late is your information?

Me Nonne today; we get a daily report at noon.

Mo Keep us informed.

Me Yes I will and you inform WRA will you.

Mo Thanks a lot Colonel.

338/4

CONFIDENTIAL

#694
WDC
1500 Feb 15 — 43

Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and General JOYCE, CG, 9th Service Command.

General DeWITT: Hello, how are you?

General JOYCE: Fine. Do you want to switch on your button?

D: All right.

J: Nothing more from DELTA. The same situation still exists down there — opposition and they still request our people to be on the alert. Yesterday in the afternoon, the Director at Gila River called up — have you heard anything about this?

D: No.

J: The Director at Gila River called up and wanted our MP's to come into the camp and arrest 19 bad Japs, which of course, our MP's refused to do. And then the Director wanted the Commander of the company to take over the camp; arrest the Japs, and then turn the camp back to the Director after the Japs had been arrested. That, of course, was denied also. If they want to arrest their 19 bad Japs, all right, let them do it and then if they want to send them to Moab, of course we will send an escort along to see that nobody molests them. But he seemed to think that trouble was expected there and there was violent opposition to the program as it was being carried on. We have heard nothing from him since. We simply denied his requests on that basis, you see, and that was that.

D: The only thing is to keep on the alert.

J: Oh yes. Our people are on the alert there. They are on notice and they are standing by. But I mean for us to go in there and take out bad japs —

D: Oh yes. They have got to use civil processes for that.

J: Yes. Otherwise the situation is just the same as it was. We've heard from all of them and they are going along. Both Tule Lake and Minidoka seem to be pretty well all right. In Manzanar there is opposition but no trouble has come to the Service as yet. At Tule Lake there is some opposition but no difficulty has come to the Service. Delta and Gila River seem to be the two focal points at this time. That is the story on that.

D: All right. Thank you for calling me up.

J: Goodbye.

D: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ____ date ____

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
Feb 16 A.M.
WDC &
Fourth Army
WCCA
565

49

291.2 - Japanese

CG.
KRB.

Records #54 & 55
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Scobey
2-16-43 Time: 2:15 p.m.
K. Russell - mm

SUBJECT: 291.2 Jap Americans mld

S I wanted to talk to you about a letter of instructions that apparently is being issued by the Ninth & Seventh Service Commands and I am told by the Ninth Service Command that the promulgating instructions had come from the WDC.

B I see

S The letter is a letter in the Ninth Service Command, is dated February 10th, with a file number 342.SPKIR, 2/10/43.

Apparently instructions to the WD representatives who are officers on those teams in the WRA centers, in which they state that a furlough of 10 days will be given to the Japanese at enlistment prior to the time they are ordered to report to their station which is Camp Sheldon, Mississippi; and in the letter, further, according to information we have here, is that they will not be given any furlough under any consideration to travel back into military areas Nos. 1 and 2, California and 1 in Oregon and Washington and Arizona.

Now that prohibition is interferring materially with the process of our recruitment, in that a number of these Japanese have asked permission to go and settle up their business where they came from; some of them - I don't know how many. But in view of the fact that the WD answered this question, which I will read to you as follows:

"Will I be permitted to travel throughout the US;"

The answer is "Yes, except that return to the evacuated area will not be permitted except under the authorization of the WDC; permits for temporary visits will be granted automatically to Japanese American soldiers in uniform."

Now that is a promise the WD made them, and that set of questions was approved through PMG and Mr. McCloy's office. The Ninth Service Command instructions is completely in variance with that and is causing a great deal of difficulty.

FILE

File
my

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S It indicates to these Japanese that what the WD told them isn't so, and it is embarrassing the WD; and in view of the WDC instrucions on leaves it says as follows:

"present regulations covering visits of soldiers of Japanese ancestry to the WRA projects as published in WD directive dated Oct. 7, 1942 do not require that such soldiers be accompanied by Caucasian escorts." That is to the centers. "all that is required is that the soldier carry a blue paper and travel permit issued by this headquarters."

Further on in your letter of Dec. 30th it says, "for this reason it is deemed advisable and necessary that regulations now in effect be continued for the present, namely that all persons of Japanese ancestry other than those in the armed services must obtain a permit to enter areas 1 and 2 in California and that portion of military area No. 2. That Caucasian escorts must accompany such persons while travelling within the evacuated area."

Now, of course, this letter that I have just quoted does not authorize the return of these Japanese soldiers to the areas from which they came excepting under certain conditions. However, in view of the WD's action in soliciting these people and in view of the fact that they will be actually enlisted and given a serial number and a seven day furlough, can it not be made possible for these people to return in time to the area from which they came to attend to such business which they feel they should attend to?

B I will put the matter up to the CG, Colonel Scobey. Is that the desire of Mr. McCloy?

S Yes, it is. He isn't here, but I consulted with him before he left and I know that that is exactly what he wants.

B This comes as somewhat of a complete surprise to me and I am sure that it will to the General also because the only thing that was ever discussed with this headquarters was the question of whether soldiers could come into the 4 centers without having to show that a member of the immediate family was in danger of death. You asked that question or Captain Hall did, rather, and I said that under the present policy of the CG any Japanese soldier could visit any one of the four centers merely if he had a furlough. Captain Hall then said that he would like to have a letter written to the Captain of the Team at the Gila River Center which explained that and that was done, but this is the first time that any mention whatever of such a thing as this was ever made to the headquarters as far as I know. I think it is coming as a complete surprise. However, I will take it up with the CG at once, Colonel Scobey.

S Well, here is what Mr. McCloy said about it; in discussing it, and as I say, this questionnaire was cleared through Mr. McCloy, said that it seemed inconceivable that a US soldier in uniform could not travel anywhere an alien could travel. But he thought that the American soldier in uniform should have permission as any other soldier in uniform to travel anywhere an alien could go.

B Are these men to be in uniform?

S No, they are not, because they will not get their uniform until they get to their stations and as a matter of fact I don't think there will be many, but the only thing is that they are sworn in, they will be inducted, they will have their army serial numbers and they are soldiers in the armed service from the moment they are sworn in.

B Will they be under any escort?

S No, not unless we are forced to give them an escort and I don't know that an escort can be provided for them.

B Well, I will take this up with General DeWitt at once.

S Fine. Now is there any other question you would like to ask?

B I don't think so; from what I understand, you are requesting that the rules be changed completely to permit those who are inducted to go through the area freely, even though they are not in uniform.

S That is not exactly stated correctly.

I am requesting on behalf of the WD in accordance with an approved paper gotten out by the WD that these soldiers, after they have become duly enlisted soldiers, in combat service, be permitted with a proper pass and furlough to go to definite localities as described in their furlough for a period of time not to exceed 7 days from the induction, not to travel indiscriminately by any means. They will be given furlough papers stating where they will be permitted to go; they will be soldiers with army serial numbers and will be enlisted under oath.

B All right, sir. I have the picture and I will take that up.

S Fine, and when will you call me back?

B I will try to call you back the first thing in the morning.

V4

Record No. 56
Colonel Bendetsen & General Barnett
February 16, 1943 Time: 2:55 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

Be: General Barnett I just got a call from Colonel Scobey. I wanted to call you up about it so that you could inform the General. I made a transcript of the conversation and as soon as it is typed I'll send it right out. Colonel Scobey evidently is back from his trip and he states that the instructions of the Ninth and Seventh Service Commands which have been issued in connection with the induction of Americans of Japanese ancestry into the Army, has just come to his attention. And that he finds that those instructions are directly contrary to the questions and answers approved by the War Department and discussed in the centers by these teams...which suggest to these Japanese that if they are inducted that they get a 7 day furlough after they're sworn in and they can go anyplace. That is, they can go back to their communities to take care of business. Even if it's in San Francisco or Los Angeles.

Well, I said that comes as a complete surprise. We weren't consulted about it--that all that was ever mentioned to us was the question whether they could go into the 4 relocation centers in the evacuated zone, and so on.

Well, he said that that has the approval of the War Department and of Mr. McCloy's office - as he put it. Not Mr. McCloy. Mr. McCloy is away now, he said. At any rate the question is up and he asked that I take it up with the Commanding General and call him back first thing in the morning.

Ba: Send the thing out, will you Bendetsen?

Be: Yes.

Ba: So we can get it cleared this afternoon.

Be: Very well sir.

Ba: O.K. Fine.

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Record No. 63
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Meek
February 16, 1943 Time: 3:45 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

M: Did you hear from Colonel Scobey today?

B: Yes, I just got a call from Colonel Scobey.

M: About this recruiting matter over here?

B: Yes.

M: Are you familiar with the letter he's referring to Colonel?

B: No.

M: Well I'll quote you some of it if you want me to.

B: Go ahead.

M: Paragraph 5 of the letter - dated February 10 and signed here by Major Roben (?) (Roland), Assistant Adjutant General.

Par. 5 "Whether or not the recruitant desires to avail himself of the 7 day inactive period, none of these volunteers will be permitted under any circumstances to enter Military Areas No.1 and 2 in California and No. 1 in Washington, Oregon and Arizona."

Par. 6 "It is requested that you convey this information to all applicants in order that there may be no misunderstanding on their part as to the procedure to be followed and that they will have no grounds to claim hereafter that they were inducted under any false pretention."

Do you have your recorder on?

B: Yes.

M: That letter was sent out to all of the team captains on the teams in the different centers here in this service command.

B: I see.

M: Now I think the basis of that Colonel, had to do with a teletype from Colonel....DeWitt, dated February 10.

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B: Yes, I know about the teletype.

M: You're familiar with the telegram. Now would that information be of any help to you?

B: Yes. Thanks very much. I'm going to take it up with the General right away.

M: Now there's one other thing I thought you ought to know ... what our situation was. Everything is as I reported yesterday.

B: The same? Everything unchanged?

M: Everything is the same over yesterday. No change.

B: No change in the situation reported yesterday within any of the relocation centers.

M: That's true. However you might want to know that down at Gila River they are taking ... the FBI are taking 16 out of there at 3 o'clock this afternoon on a presidential warrant.

B: I see.

M: To be tried I suppose...I suppose they are going to try them for espionage.

Be: Beyond that there is no change?

M: No change beyond that. We are furnishing a guard to go in with the FBI agent to make the arrests.

B: You are?

M: Yes. Well yes sir. There will be 10 agents go in in pairs and we are sending 1 enlisted man with them. That's cleared thru the Chief of Staff here and Colonel Scobey cleared it this morning also.

B: Is that so? I see.

M: You don't sound like you agree with that.

B: No, I don't.

M: Neither does Bolt. Neither do I, but I lost the argument.

B: I see. Well, all right thanks for the report.

M: How's everything going?

B: Pretty well.

M: Well, remember us to all of them there.

B: You bet we will. Good-bye.

M: Just a minute Colonel...hold it...Oh! would you like to know what Colonel Scobey said to us about that matter?

B: I imagine he told you that it was in complete variance with the War Department instructions. Is that what he said?

M: Yes. He made a funny statement.

B: What was it?

M: Well, let me get it here...Here's what he said:

"This order from the Ninth Service Command carries provisions which we do not want you to rescind, but which appears is appropriate." (?) "Well, I would take that up with the Western Defense Command" he said.

Does that make sense to you?

B: No, it doesn't.

M: Well this is a transcript of the conversation.

B: No, it is difficult to reconcile the 2 parts of his sentence.

M: You got that, didn't you?

B: Yes I did. Thanks very much Frank.

M: It rather conflicts with what he said before that.

B: Yes, it is anachronistic.

M: Want me to air-mail you a copy of this? I can.

B: All right fine.

M: I'll air-mail it to you tonight, Colonel.

B: Thank you.

M: To the Whitcomb Hotel. O.K., it will go out right away.
B: Thank you.

2-2

HEADQUARTERS NINTH SERVICE COMMAND
FORT DOUGLAS 2/16 1943

INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

MEMORANDUM: To. Col. Bendetsen

Herewith the transcript I promised you - Please note the Rumanand WRA are giving us on the Draft matter -- Part you want begins bottom 2nd page on Japanese furloughs -

Regards

Meek

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN COLONEL SCOBEY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR'S OFFICE, AND MAJOR BOLDT, ALIENS SECTION, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION, NINTH SERVICE COMMAND, FORT DOUGLAS, UTAH.

12:30 p.m.
February 16, 1943.

BOLDT: Major Boldt speaking, Colonel Scobey.

SCOBEY: Major Beldt, Colonel Wing called me up this morning about this Moab situation.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: Are you familiar with it?

BOLDT: Yes, sir, I am.

SCOBEY: Well, briefly, there was this complaint which I think was justified, that Mr. Bird down at Moab — is that his name?

BOLDT: Best, B-E-S-T.

SCOBEY: Mr. Best did not have any interior police force, and he called on the Army and we were doing it for him.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: We object to that being not in accordance with the agreement which we have with the W.R.A.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: I took it up with Mr. Meyers. Mr. Meyers said that we had a just cause of complaint. He agreed with me that he should furnish the men.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: He will do so without delay. It may be some time the latter part of the week before he can get them in there, so that's the best I could get out of him.

BOLDT: Colonel, two men were supposed to have left the Gila River Project --

SCOBEY: What is that?

BOLDT: Two men (interior police) were supposed to have left the Gila River Project to go to Moab to help Mr. Best.

SCOBEY: Yes.

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BOLDT: But they have not arrived there the last we talked to them here yesterday.

SCOBEY: Mr. Meyers tells me he wants to have at least six men in there at the end of this week.

BOLDT: At the end of this week?

SCOBEY: Yes. And that he will take it over just as quick as he can from us, and if he doesn't do that we would like to know about it because we do not propose to perform that function.

BOLDT: Very well, sir.

SCOBEY: We will, in the interim, support him to the extent of helping him to the end of this week.

BOLDT: Yes, sir, that is being done.

SCOBEY: And after that if he hasn't put men in there, then we will have to deal with him some other way.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: He tells me that he expects to move four of those Japanese out of there very early — four aliens — and put them in an internment camp.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: The others are citizen Japanese, and he can't put those in internment camps.

BOLDT: That is right.

SCOBEY: So that is the status of it. He apologizes and says he is sorry, but it just couldn't be helped.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: Now, I wish you would tell Colonel Wing that, will you?

BOLDT: Yes, sir, I will.

SCOBEY: Now, there is one other matter. According to a letter from the Ninth Service Command, dated, I believe, February 10th, file 342 SPKIR, instructions have been given to the Team Captains through the Project Director, in the Ninth Service Command, that these men who volunteer — for these Japanese units — will be given a seven days' furlough. Is that correct?

BOLDT: Yes, sir. We did not have that information here.

SCOBEY: What is that?

BOLDT: We did not have that information here.

SCOBEY: You did not. Well, this letter originated in the Service Command headquarters.

BOLDT: Well, we did not have it in the Aliens Section here.

SCOBEY: Well, who should I talk to about this letter? The point is this — these men will be sworn into the Army and given a serial number and then be given seven days' furlough.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: Now, the Ninth Service Command says to them: "You cannot go into Military Districts One and Two." We have promised these people that when they go into the Army and become soldiers they will be given an opportunity to go into that District and attend to essential business affairs and should clean up those matters so that they can then go on to their service and duty and station in the Army, and this letter breaks faith with the Japanese on the proposition they have been given.

BOLDT: Yes, sir, it does.

SCOBEY: We expect the Ninth Service Command and the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to give such permits to these people -- of course limit the place to go to, a specific place to go to at their request and date of return -- but these are soldiers and they will not be in uniform, that is the bad part of it.

BOLDT: That is, yes.

SCOBEY: But they could have, it seems to me, an appropriate pass which will identify them so that they could go back and attend to what essential business they may have, and I think it is only just that they be given that authority.

BOLDT: Yes, Colonel, that will have to be taken up with the Western Defense Command, though, who would have to issue them the passes.

SCOBEY: Right, but this order from the Ninth Service Command carried provisions which we do not want you to rescind, but which embarrasses the program, -- well, I will take it up with the Western Defense Command.

BOLDT: Yes, sir, that will be with Colonel Bendetsen.

SCOBEY: Right. I understand. But your letter of instruction covers the matter there in such a way that it embarrasses the Team Captains out in the field.

BOLDT: Colonel, I do now recollect having heard about that. I haven't seen the communication, but I believe the letter originated in the Western Defense Command to here.

SCOBEY: I see.

BOLDT: And that the Ninth Service Command letter was a "follow-up" on the letter we had from the Western Defense Command on the subject.

SCOBEY: I see. Well, I will talk to Bendetsen about it then.

BOLDT: Yes, sir, because with a pass from the Western Defense Command they can go in --

SCOBEY: What is that?

BOLDT: With a pass from the Western Defense Command they can go in.

SCOBEY: Yes, well that is what we feel. That is the intention of the War Department -- to let them attend to essential business in connection with getting ready to go into the service.

BOLDT: Yes, sir.

SCOBEY: Well, I will take it up with Bendetsen then.

BOLDT: Very well, sir.

SCOBEY: You will give my message to Colonel Wing?

BOLDT: I will, sir.

SCOBEY: Thankyou very much.

BOLDT: You are quite welcome.

SCOBEY: Goodbye.

BOLDT: Goodbye.

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CONFIDENTIAL

#702
wdc
0900 Feb 17, 1943

Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and Colonel BENDETSEN, CAD, this Headquarters.

General DeWITT: ——still holds with reference to having Japanese soldiers in here. They haven't any business to attend to anyhow. They did that all at the Assembly Centers and they haven't any more business to attend to than if they were in Assembly Centers. Isn't that correct?

Colonel BENDETSEN: That is correct, sir.

D: The type of men that they are getting were not engaged in any business activities that would require them to have to come back here and run around Los Angeles and San Diego and those places.

B: That is correct, sir. They are a younger group of men -- between 18 and 25.

D: You are talking to Scobey now -- not to the Secretary.

B: That is right, sir.

D: I want you to talk to him. I won't talk to anybody. But I'm going to stick to my present policy.

B: Yes sir. I understand.

D: Notify the War Department.

B: I'll advise them -- I'll advise Colonel Scobey that the Commanding General adheres to his present policy as approved by the War Department and no change. And in the absense of a directive to the contrary, they will be permitted to visit only the four Relocation Centers.

D: That is it. Make it plain to him that we haven't been consulted before on this and that my attitude is based on the fact that we weren't consulted because there was no intention of the War Department to view that fact or expectation that it would -- any change in the policies that have been established would be desirable or necessary.

B: I understand.

D: . . . . . but I'm not going to talk to Scobey about any change in important policy of that kind.

B: I understand that, sir, and I also understand that General Joyce was advised in response to his request, that if furloughs were granted, there was to be no change in present policy. I understand that he was so advised, sir.

D: By the War Department. Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 4/13/65

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B: I'll also point that out.

D: All right. Don't do it in a way that will bring orders. Do you see what I mean. Don't do it in a way that will bring the Secretary in it. I mean Mr. McCloy.

B: All right, sir.

D: You are talking personally to Scobey and not officially. Understand?

B: I'll talk personally to him. I understand. Yes sir.

D: All right. Now give me the address of the travel bureau.

B: The Alaska Travel Control is 1331 3rd Avenue. Directly across the street in Seattle from the Post Office on Third Avenue.

D: Major Goebel.

B: Yes sir. Major G-O-E-B-E-L.

D: All right. Thank you.

B: All right, sir. About what time do you expect to go over there?

D: I don't know. Don't let him know. I don't want anybody to know I'm getting up there. I'm going to Admiral Fletcher's office. I'll go over from there.

B: All right sir.

D: I'll telephone him from there. What is his phone number?

B: Eliot 3402, Sir.

D: All right.

B: All right, sir. I'll take care of it this morning. Goodbye Sir. Have a good flight.

D: I hope so. The weather is good now.

B: Good. That is fine, sir.

D: Goodbye.

B: Goodbye.

* * *

17

370

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#703 /pwt
1055
17 Feb. 43.

Transcript of telephone conversation between General BARNETT and General JOYCE, Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Ft. Douglas, Utah.

General JOYCE: This is Joyce speaking . . . pull up your button will you.

General BARNETT: Yes, sir . . . . all set. (SCRAMBLER ON)

J: I was calling up General DeWitt to give him the latest dope in regard to the Japanese response in regard to this recruiting, you know. It is running along about the same: . . . .

At POSTON it is running allright, there is a satisfactory response, no opposition, no trouble expected etc.

DELTA, response is poor and there is opposition and possible trouble.

TULE LAKE, the response is poor and there is some opposition, no trouble expected.

MINIDOKA is satisfactory and it is going well there.

GILA RIVER, the response is poor, there is opposition and they expect possible trouble.

At MANZANAR there is no response, there is opposition, they don't expect trouble.

There at GILA RIVER the FBI went in this morning to arrest sixteen Japs and I don't know the result of that yet but I guess it is allright.

Now, yesterday afternoon Colonel Scobey called up from Washington and he was very much put out that the Japs were not going to be allowed to go into Districts #1 and 2. See?

B: Yes sir, I understand, he called here also.

J: He got one of our fellows in Internal Security here and he was told of course that would have to be handled by Western Defense Command and he said he would call up them so I suppose he has. What answer did he get?

B: He got the answer that there would be no change in the situation. The General said that without a directive from the War Department (and he had had none) that his policies were to continue on the existing War Department policy as published in the letter of . . . I forget the exact date, you know the one I mean.

J: Yes. Well, General DeWitt says no change from what we have put out.

B: That's right, sir.

J: Until the War Department directs otherwise that's that, but old Scobie was quite impertinent about the thing with the Major he was talking with on the phone here that he didn't have anybody higher than that.

B: He was a bit of the same with Bendetsen and Bendetsen talked to the General and I heard the General's side of the conversation and he told him very definitely that he was going to adhere to the existing policies . . . and not even to suggest to him that they send a directive out here. In other words, make it a personal matter between Bendetsen and Scobie, however, not official because . . . but to state his policy as being the existing instructions on the thing.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 4/8/65

J: As I say, it is purely a Western Defense Command matter and there we are . . . I am glad to get your angle of it from there. How long is the General going to be away?

B: He will be back tomorrow.

J: Well allright, I am getting out of here the later part of the week myself, I am going South but that doesn't make any difference I will always be available. Things are simmering along about the same on this response business . . no trouble yet. Incidentially, our friend Scobey made some remarks that were not too good about one of the MP Guard companies, the one at Gila River for instance (Escort Guard Company) and he was just all wet on his information. He passed that over to the Provost Marshal General's Office in Washington.

B: Yes sir. Well, he was out here you know, he made a quick trip through the area recently.

J: I know, I know, but he was wrong about that information. Did he dip into things a lot around?

B: Well, this was the first time. I have known Scobie a long time, of course more in a social way than in any other. When I left Washington he was Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but I guess he is in Mr. McCloy's office now.
(clear the?)

J: Yes. Well allright . . he is just injured at not being able to create Districts #1 and 2, that's all.

B: I think this is one of his pet ideas too and he is pushing it hard. He is enthusiastic for it and you can't blame a man for that.

J: No, no, it is allright . . . so long as he gets his dope right, I don't care.

B: So long as he doesn't get the wrong facts or distorted facts.

J: Fine.

B: Thank you very much, sir.

RECEIVED
17
Fourth Army
WCCA
372

Records #75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Scobey
2-17-43 Time 11:18 A.M.

SUBJECT: Registration of Japs in WRA Centers

S This is Scobey; I've been pretty busy this morning; I've been over to the D of J all morning.

B Good. How is Ennis?

S I didn't get to see him; he is not in the city. We went up there trying to get some action by the D of J on these people they picked up down in Gila River.

B I see.

S We - I was down there the other day and suggested that we take action against these people who are counselling the Nisei to have nothing to do with this thing; to say that they didn't want to have anything to do with it, and they were against registering and things of that kind, you know.

B Yes, interfering with this program, I suppose.

S They are definitely doing so.

B Yes, I suppose so. That group of pro-Japan people are doubtless not resting.

S No, they were very active at Gila, I found, so I didn't like it, and came back and took measures to have something done. They went in yesterday and took out 20 of them - 28 of them; 14 aliens and 14 citizens.

B They did; well, that is good.

S They put the aliens in jail, and the citizens they took up to Moab, temporarily, but I wanted to get prosecutions against them and I went over to the D of J and so they are going to try and move against them under the espionage act, and interference with the draft registration and everything they can; they are going to throw the book at them if they can get near them. I don't know, I haven't seen what they do have, but nevertheless they have enough to convict one or two of them.

B That ought to be very helpful. There should be much more of that.

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S Well, it will be helpful, and apparently it should be or is already reflected to some extent because nobody is monkeying around with /it/ now much.

B Sure enough. I get what you mean; I hope they intern the aliens right away.

S Well, that is what we expect to do.

B That is the way to do it all right.

S It is my suggestion and I asked that they be interned immediately. They don't have to have a lot of evidence on it, and the representation of the director down there that they are potentially dangerous, I see no reason why they shouldn't take them away.

B That is forthright action on your part. I certainly hope they follow through on it.

S Well, I'm trying to get them to. What have you got for me this morning.

B I just now talked to the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff at some length. The General took off right afterward on a trip. He feels that he can't change the present policy on it, Colonel Scobey.

S They are not to be permitted inside at all except with a Caucasian guide?

B No, not exactly that. Any of them can come in to visit any of the relocation centers without escort. In addition, where they have members of their immediate families who were deferred or exempted from evacuation on account of illness, or if any of these family members are in immediate danger of death, they can come in to visit them without escort, or permit, in uniform.

Between us, your request comes as a distinct surprise to the Commanding General. You will realize that I am now speaking unofficially. The War Department has always known of the existence of the present policy. It has formally approved it. In developing this program, the War Department gave no indication that it had any intention of changing the policy. If it had such an intention, it surely would have called on the Commanding General most concerned for comment in advance -- you must realize that this is fundamental. Furthermore, when General Joyce queried the War Department for instructions on granting furloughs to those inducted, he was advised that there would be no change in policy so far as entering the evacuated zone is concerned.

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S Yes. Well, Hall participated with the Provost Marshal's office and the G-2 evolving the message they are to give to these people, which contained the statement I read to you over the telephone.

B Of course we never have received any of those questions and answers here directly. The War Department never sent us any of the material. We did see some of them reprinted in one of the Japanese center newspapers. It seems that I recall that there was another question, a direct one, which was asked; whether they would be permitted to return to the coast and the answer was, "not at the present time".

S That was with reference to their families there, you know.

B Oh, I see. Well, there was nothing whatever to show that -- so probably what we saw wasn't an accurate reprint.

S I'm not sure about it. You may have seen an accurate reprint but in the _____, I happen to know and I don't remember how it was phrased but the attempt was to tell them they would not be permitted to return to the coast to live or to visit, either one, but that applies not to the military but to all of them, not to the soldiers.

B I see. In other words, their own relations. Well, of course, this group really have no businesses to attend to out here. I think from what I have seen of the program that most of them had everything pretty well attended to. Of course that is incidental but I merely point to that in passing. I don't want to take your time and go over something that is entirely familiar to you but I do remember this, for example. Not so very long ago, Col. Rasmussen, from his school in Minnesota, sent a detail in to Manzanar to gather up a few enlistees. Four or five only enlisted at that time. They came down from Manzanar on the train in company of a non-commissioned officer and officer. By jove, when they got to Los Angeles, the whole town was in a tail spin for the entire night upon reports of seeing Japanese there. Calls began to come into this office and the headquarters and they just -- of course they had permits with them, but everyone -- Here is what happened. For example one Japanese was seen and then a hundred reports would come in on him and the police would think there were probably a hundred Japanese and their prowler cars were out and we couldn't get it straightened out until the next morning. Just a small incident like that which shows that out on this strip there is a pretty deep underlying feeling. The proposal you make has been thoroughly considered. While it may be true that some of the Japanese are trying to embarrass your program by raising questions such as these - this is fundamental. I have put your case up and the Commanding General, in justice to his official duties, cannot change the policy himself.

S Well, I hope that he understood that it was no personal representation on my part; I am or was simply presenting the matter as Mr. McCloy presented it, and as he told me to present it. In other words, it is not my personal decision.

B No, I think --

S It is not my personal desires, they are besides the point; I am acting for the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, and he very definitely felt that those, and so stated, that he felt that when a man was in the uniform of the U.S. Army that, unless he was guilty of some offense, that he should have the rights of a citizen to be at large. That meant, that he should go back, for specific purposes to definite localities into the WDC area. Now that is the concrete statement of his representation.

B I appreciate that. I recorded our conversation as well, and I also had that there, so that there could have been no mistake about it, to insure that what you asked would be presented, and this is the reaction.

S The policy, I think was materially changed by the Secretary of War's pronouncement. That constitutes the principles and policy of the War Department, don't you think?

B Well, I can't say. Of course General DeWitt has never had anything on it.

S Did he get the Secretary's announcement on the thing?

B No, he never got anything -- only a directive on making investigations.

S It was never referred to him?

B No, we have never gotten a thing at all on this whole program.

S And, of course, the president's statement combined with the Secretary of War's release is considered to be policy; I don't think there could be any controversial opinion on that either. Did you see the President's statement?

B Yes, I saw it in the paper. That he felt that any American citizen should have equal opportunity to serve in the Armed forces if he wanted to.

S Yes.

B I saw that; it was in some of the coast papers here.

S Of course the Secretary of War's statement, in which he says that it is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms for the nation's battle, and when obstacles to that right are imposed by vital considerations, those barriers should be removed as soon as humanly possible. Loyalty to the country, is a voice that must be heard; I am glad that I am now able to give active proof that this basic American belief is not a casualty of war.

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S Now that, of course, consituted the fundamental policy on the Japanese situation, which the War Department is being governed by. Now from that, of course, flows a great many things. From that flows the right of a soldier to do whatever any other soldier has the right to do, regardless of whether he is Austrian, Italian, or the Polish battalion or the Japanese battalion. That was the theory I feel sure that Mr. McCloy went upon.

B Are there -- Oh, by the way, are there other battalions being organized that you mention, for example Polish and so on?

S Yes, there is an Austrian battalion and _____ I wouldn't make the suggestion.

B I had heard of it, and just wondered out of curiosity whether or not it had been done.

S There is an Austrian battalion already organized, and I am sure -- ------ a great many of those are aliens, too, you see.

B I would assume so, yes.

S These people go around free; but here is a unit of United States citizens which do not have the rights of an alien; he doesn't want to embarrass General DeWitt by any means; for that reason, it was proposed in the general plan to which he is sponsor of, that not at this time would the Japanese be permitted to go back to the WDC. Of course the additional basic policy on the thing is contained in the President's letter to the Secretary, in which he says that the proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team of loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry has my full approval; and then he goes on to say that this is a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of the selective service conditions which were temporarily halted by the evacuation from the West Coast. No loyal citizen of the West Coast; no loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to accept the responsibilities of his citizenship. As I say, it is difficult to accept the basic policy without letting _____ from that basic policy other incidentals that are questions of the basic policy.

B Well, of course,as I understand it, the basic policy is only that they will be afforded an opportunity to prove themselves, and not that they are to be given everything right off the bat until they have proven themselves.

S What do you mean by prove themselves?

B Well, that is what I thought the program was about.

S Well, I want to get your definition of what your understanding of prove themselves is.

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B I don't have any, naturally.

S Is it that a soldier has to go out and get shot at in order to prove himself?

B I don't know, Colonel Scobey, perhaps that is what this program is about. It seems to me that I heard you say that somewhere along the line, that your program was to give them an opportunity to prove themselves; I don't know what you meant by it, but I think that probably it means what it seems to mean.

S I have my idea of what it means, but I wanted to see what you thought.

B Well, it seems to me that one of the questions I saw in the Japanese newspapers, in which I saw the questions and answers, was one that said, "Why don't you let us go in singly and fight like any other American citizen can, not in a group?" And the answer was somewhat to the effect that, "Well, you have got to show yourselves as a group in order to bring about your future salvation", or words to that effect. That is what I thought you meant by "prove themselves".

S The group idea, of course, was as a symbol for the Japanese loyal people - that is, the loyal people of Japanese ancestry so as to prevent them from or to present themselves before the American people as a loyal group. That was the idea of the Japanese unit.

B Well, of course we have Japanese in the Army both singly and as units already. We have had them since the war began, as groups and so I thought certainly you meant a little more than just having a group of them in a unit.

S You are incorrect there in a measure, Colonel Bendetsen, because the only group we have is the 100 battalion which came from Hawaii. We have no American group - that is the United States Japanese in a group.

B Haven't we?

S No. We have over 2000 in the Army but they are scattered around through the Army; but a group, if you want to call it a group, up at Minnisota - but that is only a temporary group; those people don't fight together. They are intelligence officers or troops for other units.

B Oh I see. I thought there was a group at Camp Shelby, Camp McCoy and so on.

S There is the 100th battalion which came from Hawaii; they were sent to McCoy. They were not expected to go into combat. The War Department changed its mind and sent them to Shelby to train them for combat and they are scheduled to leave inside the next month or two for combat.

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B I see. Well, maybe I misunderstood it. I could only go on what I had before me. I just haven't any connection with it to know any differently. I was merely giving you what I thought the program was about from reading the Japanese newspapers. If it is wrong, then it is wrong.

S I think that the Japanese question was submitted to the WDC; I am not positive, but I think I can get the files very quickly. _____ The question was submitted to the WDC and the answer made was that no Japanese was considered to be loyal or dependable or some such statement, or something, and that statement was, I believe, in accordance with the general expression of the WD.

Please understand me on this; none of this is my initiation and none of it is my personal views. It is all by direction of the Assistant Secretary.

_____ developed the idea, and sponsored it, and sent it to the War Department where it was considered a sound thing to do.

B Yes...

S _____ that not all Japanese were bad; that there were a lot of loyal Japanese and the problem as now exists had to be solved sometime by somebody and the beginning of the solution was to open up the military prestige to those Japanese whom we could feel were loyal and upon examination whose records indicated no disloyal facts.

B Yes...

S My _____ I want that clearly understood.

B Yes, I understand.

S I don't want you or General DeWitt or anyone else to feel that I am personally doing something here without the War Department's stamp. I am doing what Mr. McCloy has directed me to do. And he directed me, along with other things, to go out and look at some of these camps, and I did. I went to Manzanar, Poston and to Gila.

B I understand you did. I appreciate that this is a project of the Assistant Secretary's and, as a matter of fact, you will understand that I am merely reporting to you on what General DeWitt as my commanding officer told me.

S Surely, I understand that.

B So far as personal views are concerned, I have always been of the view personally that a combat unit might be formed; Mr. Mr. Cloy knows that, because when he was here last September he specifically asked for my personal views. I gave him the pros and the cons as I saw them -- told him that no attempt should be made at determining loyalty except by performance.

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(B) As to official views; as far as they are concerned, General DeWitt has never been consulted; he has never been asked to comment on any change, in what would be one of his most fundamental policies whatever, never even was he asked for a peep, not a word.

S I think he has been asked.

B Never has been; never was. No sir, not once - not on this program.

S Why was he not consulted on the organization of this Japanese combat team, I have no idea.

B Of course I haven't either.

S It remains that it was a War Department General Staff matter and processed through the General Staff like any other problem and I don't know that all problems are presented to the defense commanders at all. It might have been well for them to have asked General DeWitt to sit in, or when the opinion was passed to have asked for his. But when the matter was unrolled about a year ago, it seems to me that General DeWitt did comment on the matter.

B That is true. Sometime last year General DeWitt was asked for his opinion on a number of questions relating to the use of Japanese in the Army. He was asked by a committee of the War Department General Staff. I believe General Koenig was the chairman. When the request arrived the Commanding General directed the appointment of a committee of the general staff of this headquarters with G-3 as chairman. Each of the five G's were asked to prepare his views in a separate paper. These views were submitted to G-3, who presented them to the Commanding General. From this material he submitted his own report. I have never seen what was sent back there. In submitting the views of the CAD I prepared a paper about fifty pages in length analyzing all aspects of it as I saw the problem. Once my paper went into G-3 I have never heard any more about it. The committee was never officially convened.

S That is my information; I was told I believe, I don't remember. But I think I was told that General DeWitt was against it. Outside of that, I don't know what the devil the ideas were and I don't know why he was not consulted further on the matter.

B Well, of course in this case, Colonel Scobey, he had to ask for permission to comment after he had heard about it informally.

S He did.

B Yes, and that is all he did.

S Well the comment I am talking about, though, is the comment of last June. He was asked to comment on it at that time.

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B Well once the decision had been made to organize the show, then the other plan came into being which was sponsored by Mr. McCloy. On that he was never asked to comment, although he is doing everything in his power to cooperate and help carry it through, as a soldier which he always has done and which he always will do.

S I don't know whether or not the War Department would say that these soldiers would have a right to go into the WDC or not.

I don't know what they would do; it isn't for me to say, it is entirely up to the WDC to say. I have no comments to make on it one way or the other.

B I appreciate that.

S I would like to make, and ask just consideration of it, since we are organizing such a unit, and since a great many of these soldiers will come from Poston, Manzanar and Gila, within the restricted areas of the WDC would it not be possible to formulate some kind of a policy by which the soldiers, on furlough, could return to their particular homes or particular places where their families are without having the WDC in each case specifically give the permits.

B You mean to the other centers?

S Manzanar and Gila?

B Now let me understand: you mean for example a soldier is indicted at Topaz and wants to go and see his family at for example Manzanar.

S No, that is not what I mean. Any soldier of Japanese ancestry in the Army who now gets a furlough to go home to see his father and mother he has to get a permit from your headquarters; now anticipating that we will have scores of these.

B You want furloughs to return.

S When they are inducted into service and when they go to their station in Camp Shelby and sickness arises or something occurs by which he wants a furlough to go back home, is there anyway we can work out a method without having that soldier to make representation to the WDC for a special permit.

B Well, I will put that up; but here is a point for consideration, Colonel Scobey, the way the method actually works, the soldier asks for a furlough and his CO if he grants the furlough asks us for a permit at the time he gets the permit. Now, when the soldier gets here everybody in the WDC, in the evacuated zone, all law enforcements

agencies have been told that no Japanese person is entitled to be in the area whether he is wearing the uniform or not, without a permit. It serves as a protection to him.

S Well it seems to me that if a change is made, and it seems to me personally I feel that it should be made, it is too laborious that way, a man's mother may die and he may want to leave inside of twenty-four hours, or less.

B He gets it under twenty-four hours now.

S And furthermore here is a United States soldier who can't travel in certain areas without special permits, and it seems to me, Colonel Bendetsen, that it would be _____ but if the authorities be notified, that a Japanese in uniform was travelling and had the authorized furlough in his pocket, showing his destination that he should be permitted to travel.

B To those four centers.

S Yes, as a matter of fact, I personally feel that he should be entitled to travel anywhere he gets furlough for, not only to the four centers but I do think the four centers are very essential.

B Well, the other question is what I put up to the General.

S Well, to go back to the centers is what I said.

B I see what you mean. Now I will put that up and see if there is any feasible way it can be worked out. I can say, I know that General DeWitt would not want to change the instructions that the law enforcement agencies now have, in the area, but there might be some other feasible way of working out what you ask and I will see if there is and let you know.

S I want to make it clear, perfectly clear that what I am suggesting that a Japanese soldier in uniform wanting to go back to his home in Poston, Manzanar, and Gila, be permitted to go back on the approved furlough alone, without further instructions or permission from anyone.

B Well, if he gets a permit as a matter of course by wire, what is the difficulty, why is it necessary to change it?

S Because it is not required of any other soldier in the United States Army.

B Well, there are other things that he doesn't get which other soldiers get, even under your plan.

S Well, if his approved furlough isn't sufficient to protect him I don't know what other protection he could have from the people than his uniform.

B Well, it hasn't been up to now, Colonel Scobey.

S Well, I know it hasn't up to now. That is why I suggest that some consideration be given to changing the situation.

B I understand now just exactly what you ask for and I am trying to get all of the aspects I can to put before the General but I don't think he will regard it favorably; I am now speaking officially and I want to make this clear, that I am speaking of what I understand the position has unalterably been.

I don't think he will regard it favorably in view of the fact that they can get a permit without any difficulty whatsoever just by the asking for it, by wire, as a matter of course, and I can't see where the Japanese soldier is being denied something that amounts to anything.

S I have no desire to belittle the question or to argue it, but I have attempted to show sincerely in my attempts to straighten out the situation that I am merely presenting the matter as Mr. McCloy has stated it and that is the only interest I have in the matter.

B You are acting, of course, as the Assistant Secretary's agent and I am acting as the Commanding General's agent.

S I'm not going to argue; I'm merely presenting the question as I feel Mr. McCloy wants it.

B I thought perhaps you would want to get what the attitude here is and why. That is all I was trying to present, Colonel Scobey.

S I am not sure; I think I feel that way, you are on the WDC and their rules are not to let them in the evacuated area.

B That is right.

S The only exceptions are mixed marriages, inter marriages and so forth.

B That is correct.

S I presume that is to maintain a state of security.

B That is right.

S I have nothing more then, Colonel. I can say, then, that General DeWitt will not permit these soldiers to return into the WCD without Caucasian escorts and other permits from you?

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B Well, we don't require soldiers to have an escort, Colonel Scobey, but they must have a permit and it must be for one of the reasons now stated in the present WEC directive.

S What are they? I'm not familiar with them.

B The reasons are these, a Japanese cannot return into the evacuated zone unless by reason of the fact that a member of his immediate family in that area is gravely ill, near death, or has suffered death. He may visit one of the four centers anytime, a permit issued as a matter of course. No escort is needed.

S Well, that is fair enough. Then under that policy none of these Japanese are going to be able to come back in, in uniform.

B That is correct.

S All right, thank you very much.

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291.2 - Conferences

#705
gjr

1200 17 February 1943

Transcript of telephone conversation between General BARNETT and Colonel BENDETSEN, AC of S, Civil Affairs Division, San Francisco, California.

Colonel Bendetsen: ....to follow the directive. I don't know how well I succeeded but at any rate he didn't say that there would be orders——he didn't say anything in that regard. He countered with another proposition to this effect: He said: "Could it be arranged to admit these soldiers once they are in the army back into the four centers to visit their families when they do get furloughs without going through the present prescribed procedure of getting a permit?" Well, I said I would present that but I had the impression very definitely that my Commanding General would desire the continuance of that arrangement and that I was now speaking as his agent in that regard. Then I said: "Here are some of the considerations", and I outlined them and told him several incidents that had occurred and of our experience and also told him that the permits came out as a matter of course. Well, he said, "I don't desire to hear any arguments or any brief on the subject," and so on and so forth and to say the least he talked like he was the Secretary himself on the matter and made it a little bit thick and made it a little difficult to carry on at this end but I maintained control nevertheless and the same equanimity all the way through and tried as best I could to tell him I was.....we talked about half an hour and he wanted to do a lot of arguing but he would have none of mine. He wouldn't listen to anything to the contrary but I think it went along nicely and I assure you there were no words and as far as I am concerned I maintained complete equanimity and I think he did; and I don't know whether we will hear further from it or not. I understand Mr. McCloy will be away for another month; I think he has gone on a sort of world tour.

General Barnett: Well, now, you didn't suggest sending any orders out, of course....

Bendetsen: No, sir, I certainly didn't.

Barnett: ....and he didn't say anything about sending orders?

Bendetsen: No, sir, he didn't. I had a little difficulty in that field, sir, as you could imagine but I just couldn't say anything that was very concrete other than "no" the answer was "no" and he would keep referring back to the fact that this was the Assistant Secretary's own desire. I just couldn't say: "Why don't you send a directive."

Barnett: No. Of course, the answer to the whole thing is that the General doesn't take orders from the hired help, as I told you this morning.

Bendetsen: That's right, sir. He talked about the President's letter to the Secretary that was published (you saw that, sir) and he talked about that and said: "Why, that should be enough by itself to see that the policies are changed here;" and then he talked about Mr. McCloy approving the questions, etc. Well, the only point I did get across to him was this: I said: "Well, the only place we have ever seen the questions you refer to; they were printed in a Japanese newspaper."

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 4/3/75

57

Barnett: That's right; that's corret.

Bendetsen: Certainly it is correct, and I said: "Maybe what we saw wasn't quite right but we saw one that said they wouldn't be admitted for the time being." Well, he said: "That meant their families." I said: "We have no way of knowing these things because we have never been consulted at all on this program." Well, he said: "Well, I know that last June, General DeWitt was asked for his opinion on whether there should be a combat unit formed and he said no." I said: "Well, that may be but once the decision was made to form it he was never consulted on the method and had a good deal of background, experience and concern, and as a matter of fact we never heard of it." Then he said: "Well General DEWITT did comment on it," and I said: "Not because he was asked to but because he requested permission to." And he said: "Well, that may be," and I said: "And on these policies we have assumed that they remain as they have been because these have been pretty basic policies and ordinarily the Theater Commander is requested to make a comment when they propose to change a basic policy" and that was gotten across. He had no answer for that one.

Barnett: Fine; I think maybe....what I really think is that they are going to come out here with a "By order of the Secretary of War" thing pretty soon but until they do the General is going to stick to his guns, I believe.

Bendetsen: I do, too, sir. I have one concern. This may be wholly off base and I've just talked it over with Major Moffitt and we agree on it. The concern is this: That maybe this progrom is going over at all.

Barnett: By the way that is just what I get from a conversation with General Joyce a few moments ago, a copy of which I am sending down to you.

Bendetsen: Very well, sir. Maybe it isn't going over at all and that is your impression sir, and that is also mine and maybe Colonel Scobey is looking around for a place to hang the blame, like saying, well....

Barnett: ".....if we had had cooperation, well, it would have gone over."

Bendetsen: That's right, the policies of the Western Defense Command requiring these permits, etc., are the reason why it fell through. Well, that simply isn't true. They knew about this permit system before they ever thought up this plan and the Japs have known about it all the time and there never has been much talk. That may be what he is building up to. That is the only concern I have, sir.

Barnett: It could be. I don't think that would bother the General one particle.

Bendetsen: I hope it won't. I don't think it should but it is something that I wanted to mention and have it in mind.

Barnett: He doesn't mind things like that very much. In fact, I think he sort of welcomes an opportunity once in a while to say....

Bendetsen: Well, he might be given an opportunity to let them have it with both barrels again as he did last time.

Barnett: If he is given the opportunity, he'll do it, too.

Bendetsen: Well, I wish I could have opened up this morning with some heavy artillery.

Barnett: Well, naturally you couldn't afford to do that.

Bendetsen: I couldn't absolutely, but you know what the impulse is, sir.

Barnett: Yes, I know. That is exactly right; I would feel the same way but you can't do it.

Bendetsen: No, sir, you can't and it wasn't done either.

Barnett: Okay, fine.

Bendetsen: All right, sir.

* * * *

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM
G-2

AG
C- NID 291.2 Japanese

SUBJECT: Induction of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry

Date February 22, 1943

TO ___C/S ___G-1 ___G-2 ___G-3 ___G-4 ___Air Staff
X TAG ___OPD ___USW ___ASW ___ASWA ___CG ___Army
___AC ___BLP ___BOWD ___ExRA ___NGB ___CG ___Army Corps
___INF ___FA ___CAV ___CA ___ENGR ___CG ___CA
___ORD ___QMG ___CSO ___SG ___FIN ___CG ___Dept
___GHQ ___JAG ___CWS ___IG ___B/PR ___

FOR ___S/W DIRECTS ___Draft of reply ___Direct reply ___Approved ___Disapproved ___File
___Comment or Concurrence ___Remark and recommendation ___Inviting attention to ___See notation of _____ ___Information ___Consult _____
___Necessary action ___Information for reply ___Ind. approved ___Primary interest ___Notation and return ___Noted _____

BY ___Spcl Msgr ___Radio ___Air Mail ___Immed. Action Ltr ___Letter

It is requested that the attached correspondence be answered by first indorsement addressed to the ~~Adjutant~~ Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, substantially as follows:

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the basic communication.

2. Under arrangements made with National Headquarters, Selective Service System, those persons of military age within the War Relocation Centers who make application for voluntary induction also apply for transfer of delivery on DSS Form 154 if they are registered with a local board within Military Areas 1 and 2 of the Western Defense Command. The Selective Service System has advised the Military Intelligence Division that the effect of the application for transfer of delivery is to transfer all administration relating to induction from the board of original jurisdiction (here a board in Military Areas 1 and 2 of the Western Defense Command) to the board of delivery (here a local board adjacent to the War Relocation Center in which the applicant resides). For this reason, it is believed that it will not be necessary for any person in the War Relocation Centers who is registered

[illegible] -15-43

with a local board in Military Areas 1 and 2 of the Western Defense Command to make a personal appearance before that board.

3. For these reasons, recommendations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the basic communication are not favorably considered by the Military Intelligence Division.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

8AGO
FEB 25 1943
Bowen

John T. Bissell

JOHN T. BISSELL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, MIS.

A.G.O. FEB 25 1943 RECEIVED 5 APPT'MT. & IND. BRANCH

1 Inclosure:
9th S.C. ltr 2-10-43.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Apparently, the letter from the Assistant Adjutant General, Ninth Service Command, was misdirected to the Military Intelligence Division and was not routed through the Adjutant General.

V- Loyalty Investigation ?

Records #65 - 66
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Whitcomb
2-24-43 Time 8.45 a.m.
K. Russell

SUBJECT:

B Colonel Whitcomb this is Colonel Bendetsen, how are you?

W Fine, just a minute, I'll get the things I was going to ask you about.

This is a about Japanese _____ and furloughs and what not; a member of the WRA has brought up this matter of permits which your command gives. Can you hear me, the connection is not so good

Anyway, the requirement of permits has caused a great deal of confusion and is also bearing adversley on morale, in the centers. Now I called you to see what your attitude on it might be. The also quote in this regard certain letters which the President has put out and the Secretary of w r, and particularly the directive of January 20th, _____ _____ and all that sort of thing.

B Yes, well I am entirely familiar with that because they have raised the point before, and Colonel Scobey called up on it some time ago, about a week ago and talked the matter over, on the phone at length, and I discussed the matter with the CG and also the CofS here;

Of course all that is required is this, if an American soldier of Japanese ancestry desires to come into one of the four relocation centers inside the evacuation zone, and that is what they are talking about, I think; all he has to do is to apply for a furlough and if he gets the furlough, then his/~~CCC~~ Commanding Officer advises of the furlough, advises us, that is, then he gets a permit automatically; it does however impose this much control; first of all ~~WE~~ knows he is coming, he also has a permit which will protect him - now even though he is in uniform out here there is still considerable underlying feeling, and if he comes in without a permit from this command, he is often stopped, embarrassed and can't show it.

W Isn't furlough papers _____ ?

B No, because it doesn't show on the furlough papers where he is going. In other words he just has a pass and doesn't show where

OPERATORS ON THE LINE AT THIS POINT

66

B He merely applies for a furlough and that doesn't disclose his destination

W _____ (Interruption still continues, lines apparently crossed with Major Fullerton's office)

B Well he feels somewhat the same way as the WRA people do, but that is a pretty fundamental policy of General DeWITT's out here to control this strip out here against Japanese coming thru, without permits and before those directives to which you refer on loyalty investigations were adopted , that was all known not only by WRA but also by the War Department; it was discussed prior to that time with us, and they asked us exactly what the rules were so they could e sure, and have it right in the questions and also the answers in the centers when they put out - they are still having this campaign in there, that was known at the time; I don't know perhaps there was some reaction in the centers, but I don't know; tere has always been something of a discordant element, who would raise a question like that just to try to embarrass the prggram, no matter what you did, they would somehow ask for something else to ask for.

W Well what seems to be the _____ confusion.

B I don't know that I can agree as to its having caused confusion. It might have caused some annoyance and embarrasment when the questions were raised; say to this effect, inside of a center a Japanese might say , well why can't I go into the zone just like anyone else. That sort of thing, I am sure, must have arizen, in ther words it is bound to; by the same token they m ght ask "why am I in the center at all"

W Now, just a minute _____ about the WRA centers, I un erstand that this thing _____

B That is right, it applies just to the evacuated zones, just to military area no. 1, that is the west half of Washington, Oregon and California Now there are four relocation centers inside the WDC, in the zone, there are two in California, just inside the zone unfortunately, and two in Arizona. Now what they are trying to do, or what they are talking about is this, they are going inside of one of the relocation centers now, and they are asking Japanese inside those centers to volunteer for military service; now when they go in there, there has been a great number of Pro-Japanese in these centers, who are American borne; that is they have a large group insidd of each of the centers who have returned from Japan, Kibei, now when they put on this program, the Kibei will say, well if we volunteer can all of us go inside the evacuated zones, go back to our homes, or go into the centers without permits. Now that is a very fundamental thing.

W What do they want to do, go into their homes or to the centers?

B They want to do both.

B They want to go in and out of the zone to go into these centers say to visit friends and relatives, go in and out without restriction, and they want to be able to return to the places of their former residence without restriction, so that they, as they can put it, attend to any necessary business affairs.

W Yes,

B Well that would break down the whole program; if you once let the bars down, to let them come into the evacuated zone, on any grounds, to any place without a permit, then you have broken down the whole foundation; now we, in the case of a Japanese who wants to go into one of those centers, we always give him a permit, it is issued as a matter of course, and it is usually responded to within a few hours by telegraph, but we are still maintaining that one barrier. It is an important thing, not only to the fundaments of the program, that the CG put thru here, but is is also important I think from a public relations standpoint. The public out here has by no means, to any degree, lost any of its long standing anti Japanese feeling.

W Here is one thing, is this the_ _____ _____/

B That is what they always are, all he has to do is to carry that, and if they ask for it bhey normally do so by telegraph, and we respond immediately, so I don't think I know of a case where there has been a case where there has been over ~~24~~ 24 hour delay, from the time he decided he wanted one.

W I see, I don't know why Scobey wrote this long winded thing, dated February 20th, when he had already talked to you on it.

B Well he had, he talked to me at some length prior to that time; we had long conversations on it over a period of time, and we also had several, even prior to the time when the directive on loyalty investigations were given, so that it has been pretty thoroughly understood.

W Well I think in view of his stand on this thing, _____ change in his attitude, we have a letter signed by him, from the office of the Assistant Secretary _____ _____ .

B I don't think he is here now.
All right fine, I think it should have too; I thought the matter, when we talked last time, I thought it was finally settled from the impression I got; we talked, I would say about just a minute, I'll tell you just when; we talked it over on the 18th, and I thought it was finally settled, but if you have a further communication, Colonel Whitcomb send it out and

W Well this is in the form of a memo_____

W Do you think the Assistant Secretary is out there?

B No he is away in the other direction I think he has been away about a month.

W Yes; I would like to get ahold of this whole thing, in fact I might talk to Colonel Scobey and see just what he is driving at I don't know what else to _____

B I don't know that ver much else could, here is the proposition, it is just a divergence of a fundamental point of view; first of all the CG is convinced that he must maintain the same restrictions which have always applied.

Now in the granting of a permit, that has been very widely relaxed from what it was; there was a time when they could come in only to see a member of the immediatel family and then only when the member of the family was practically ready to ie; now they can come in if they merely ask, but we do want to maintain the, General does insist on retaining that much of a restriction; if he lets it go, then the program is sunk.

That is about the size of it; it is just the fundamental difference. We don't think you can be sure of why or who is who, and we are also well aware of the attitude of the public out here, which perhaps isn't so well known there, it is that ver fundamental difference. There isn't very much more that the CG could say that hasn't already been said.

W That's right, I'll talk to Scobey, _____

B All right fine, thank you sir, and call me.

1. Washburn.
J. Ashworth

Record No. 29, 30, 31
Colonel Bendetsen & Colonel Wittkop
March 2, 1943 Time: 2:20 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

B: Colonel Wittkop, this is Bendetsen. I've just a long conference on the topic we have discussed, with Gen. DeWitt. He has directed me to say that he doesn't desire to relax any of the security measures which he has established under Executive Order 9066 out here to apply to the security of the West Coast. He states that he does not desire to accord permits to persons of Japanese ancestry to go into the evacuated area in places other than the 2 relocation projects which will remain therein except ... there will only be 2 remaining in there because we're getting a proclamation out today which sinks the size of Military Area No. 1 in Arizona and puts those 2 centers (Colorado River and Gila) outside the prohibited zone, so there would be no restriction there.

But 2 of them will remain the zone (Tule Lake and Manzanar.) He feels he does not feel he should extend or relax the policy, however, where exceptionally meritorious cases arise, then the circumstances should be stated in writing and submitted here to the Commanding General in each case for decision on the merits.

W: How the restrictions that he refers to are also covered in that letter of October 7th, aren't they?...same thing?

B: Correct. However, as you know, with regard to applications to enter the area for the purpose of visiting the two centers I've names (Tule Lake and Manzanar), any application is granted to a soldier to go in to either of those 2 centers and without escort.

W: But with a permit.

B: But with a permit.

W: In other words he stands by his original decision on the whole matter, doesn't he, practically?

B: Practically so, yes. He feels he doesn't want to relax the security measures which he feels are necessary for the security of the West Coast and if exceptions are made it will tend to undermine the whole program.

W: Even in the case of soldiers who are now being inducted?

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B: Yes, that's right. He says of course in that case there are still some restrictions on them imposed by the War Department itself.

W: But it was because the restrictions which he has are those that the War Department is now trying to follow with regard to these new people...didn't quite die, that this thing is brought up now. Certain concessions are being made to these men and they feel here that they are exceedingly well founded in view of what is expected of them and that they therefore want to bring Gen. DeWitt's policies in line with the revised War Department policies on it.

B: Well of course any inductee even though he is not in uniform will be given a permit to go to either of those two centers without restriction.

W: That has been the case before, hasn't it?

B: Yes sir. It doesn't show in the letter you refer to, but that is the case so far as this headquarters is concerned.

W: ...practice is worked out that way.

B: Yes sir.

W: But he doesn't go with this other change which they are trying to get, permitting them to go into....did you mention that matter of parents in the sanitarium in the Western Defense Command?

B: Well those cases are now covered, and if application is made on the part of a soldier to visit a parent who is defferred and who is seriously ill in a sanitarium, I am inclined to think that those cases will normally be favorably regarded.

W: Well of course they wouldn't be in there unless they were seriously ill, would they?

B: I don't think so.

W: They'd be at the relocation center.

B: That's right.

W: And what about business reasons?

B: Well in that case, he doesn't want...he desires that the present policy remain unchanged. But that where in an especially meritorious case arises, that statement be given of the considerations of the reasons and if it is especially meritorious, he would like to make a decision on the merits in each case.

W: I wonder what he would regard as a meritorious case?

B: Well I think he is inclined to feel that the policy should not be liberal.

W: Yes. Well I don't believe that is the case. Did you mention that one that I told you about either Friday or Saturday...the individual who wanted to go down to San Diego?

B: I mentioned that class of case to him, yes.

W: Yes. What was his reaction?

B: His reaction was that if there was an exceptionally meritorious case of that kind where he really has to go in to take care of it, that would be all right but he wouldn't for example allow him to come in just to say good-bye to a lot of former people he knew.

W: Yes. Well those cases were for a particular purpose, something that had piled up, as I said the other day you know.

B: I'd suggest Colonel Wittkop, as a matter of fact, the best thing to do with those would be to send them on.

W: Send on the cases for the review of your headquarter there/

B: That's right sir.

W: Of course the matter of delay....can't always be presented, usually can't be adequately in a radiogram. Depends on mail which is slow...and the time is short...

B: Of course as a matter of fact he feels and he...he has the feeling that you can't be liberal with them and in placing a restriction on them for example not to fight in any theater where they might meet troops of their own race, that that in itself indicates that they are not entirely free of being suspect.

W: In other words if they are uniform or are inducted it doesn't change their status so much.

B: That's right sir.

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W: Not as much as the War Dept. _____ to concede.

B: Well no not so much that. Even in connection with the War Dept.'s position. They themselves are not going to employ them in any theater where they would meet troops of their own race, which would tend to indicate that there is some reservation in the war department's mind. In other words, ordinarilly an American soldier would not be under any restriction as to where you would use him. But apparently there is some reservation until they have proven themselves... in the mind of the War Department. Or else there would be no restriction whatever.

W: Well I don't know just what their plans are in regard to these men, - it might be that they intend to do that very thing.

B: Of course I was only referring to the point that he had made in connection with the War Department's announcement on it. Which was to that effect, as I understand it.

W: Yes, that may be. I am not acquainted with that.

B: I'm not so thoroughly familiar with it myself, but I somehow have that impression.

I have presented the matter to him in full, and he is of the solid conviction that it is not advisable to relax the policy--the the minute you do there will be no end to it. And that will tend to undermine the program which he thinks is essential for the security of the Pacific Coast. That is, to keep Japanese off the Coast. And not have them return.

W: How does he reconcile that with the treatment of other aliens out there,...because they are certainly running around.

B: Well in that connection of course, - that is a long discussion. It is an entirely different thing, Colonel Wittkop. At least ostensively those who are suspected have been interned and those who have records are being picked up or excluded.

W: Yes, I know it is a long subject all right. Are you going to send a resume of those _____ here if it is possible?

B: Well, in view of the fact that there is substantially no change, the General felt it wasn't necessary.

W: Yes. I'll tell you. I'll talk to the Secy. of War's office on this and sound out the attitude here, and then I'll let you know what else might be desired in regard to this thing.

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They wanted to push it. It is quite evident they wanted to put quite a lot steam behind it. They feel that something should be done immediately for these people whose status has been changed. They want to make some tangible change which these people themselves will recognize and be able to point to when they get into the...into some of the difficulties you know of, you know.

B: Yes. Yes.

W: Now they practically don't have a damn thing to disprove the talk that they...that is directed against them and their being "suckers" you know. Nothing in writing to really clarify the matter and the War Department is very anxious for that reason and others, to really clear up the situation and relax some of the restrictions in regard to these people.

B: Well I think perhaps the program you outline is the best way to proceed on it...

W: Well the whole thing boils down to this of course...whether in actual practice with the restrictions that are...that General DeWitt wants retained, whether in actual practice, all that they are after now, that's the question.

B: Yes...

W: ....done, why of course there would be little objection except for the matter of being able to prove it in writing you know. The policy had been relaxed officially for these people in recognition of the services they are about to render.

B: Well of course he feels there should be no relaxation in the policies as far as the Coastal Strip is concerned. Of course the program that is under way is one to give them an opportunity to show themselves and not that they have already established that.

W: Yes, I see his angle there. And I suppose in turn you appreciate what the War Department is trying to do. They're trying to make an unmistakeable gesture that will satisfy these people and our own citizens.

B: Well as for myself, Colonel Wittkop, I can see both points. As a matter of fact I'm right in the middle.

W: You're right in the nut-cracker.

B: That's right.

W: I know it. But I'll talk to these people again and get all the dope I can. We want to push it through right away...I don't know whether in the future we'll be able to relax it or not.

.7

Certainly they want to make some concrete tangible gesture that will be obvious to everyone. . . Now, and particularly later.

B: Well of course I don't know how the program has been going Colonel Wittkop, but has that not been done in that an opportunity is now being afforded to either go into the armed services or work in war industry and be relased on the same status as any other person--isn't that in itself a tangible gesture?

W: Well, yes it is, except that what do they get out of it?

B: I would think that they would get a good deal out of it in comparison to what they now have. In other words it gives them a chance to prove themselves with the American public and solve their future relationship in it.

W: Yes, but do you think/on the undesirable element is something that is sought too. (the effect)

They can still stand off you know -- the smart aleck kind-- and say "well you're just a plain so-and-so because there is nothing to prove that your status has been improved one bit."

B: Yes, but here's another side to that. I found that when they were in the centers out here, that if you were clear and direct and unvacillating, they would accept it--if you were firm. If you weren't, you see, they would continue to push as far as they could push you. Now I think in many cases the persons who are raising these questions are the smart alecks. They are the persons who are not so much concerned with whether anything is done for them. But they want to see how far they can push the War Department or push any part of the Federal Government. I think there is something to that.

W: Well I know, - the old bargaining instinct.

B: That's right. And the smart alecks--the boys they are having now pulled out of the centers and arrested, are the ones who probably are raising these questions by more or less forcing the others into it.

W: Yes, that is very possible.

B: And I think that is another consideration that perhaps has been already been given full consideration.

W: The next to do so that we will know where we stand and we'll know where General DeWitt stands on it, is to put through a couple of trial cases and see what comes of it.

B: Well his present position is as I have said — he doesn't feel the restrictions should be relaxed so far as this strip is concerned. However, as far as going into those 2 centers is concerned, yes—without question.

W: With a permit.

B: But with a permit. And as far as going elsewhere, his feeling is "No, not unless it is a serious case." In other words about the same as it was before.

W: Very much so.

B: Or the same. That's right.

W: Does he stand fast on that—having a permit for those 2 relocation centers?

B: For those two centers, yes, he does.

W: I wonder why.

B: Well, for the purpose of traveling...for example, to get into one of the center—Manzanar—you've got to traverse several hundred miles of prohibited area.

W: Yes, I understand.

B: You've got to travel almost the same as if you were going to Los Angeles, or San Francisco.

W: Yes, I know that. What about this other matter of a man in uniform under competent War Dept. orders being permitted to go thru Western Defense Command to his destination without a permit.

B: That is for example, going thru to a place beyond the Coast?

W: Yes, or for some purpose...usually he wouldn't be. He'd be going through.

B: Ordinarily, all we've done is in that case, going through the War Department agency concerned who has directed them, merely calls up or sends a wire and says so-and-so is going through and we normally send a permit. But anyone who is under...I didn't take that up with him...but I think anyone under War Dept. orders there'd be no question about it.

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W: Well would they require apermit?

B: Well I don't think so. I didn't take that precise point up with him, but I can't see where that would make any difference.

W: They're _____ to this permit...these tags that they must have just to go a little further. They feel conditions should be such out there that a man wouldn't require that tag. That the thing should be under control to such an extent that...and General DeWitt's policy understood so that a man who had his furlough papers would be unmolested regardless of whether he had a permit from Western Defense Command.

B: Normally, furlough papers don't show the destination, but as far as that is concerned on traveling on furlough I believe that is in the General's mind as being one case in which he feels a permit should be sought. But if he traveling on official business, then that is another case.

W: Yes. But on furlough orders he feels a permit should be required. For what purpose? For the man's protection?

B: Well yes, for his protection and also for the information of his headquarters to know who's here on furlough...who's in the area. In the Coastal strip, that is, not in Western Defense Command.

W: And a special tab is kept on these men?

B: Well we always notify all agencies. FBI, ONI, G-2 and they in turn local law enforcement agencies so that if they got a report that so-and-so is seen they don't go up and arrest them. And we watch them through those channels as far as the ordinary surveillance extends. We don't put a tail on him, no.

W: Well I can see the picture isn't as simple as it might appear from this distance, but I tried to get over the attitude here... they are very anxious to make some tangible gesture in the matter now and they aren't so very sympathetic (at least they don't appear to be) (or profess to be) with some of these restrictions they are under.

B: I know that is the view, and on the other hand I've put it up to General DeWitt and he stands firm in the view that the restrictions should not be relaxed.

W: Well sir, we'll try to put through some of these things and see how it works out. That will give everybody an idea of just what is being sought.

B: All right sir, fine. Good. Good-bye.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WTJ 50
Filed 4/1354Z
ecn

WDCC
March 4, 1943

DIVISION	ACT	INFO
T & INDUCTION BR		
Y POSTAL SERVICE		
UALTY BRANCH		
ENL REFL BRANCH		
ORATIONS & AWARDS		
PENDENCY BENEFTY BR		
LISTED BRANCH		
CHINA RECORDS BRANCH		
ICERS BRANCH		✓
PERATIONS BR AGO	✓	
JELICATIONS BRANCH		
RAINING BR AGO		
Mil Pers		✓

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 7/14/69

From: Ft Shafter TH
To: AGWAR

In reply cite: 1485 March [illegible]

The following non-Japanese officers reurad 2864-16th available and recommended for duty with Nisei combat team: Lt Col John C Simerson 0250730, Inf, part Hawaiian extraction, graduate Inf School 1935, present executive officer 298 Inf; Maj Jack E Corley 0348128, Inf, White, graduate Inf School 1941, former head Luna Wailuku Sugar Company, present duty S-3, Maui Service Command; Maj Emmet L O'Connor 0270707, Inf White, early war service with territorial guard, present duty with OMG; Maj Francis H Kanahele 0321594, Inf, part Hawaiian extraction, graduate Inf School 1940, present duty S-3, 298 Inf; Capt Robert S Blake 0390023 Inf, white, graduate Inf School 1942, present duties 298 Inf; Capt John J Earnest 0504518, Inf, white, former ROTC sgt instructor McKinley High School Honolulu, present duties with Provost Marshal; Capt Arthur B Chun 0343577, Inf, Chinese extraction, graduate University of Hawaii ROTC, present adjutant 298 Inf; Capt James TM Chang 0249592, Basicallu Inf, Chinese extraction, graduate Inf School 1933, although at present assigned District Engr Emmons HDGAP. All the foregoing are professionally qualified, General service, with wide experience in dealing with Nisei groups. All except Capt Earnest have had much commissioned service with Hawaiian National Guard units.

no sig

FOOTNOTE: 2864 is CM-OUT-5302 (16 Feb 43) SOS-TAG

ACTION: SOS

INFORMATION: OPD, [illegible]

CM-IN-2127 (5 Ma[illegible] 0426Z new

REGRADED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARAPHRASED
BY AUTHORITY OF CG, AGF, DATED 7 JULY 1945
PERSONS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8Z13

~~SECRET~~

~~THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN~~

NOTE: Action reassigned to SOS - Mil. Pers.
ehb - 2 B 939.

MAR 5 '43 AM
RECEIVED
S & C Section
MAR - 6 1943
COPY No. 21

AG 320.2 (3-4-43)

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

12 WTJ
0045Z/5th
efg

CCWD
March 5, 1943
0250Z

DIVISION	ACT	INF
Z [illegible] SECTION BR		
A [illegible] SERVICE		
[illegible] BRANCH		
[illegible] GEN. REFL BRANCH		
[illegible] ORATIONS & AWARDS		
[illegible] EFFICIENCY BENEFIT BR		
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[illegible] PUBLICATIONS BRANCH		
[illegible] TING BR AGO		

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by [signature] date 7/14/78

From: Ft Shafter TH
To: Adjutant General Washington DC

In Reply Cite: 1507 March 4, 1943

Supplementing report of names of officers for nisei combat team our rad 1485-4th. the following Captains of the 298th Inf are also available, suitable and recommended:

Ralph B Ensminger Jr 0406093, white, Inf School 1942;

William R Chillingworth 0338081, white, Inf School 1941;

Michael Ray 0001876, part Hawaiian, Inf School 1941;

Frank Marzano 0382341, white. University Hawaii ROTC Graduate, 4 years enlisted service Marine Corps;

David B Chun 0287679, Chinese, University Hawaii ROTC graduate,

Emmons EDGAP all except David B Chun had service with Hawaii National Guard.

MAR 5 4 PM

No Sig.

NOTE: 1485 is CM-IN-2127 (3-5-43) SOS.

ACTION: SOS
INFORMATION: OPD, G-2, CGGN, G-1

RECEIVED [illegible] 263 (5 Mar 43) REGRADED [illegible] PARAPHRASED [illegible] DECODED [illegible] UNCLASSIFIED
[illegible] MAKING OF [illegible] IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 18

NOTE: Action reassigned to SOS - Mil. Pers. ehb - 2 B 939.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

WDGAP 320 (1-9-43) March 10, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:
(Through MPD, SOS)

Subject: Organization of a Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

The Secretary of War directs that all concerned be informed substantially as follows:

1. Reference (The Adjutant General fill in proper reference to WDGAP 320, dated January ~~9~~ 12, 1943, subject as above).

2. Subparagraph 4b of the reference letter is changed as follows:

Source - 2,500 from Hawaiian Department.
(Not to exceed 10 per cent may be composed of volunteers from non-combat units in accordance with recommendations submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.)

2,000 from continental United States.
(Any shortage in voluntary inductees will be met by transferring enlisted men from units and installations in the United States. Personnel will not be taken for this purpose from the 100th Battalion and the Military Intelligence Service.)

M. G. WHITE,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

NOTE: This paper was shown to Col. Johnson, OIS&D Sec. who stated no action was necessary on it.
ehb - 2 B 939.

C/b retd to G-1, 3-22-43.
ehb - 2 B 939.

(3-10-43)

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
8 Z-1 13

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: [illegible] states that only a part of the quota allotted the continental U. S. will be filled and recommends transfer of men from units and installations in the U. S. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department states that an additional 1,000 can be secured from Hawaii without disrupting local economy; he has previously requested authority to permit men in non-combat units to volunteer for this unit.

The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 (Major Lansdale), G-3 (Colonel Stephenson), and OPD (Colonel Eckhardt) informally concur.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

dlw 9-1-43.

2-0-9220.2

KRB

291.2 Japanese

March 10, 1943

CBW

SUBJECT: Induction of Persons of Japanese Ancestry into Army.

RA/cm

CAD

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command
Attention: Director of Personnel

1. Reference your letter 327.31 (SPKIR) dated March 4, 1943, above subject, this headquarters concurs in the proposal to send a medical officer to each Relocation Center and there conduct the preliminary examination of all volunteer inductees.

2. No authority from this headquarters is necessary to place this proposal in operation. The Liaison Officer with War Relocation Authority, Major M. H. Astrup, has discussed this matter by telephone with the Director of War Relocation Authority in Washington who approves this proposal for all War Relocation Projects with the possible exception of Tule Lake. Major Astrup requests that a schedule of the dates on which the medical officers will appear at each of the projects be submitted to War Relocation Authority, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, and that the Project Director at Tule Lake be contacted and his concurrence obtained prior to sending a medical officer there.

3. It is pointed out that Proclamation No. 16, this headquarters, which became effective at midnight March 4, 1943, removed the Gila River and Colorado River War Relocation Projects from the areas prohibited to persons of Japanese ancestry. Therefore, travel permits from this headquarters are no longer required for persons of Japanese ancestry traveling to or from these Projects unless the travel route is through the remaining prohibited areas. Travel permits are still required for persons of Japanese ancestry traveling to or from the Manzanar and Tule Lake War Relocation Projects.

For the Commanding General:

Leslie J. Bishop
Major F. A.
Acting Assistant Adjutant General

Orig. sent to A. G. Records 4/2/43
DK

FW 68

AKM/ar

327.31 (SPKIR) March 27, 1943

SUBJECT: Induction of Persons of Japanese Ancestry into Army.

TO : Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California.

1. Reference your letter, 291.2 Japanese, Subject: "Induction of Persons of Japanese Ancestry into Army", dated March 10, 1943.

2. In compliance with Paragraph 2 of the above cited letter, this will inform you that arrangements have been made with the Director of the Relocation Center at Manzanar, California to send a medical team to his station on Wednesday, March 31, 1943, for the purpose of examining volunteers.

3. It is impracticable to furnish a schedule of examinations to other stations at this time. However, when it is known that these stations will be visited, your headquarters will be advised.

For the Commanding General:

RECEIVED MAR 28 1943 WDC and Ft. Sam ARMY

A. E. MERRILL,
Colonel, Cavalry,
Ass't to Director, Personnel Division.

AIR MAIL

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM
Personnel Division, G-1

AG WDGAP 320 (1-12-43)
G-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT Organization of a combat team composed of citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Date April 15, 1943.

TO	___ C/S	___ G-1	___ G-2	___ G-3	___ G-4	___ Air Staff	
	X TAG*	___ OPD	___ USW	___ ASW	___ ASWA	___ CG	_____ Army
	___ AC	___ BLP	___ BOWD	___ ExRA	___ NGB	___ CG	___ Army Corps
	___ INF	___ FA	___ CAV	___ CA	___ ENGR	___ CG	___ CA
	___ ORD	___ QMG	___ CSO	___ SG	___ FIN	___ CG	_____ DEPT
	___ GHQ	___ JAG	___ CWS	___ IG	___ B/PR	----------	

*Through MPD, ASF

FOR	X S/W directs	___ Comment or Concurrence	X Necessary action
	___ Draft of reply	___ Remark and recommendation	___ Information for reply
	___ Direct reply	___ Inviting attention to	___ ___ Ind. approved
	___ Approved	___ See notation of _____	___ Primary interest
	___ Disapproved	___ Information	___ Notation and return
	___ File	___ Consult _____	___ Noted _____

BY ___ Spcl Msgr ___ Radio ___ Air Mail ___ Immed. Action Ltr ___ Letter. . . .

1. Reference (The Adjutant General insert proper reference to WDGAP 320, dated January 12, 1943, subject as above).

2. Subparagraph 4c of the reference letter is changed as follows:

"Type - English speaking, General Service and/or Special Assignment, native-born citizens of Japanese ancestry."

87 AGO
APR 17 1943
Received

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1:

E. C. LYNCH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: The reference directive on this subject required that General Service enlisted men only could be assigned to this unit. It has developed that a large percentage of volunteers have been rejected because of minor physical defects, particularly eyesight.

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC. ARMY
BY TAG LETTER
APR 21 1943
RECEIVED APR 20 1943 ADJ. GEN'S OFFICE BR. WDGO

AGO APR 20 1943 N CLASS

Aud 4-28-43

HQ. W. [illegible]
APR 16 1943
[illegible]

RADIOGRAM

No. 1172
Date: April 15, 1943
From: Chief of Staff, War Department
To: Commanding General, WDC & 4A.

Send by air mail text of proclamation to effect modification of present restrictions regarding movement of persons of Japanese ancestry within Western Defense Command. It is desired that this be done to enable Japanese-American soldiers who are on leave and wearing the uniform of the United States Army all advantages and freedmon of action that is now enjoyed by any of our soldiers. The War Department will direct all commanders issuing passes to such soldiers to supply your headquarters with pertinent information regarding same. This information will advise length of furlough, ASN, grade, name and destination of soldier.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by [illegible] date 4/13/69

FILE CAD.

70

676

COPY

IMMEDIATE ACTION

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington

McA/dhk/2213

AG 220.71(4-16-43)PE-A/OPD

April 19, 1943

APR 22 1943

Subject: Circulation of Soldiers of Japanese Ancestry in the Western Defense Command.

To : Commanding General,
Western Defense Command,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

1. This will confirm radio message of April 14 on the subject of travel of American soldiers of Japanese ancestry.

2. The prohibitions and restrictions now in force in the Western Defense Command with respect to the movement of persons of Japanese ancestry will be modified so as to accord to American soldiers of Japanese ancestry in uniform, and on furlough the same privileges with respect to entrance into and movement within the Western Defense Command as are accorded to other American soldiers.

3. It is desired that you submit by airmail the text of your proclamation to be issued to implement this change.

4. In this connection, War Department instructions are issuing to all posts, camps, and stations substantially as follows:

a. Furloughs for the purpose of visiting within the Western Defense Command will be issued to American soldiers of Japanese ancestry by their local Commanding Officers.

b. When furloughs involving such travel are granted, Commanding Officers having jurisdiction will advise the Commanding General, Western Defense Command by telegraph the name, serial number, grade, organization, and station of the soldier, his destination in the Western Defense Command, expected date of arrival and duration of pass or furlough.

c. The soldier will be furnished with written evidence of pass or furlough.

d. It is considered that soldiers of Japanese origin may have difficulty in obtaining suitable living conditions in the Western Defense Command due to the fact that there are no longer any Japanese communities in that area.

IMMEDIATE ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ___ date 11/3/78

CONFIDENTIAL

AG 220.71 (4-16-43)PE-A/OPD April 19, 1943

This situation will be explained to such soldiers when they apply for furlough, with specific advice to the effect that they are authorized and encouraged to obtain quarters and mess at an Army post, camp or station in the vicinity of the place at which they propose to spend their furlough,by applying to the Commanding Officer thereof.

e. Commanding Officers of posts, camps, and stations in the Western Defense Command will be instructed to provide such accommodations upon request of soldiers concerned.

f. Direct communication between your headquarters and the Commanding Officers of all posts, camps, and stations physically located within the Western Defense Command is authorized for the purpose of making necessary arrangements to accomplish the foregoing.

5. The War Department will make arrangements whereby accepted inductees who desire to visit in the Western Defense Command will, subsequest to induction, initial processing, and equipment with uniform, be granted furlough in lieu of the usual pre-induction leave. In consequence, the procedure above described will, from the point of view of the Western Defense Command, apply to soldiers in uniform only.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Ray C. Yemer (?)
Adjutant General

FILE CAD

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] VLS:MVS:hb

AG 342 (4-15-43)PR-I-A

April 23, 1943.

Subject: Induction of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry - Qualifications.

To: Commanding General,
First Service Command,
Army Service Forces,
Boston, Massachusetts.

1. Reference is made to letter from this office SPX 342 (1-28-43) PR-I, dated February 1, 1943, subject: "Induction of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry".

2. Paragraph 2 of reference letter is changed to read as follows:

"2. Beginning February 23, 1943, 3,000 English speaking native born United States Citizens of Japanese parentage or ancestry qualified for General Service or Special Assignment will be selected in the continental United States by voluntary induction through Selective Service."

By order of the Secretary of War:

S. T. Ansell

Adjutant General.

SAME LETTER SENT TO EACH SERVICE COMMAND.

Based on Disposition Form from Personnel Div., G-1, dated 4-15-43, file WDGAP 320 (1-12-43.

Comeback copy returned to G-1, 4-23-43, with copy of action taken.

1700

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED
DOWNGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
9 AY

Distribution attached.

[redacted]

APR 23

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE ACTION

Basic: Ltr AG 220.71 (4-16-43)PE-A/OPD fr/The AG, Washington, D.C., 4/19/43, to CG, WDC-4A, Re Circulation of Japanese Soldiers in WDC Area.

291.2-Japanese-CAD 1st Ind.

Hq, WDC-4A, Presidio of San Francisco, California, April 24, 1943

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Copies of Public Proclamation No. 17, this headquarters, attached in compliance with par. 3 of basic. The text of the proclamation was read over the telephone and verbal approval obtained prior to its issuance.

For the Commanding General:

Incl:
Pub.Proc.#17 (in trip.)

FILE CAD

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by ____ date 4/13/79

RETURN TO CAD FILES

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE ACTION

676

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California

APR 29 1943

291.2 - Japanese (CAD) April 26, 19

SUBJECT: Circulation of Soldiers of Japanese Ancestry in the Western Defense Command.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference paragraph 3, letter AG 220.71 (4-16-43)PE-A/OPD, dated April 19, 1943, subject as above, attached are copies of Public Proclamation No. 17, this headquarters. Prior to the issuance of the Proclamation, its text was read over the telephone and War Department verbal approval obtained.

2. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command is in receipt of instructions referred to in paragraph 4 of letter referred to in paragraph 1 hereof, and the plan outlined is being put into operation.

For the Commanding General:

Incls:
Pub. Procl. No. 17 (3)

FILE CAD

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNW by ___ date 4/13/65

IMMEDIATE ACTION

~~RESTRICTED~~ Completed - 298 33

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY GROUND FORCES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

322/98 (Army Bands)(R)-GNGCT
(5-15-43)

2855 MAY 15 1943

Memorandum for THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Organization of Band, 442d Infantry.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. Issue "restricted" orders to Commanding General, Third Army, substantially as follows:

1. Reference, ~~War Department~~ letter, AG 320.2 (1-20-43) OB-I-GN-M, January 22, 1943, subject: "Organization of a Japanese Combat Team."

2. ~~Activate~~ the Band, 442d Infantry, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, at the earliest practicable date.

3. ~~This unit will be organized~~ with personnel from the Japanese-American Combat Team and in accordance with Column 3, of T/O 7-11, April 1, 1942, with an authorized strength of (1) warrant officer and (28) enlisted men.

4. Equipment.

a. Priority for issue of equipment is B-2-298. (See ~~ltr~~ letter, AG 400 (4-27-43) OB-S-C-M, May 7, 1943, subject: "Distribution of Controlled Items of Equipment.")

action taken by mimeo ltr. 5-17-43 SCS/jaj

II Distribution Complied With MEB/mep 2B-939

b. Tables of Basic Allowances:

(1) Organizational equipment, 7, June 20, 1942, with Changes 1 and 2.

(2) Clothing and individual equipment, 21, January 7, 1943.

c. Band instruments will be requisitioned in the usual manner.

4. Instructions contained in ~~reference~~ in paragraph 1, above, in conflict with ~~instructions contained herein~~ are superseded by these instructions.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
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~~RESTRICTED~~

5

6. Reports.

a. Date ~~unit is activated~~ of action taken will be reported w/o delay to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, and ~~to The Adjutant General~~ this office by letter.

b. The provisions of paragraphs 11, 12 and 18, AR 345-800, ~~Military Records-Report of Change~~, July 1, 1942, as amended by Changes ~~Nos~~ 1, 2, 3 and 4, will be complied with where applicable.

6.X adding etc.

II. Inform Commanding Generals, Army Service Forces and Fourth Service Command, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff, and all other interested agencies of the War Department of this action.

agencies

For the COMMANDING GENERAL:

WAR DEPARTMENT MAY 15 P M

WAGO

MAY 16 1943

RECEIVED

Frank Ward

FRANK WARD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Exec., Opns. Div., G-3.

Cy to ASF
ASF
Repl & Sch Comd
4th A. C.
WDGS
C.O. Camp Shelby
Miss

c/l rtd to CG, AGF-1
Army Ground Forces
5-18-43
as

Memorandum for Record:

Action requested by Asst Secty of War, (J. J. McCloy) in letter of May 10, 1943, to Gen McNair. Approved by G-3, WDGS, (Col. Matchett) by telephone to C/S, AGF. Gnd G-3 directed to prepare necessary orders to authorize band and prepare reply to Mr McCloy informing him of action being taken. (See AGF M/S, no file, subj: "Band for Japanese -American Combat Team," dated 5-12-43).

This regiment is not, under current AGF band policy, eligible for a band. However, it is authorized as a special and exceptional case.

Equipage Sec, O/QMG, (Capt. Smith) has been informed and is shipping instruments at EPD.

FILE MAY 18 1943

AAK

as

~~RESTRICTED~~

March 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FORRESTAL:

Herewith is a telegram protesting some utterances by a naval officer against the use of American soldiers of Japanese descent in Army units.

I understand that McCoy is one of those who escaped from Mindanao with Dyess, and I have no doubt he has some well justified basis for bitterness; but the Army has decided to utilize the services of loyal Japanese American citizens by forming units composed of such citizens, and we are interested in maintaining their morale and fighting qualities. The record of the 100th Battalion in Italy is outstanding and compares favorably with any native American unit we have had engaged. The record of the 442nd Combat Team, which is still in this country, so far as its training tests show is also excellent.

We are making good use of Japanese American citizens as soldiers, not only in Italy but also in the Pacific, and we are preparing as a result of our success with existing units to take in more Japanese American citizens, first to serve as replacements for the existing units as casualties occur, and secondly for general use in the Army. Comments such as these at a time when we are building up an excellent morale in the Japanese American units is not helpful, nor, I think, fair in the light of their record.

JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

Encl:
Tlg. 20 March 44 to ASW fr. Saburo Kido, President of Japanese American Citizens League.
JJMcC:NZW

X - KIDO, Saburo
ASW 342.18 J.A. Selective Service
Comments
Kido, Saburo
McCoy, Comdr. Mulvin N.

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUMMARY SHEET

FOLD OVER PAPERS AND CLIP

TO			FOR		FROM
		G-4			
	G-1	OPD			
	G-2	1 D/CHIEF OF STAFF	1 & 2	APPROVAL	
	G-3	2 ASECRETARY OF WAR		SIGNATURE	

OFFICE OF PREPARATION: Control Group, G-1

GRADE—SURNAME—PHONE: Col Boyd/3847/ps

FILE NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
WDGAP 291.2 Japs (15 Nov)	Nisei Situation on the West Coast	15 Nov 45

SUMMARY

1. On 13 November 1945 the Assistant Secretary of War stated that he had heard disturbing stories both on the West Coast and in Honolulu on the demobilization of the Nisei. He stated the Nisei are being separated on the West Coast and are now waiting around Pacific Coast ports as civilians for transportation to Honolulu. The Assistant Secretary of War stated that he spoke to General Pratt and General Wilbur, of the Western Defense Command, about this situation. Both of these general officers admitted that the situation existed and stated they could do nothing about it since the instructions came from Washington. It was believed that the men are now mainly at Camp Beale and Camp Maysville, California, and Fort Lewis, Washington. The Assistant Secretary of War directed that the situation be corrected at once.

2. War Department Readjustment Regulations and War Department Circular, Number 188, 1945, require that individuals who enter the military service from a territory of the United States be returned to the appropriate territory for separation. War Department Circular, Number 338, 7 November 1945, made two exceptions to Readjustment Regulations to provide for separation of territorials in the United States when they present satisfactory evidence of a permanent change of residence to the continental United States, or of an offer of employment.

3. A telephone call was made to General Wilbur, Chief of Staff of the Western Defense Command. He was unable to furnish any details concerning the Nisei situation. He said the Assistant Secretary of War had talked to him about the situation recently and that he only knew that a number of Nisei who had been separated on the West Coast had had to await their turns as civilians for transportation to Honolulu when they could have been moved to Honolulu on transports.

4. The Military Personnel Division of the Army Service Forces, investigated the situation on 14 November 1945 and reported as follows:

a. There are four Separation Centers in the 9th Service Command, and the status of Nisei at these Centers is as shown:

(1) Fort Lewis, Washington -- No Nisei present.
(2) Fort Douglas, Utah -- No Nisei present.
(3) Camp Beale, California -- 72 are present. Five are there for rest and recuperation, and 67 for separation. Of the 67 separatees, 25 are under orders to ports, and shipping orders on the remainder have been requested from the ports but have not been cleared by the ports.
(4) Fort MacArthur, California -- 9 Nisei were present. Shipping orders had been requested for all, and 4 were cleared to the port within the next 2 days.

15 Nov 45

ASW 014.311 WDC General

b. There is no Camp Maysville, California.

c. The 9th Service Command had recently issued a memorandum to the Separation Centers outlining the regulations concerning separation of Nisei and had sent War Department Circular, Number 338, 7 November 1945, to the Separation Centers.

d. The 9th Service Command admitted that a few Nisei from Hawaii had been separated on the West Coast instead of in the Territory of Hawaii as required by War Department regulations, but that such separations had been stopped.

5. The Office of the Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, stated there had been some cases where Nisei had been separated and sent to ports as civilians for transportation to Honolulu. In all such cases the port authorities asked the Separation Centers concerned to provide travel orders for the Nisei. These travel orders were furnished in all cases and the Nisei were shipped to Honolulu. At the present time there is no backlog of Nisei awaiting shipment at West Coast ports.

6. Action has been initiated to obtain weekly reports for the next 6 weeks from the 9th Service Command concerning the status of Nisei in their Separation Centers.

7. The President of the War Department Returnee Advisory Board has been requested to continue investigating this situation.

8. It is recommended that the attached Disposition Form be approved and dispatched to the Inspector General.

9. Based on the reports and investigations mentioned above, further information will be furnished you.

W. S. PAUL
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Incl:
D/F to IG, dtd
15 Nov 45, fr
G-1.

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
NOV 17 1945

NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Nov 17, 1945

Information copies to:

The Inspector General
WD Returnee Advisory Board