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AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS

A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945

IN NINE VOLUMES

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Edited with an introduction by

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American Concentration Camps

On August 10, 1988, President Ronald W. Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which probably closed the last legislative chapter of the World War II removal and incarceration of more than 120,000 Japanese Americans, almost all of them residents of the West Coast. Under the terms of that act, each surviving victim—there were then perhaps 60,000 such persons—was entitled to a one-time, tax-free payment of $20,000. This redress, as it has been called, stemmed from the findings of the federal Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC, established 1980) as expressed in its 1983 report, *Personal Justice Denied*, and its subsequent recommendations in June of that year. The CWRIC's basic conclusion is worth quoting:

> The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II. (*Personal Justice Denied*, p. 18.)

The documents printed here trace and explicate not only the decision to submit a whole people to internal exile but also delineate the execution and modification of that policy during the course of the war. The documents are drawn largely from the archives of the government department chiefly responsible, the War Department, and from the archives of the United States Army. Eventually many other agencies of the executive branch were accessories after the fact and the Congress was intimately involved as well. (So was the Supreme Court of the United States, but its decisions are not directly treated here.)

In addition, as these documents make clear, the incarceration of the Japanese Americans enjoyed widespread public support. During the war there were more complaints that the government was being too soft on "Japs" than there were complaints about the very real harshness of their treatment.

In signing the 1988 act President Reagan refused to make any judgments about the past: ". . . it's not for us today to pass judgment upon those who may have made mistakes while engaged in that great struggle." ("Remarks by the President at the Signing Ceremony for Japanese Internment Legislation," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, August 10, 1988.) One of his recent predecessors was willing to make those kinds of judgments. "We know now what we should have known then," said President Gerald R. Ford in a 1976 proclamation, "not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans." (Proclamation 4417, "An American Promise," February 19, 1976, *Federal Register*, Vol. 41, No. 35—Feb. 20, 1976.)

The views of both chief executives merely echoed what scholars had been saying for some time. Just before the war ended Eugene V. Rostow, in a brilliant article in *Harper's*, had dubbed the relocation "our worst wartime mistake." Nearly twenty years later, the late Stetson Conn, a civilian who was the Army's chief military historian, published, in an official history, a detailed account of the Army's role in the evacuation. He demonstrated that the decision was not dictated by "stern military necessity" as the Army and its defenders had claimed. As striking as Conn's conclusions were, he had been inhibited if not absolutely prevented from publishing some of the evidence. He generously allowed me to use his notes and files and even checked my notes to make sure that I found several items that he had not used and which we today might call "smoking guns." My own findings have been published in several books and a number of articles.

I argued in 1972 that

> the general tendency of educated Americans, including historians, to write off the evacuation as a "wartime mistake" is to obscure its true significance. Rather than a mistake—which, according to the dictionary, is "an error in action, calculation, opinion or judgment caused by poor reasoning, carelessness, insufficient information . . . a misunderstanding or misconception"—the legal atrocity which was committed against the Japanese Americans was the logical outgrowth of over three centuries of American experience, an experience which taught Americans to regard the United States as a white man's country in which nonwhites "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." These infamous words, from Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's 1857 decision in *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, were merely echoed by the United States Supreme Court during World War II. (*Concentration Camps, USA,* p. xiv.)

The documents presented in these volumes are selected from literally tens of thousands of sheets of paper which document the government's role. As noted, the point of view from which the documents are presented is chiefly that of the Army and its civilian masters in the War Department. Most of the non-Army/War Department archival documents printed here were either sent there or sent elsewhere in response to their actions. An equally large group of documents could be presented from the archival remains of the War Relocation Authority, the custodial agency set up to warehouse the Japanese American people. The documents presented here are not just "decision papers" but rather have been structured not only to tell a story but also to try to show the kinds of complex matrices from which governmental decisions flow. We Americans habitually speak of government as if it were singular and monolithic—and nothing is more monolithic than the resentful "they" or "them" that one hears so often. Yet, as I believe these documents demonstrate clearly, there were constant differences of opinion within the government—and often within the War Department itself. These differences grew as the war went on and the decisions of early 1942 looked more and more like a "mistake" to growing numbers of officials.

Many historians complain that the advent of the telephone has made it more difficult to trace decision making and the information flow upon which it is based. The War Department, however, recorded large numbers of telephone conversations. These were not surreptitious wire taps, but actual recordings made on wax cylinders and made with the knowledge of the caller and the called. (At least this was the case among the Army officials involved: it is not clear whether outsiders—Justice Department officials or scholars, such as Morton Grodzins—knew that they were being recorded.) The wax cylinders were transcribed by typists, often the same

day. Transcriptions of important conversations were sometimes circulated rather widely within the War Department and within regional commands, such as General John L. De Witt's Western Defense Command. These transcripts enable us, I believe, to understand the day to day and sometimes hour to hour decision-making process as if we were the proverbial "fly on the wall" taking it all in.

None of the documents printed has been altered or edited in any way. Except for the telephone conversation of February 4, 1942, between Generals Mark W. Clark and Allen W. Gullion, which is printed in Volume II, all are photocopies of original documents or carbons of those documents.

They have been selected and arranged with the research student in mind. There are not only key documents showing how important decisions were made, but also documents showing how conflicting and contrary lines of action were being followed at the same time. Some documents feature major historical figures: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, General George C. Marshall, and Admiral Ernest J. King. More often they feature key subordinates: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Generals De Witt and Gullion, and on down to the middle and lower level bureaucrats who served them, such as Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen. In addition, a number of unsolicited letters and telegrams from the private sector have been included along with some congressional debate and hearings and attempts of government agencies to evaluate public opinion.

The basic arrangement of the documents is chronological, although a number of separate matters are treated topically. The chief of these latter are: the reports of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League (Volume II); letters showing changing relationships between JACL officials and federal officials (Volume IV); a dossier compiled on General De Witt (Volume VII); The War Department and the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study (Volume VIII); the Japanese of Hawaii (Volume VIII); and Raising Japanese AmericanTroops (Volume IX).

Since the point of view is chiefly that of the War Department/Army, sequential correspondence from outside that nexus is usually printed as it was received. Thus a March 28, 1942, telegram from University of California Provost Monroe E. Deutsch to Justice Felix Frankfurter will be found, not under that date, but immediately after the letter of March 30, 1942, from Frankfurter to Assistant Secretary McCloy to which it was an enclosure.Similarly, the letters of April 1, 1942, and April 2, 1942—McCloy to Frankfurter and Frankfurter to McCloy—which refer to that telegram will be found immediately after it with the March documents (Volume III) even though most documents written in April 1942 are in Volume IV.

The archival documents are drawn from the following sources:

National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Record Group 16	Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
Record Group 107	Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (includes records of Asst. Secretary)
Record Group 338	Records of United States Army Commands, 1942–
Record Group 389	Records of the Office of Provost marshal general, 1941–
Record Group 394	Records of United States Army Continental Commands, 1920–1942
Record Group 407	Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917–

Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
Record Group 44 Records of the Office of Government Reports

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
The Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo.
The Papers of Tom C. Clark

Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.
The Papers of John Anson Ford (Reports of the Anti-Axis Committee, Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League)

Bancroft Library, Berkeley, Calif.
The Papers of Hiram W. Johnson, III
The Papers of Culbert L. Olson

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Cincinnati
September, 1988

Contents

Volume I: July 1940–December 31, 1941

Archival Documents, pre-Pearl Harbor.

These materials deal largely with discussions between the War and Justice Departments over responsibilities for enemy aliens in case of war and with internal Army documents about construction of accommodations for enemy aliens and interned merchant seamen. There is also the famous "Munson Report" of November 1941, dealing with alleged loyalty and disloyalty of Japanese Americans.

Official Proclamations and Other Public Documents, December 7, 1941–April 20, 1942, as printed by the Tolan Committee.

These public documents show the ways in which the lives of enemy aliens in general and of Japanese Americans in particular were affected, and how, over time, most of the options of the latter disappeared.

Archival Documents, December 7, 1941–December 31, 1941.

These demonstrate the growing conflicts between the War Department and the Department of Justice and show the rising concern about internal security in both the government and the nation at large.

Volume II: January 1, 1942–February 19, 1942

Archival documents, January 1, 1942–February 19, 1942.

This sequence shows chiefly how the decision to relocate the West Coast Japanese evolved from conflicting views both outside and inside the executive branch. The terminal date is that of Executive Order 9066, printed in Volume I.

Reports of the Anti-Axis Committee, Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League (JACL).

These documents, found in the John Anson Ford Mss., Henry E. Huntington Library, show the stresses and strains placed on loyal Japanese American citizens, some of whom were persuaded that there were "enemies" among them.

Volume III: February 20, 1942–March 31, 1942

Archival Documents, February 20, 1942–March 19, 1942.

The basic decision having been made and authority delegated to General De Witt and his staff, the problems of how to remove more than 100,000 human beings proved to be more complicated than many officials expected.

Congressional Record, March 19, 1942 (selected pages).

The few pages printed here contain the entire congressional debate over the statute which made it a federal crime for a civilian in an area that was not under martial law to fail to obey the instructions of a commanding general and his deputies. Note the sarcastic remarks of Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Oh.) at *CR*, p. 2726.

Tolan Committee, *Preliminary Report and Recommendations*, March 19, 1942.

This report, although it did *not* make policy, was important because it endorsed what the military wanted to do and was doing. Had it been otherwise, congressional approval might not have been so routine.

Archival Documents, March 20, 1942–March 31, 1942.

These documents show the policy of forced removal being put into effect; in this period the first of General De Witt's Civilian Exclusion Orders (printed in Volume I) was issued, affecting the Bainbridge Islanders of Puget Sound, and the first Relocation Center was opened at Manzanar, California.

Volume IV: April 1942

Archival Documents, April 1942.

In this sequence of documents the growing opposition of western officials outside of the West Coast to having Japanese Americans moved to their localities is manifested. Particularly noteworthy are reports of meetings in Salt Lake City between army officials, Milton S. Eisenhower of the newly-formed War Relocation Authority, western state officials, and representatives of large agricultural interests taken from the Records of the Secretary of Agriculture.

Federal Government Surveys of Public Opinion, January 1942–August 1942.

These thoroughly unscientific attempts to gauge public opinion, done by the federal Office of Government Reports, a forerunner of the Office of War Information, were circulated among high government officials.

The Japanese American Citizens League and the Federal Government, March 1942-November 1944.

Relationships between the oppressed and their oppressors tend to be complex, especially when there are reasons for the oppressed —or some of them—to believe that "appropriate behavior will ameliorate conditions and/or shorten the term of oppression. The leadership of the Japanese American Citizens League, as the correspondence here shows, perceived that the political heads of the U. S. Army, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and particularly Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy and his uniformed staff, were likely targets of a "how to win friends and influence people" approach which even included small gifts. Perceptively, no such approach was made to General John L. DeWitt, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, or their subordnates. In recent years there has been increasing criticism of what some have termed the "over-enthusiastic collaboration" between the JACL and the Army. At the recent (August 1988) biennial JACL convention in Seattle a motion, on which action was deferred, asking that the JACL admit and apologize for its wartime "errors" caused great consternation.

Volume V: May 1942

Archival Documents, May 1942.

These documents show the Army making California and the other West Coast areas "free" of Japanese, as first the Assembly Centers and then the Relocation Centers began to fill up.

Tolan Committee, *Fourth Interim Report*, May 1942.

This report demonstrates, perhaps better than any other single document, the degree of support that existed for governmental policies affecting the Japanese Americans and shows that many felt that the government was not doing enough to keep the West Coast safe.

Volume VI: June 1942–December 1942

Archival Documents, June 1942.

These documents show the first major modifications of relocation policies and depict the resistance by Western Defense Command to any amelioration of the condition of the Japanese Americans.

Congressional Record, June 22, 1942 (selected pages).

This brief Senate debate of a bill to authorize the incarceration of any person of Japanese ancestry anywhere in the United States or its territories is but one more example of the willingness of some members of Congress to go farther than the executive branch was willing to go.

Archival Documents, July 1942.

These documents show, among other things, the increasing uneasiness of officials in the interior western states to which Japanese Americans were being shipped. An important policy document is the joint memorandum to President Roosevelt from General Marshall and Admiral King, July 15, 1942.

Reports of Civilian Agencies to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, June 1942.

These largely self-congratulatory reports are by agencies that assisted the Army in the process of getting the Japanese Americans into camp "humanely."

Army Inspections of Assembly Centers, July 1942.

A collection of documents demonstrating that, even by its own standards, the living and sanitary conditions that prevailed in the Army-run Assembly Centers were often deficient.

Archival Documents, August 1942–December 1942.

These documents are largely concerned with attempts to justify the relocation and include some materials illustrating how the mendacious *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast* was assembled.

Digest of Newspaper Editorials by Western Defense Command, January 31, 1942–December 9, 1942.

A carefully selected group. All are supportive of Western Defense Command policies and some press for even more stringent measures against the Japanese Americans.

Volume VII: 1943

Archival Documents, 1943.

These documents depict the continuing resistance of General De Witt and his subordi-

nates to the "liberalization" of policies toward Japanese Americans—including military service and loyalty "testing," which are covered more fully in Volume IX—and the distinct change of tone that occurred when General Delos C. Emmons succeeded De Witt as head of Western Defense Command. This section also contains the White House response to congressional criticism of the "too liberal" relocation program.

Hearings on *War Relocation Centers* (Chandler Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs), Parts I and II, January 20, 27, 28, and February 11, 1943.

These hearings demonstrate the congressional opposition to the "liberalized" relocation program. In them Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, responds to that criticism. (Parts III and IV, which deal with Arizona and Tule Lake, are not reproduced here.)

Dossier on General John L. De Witt, August 22, 1942–April 29, 1943.

In September 1943, General Delos C. Emmons succeeded General John L. De Witt, who became Commandant of the Army War College. The War Department denied that General De Witt was being punished. This dossier, found in the files of the Adjutant General, was assembled sometime in 1943, and could have been the basis for an official reprimand—or worse—as it shows General De Witt in deliberate and insubordinate resistance to War Department policies. No documents explaining who ordered the dossier compiled or for what purpose have been discovered.

Volume VIII: 1944 and 1945; Japanese of Hawaii

Archival Documents, 1944 and 1945.

These documents depict, in part, the winding down of the relocation program.

Congressional Record, February 23, 1944, and June 23, 1944 (selected pages).

These brief debates resulted in the passage of a statute, requested by the Department of Justice, to facilitate the renunciation of United States citizenship by Japanese Americans as part of the "segregation" program.

Army and Navy Intelligence Reports, 1944–1945.

The reports show that west-coast-based intelligence officers continued to harbor the same kinds of attitudes toward Japanese Americans that triggered the relocation long after such views ceased to prevail at the top of the chain of command.

The War Department and the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study, October 1942–October 1943.

These documents illustrate the possible ethical conflicts involved when scholars bargain for special access to contemporary government documents.

Japanese of Hawaii, August 1941–May 1944.

These documents demonstrate how differently the 150,000 Japanese Americans in Hawaii were treated during the war despite their greater incidence and proximity to Imperial Japanese Forces.

Volume IX: Raising Japanese American Troops, June 1942–November 1945

Archival Documents, June 1942–November, 1945.

This collection of documents shows how, almost from the beginning of the relocation program, some within the military and government establishments were considering the use of Japanese American manpower and special skills. This began with the recruitment of linguists from the camps for the Military Intelligence Specialist School, continued with the formation of the 100th Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, and ended with the reapplication of "normal" selective service procedures to eligible Japanese Americans both inside and outside the relocation centers. The use of this manpower, as De Witt and his key subordinates correctly noted, called into question the validity of the assumptions on which the whole relocation program had been based.

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4. Archival documents, July, 1942.

5. Army inspections of assembly centers, July, 1942.

6. Archival documents, August, 1942–December, 1942.

7. Digests of newspaper editorials by Western Defense Command, January 31, 1942–December 9, 1942.

Archival documents
June, 1942

ASW 014.311 Western Defense Command
Class No.
(ASW Geog. Alaska)

Paper: Ltr. 6-3-42

From: Col. Tate

To: Richard L. Neuberger

Re: Several articles appearing in his byline - article on Gen. DeWitt.

Re his appointment to Lt. Lieutenant.

"As Colonel Lovett informed you, the publication of any meterial on Alaska right now is difficult because of General DeWitt's feeling that the extreme sensitiveness of the military situation there necessitates his declining to approve the release of any information concerning Army activities in Alaska. I do not believe restrictions on Alaska itself would prevent your being assigned to General Hoge's project, either as an officer or as an enlisted man, as originally contemplated. While it probably would not be possible to publish articles written or arranged by you at the time, nevertheless, the material you would acquire there could be used later very nicely.

6-3-42

Ediphone Record ½, 51, 52, and 53
Date - 6/3/42 Time: 8:22 a.m.
Principals - Col. Bendetsen & Col. Bryan
Subject
Transcribed by - Evelyn M. Rudy Date 6/3/42

Be: The recorder did not work last night?

Br: No, and I thought I might get you as you walked in, and then get Olson paid for you.(??)

Be: Yes. Well, you see, we didn't get any word about this State Department deal, at all. It...the only people they notified were War Relocation Authority, and we got sort of a hazy sort of a word from them on it.

Br: Well, what is your trouble out there, now?

Be: Well, we just didn't know anything about the situation, and some of the Japanese of our assembly centers began receiving telegrams direct from Joe Green, right into the centers, in which Joe Green told them to go to New York.

Br: Yes.

Be: Well, there was considerable consternation, because they can't leave centers without permission, and we didn't know anything about it, and they were told to apply to the District Attorneys who would supply them with free transportation, etc. Well, the district attorneys knew nothing about it, so so far as our Japanese were concerned, it was pretty much of a comedy of errors. As a result, none of them have left and we've told our center managers to hang tough, just to wait until we give them further instructions and to allow no one to leave. But we've assured ... we told them to assure all those who felt they were eligible that we would see that they got a full opportunity to take full advantage of the offer of repatriation. And it may be necessary to hold the ship, because we got no word.

Br: Now you say those persons, themselves, did get word.

Be: Well, we don't know. We don't know whether all of them did, or just a few of them did. We just have no data, Babe.

Br: I see your point exactly. This whole thing has been rather messed up, Karl. The final date, after much grief, for the sailing of that boat, is the 11th.

Be: The 11th of June.

Br: Yes.

Be: Well, that doesn't give very much time.

Br: No. But you have more than I have. Now I'll fix the thing up, and you'll have to order those people to stay there pending further instructions.

Be; That's right.

Br: What instructions do you want?

Be; Well, hold on a minute, Babe....just a minute....Hello? ....Here are the orders that I gave last night to each of the assembly center managers, or directors: "Japanese nationals in assembly centers have received telegrams from the State Department, indicating that arrangements have been concluded for their repatriation, and advising them to proceed to New York, after clearing with the appropriate federal district attorney, by June 7th, in order to sail on an exchange vessel leaving within the week following. No Japanese evacuees are to be released from assembly centers for this purpose until further specific instructions are received from the Civil Affairs Division, headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. The Civil Affairs Division will make all necessary arrangements, so that all concerned will have full opportunity to take full advantage of the offer of repatriation. " I wanted to be sure and get that over. "The Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division has contacted the War Department in connection with this matter and will advise all concerned as to specific actions to be taken, at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, report by teletype, alphabetical list of names and former addresses and former occupation or profession of all evacuees who have received telegrams in your centers." That's the end of the message.

Br: All right.

Be: Now, in addition to that, I went downstairs...I got ahold of the WRA man (War Relocation Authority) and he had a mimeographed list.

Br: Was that list 2a or 2b?

Be: Don't know. Just a minute...I'll find out, I don't know yet?

Br: Was it a list of about 500 or 535 names?

Be: Yes.

Br: Well, that's 2b, I think.

Be: Is that a correct list?

Br: Well, that's a partial list. That's not all of them. We haven't gotten all of them, Karl.

Be; See, in addition to just what I've just told you, I had that list given

to our statistical division, which worked all night last night, trying to figure out whether any names applied to our people, and if so, where they are. We will compare the returns we get from assembly centers by teletype, with the result obtained by the statistical division, which will probably be a job that went all night last night, and maybe all day today. Because at this stage, our records are not yet in alphabetical order...by centers. They are in alphabetical order by locality, you see, so that's a little bit hard to find, in the way they have compiled the lists.

Br: I guess.

Be: Now that's what we've done here. What's the next move?

Br: Well, Karl, of course anything I say, is purely a personal estimate on the thing. You realize that?

Be: Yes, surely.

Br: Because I'm in more hot water on this one deal, than you can shake a stick at.

Be: Are you really?

Br: Yes. They first told me to use the 4th, then they moved it to the 7th, and now I find the boat is to sail on the 10th, or possibly the 11th. They told me they'd deliver them to Ellis Island, but Ellis Island can't take them. They never thought of checking with us, see. So I'm really in hot water on this, too. But, I do know the State Department sent out special telegrams and letters to people, and those people have been requested by the Japanese government, and I do know (this is by hear-say) that the government has agreed, that is, that the state department has agreed to repatriate any and all that the Japanese government asks for. That, I'm not entirely sold on, though. But I think those telegrams are authentic, but the best thing for me to do is to get ahold of Col. Tate, and tell him what you have told me, and then ask him to get in touch with you.

Be: Perhaps. Yes. If you could talk it over with Ralph and possibly then the two of you might call the state department and see if there's any further dope on when the vessel sails. Now then, I'd like to know the answers to a few questions.

Br: All right.

Be: (1) Does it include the families of the person who gets the wire, or who's on the list? And if so, does it include them only where the families are Japanese subjects? Or does it include the immediate family, that is, the wife and the minor children even where the minor children are dual-citizens? That's one question.

Br: Yes.

Be: Second question: Does the U.S. Government pay the cost? Of transportation? If it does, inasmuch as nobody out here seems to know anything about it, should the War Department...for example, should the Wartime Civil Control Administration, my outfit, arrange for it and pay for it? We can. Should we? I mean we can if we <u>have</u> to.

Br: Yes...I've got it.

Be: Third question....

Br: All right.

Be: As Ellis Island is full, where will we send them to?

Br: Wait a minute, now.....C.K.

Be: Fourth question: Do we pay the cost of transporting baggage? And how much baggage does that mean by weight - they talk about so many cubic feet, but we have to figure on it by weight, from here to New York.

Br: Yes, that's right.

Be: I'm just trying to think of these at random. Let's see...Well, the next thing, is, of course, we will not permit them to fly so that they will have to fix their time of sailing in order to conform to the time which they could get there by rail. We just won't let them fly out of here.

Br: No. How long would it take for you to get them there?

Be: Well, depending on the arrangements we could make with the railroads, I would say 5 days, counting tomorrow as the first day. I'd rather make it 7 days, however, because many of these people probably have to make some arrangements, and so do we. Now that raises still another question. Are they entitled to first class passage? Do they go first class pullman? And are each of them entitled to a lower standard?

Br: O.K.

Be: Next question is: What happens to the rest of...does the alien property custodian take over any property they own, then? Do we have any responsibility, now that they're under our supervision...suppose the guy... who takes care of that....do we just say "So sorry, if you want to go, go ahead. We can't do anything about it." Then the next question...I'M just kind of asking you these "off the hip". I hadn't thought it through, but I think most of these questions are ones that seem to me are pretty hot, and will arise,....I guess that's all I had in mind. Do they pay for their own meals on the train, or do we? I guess we could send them to...probably send them out to Great Neck, to your place out there, couldn't we?

Br: You mean Upton?

Be: Yes.

Br: Well I think Gen. Gullion would object strongly to putting women and children in there and guarding them.

Be: That's right, too. That's right. You think it includes women and children, even when the children are born here?

Br: I believe it does, Karl. If they want to go, I'm pretty sure that the condition on that will be that they can go, and they can get a clearance from the state department.

Be: Now I suppose that full responsibility rests on the state department, for the repatriation for persons who may leave the country with information of considerable value to the enemy...??

Br: Well, Karl, I've fought that question back and forth, pro and con. The State Department is supposed (underscore "suppose") to have cleared that. They so stated to me. I am doubtful, and I know that the Navy is going to object to at least two people on that list. And I don't think that they will go back. My stand on the question is that an internee to whom anyone objects, I simply will not turn him over to the state department for repatriation. The general approved that.

Be: Well, let me ask you this: If that is the case, when you talk to Joe Green today, with Col. Tate, point to the fact that many of these Japanese have very recently been in the San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles and Seattle areas. San Francisco, in particular, is a staging area, and it's very easy for anyone with a pair of eyes to stand up on any hill in San Francisco and see what's doing. Some of them, as recently, as 2 weeks ago, may have, I don't know, observed those activities. Morever, whether they have observed them or not, I am convinced, and still am, that if there is an espionage net, these Japanese have white agents. We have not been able to check exchange of correspondence, and visitation, even though they are in centers. As a consequence, any one of these persons could leave in full possession of any information that someone that was on the outside might have been able to hand them. Now I think that should be given careful consideration, particularly, as these people are West Coast Japanese. I suppose that's all been considered. I don't know that it has,...I mean that I just.....

Br: Your whole point is, that these people have recently been in a position to see this movement out there, and know what's going on, and have valuable information in their possession.

Be: They could....they could very reasonably have it, yes. And they could also get it from persons on the outside because their mail has not been stopped in any way. Are you recording this?

Br: Well, it's not working. I'm having it taken down, here.

Be: I wish you had been able to record it.

Br: I can't get your voice through, Karl.

Be: Well I can speak up, - how's this?

Br: Well, I've got all the stuff down here, though.

Be: I see.

Br: I've got all your questions, here.

Be: I see. Well, will you do the best you can, Babe. Now here's something else.

Br: What's that?

Be: I don't want to, in any way, take any action which would operate to prevent an exchange, because I'm thinking as you are thinking, of our nationals over there, who we want back. I don't want to do anything that's going to prevent that. At the same time, I think that these considerations are important, and I have no doubt that you've gobe through them very completely already, but I just wanted to give you a few of my off-hand observations from off the hip for what they're worth.

Br: Yeah. I don't know. I think it's pretty much of a mess...just hold the line a second, will you Karl?

Be: Yes, surely.

Br: Karl? Do you have any more questions on this thing? I understand your problem very well.

Be: Well I think that's all there are that I have in mind, at the moment.

Br: Now you remember sometime ago, Gen. Gullion said that you wanted that report that you made to him on your return from the West Coast.

Be: Yes.

Br: I have eventually found that, together with the map.

Be: Fine!

Br: Now that's a report, as I've got it, with 7 or 8 enclosures with it.

Be: Yes, that's right. I'd like to have that, in order to complete the early history of this West Coast Deal. I think it probably, as I

remember it, will serve to fill in some of the gaps.

Br: Yes.

Be: ..Which led to 9066, - that executive order.

Br: Yes. Now that refers in there to your visit out there in which you talked to Mr. Rowald.

Be: Yes, that's right.

Br: O.K., and the date of it is January 16th.

Be: Oh, I see. That's fine.

Br: Is that the one you want?

Be: That's right, Babe.

Br: Now in addition to that, you want all of those maps.

Be: Yes...of the Attorney General areas. That's right.

Br: Now you'll return those here sometime, I presume.

Be: Yessir. We will return the whole works to you.

Br: O.K. Anything else on your chest?

Be: Not at the moment, Babe. Thank you very much.

Br: Say, have you still got Ike Evans out there?

Be: Ike left yesterday afternoon at 6 p.m. for Washington, to be in there this afternoon for two days. Don't you keep him there, now!

Br: What?

Be: I say - don't you dare keep him there!

Br: Well we won't keep him here. We're going to send him to the East.

Be: You'd better not! We can't spare him yet, Babe.

Br: Well, I have nothing to do with that, as you know.

Be: Why do you think they're going to grab him?

Br: Keep him out here?

Be: Yes.

Br: He was "up" to go.

Be: Yeah, I know it. You don't/think they're going to pull a stunt like that on us while he's there, this time, do you?

Br: I don't think so. I think he's got a deferrment of about 60 days, as I understand it.

Be: That's right.

Br: His name is still up.

Be: I understand so. He's a very good man.

Br: Ike's all right.

Be: You bet.

Br: One more question, here. Have you issued any orders to Japanese in these relocation areas to prevent them from moving out?

Be: Yes. I'll send you a copy of what we call "Civilian Restrictive Order" - No. 1, which is to be posted on the outer limits of every assembly, reception and relocation center.

Br: All right. Well, I just wanted to know that. Somebody came back here and wanted to know whether anything had been done about that, and you've answered that question for me. O.K. Karl.

Be: All right, fine, Babe. Good luck!

Br: Call you back...

Be: Say, Babe! I have a little question here. If I can trouble you with it.

Br: Shoot.

Be: I prepared a little pamphlet in mimeograph form, after the Air-Associates Bendix, New Jersey deal that I went up on last fall, comprising copies of the executive order and under which the plant was seized and several other things about - oh, 50 or 60 pages, I guess. There are some of those lying around back there, in my cabinet drawer, if you still have room enough for it, - and I think Charlie May Scott may know where they are, and I would like to have one of those, plus my North American file, on the North-American Aviation Seizure sent out here. I want to give it to a retired colonel, who is apparently writing some kind of a book and I wanted to help him on it. Could you look for that?

Br: All right. That's the Air-Associates Bendix Seizure, and the North-American Files Seizure.

Be: Yes.

Br: One of them is mimeographed.....

Be: Yes, one is a series of 50 or 60 pages of mimeograph, and the other is just a helder-scelder manilla file folder.

Br: O.K.

Be: Thank you, Babe.

Br: I'll look it up and see what I can do for you.

Be: Fine! If you can, send it right out to me. Collect, or something. Thank you. Bye.

Conversation between L. Bendetsen and Major in Col. [illegible]te's office. June 3, 1942

Re: Repatriation

Gripsholm to sail from New York carrying Japanese officials and approximately 500 others, of which 100 are interned clerks, on an exchange.

IAW

Col Bendsel
Col Houston

60-81-32

6-4-42 5.25 p

Colonel Berdstsen & Colonel Tate
Jap repatriation - Proclamation #7, Civil Restriction Order #1
K. Russell 6-4-42
Engineering Plan
Col Grove

T any printed matter

B Yes

T You are going to collect everything?

B Yes we won't let them take anything, in their baggage or on their person.

T All right fine, then we will pick up any other papers they may have sewed in the lining of their clothes when they get to New York.
No you said you were having that stuff sent to you office in S.F. and then will send it on here.

B Right.

T How are you going to send it on to us?

B By air express

T If you sent it airmail it would cost you a million dollars.

B Oh

T by air express, how much is that going to cost?

B Maybe 2 or 3 hundred dollars. Maybe 5 hundred.

T Don't go any farther I'll loose my breath;

B This is going to cost you money Ralph.

T Not going to cost me anything

B Well it will cost Uncle Sam money

T Well

B The State Department starts in 24 hours in advance to do a job like this it is always going to cost them money. They don't know how much they have spent today in phone calls.

T I feel that the State Department should pay for transporting this matter.

B Well I do too, yess

T And I think you should keep a record, there is no reason why the War Dept. shoud pay this bill.

B All right we will keep a record of the cost of shipping air express We are shipping air express only because of the forlorn hope that you might give it to them before they get on the boat but I am afraid that, I don't safely think you dan give it to them.

T I doubt now whether we will even give it to them. I think what we will do is to turn it over to the alien property custodian

B Well that is the best thing to do,

T They are not allowing our people to bring anything back

B No, well you shouldn't hurry it; you should examine it very deliberately and very carefully if you want to make delivery let the international red cross service do it, they will be glad to.

T Well it isn't going to be hurried, I can tell you that.

B That's good, we will ship it by straight express then.

T This telegram from the Japanese government cinches that point.

B What does that say.

T They say they are not being permitted to bring any printed matter.

B Fine that's a good deal.

T We'll handle the thing the same way ourselves.

B Fine then, we'll send the stuff to you on the next train, the slow freight.

T O.K. you're the doctor.

B Well we'll get it to you.

T Now let's see if I have anything else.
Yes your proclamation No. 7.

B Proc. #7,

T Excluding all Japanese now been picked up.

B Right.

T You exclude them from area No. 1.

B That 's correct.

T Where are they going?

T Where are they going?

B They are all in assembly centers.

T You don't know whether they are or not. you might have a stray kicking around someplace that is not in the excluded area,

B Well we are pretty sure we haven't.

T Well why don't you instruct them to report to an assembly center and turn themselves in.

B That's a good suggestion, we'll do that.

T Well it would cinch matters, so that you won't have them roaming around in some other area and getting themselves killed or shot at.

B All right we'll do that.

T Fine, now my second question? You told me that the, in connection with keeping the Japs in a center you included a civilian restrictive civilian order No. 1 as now requiring that.

B Yes,

T I fail to find in our files a copy of Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1.

B You do?

T Yes, now what does that apply to - is it a regulation issued in a Center?

B It is a regulation applicable to every center, and it is called for by the agreement between the War Dept. and WRA.

T I don't have a copy of that order Karl.

B I will see that you get it.

T Of course this exclusion order does nothing more than affirm that.

B That's right.

T Well those are the only two points -- we will try to get this cleared tonight, so I'll call you back. I don't see any objection to it, and I am sure that the Dept. of Justice will not have any.

B I see, have they received the data on it.

T They are trying to communicate with them now, they are out to dinner and will be back to the office, Mr. Ennis will be back shortly and I'll try and get the thing thru this evening.

B Fine, what did Ennis have to say about our meeting?

T Very fine, he felt that his trip out there was very profitable both from the point of the Dept. of Justice and the local command out there.

B Yes, I think it was, I think he changed his ideas about the commanding general didn't he?

T Yes he was very well pleased with everything out there and was very glad he made the trip.

B Well we were too, did he see, did you see the agreement?

T No I did not.

B Well we sent you one, he had it with you, and I thought he might have shown it to you.

T I think he left it at the office.

B Fine

T Our copy hasn't come in yet.

B Fine, now have you anything more?

T No Karl, I can't think of anything more .

B Well fine this is a separate subject, I wanted to at least make a comment on it tonight, and we'll call you on it tomorrow when Evans is there. Is he there now?

T No, he said he was coming back this evening but so far he hasn't shown up

B Well Colonel Groves came this afternoon,

T He is a colonel isn't he. ——called him a general, and I knew you were wrong.

B I know, he and General Hannum who is here in S.F./ The Div. Eng. he is a general and Colonel Parks the Division Engineer for the North Pacific Division is here, they had a program cut and dried on what to put in relocation centers and under their program there would be no wiring, no electric lights no latrines, that is no flush type latrines, no pit type, and then only in every other block at first, and they would have showers in every other block and they point to the fact that in troop housing, I believe Colonel Parks says that at one place up near, I believe it was at Dutch Harbor or Kuminack there were only 12 toilets for 300 soldiers for a year. Well that

B shouldn't be that way; that's no argument

T Well they have women and children in these groups

B That's it, they have it cut and dried and they have their prggram made up, Colonel Groves came out here deliberately with the intention not of finding out what we can do, but of saying that it would be thus and so, you see

T Yes

B Well we didn't get any place this afternoon at all, I was in there for a while and I couldn't stay long on account of this business for the State Department, Colonel Hansston though who is entirely familiar with all of the construction details talked with them and there was just nothing, in other words Colonel Groves tried to make these requirements look entirely ridiculous. Well you can if you set out to do it, and these do relate to women and children and if you build a camp like he thinks it can be built for soldiers they are not the same at all, then you have disease on your hand, when you have an organized group of men to deal with they can get along with pit latrines and move their camps too, but not so with these bozos and

T Are they going to continue their conferences tomorrow?

B No Colonel Groves, has to go on a trip tomorrow, he didn't come out here to confer he just came out to tell us. He is going on a trip tomorrow and will be back Monday he says, if we want him to.

from

T I wish you would ascertain/the people he talked with, exactly what he proposes to do in the way of construction and let me know.

B All right we will let you know tomorrow morning.

T Because I am sure that what he has done will not meet with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War.

B Well he even commented on that; he says the SoS wanted to know how this business of continueal pressure for priority seemed to be ooming down from the top apparently he said somebody had direct communication with someone on top, the Assistant Secretary of War, in other words, you have your friend who wants to put you out of office trying to run the Secretary, do you get the play?

T Well we can handle that situation.

B That's right, but that is your deal though.

T I want to know the full particulars.

B All right sir, just a minute

B Colonel Hansston will have a copy tonight, and he will read it to you in t e morning, how is that.

T That's all right, just so I get the full particulars, we cannot let this thing get aw y and run us into trouble

B It can very readily dó it the way they want to build it. For instance, they don't even w nt to put in, oh heck never mind you'll get the dope later.

T I'll look for it in the morning.

B Fine Ralph, I don't want to pour this on you, I'm not trying to do that and I want to be reasonable but you cannot put women and children into a camp like he wants to build.

T I realize that, we'll have to arrive at a compromise which is sensible.

B Sure, thank you Ralph.

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

SECRET
ASW 014.311 W.D.C.

June 6, 1942

Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McCloy:

There are enclosed for your information five copies of an agreement between the Department of Justice and the War Department, through the agency of Western Defense Command, in regard to the enforcement of contraband, curfew and travel regulations in the Western Defense Command.

Sincerely,

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

A-13-9-7

Memorandum between War and Justice Departments on Enforcement of Contraband, Curfew and Travel Regulations in the Western Defense Command.

On June 2, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt, Colonel Bendetsen and Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice conferred on the enforcement of the contraband, residence, curfew and travel regulations in force in the Western Defense Command and on enforcement of exclusion orders and certain other related subjects. General DeWitt stated that during the present military situation, which he explained to Mr. Ennis, he wished a strict enforcement of the regulations. Mr. Ennis explained that at the orders of the President after consultation with General Marshal, the United States Attorneys were, since May 27, operating under instructions which prohibited them from releasing any person apprehended for violation of the instructions even though the circumstances involving the apprehension of several persons since these instructions went into effect were such that the United States Attorney, if he had discretion, would direct the release of the person detained as a case involving no violation or an excusable violation. General DeWitt agreed that even strict enforcement permitted the exercise of some discretion and requested, however, that for the present, release in the discretion of the United States Attorney should be after consultation with the War Department officials. Thereupon the following was agreed:

During the present military situation, and until termination after consultation between representatives of the War and Justice Departments, all U. S. Attorneys in the Western Defense Command will order the apprehension and detention of all persons violating contraband, residence, curfew, travel, prohibited zones and exclusion regulations, or of any other person, citizen or alien, whose activities are deemed by War Department to be dangerous to the security of the nation, and will consult duly designated representatives of the War Department before releasing any such persons.

By the use of the term War Department herein, is meant the War Department through Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

Dated at San Francisco, California, this 2nd day of June, 1942.

For the Department of Justice

Edward Ennis

Director, Alien Enemy Control,
Department of Justice

For the War Department, through
the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command

J. L. DeWitt

Assistant Chief of Staff

Ediphone Record No. 16
Date June 6, 1942 Time 3:10 p.m.
Principals: Col. Bendetsen and Col. Tate
Subject: [redacted]
Transcribed by I. Kraut June 6, 1942

T: A Mrs. Elise V. Yamas of 420 South Oak Knob, Pasadena, California. She writes that she is the white wife of a Japanese. She is a naturalized citizen, swedish origin. They have a daughter who is 25 and married to an American of Swedish descent. He has accompanied her to the camp at Manzanar. The name is Mr. and Mrs. Chester Klingstore. The Japanese husband of the mother was evacuated to Tulare. His first name is not given and she does not ask for his release and states that he has hardly ever lived at home but has lived where he is working. This last information was given as indicating that the daughter was brought up wholly under white guidance. I pass that on to you as another mixed marriage case.

B: What does she ask for?

T: The daughter and her husband at Manzanar. This Mr. and Mrs. Chester Klingstore.

B: Yes, they want to be taken out of Manzanar.

T: They have no interest in the father. He apparently has not been living at home.

B: All right, I'll take action on it.

T: All right.

B: O. K., fine. Now, you said you had something.

T: No, do you?

B: Yes, I do, can you stand by a minute? Hello, Ralph, do you think you could get ahold of anyone at the State Department?

T: I've tried for the last hour and haven't been able to reach anybody.

B: Or the Spanish Consulate?

T: What's the matter now?

B: Well, it is a little complicated. The situation on a Jap. No. 367 on the list, whose name is Yoshitaka Shinowara, on the list, this man is age 41, he landed in San Francisco in October of 1937. He was born in Sendai, Japan. He was the manager of the Sumitomo Bank in Sacramento. He has a wife and three children in Tokio. He claims that he is eligible for repatriation. Now, No. 367 on the list is shown not as Yoshitaka but as Yoshio. The last name is shown not as Shinowara, but as Shinohara, substituting an h for a w,

shown as a business man in Gloucester, New Jersey. Now, we have been unable to locate anybody corresponding to 367, except Yoshitaka Shinowara, we can't find Yoshio Shinohara. He must be, I don't know --

T: He must be in New Jersey.

B: Maybe Yoshio Shinohara is in New Jersey, but we think maybe he is the same person as Yoshitaka Shinowara and he says he thinks he is too.

T: Well, I think he is crazy.

B: I'm getting kind of slant eyed myself here.

T: I don't believe I can raise anybody and settle the question in time for you to get him on the way. If he is supposed to go and the wrong man is picked up, he'll have to wait until the next boat.

B: Well, we think maybe that is too bad.

T: Why?

B: Because he is already to go.

T: He is?

B: Yes.

T: Well, maybe I can raise somebody then, I'll try. Everybody is at home. I don't think I'll get anyone at the office. They'll be reluctant to make a guess at anything. How much more time have you got before you load him on the train.

B: We have to load him on the train. He is in Sacramento. We have another nine hours. We got another eight hours. We got another seven hours.

T: Seven hours?

B: Yes, the train goes right through Sacramento. It leaves Oakland at 9:30.

T: I'll try, Karl.

B: We have seven hours. I don't know that it is worth it, but that's it. He is listed alone with a wife and three children in Tokio. No, he is listed alone.

T: He is alone. All right. I'll check and find out.

B: All right, Ralph.

T: Now, Karl, on the construction for your camps, Mr. McCloy talked with Gen. DeWitt after he talked with you.

B: He told me.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9

June 8, 1942

Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am attaching a brief statement about the limited experience we have had thus far in permitting the private employment of persons evacuated from the Pacific Coast military zone.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director

Enclosure



Private Employment of Evacuees from the Pacific Coast
Military Zone in Seasonal Agricultural Work

This is a summary of the brief experience of the War Relocation Authority with the private employment of persons evacuated from the Pacific Coast military zone. It covers the background of the problem, the present policies of the Army and the WRA, and the two agreements which have been reached to date for sugar beet work in eastern Oregon and in Idaho. (An additional agreement is now being developed in Montana.)

Voluntary Evacuation

After the announcement of the evacuation program by General DeWitt, Commanding General, Western Defense Command, (March 2, 1942) Japanese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry were allowed and encouraged by the Army and other Federal agencies to leave the military zone voluntarily and to relocate elsewhere. Some 8,000 persons attempted to do this. The voluntary evacuees encountered bitter opposition throughout the States east of the Coast, partly because of the misunderstanding of the military necessity for the evacuation, the nature of the evacuees, resentment at their acquiring property, and of the plans and policies of the Federal Government with regard to this problem. On March 29, General DeWitt discontinued voluntary evacuation.

During this same period, however, there also developed a considerable interest in the possibility of employing evacuees in seasonal agriculture work in the western States.

Salt Lake Conference

The question of private agricultural employment was one of the principal subjects discussed at the conference held by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the War Relocation Authority with State officials in Salt Lake City on April 7. To this meeting had been invited the following officials from the States of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, and Montana; the Governor or his representative, the Attorney General or his representative, the State Extension Director, the Chairman of the State Agricultural War Board, and the State Director of the Farm Security Administration. In addition, representatives of farm organizations, sugar beet growers, and others attended. The meeting was an executive session not open to the press.

Persons speaking for agricultural interests, particularly the sugar beet growers, expressed fears of a labor shortage and wished to be able to employ evacuees for seasonal and other work. The Army expressed a willingness to permit the voluntary recruitment of evacuees from assembly centers for private employment in agriculture — even though this would tend to disrupt the orderly prosecution of the evacuation program — provided that State and local authorities would guarantee the safety of evacuees and of communities and the maintenance of law and order. The sentiment of the Governors and their representatives was that these conditions could not be met — they wanted the Army to supply troops to guard evacuees working in agriculture or the

Federal Government to provide funds to pay State guards for this purpose.

WRA and Army Agreement on Private Employment Conditions

Shortly after the Salt Lake City meeting, sentiment among State officials began to grow more favorable to the employment of evacuees on the terms which had been specified by the military authority. In response to this renewed interest the Army and War Relocation Authority established a set of conditions and a procedure for the voluntary recruitment of evacuees from assembly centers for seasonal employment. The WRA agreed to investigate, with the help of other Federal agencies, each proposal and advise the Army on it, and to follow through to see that the prescribed conditions were met. The final decision to permit recruitment was to remain with the Army, however, so long as the evacuees remained in assembly centers. After the transfer of evacuees to relocation centers, the WRA was to assume complete responsibility for private employment.

The conditions jointly established for the voluntary recruitment of evacuees by the U. S. Employment Service (at assembly centers) were as follows:

A. Assurance from the Governor of the State and from the principal law enforcement officials in the locality that law and order will be maintained in the event that Japanese evacuees move into a specified area. (Such assurances will be released to the newspapers by the War Relocation Authority.)

B. Assurance from the employer that transportation by bus or rail will be provided by the employer from the

assembly center tc the place of work and return, or, if the assembly center has been evacuated in the meantime, assurance that the employer will compensate the Military authority in an amount equivalent to the cost of returning the evacuees to the assembly centers. In connection with transportation it is to be understood that, in the event the return of the evacuees is deemed necessary by the Director of the War Relocation Authority at any time, the employer will provide for such return as agreed to in this paragraph.

C. Assurance by the employer that not less than the wages prevailing in the locality will be paid the evacuees, and that any legal minimum wage requirement will be observed. The employer will agree that, in the event the family of the evacuee should be moved from an assembly to a relocation center during the period of private employment, a portion of the evacuee's wages as determined by the War Relocation Authority to be necessary for the support of the family will be paid to the Authority by the employer. The employer will also agree that at each pay period a record of the wages paid to each evacuee is to be submitted to the War Relocation Authority.

D. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to housing and sanitary facilities for the evacuees without cost to them.

E. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as tc cooking facilities for the evacuees, or assurance that board will be furnished by the employer at cost.

F. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to medical attention for the evacuees or assurance that medical attention is readily available to them at rates commensurate with wages.

G. Assurance by the United States Employment Service, or assurance received by the Employment Service from responsible public officials, that the provisions made by the employer for housing, sanitary conditions, and medical service, are satisfactory.

H. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that labor in the locality will not be displaced by the

evacuees, that a genuine labor shortage exists in the locality, and that the wages offered by the employer are not less than prevailing wages in the locality and not less than the minimum wages required by law.

I. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that it will make a weekly telegraphic report to the War Relocation Authority on general conditions in the area of employment.

The Oregon Agreement

On May 5 the first private employment agreement based on these conditions was signed by Governor Sprague of Oregon, the District Attorney, Sheriff and Judge of Malheur County, and the Amalgamated Sugar Company. Four hundred workers were requested for sugar beet thinning, to be followed by work in other crops in the same area. Recruitment was started by the U. S. Employment Service in the Portland, Oregon assembly center under authority of a restrictive order issued by General DeWitt on May 20 permitting 400 persons to leave for private employment in Malheur County, and only in Malheur County.

Recruitment in the Portland assembly center started off fairly well but when transportation arrived for the first group of recruits only 14 would board the train. The others who had signed up appeared to fear for their safety if they left the assembly centers without military protection. Recruitment was next begun in the Puyallup, Washington, assembly center and was progressing favorably until local newspapers carried a story that the Governor of a nearby State had violently opposed the entrance of any evacuees into that State. Thereupon, further

recruitment became impossible. Subsequently, the Governor just referred to wired the Director of the WRA giving assurances that evacuees who came to work in his State would be fully protected and be well provided for. WRA made this statement public.

The Situation on June 1

The situation on June 1 can be summed up as follows: 74 evacuees were working in Malheur County, Oregon. An equal number, including whole families, had signed up for the same locality. A total of five assembly centers had been opened to recruitment. The Chief of the WRA Employment Division had personally inspected the housing and working conditions of evacuees in Malheur County and found them satisfactory. The WRA planned to have members of its own staff present when recruitment started in other centers to help reassure the evacuees. A second agreement had been signed, with Idaho, and negotiations on an agreement with Montana were under way. The total number of evacuees requested for sugar beet employment in these three States was 3,000.

Present Prospects

If evacuees are assured as to their safety and the Oregon and Idaho agreements work out well, it is possible that private agricultural employment will assume sizeable proportions this season. Practically all of the first group of fifteen evacuee workers in Malheur County wrote back to the Portland assembly center expressing satisfaction with their working conditions. The evacuees are eager to resume employment. Only a few have opportunities for work in the assembly centers. There

is also a real financial inducement for outside work -- the few who can be employed in the assembly centers will receive only $8, $12, or $16 per month in addition to subsistence. The determining factor, however, will continue to be whether the evacuees feel that they will be safe in going out into private employment. Intemperate statements by officials in the States east of the Coast might again destroy overnight the confidence of the evacuees which is now being built up.

#

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4849

June 18, 1942

JUN 1 10 51 AM '42

RECEIVED

The President
The White House


GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
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Dear Mr. President:

In view of my immediate transfer from the directorship of the War Relocation Authority to the Office of War Information, I am submitting a brief report on the work of the Authority from the time of its establishment on March 18, 1942 to the present.

Number of Evacuees Affected -- To date, about 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry have been affected by the military orders of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. Of this number, approximately 81,000 are now in temporary assembly centers, roughly 20,000 are in war-duration relocation centers, an additional 15,000 have been "frozen" in Military Area No. Two of eastern California, and from 5,000 to 8,000 voluntary evacuees from the West Coast are still living rather precariously in the inter-mountain States, principally in Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.

Voluntary Evacuation -- For nearly four weeks following Lt. Gen. DeWitt's initial proclamation of the West Coast as a military area on March 2, the Army and other Federal agencies encouraged people of Japanese ancestry to move out of the prohibited zone on their own initiative. At that time mere removal of the Japanese from the potential area of combat appeared to be the principal problem. During the ensuing weeks, however, as some 8,000 Japanese filtered into the inter-mountain States, it quickly became apparent that voluntary evacuation was not a feasible solution. Public opinion in the inter-mountain States, as reflected in press comments and in statements made by governors, attorneys-general, and other public officials, was bitterly antagonistic to the influx of Japanese from coastal areas. Demands arose that the Federal Government take all people of Japanese descent into custody, surround them with troops,



prevent them from buying land, and return them to their former homes at the close of the war. Violence was threatened. Japanese were arrested. Mass meetings that warned of trouble were held.

This was the situation which the War Relocation Authority faced at the outset. Before the agency was even a week old, it was abundantly clear both to the Army and the Authority that voluntary evacuation would have to be discontinued. Consequently, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command issued an order "freezing" all Japanese in Military Area Number One as of March 29. This action paved the way for a planned and orderly program of relocation under Federal supervision.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service

Selection of Sites — The first step in the relocation program has been to find suitable areas where the evacuees might live and work in reasonable comfort for the duration of the war. Of necessity, the standards for site selection have been somewhat exacting. To be suitable, an area must be located at a safe distance from military establishments. It must have adequate power, transportation, and water supply facilities. In order to insure economy in the use of funds and in the assignment of military guards, it must provide a resource base capable of supporting at least 5,000 people. In the arid and semi-arid West, areas meeting all these requirements have been extremely difficult to find. As of June 15, nearly 75 potential sites had been examined. Eleven had been approved in California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas. These would acommodate 130,000 evacuees — 120,000 from the Coast and 10,000 from Hawaii. On the 15th, however, one excellent project area was disapproved so now a substitute location must be found.

Wage Policies — From the very start of the relocation program, public opinion has strongly influenced all considerations of a wage scale for the evacuees. Following a premature announcement in the press that evacuees would receive WPA wage rates for their work in assembly centers, the public reaction was immediate and unmistakable. It was clear that no wages for evacuees in excess of those paid the American soldier would be tolerated even though the costs of subsistence for each evacuee and his dependents might be deducted from the wages paid. In the light of this feeling, the War Relocation Authority has abandoned the idea of straight wages in favor of a plan under which

evacuees who enlist in the War Relocation Work Corps will be permitted to share in the profits of their own agricultural, industrial, and public works enterprises. During the development period on relocation projects, before any profits are realized, members of the Work Corps will receive cash advances of $12, $16, or $19 a month depending on their skills. In addition, shelter, food, medical care, and education will be provided for all evacuees and their families.

The chief disadvantage of this low scale of cash income is that it rather severely limits many of the evacuees in planning for their reassimilation in American life after the close of the war. If public opinion had permitted, it might have been preferable in many ways to pay WPA wages to members of the Work Corps and to provide their families with subsistence in addition. This would have been more in keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Convention.

I sincerely hope that changing public attitudes will later on permit a change in this severe wage policy.


Types of Work — Fullest possible employment of the evacuees has been a cardinal principle of the relocation program. In relocation centers members of the War Relocation Work Corps will be assigned mainly to public works, agricultural production, or manufacturing. Public works will include irrigation, drainage, land clearing or levelling, and similar projects designed to develop natural resources. Agricultural production will be aimed primarily toward meeting the needs of the evacuee population and secondarily toward producing a surplus for use in the Food-for-Freedom program. Manufacturing projects will be planned so as to produce a variety of useful articles needed for the war effort and by the Nation as a whole.

In keeping with the provisions of the Geneva Convetion of 1929 (which of course is not legally applicable) the Authority has decided not to permit alien evacuees to take part in the manufacture of goods for the armed forces. With that one exception, however, I strongly believe that the evacuees, and particularly the American citizens among them, should have an opportunity to produce any manufactured goods that are needed without restriction. To limit all evacuees, as some officials of the War Production Board have suggested, to manufacturing work which is wholly non-competitive with American industry would be, it seems to me, a serious mistake. In a period of all-out production I cannot believe that any American citizen, regardless

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

of race or color, should be denied the opportunity to participate as fully as his skills and energies will permit.

Private Employment — Because of the bitterness of anti-Japanese feeling particularly in the inter-mountain States, it seemed unwise in the early days of the relocation program to contemplate any employment of evacuees outside the boundaries of Federally-supervised relocation areas. More recently, however, the growing need for labor, especially in the sugar beet areas of the West has led to the adoption of a policy permitting private employment under specified conditions. The War Department and the War Relocation Authority have agreed to grant furloughs to evacuees in assembly centers or relocation centers for private employment in agriculture or industry wherever State authorities can provide the following assurances: (1) that the safety of the evacuees will be guaranteed by State and local law-enforcement officials, (2) that working, living, and sanitary conditions will be adequate, (3) that prevailing wages will be paid, (4) that local labor will not be displaced, and (5) that transportation costs will be paid by employers. Three States -- Oregon, Idaho, and Montana — have now given these assurances, and about 1,000 evacuees have already left assembly centers for the beet fields.



Community Living -- One of the fundamental objectives of the War Relocation Authority has been to make life in the relocation center just as close to normal as wartime conditions will permit. Schools are being planned for all relocation areas so that evacuee children will be able to continue their education through the high-school level. Efforts are being made to arrange for the transfer of college students to midwestern universities. Hospitals will be established at relocation centers and staffed with qualified doctors and nurses (recruited as far as possible from the evacuee population) in order to keep the evacuees in good health. As soon as each relocation center is fully populated, the evacuees will be given an opportunity to establish their own community government and elect their own officials.

Recommendation — These are some of the highlights of the relocation program during its first several weeks. The future of the program will doubtless be governed largely by the temper of American public opinion. Already public attitudes have exerted a strong influence in shaping the program

and charting its direction. In a democracy this is unquestionably sound and proper. Yet in leaving the War Relocation Authority after a few extremely crowded weeks, I cannot help expressing the hope that the American people will grow toward a broader appreciation of the essential Americanism of a great majority of the evacuees and of the difficult sacrifice they are making. Only when the prevailing attitudes of unreasoning bitterness have been replaced by tolerance and understanding will it be possible to carry forward a genuinely satisfactory relocation program and to plan intelligently for the reassimilation of the evacuees into American life when the war is over.

I wish to give you my considered judgment that fully 80 to 85 percent of the Nisei are loyal to the United States; perhaps 50 percent of the Issei are passively loyal; but a large portion of the Kibei (American citizens educated in Japan) feel a strong cultural attachment to Japan. At the appropriate time, therefore, I hope you will find it possible to:


1) Recommend to Congress a program of repatriation for those who prefer the Japanese way of life; ×197-A

2) Issue a strong public statement in behalf of the loyal American citizens who are now bewildered and wonder what is in store for them;

3) Call for a more liberal wage policy for evacuees, and ×98

4) When the war is over, recommend to Congress a special program of rehabilitation designed to help this displaced population find its place once again in our economic and social life.

Respectfully yours,


GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
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M. S. Eisenhower

×50N-

June 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MEYER:

In my memorandum to Mr. Eisenhower of June 10th, I informed him that our best estimate of the number of Japanese evacuees you might have to relocate would total 138, 870. Since my figures were not broken down into the immediate needs and possibilities for the future, I feel it is desirable to give them to you.

Our best estimates at this time are as follows:

Area	Immediate Requirements	Estimated for the future
West Coast, Military Area No. 1	100,370	
West Coast, Military Area No. 2	15,000	
Alaska		500
Hawaii		15,000
Elsewhere (volunteer evacuees moved from West Coast)		8,000
Total	115,370	23,500
Grand total	138,870	

If it is desired to relocate Japanese from Alaska, Hawaii and elsewhere, the War Department will attempt to anticipate its needs at least three to four months in advance in order to allow sufficient time for completion of any construction which may be necessary.

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

Mr. Dillon Meyers
Rm. 812 Barr Building

OASW:RHT:MAM

June 27, 1942

Dear Mrs. Kinney:

I have your letter of June 24th. The War Department does not contemplate any mass evacuation of aliens in the East. You could do a great service if you would make this fact known to those who are spreading the rumor that such an evacuation is planned.

The suggestion that hearing boards be set up has been sent to the War Department by many people interested in the alien problem and this suggestion will be given full consideration in the event that it ever becomes necessary to resort to mass evacuations.

In regard to the evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast you undoubtedly realize that a very difficult situation confronted us on the West Coast on the sudden outbreak of the war with Japan, but I very much doubt if even you could have appreciated the extreme seriousness and difficulty of the situation. Not only did great cities exist along the sea coast with large populations subject to possible attack, but some of our most important manufacturing establishments from which the Army and Navy obtains vital munitions were in the same locality. A successful attack might well have had a disastrous effect upon the war. As a consequence, the entire American populations of the West Coast States were left in a condition of great excitement and apprehension, and the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor tended greatly to inflame our people against all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizens or not, and irrespective of their good or evil records as citizens.

Thus, the evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent from the immediate neighborhood of these sensitive key points of our vital defense became at once imperative, not only for the safety of our country but for their own protection. The number of these persons was so large, amounting to over 115,000, that individual action which would afford adequate protection either to them or to us, was impossible in the emergency.

At the outset, an opportunity was given to all who were willing to move voluntarily, to go wherever they wished, provided only that they left the neighborhood of the dangerous spots. This policy had to be abandoned, however, because of the opposition of

ASW 014.311 W.D.C.
Classif. No. ASW 014.311 E.D.C.

the authorities and citizens of the interior states into which these people desired to move, and we had to supersede it by subsequent action in which the protection of the Army itself could be thrown around the persons who were moving.

We have made every effort to handle this thorny problem with the utmost care and humanity, and as a matter of fact, it has been very ably so handled by General DeWitt, the Commander of our forces on the West Coast. The conduct of General DeWitt and of the officers working under him has won the approval of all good American citizens in that neighborhood, and the evacuees themselves have expressed their appreciation of the consideration and care which has been shown them. Every reasonable effort has been made to protect them and their property and to provide for them an opportunity for useful employment as well as suitable recreation. I can assure you that we are alert to protect these people from exploitation of any kind.

Whether it will be possible later to deal with the evacuees on an individual basis, as suggested in your letter, is open to great doubt. The evacuation once accomplished is not easily undone. It is, however, the desire of all of us to hold down to an absolute minimum any interference with the liberties of individuals. We are not unmindful of the fact that the majority of those evacuated are American citizens.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

John J. McCloy

Mrs. Edwin H. Kinney
2989 Vernon Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

THE ASST. SEC'Y'S OFFICE
JUN 30 1942
WAR DEPT.

SIGNAL CORPS
UNITED STATES ARMY
War Department Message Center
Room 3441, Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

CD84 25 DL 4 EXTRA

MS NEWYORK NY 29 109P

HON JOHN J MCCLOY

ASSISTANT SECY OF WAR WASHDC

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING US WHETHER YOUR INQUIRIES SHOW ANY OF THE DEPORTEES FROM HAWAII STILL REMAINING AT CAMP MCCOY WISCONSIN

ROGER N BALDWIN 170 FIFTH AVE NYCITY.

306P.

Copy to Col. Bryan —

Assistant Secretary of War

June 30, 1942

Roger N. Baldwin
170 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

THERE ARE SOME JAP DEPORTEES FROM HAWAII STILL IN THIS COUNTRY

BUT THEY ARE BEING MOVED FROM CAMP McCOY

McCLOY

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Executive Officer

OASW
RHT:mw

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GRamercy 7-4330

THE ASST. SEC'Y'S OFFICE
JUL 4 1942
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July 2, 1942

Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

We are appreciative of your telegram stating that "there are some Jap deportees from Hawaii still in this country but they are being moved from Camp McCoy".

We do not understand your reference to Jap deportees. We did not know of Japanese-Americans so held. Our communications have been with naturalized Americans of Italian and German extraction.

If there are American citizens from Hawaii of whatever ancestry held by the military authorities in this country, obviously they should be either released or returned to Hawaii. Will you be good enough to let us know whether the men to whom you refer are American citizens, and whether they are being returned to Hawaii or sent elsewhere in this country?

As you know, we are exceedingly reluctant to resort to the courts to correct any irregularity which we feel the War Department itself should handle without intervention by private citizens. But you will understand our obligations are such that we must act through the courts if any American citizens continue to be improperly held. We would appreciate your further information.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur Garfield Hays
General Counsel

Director

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1942

THE ASST. SEC'Y'S OFFICE
JUL 11 1942
WAR DEPT.

SPMGA(26) 014.33

MEMORANDUM for Colonel Ralph H. Tate, Executive Officer, General Staff.

Subject: American Civil Liberty Union Letter of July 2, 1942.

1. It is suggested that in replying to the above subject letter, a statement be made that an investigation is presently being undertaken to determine whether any of the internees from territories or possessions of the United States at Camp McCoy are American citizens of Japanese ancestry; and if it should develop that any of these internees are American citizens, that appropriate action will be taken in their behalf.

2. A reply of this nature should afford time for the return of internees to Hawaii who are citizens of the United States.

For The Provost Marshal General:

B. M. Bryan,
Colonel, F. A.,
Chief, Aliens Division.

1 Incl. -
American Civil Liberty Union
ltr. - 7-2-42.

July 13, 1942

Dear Mr. Baldwin:

I have delayed replying to your letter of July 2 until I could get some word from our people about the citizenship status of the Japanese-Americans referred to in my recent telegram.

I am told that an investigation is presently under way to determine whether any of the internees from Territories or Possessions of the United States at Camp McCoy are American citizens of Japanese ancestry. If it develops that any of them are American citizens, I shall let you know.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

Mr. Roger N. Baldwin, Director
American Civil Liberties Union
170 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

RHT:JJMcC:JHS

Cy. to PMG

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

SPMGA (12) 014.33

July [illegible] 1942

THE ASST. SEC'Y'S OFFICE
JUL 25 1942
WAR DEPT.

COPY

SECRET

MEMORANDUM for the Chief, Operations Division, General Staff.
(through the Chief of Administrative Services)

Subject: Return of American Citizen Internees to Hawaii.

1. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, has directed The Provost Marshal General to return to Hawaii all American citizens of Japanese lineage who are now interned in Continental United States. The records of this office reveal that there are now nineteen persons in this category.

2. It is requested that this transfer of internees be given highest priority in ship movements in order that the internees may be returned to Hawaii at the earliest practicable moment. It further is requested that this office be notified when shipping facilities are made available in order that necessary transfers of these internees to the port of embarkation may be arranged.

For The Provost Marshal General:

B. M. Bryan,
Colonel, F. A.,
Chief, Aliens Division.

B. M. Bryan

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BY DEPT. OF THE ARMY BY TAG PER OWI 44

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Receipt in
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COPY FOR COLONEL TATE, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

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Counsel

SEP 5 1942
ASST

September 4, 1942

Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Since we were unable to get further information from the War Department as to what had happened to the naturalized Americans in Hawaii held without charges or hearings at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, we went into the Federal District Court at Madison for writs of habeas corpus.

The returns on the writs showed that all the men on whose behalf we sued had been removed from Camp McCoy. The notation was given us that the following persons had been sent to San Francisco to the Western Military Command:

Hans Zimmerman	April 19, 1942
Alfred B.M.Smith	April 19, 1942
Helmut Emig	June 6, 1942
Fred Berg	April 19, 1942
G.Herbert Walther	April 19, 1942
Tony Marta	June 6, 1942

We have endeavored to find out from headquarters at San Francisco whether these men are in its jurisdiction or have been returned to Hawaii. The officers of the Command referred the inquiry to Washington.

We do not want to go to the trouble and expense of suing out writs in the San Francisco district on a matter on which it is very simple for the War Department to give us the information without court proceedings. Will you be good enough to advise us as to these men?

Sincerely yours,

Roger N. Baldwin

RNB/sa

September 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

I talked with Colonel Bryan about this letter this afternoon. He informs me that a letter dated August 24, 1942 concerning the same 6 men was addressed by the California Branch of Civil Liberties to the Western Defense Command asking whether these 6 men were in the custody of the Army.

The Western Defense Command forwarded the letter for answer to the Office of the Provost Marshal General and General Gullion directed that a reply be made to the effect that these 6 persons were in the custody of the Army. General Gullion did not wish to disclose where these 6 persons were.

They were at that time, and are now, in Hawaii.

JMH

September 5, 1942

Dear Mr. Baldwin:

I have your letter of September 4 requesting information concerning the whereabouts of six individuals. I am informed that they are now in Hawaii.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

Mr. Roger N. Baldwin
170 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

MAM:MAM:WSVO

CSE 014
311 Hawaii
a
254 Relocation
383.7 Gen.
013.1 Evacuation Hawaiian Canyon
9-5-42

Congressional Record
June 22, 1942
selected pages

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2293) to provide for taking into custody certain persons who are citizens or subjects of, or owe allegiance to, any nation or country with which the United States is at war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Tennessee for the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. McNARY. Mr. President, I do not desire to object. The able Senator from Tennessee very courteously spoke to me about the bill earlier today. As I understand, he is asking unanimous consent for the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the request of the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. McNARY. I assume that the bill is intended to strengthen the Executive order heretofore issued by the President with regard to Japanese in this country?

Mr. STEWART. The Executive order of the President, I will say to the Senator from Oregon, provides, as I understand, that all persons living in certain strategic areas may be removed from such areas. The Executive order would reach the same objective this bill reaches, but this bill goes beyond the order. The bill directs and authorizes the Secretary of War, during the war period, while the United States is at war with Japan, to take into custody and detain all Japanese in America and in the island possessions of America, regardless of whether or not they were American born, to retain them in custody for such period of time as the Secretary of War believes they should be retained, and to release them when he believes that their release will not be inimical to the interest of the national defense of the United States.

Mr. McNARY. Is this proposed legislation broader than the Executive order?

Mr. STEWART. I think it is somewhat broader; I think it goes further; it is not confined simply to the strategic areas, but, under this bill, Japanese might be detained at any point in the United States or in the island possessions of the United States, if, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, it was to the interest of the national defense to do so.

Mr. McNARY. Has this bill been given consideration by the Attorney General?

Mr. STEWART. Yes, sir; the Attorney General, in a letter which was addressed, as I recall, to the chairman of the Committee on Immigration but which was turned over to the subcommittee and placed in the hearings, stated that he thought the objectives of the bill were practically all reached by the Executive order of the President. I say I do not think so; I do not think the Executive order reaches quite so far as the bill does. Nevertheless, it was the opinion of the Attorney General that the bill perhaps presented some constitutional questions and, at the same time, that the objectives of the bill were practically reached by the Executive order of the President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. BALL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, in reading the report of the committee I derive the impression that the author of the bill was seeking to raise——

Mr. STEWART. A constitutional question.

Mr. BALL. Yes, a constitutional question, and the reversal of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which held that Japanese born in the United States are citizens.

Mr. STEWART. It is stated in the report, and was stated by the author of the bill, that it was hoped that such an objective would be attained. I do not know that it will be. I think the bill, as a war measure, is strictly constitutional, and that, as a war measure alone, that question would not be raised, unless some Japanese who was detained by the Secretary of War might raise the question, perhaps, in the courts by a writ of habeas corpus. That was stated to be primarily the hope or one of the hopes of the authors of the bill. It is true it may be a little too ambitious a hope, and I do not know whether we can attain it.

Mr. BALL. Did the Secretary of War express any opinion on the bill, as to whether it is necessary?

Mr. STEWART. No, sir; I did not have any opinion from the Secretary of War. We had a letter from the Attorney General expressing the opinion I have just stated. Then, there was a witness from the State Department, Mr. Flournoy, who testified that, in his opinion, as a war measure, the bill was constitutional. Then, we have the opinion of a number of other men of some prominence, the attorneys general of three or four Western States, the Governors of several Western States, the legal departments of the State governments of three Western States, I believe, on the question of constitutionality, as well as the opinion of the attorney from the State Department that as a war measure the bill is constitutional.

Mr. BALL. It actually goes to a fundamental question in our immigration laws, does it not?

Mr. STEWART. If it is confined to a war measure it probably does not, because, as the Senator of course knows, in wartimes even the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended under certain circumstances.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Mr. STEWART. As a war measure, this provision would not permit the raising of that question. I have said I hoped it would not be raised, because the decision of which we are speaking is one which was rendered 50 years ago in what is known as the Wong Kim Ark case, and I think the decision is based upon principles not fundamental. Nevertheless, that is only my personal view.

Mr. BALL. I think I must object to the unanimous-consent request, because it seems to me the bill goes to a question which is quite fundamental in our whole immigration policy.

Mr. HILL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEWART. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Is it not true that under the Japanese law a Japanese may have a dual state, to wit, even though he is a citizen of the United States, he may

CUSTODY OF JAPANESE RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration and passage of Senate bill 2293, Calendar No. 1541. The bill was reported last week by me from the Committee on Immigration, and has been on the calendar, I think, since last Thursday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

also be a citizen of Japan? Is not that true?

Mr. STEWART. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. HILL. The fact that a Japanese calls himself a citizen of the United States does not at all mean that his first allegiance, or his first loyalty, is to the United States, and the Secretary should be enabled to deal with the Japanese, whatever they may say their status is. Is that not true?

Mr. STEWART. We had at the hearings a copy of the Japanese law on that subject. The Japanese law, in effect, says that the son of every Japanese father is a Japanese, and apparently that is presumed to be interminable. It does not make any difference how many generations of them might be born in the United States or in the possessions belonging to the United States.

Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEWART. I wish to make an additional statement, and then I shall yield. The Japanese law also provides that every male citizen, regardless of where born or when he departed from Japan, is a Japanese citizen, and is subject to the Emperor of Japan until he has served his time in the Japanese Army or Navy. I now yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. The principle which the Senator has laid down is undoubtedly the position taken by the Japanese; it is also the position taken by the Germans, and it is also the position which was taken by the English in the War of 1812.

Mr. STEWART. The Senator means with respect to dual citizenship.

Mr. TAFT. Yes. It is a principle which the United States never recognized. We absolutely deny that the Japanese have any right to say that a man who is a citizen of the United States is a citizen of their country. However, it seems to me that in the preamble to the bill we are, in effect, recognizing for the first time that such a rule could be laid down which would in any way be binding upon their nationals.

So far as the object of the proposed legislation is concerned, I realize the necessity for such a law, and I am in sympathy with it, but I do not like to see embodied in legislation anything that even looks like an admission that Japan has any right to say that a Japanese born in the United States, a citizen of the United States by our law, owes any loyalty to Japan. I think it would be rather unfortunate should we enact legislation indicating acquiescence in that contention.

Mr. McKELLAR. Under those circumstances, should not the statement be stricken out of the preamble?

Mr. TAFT. Yes. My objection is only to the preamble.

Mr. McKELLAR. A preamble is not, strictly speaking, a part of a law anyway. Could not the preamble be stricken out?

Mr. STEWART. It could be very easily stricken out without affecting the bill at all.

Mr. McKELLAR. I think it should be stricken out. In my opinion the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] is correct about that, and we should not give assent to any such principle. I think the Senator from Minnesota should withdraw his objection and let the bill pass, because it is a question which should be determined, and this is the best place in the world to determine it.

Mr. BALL. Will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. STEWART. I yield.

Mr. BALL. As the Senator states in the report, and as he stated on the floor, the Attorney General does not believe the bill to be necessary, but thinks we are accomplishing the same objective without it. My reason for objecting is that just the other evening, during a discussion of the whole far eastern picture with a man who has been in the Far East for 8 years, and is a student of conditions there, it was stated by him that when the United States adopted the exclusion policy against orientals, particularly the Japanese, it laid the foundation for the attack on Pearl Harbor. This bill is obviously aimed at strengthening that exclusion policy, and I do not believe we want to do that without more consideration being given to the subject than we shall be able to give it today.

Mr. STEWART. I think, as a matter of fact, that this is a subject which has been discussed and given serious consideration for 25 years. A commission was appointed during the term of President Harding, which was sent to the Hawaiian Islands to study certain labor questions. The Senator knows about that; it was aired in the hearings. That commission brought back a report which was made public by the subcommittee considering the pending bill. The report of the commission stated that the question of national defense in the Hawaiian Islands overwhelmingly overshadowed everything else they saw or heard of while there, and they asked the Congress to give immediate attention to the question, stating that if the Hawaiian Islands were ever to be under American control, the Congress would have to adopt legislation of some kind or character on the subject. The report was a rather voluminous one. It went into many different angles of the situation and it is referred to in the report on the pending bill.

The substance of it was that the Japanese, being a race of people utterly unassimilable, utterly different in every respect from Americans, of different ideas of religion and government, and different in every other way, there would never be a time when the two races could get along together in any area. The report refers to the fact that the Japanese are insolent and impudent, that they spied upon housewives when they were acting as servants in the homes, and that the people in the Islands had no peace of mind, and were constantly in fear.

Mr. TOBEY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEWART. I yield.

Mr. TOBEY. Are not the Senator's remarks motivated by these lines from Kipling:

Oh, east is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet,
Till earth and sky stand presently at God's great judgment seat.

Mr. STEWART. I think the Senator's observation is quite appropriate, and his reference to those immortal lines of Kipling is an excellent contribution. One of the races is East and one is West, and certainly they cannot meet. There is not any possible ground upon which to meet.

However, we are wasting time in debating the question. As I understand, the Senator from Minnesota is objecting to the consideration of the bill.

Mr. BALL. That is correct.

Mr. STEWART. Then I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 2293.

Mr. BALL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gerry	O'Mahoney
Andrews	Glass	Pepper
Bailey	Green	Radcliffe
Ball	Guffey	Reed
Bankhead	Gurney	Rosier
Bilbo	Hayden	Russell
Bone	Hill	Schwartz
Brewster	Hughes	Shipstead
Bridges	Johnson, Calif.	Smathers
Brown	Johnson, Colo.	Smith
Bulow	Kilgore	Stewart
Burton	Langer	Taft
Butler	Lee	Thomas, Idaho
Byrd	Lucas	Thomas, Okla.
Capper	McCarran	Thomas, Utah
Caraway	McFarland	Tobey
Chavez	McKellar	Truman
Clark, Idaho	McNary	Tunnell
Clark, Mo.	Maloney	Tydings
Connally	Maybank	Van Nuys
Davis	Mead	Walsh
Downey	Millikin	Wheeler
Doxey	Murdock	White
Ellender	Norris	Willis
George	Nye	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventy-four Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

The question is on the motion of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] that the Senate proceed to consider Senate bill 2293.

Mr. BALL. Mr. President, I wish to take only a moment to discuss the matter. I oppose the consideration at this time of Senate bill 2293, which authorizes and directs the Secretary of War to take into custody, as he deems necessary, all persons of the Japanese race in America, whether they are citizens or not. A reading of the report on the bill makes it very apparent that its author is seeking to raise a fundamental question with respect to our whole immigration policy, and to upset, if possible, the Supreme Court decision which originally held that persons of the Japanese race born in America were American citizens, even though their parents could not become naturalized citizens.

In the first place, Mr. President, there is no showing in the committee report that any department of Government believes that this extreme legislation giving the Secretary of War authority to seize any American citizen who happens to be of the Japanese race wherever he finds him, is needed. In fact, the Attorney General said specifically to the committee that he does not believe it to be necessary. There is no testimony at all from the Secretary of War that he

believes it to be necessary. Certainly if we are going to do this to persons of the Japanese race who are American-born citizens, we should consider seriously whether we want to do the same thing to American citizens of German descent. As a matter of fact, the latter are in a position to do much greater harm to our war effort by sabotage than are American citizens of Japanese descent, because they stand out in any group of Americans by reason of their race. We know that prior to the war the Nazis were paying the expenses of anywhere from 1,000 to 1,500 citizens of German descent in my State of Minnesota, and the neighboring State of Wisconsin, to visit the homeland, where they tried to inculcate in them the Nazi doctrines.

Mr. MURDOCK. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McFARLAND in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. BALL. I yield.

Mr. MURDOCK. Does the Senator know of any request whatever coming from the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or from the Attorney General, that legislation of this type be passed by the Congress?

Mr. BALL. No, there is no such request made. The committee report on the whole shows that there is no such request and that, in fact, the Attorney General is opposed to the passage of the bill.

Mr. MURDOCK. If the Senator will yield further, I should like to observe that all the information I have been able to obtain with respect to the relocation of persons of Japanese descent is that it is proceeding very satisfactorily, and that the American citizens of Japanese descent are acquiescing in the program, and going into the camps wherever they are established, without any objection, without any protest, and without any adverse exhibition of any kind. If the program under the Executive order of the President is moving ahead satisfactorily, if by the Executive order and by the program now being followed we have solved what could have been, in my opinion, a very serious question, why should we invite trouble by the passage of a bill of this kind, when there is no request made for it by those whose responsibility it is to administer the program already started?

If we can wink at the Constitution in the case of the citizen of Japanese descent, then the next step, of course, is to move out and begin putting in concentration camps citizens of German descent, and every other citizen of foreign descent in the United States who may have come or whose parents or ancestors may have come from some nation with which we are today at war.

Mr. President, I think we are treading on very dangerous ground when we pass a bill of this kind, when, in my opinion, there is no necessity for it, and when no request has been made for it by responsible executive heads.

Mr. BALL. I thank the Senator from Utah. My information about the situation as it now stands is the same as that of the Senator from Utah. There is no request for this drastic authority.

I should like to make one additional point.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALL. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. The Senator from Minnesota says the authority proposed to be given under the bill is drastic. The Senator made the remark a few minutes ago that the same thing is being done now under the Executive order of the President.

Mr. BALL. The President has designated strategic areas from which the Secretary of War is authorized to remove any resident civilian, which is a different thing from the proposal of this bill, which would give him the authority to put into concentration camps 100,000 American citizens without giving them any trial.

The additional point which I desire to make is that it is very clear from the report that the author of the bill would like to raise a fundamental question and reverse the Supreme Court decision which holds that Japanese born in America are American citizens. It seems to me that when the war is over we shall face the problem of working out harmonious relations with the Orient. There is no question that the exclusion act has been a sore spot for many decades, and I do not believe we ought to "monkey" with it at this time, when it is not necessary to win the war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] to proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 2293.

Mr. BALL. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HILL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the folowing Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gerry	O'Mahoney
Andrews	Glass	Pepper
Bailey	Green	Radcliffe
Ball	Guffey	Reed
Bankhead	Gurney	Rosier
Bilbo	Hayden	Russell
Bone	Hill	Schwartz
Brewster	Hughes	Shipstead
Bridges	Johnson, Calif.	Smathers
Brown	Johnson, Colo.	Smith
Bulow	Kilgore	Stewart
Burton	Langer	Taft
Butler	Lee	Thomas, Idaho
Byrd	Lucas	Thomas, Okla.
Capper	McCarran	Thomas, Utah
Caraway	McFarland	Tobey
Chavez	McKellar	Truman
Clark, Idaho	McNary	Tunnell
Clark, Mo.	Maloney	Tydings
Connally	Maybank	Van Nuys
Davis	Mead	Walsh
Downey	Millikin	Wheeler
Doxey	Murdock	White
Ellender	Norris	Willis
George	Nye	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventy-four Senators have answered to their names. A quorum is present.

Mr. MURDOCK. Mr. President, I am not at all prepared today to discuss as intelligently as I should like this important question.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I wonder if we could not appeal to the Senator from Tennessee to postpone his motion. The bill seems to me to involve very important constitutional questions. I do not think the Senator from Utah or any of us ought to be put to the task of trying to argue a constitutional question without any preparation. I wonder if the Senator from Tennessee would not be willing to postpone his motion?

Mr. MURDOCK. I do not know how strong an appeal I can make to the Senator from Tennessee, but I appeal to him at this time to withdraw his motion and give us a few days to look into the question. Then I am sure we can vote more intelligently on it. I appeal to him to let the bill go over for 2 or 3 days so that we may have an opportunity to look into the question and find out how serious it is.

Mr. CLARK of Idaho. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. CLARK of Idaho. I join with the Senator from Utah and the Senator from Ohio in their request. I have just seen the bill. In my State and, I am certain, in the State of the Senator from Utah and in most of the other Western and Mountain States, we are confronted with a very difficult situation. In the beet fields our farmers are extremely short of labor. Many of the Japanese race have come there and are helping to solve an extremely critical problem. I myself should like to get in touch with the Governor of my own State and ascertain what the conditions are and whether at this time the passage of such drastic legislation would make those Japanese so angry that they would stop work. They have been cooperating splendidly in the camps there. I should like to join the Senator from Utah and the Senator from Ohio in asking the Senator from Tennessee if he will not voluntarily give us at least a day or two in which to ascertain the implications and ramifications of the bill.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator from Utah yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. Of course, I am perfectly willing to agree that the Senator from Utah or the Senator from Idaho, or any other Senator, shall have a day or two in order to consider any matter. Even if I were to oppose such a request, they probably would be given such opportunity. Of course, I desire to have the Senator from Idaho confer with the Governor and others in his State if he so wishes. I would suggest, however, that the bill go over until Thursday and be made the unfinished business on that day. I should like to have it disposed of.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. HILL. On Thursday we shall have at least one appropriation bill to consider, and we may take up one or two other appropriation bills. I am sure the

Senator realizes that next Tuesday will be the 30th of June, and all appropriation bills must be passed by that time. If the Senate should recess today without making any disposition of the pending bill, of course, it would become the pending business when we meet on Thursday; but it might be that some appropriation bills would have to be considered.

Mr. McCARRAN. Will the Senator from Utah yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. McCARRAN. As chairman of a subcommittee, I hope to obtain the floor by next Thursday in order to ask for the consideration on that date of the Labor-Federal Security appropriation bill. That bill involves a number of items which may be the subject of considerable controversy.

Mr. HILL. I am sure that the Senator from Nevada feels that the bill should come up next Thursday.

Mr. McCARRAN. It must be taken up next Thursday, Mr. President, in order that it may be passed and a conference may be had on it before the fiscal year expires.

Mr. HILL. Is there any reason why the pending bill should not go over until Thursday?

Mr. STEWART. There is no reason except one personal to me. I have to be away, and I should like to have a vote on the bill. Of course, if other business is more important, I cannot inject my personal reason into the equation; but there are other Members of the Senate who are as much interested in the passage of the bill as I am, and I should like to have an expression from them. The senior Senator from California [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], and other Senators are on the subcommittee. We agreed to undertake to bring up the bill as soon as possible, with the hope of having it passed. It seems that several Members of the Senate wish to have more time to think about it and consider it, particularly the Senator from Utah, who desires to prepare a big speech against it.

Mr. MURDOCK. Mr. President, I have no idea of making a big speech against anything the Senator from Tennessee introduces. I am rather reluctant to oppose anything he asks for. However, the bill presents a question which in my opinion is too important to be disposed of hurriedly. If the bill goes over for a few days, and if we have further opportunity to look into it, we can dispose of it promptly. At least we shall be able to dispose of it more intelligently.

Mr. STEWART. I am quite agreeable to that, if some arrangement can be worked out, because I am sure that after further study the Members of the Senate will approve the bill.

Mr. McNARY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. McNARY. I was about to suggest that the bill might be made the subject of a special order of business for a week from today. Of course, if there were any unfinished business preceding it, consideration of the bill would have to be postponed until we disposed of the unfinished business. As a special order the bill would have its status fixed, and it would be taken up Monday, unless it were crowded out by some other business. I am merely offering a suggestion to the able Senator from Tennessee as a means of meeting the situation.

Mr. MURDOCK. Let me ask the Senator from Tennessee whether it is his intention at this time to withdraw his motion for present consideration of the bill?

Mr. STEWART. I was attempting to work out an agreement or reach an understanding relative to the matter.

Mr. MURDOCK. I shall be glad to yield in order that any solution which is fair may be worked out.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me so that I may make a suggestion?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Inasmuch as the Senator from Tennessee is anxious to leave at the earliest possible moment, I was about to suggest that we agree that some reasonable time be given the Senator from Utah to look into the bill, but that we agree, as well, to vote on the bill on a day certain. Could such an agreement be made?

Mr. MURDOCK. That would be perfectly agreeable to me.

Mr. STEWART. In view of the prospective legislative situation for Thursday, suppose I request that I be permitted to withdraw my motion. I assume I can renew it at any time.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Yes.

Mr. STEWART. I do not want to make an agreement to take up the bill on Thursday if that day will be spent in the consideration of appropriation bills, and I certainly do not want the bill to go over until next Monday if it is possible to reach consideration of it at an earlier date, because I am compelled to leave the city very soon.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Utah yield?

Mr. MURDOCK. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Would it not be agreeable to the Senator from Tennessee to obtain consent to withdraw his motion to take up the bill at this time?

Mr. STEWART. I am just about to do so.

Mr. HILL. Then when we meet on Thursday we will have to take up the appropriation bill, and it will have to be disposed of.

Mr. STEWART. Very well. If the Senator from Utah will yield to me, I make the request that I be allowed to withdraw my motion, which I shall expect to renew on Thursday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Tennessee? The Chair hears none, and the motion is withdrawn.

Reports of civilian agencies to the Wartime Civil Control Administration

June, 1942

The attached report which was asked for by the Wartime Civil Control Administration marks the end of evacuation from Military Area No. 1 into the assembly centers, which are regarded as the induction stations pending the completion of the centers set up for the War Relocation Authority. There remains the task of evacuating 15,000 of Japanese ancestry in the balance of the State of California, which is about to take place.

Aside from this, our Agency will continue to be used to participate in the handling of individual cases that present special problems, and in general consulting service in the field to both the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the War Relocation Authority.

A copy of this report is being sent you for your confidential information. It should not be given wide circulation, and particularly should not lead to any publicity of any kind.

785 Market Street
San Francisco, California

June 5, 1942

Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen
Assistant Chief
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Whitcomb Hotel
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Bendetsen:

In accordance with your request, there is attached hereto the report of the activities of the various divisions of the Federal Security Agency. If for any reason this is not in the form you desire it, please let me know in order that it may be recast.

The fiscal and statistical material is not complete, but a full exhibit will be submitted within a few days.

Sincerely yours,

Richard M. Neustadt
Regional Director
Office of Defense Health and
Welfare Services

Attachment

REPORT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

June 5, 1942

The Federal Security Agency placed its entire resources at the disposal first of the Department of Justice, and then of the Western Command, in facilitating execution of their responsibilities for control of alien enemies and final evacuation from the military zone of all those of Japanese ancestry, and have regarded it as a privilege to be of service not only to the Department of Justice and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, but to the alien enemies and the Japanese American citizens whose liberties have been restricted because of military necessity.

As of February first we commenced our active service to Mr. Tom C. Clark, Coordinator of the U.S.Department of Justice, and set up special teams in twenty-eight offices of the United States Employment Service to provide information service and public assistance to those who were required to move from the original prohibited areas. These teams were comprised of representatives of the Employment Service and representatives of the Bureau of Public Assistance, including social workers borrowed from State and County Welfare Departments, and from private social agencies, and placed on special Federal pay roll for this function in order to maintain the proper governmental responsibility for serving those whose normal living was interfered with by governmental action. Approximately 10,000 families were forced to move from their homes in the original prohibited zone. In addition, at the request of the U.S.Attorney, we took over the difficult and delicate task of granting permits for travel beyond the permitted areas, and for exemptions from the curfew. In doing this, however, we refused to accept responsibility for the conduct of those to whom the permits were issued, believing that to be the primary responsibility of the law enforcement agencies.

When the President by Executive Order 9066 gave the primary responsibility for the control over all persons in the military areas to the War Department, which in turn delegated full responsibility to the Western Command, we were happy to comply with the request of General DeWitt, and to extend the service and relationships that had been established under the prior regulations of the Department of Justice. The Regional Director participated in the early conferences and helped in the planning of the organization of the WCCA established by General DeWitt to execute the program instituted by the Civil Affairs Division acting under his order. Under the responsible leadership of Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the WCCA, this Agency has participated in the following manner:

1. Through a liaison officer assigned full-time as part of the staff of the WCCA, and through direct representation of our own supervisory staff, we have participated in the development of the over-all plans and in the establishment and execution of the policies and directives for the evacuation.

2. Through the United States Employment Service, a branch of the Social Security Board, we have provided the civilian management of all the

WCCA offices and of all the Service and Control Stations that have been set up. The WCCA offices were for the most part housed in the local offices of the Employment Service, and in all cases such stations were located, equipped and supervised by the local managers of the Employment Service. To provide proper supervision a special representative of the Service was assigned to serve full time as special liaison officer with Colonel Hass, in charge of operations, and to exercise necessary authority over the local offices in the processing of the evacuation. The regular supervisory staff or specially assigned staff of the regional and state headquarters was utilized under the general direction of the regional representative of the Employment Service.

The managers of the employment offices continue to exercise the responsibility of issuing permits for travel and exemptions from other regulations of the Department of Justice and Western Command. We believe we should be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible since it properly belongs to the law enforcement agencies.

The function of management in the WCCA offices and the Service and Control Stations gave unity to the efforts of the representatives of the Bureau of Public Assistance, Public Health Service, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration, and made possible the responsible execution of the detailed plans or changes in plans deemed essential by the Division of Operations of the WCCA.

3. Through the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board we have placed in each WCCA office and each Service and Control Station a corps of properly qualified social workers to interpret the program of evacuation in human terms, and to conserve the social interests of the individuals and of their families by advice and assistance. These workers were drawn in the main from the County Welfare Departments, supervised by representatives of the regular supervisory staffs of the State Departments of Public Welfare, acting as our agents, and in turn supervised by the regional staff of the Bureau. Relationships with these State and County Departments that had been improvised originally for the first movements under the regulations of the Department of Justice were crystallized into a formal relationship that will be of service not only in any extension of WCCA, but for other wartime services as well.

4. Through the U.S. Public Health Service, a branch of the Federal Security Agency, is maintained at all times adequate supervision over the basic health conditions of the evacuees. By establishing relationships with the State and County Health Departments, and also in some instances with private physicians secured through the official medical society, the Public Health Service provided medical inspection of all who were subject to evacuation, certified those who were physically unable to be moved, and arranged for their care and rehabilitation. In addition, the Service selected and organized the medical service inside the assembly centers, composed of the Japanese physicians and nurses, and set up for them the requisite supplies for hospitals and clinics and the requisite standards and sanitary conditions. Full consultative service has been arranged for with both the WCCA and the War Relocation Authority for continuous supervision over the health conditions among the evacuees.

5. Through the Division of Recreation of the Federal Security Agency, plans were prepared and submitted to the WCCA and also to the WRA for the establishment of an elementary program of recreation in the assembly centers, and arrangements were made for continuing consultative service looking toward its improvement.

6. Through the Office of Education of the Federal Security Agency plans were submitted to the WCCA and also to the WRA for the initiation of basic programs of informal education in the assembly centers during the summer, and establishment of regular schooling in the relocation centers starting this fall. Arrangements were also made for the continuance of the consulting service, and full use of the Office of Education as the normal channel for the establishment of relations between these emergency Federal agencies and the regularly constituted State and local Departments of Education.

7. Through the Division of Nutrition of the Federal Security Agency consultative service has been offered for assistance in the establishment of proper diets for the evacuees as a whole, and in conjunction with the Public Health Service and the Children's Bureau, of special diets for pregnant mothers, infants, and those who are sick and convalescent. This has not been taken full advantage of as yet.

In the course of this work the Agency has been privileged to enlist the cooperative services for itself and also for the benefit of the WCCA and WRA of such public agencies as the Children's Bureau, WPA, Office of Civilian Defense, etc., and of such private organizations as the Councils of Social Agencies, Friends Service Committee, YMCA, YWCA, and American Red Cross.

It has seemed wise to submit more detailed reports of the participation of the Public Health Service, the United States Employment Service, and the Bureau of Public Assistance as separate chapters, and then as addenda the manuals of instruction and the statistical and fiscal reports.

This active participation by the Federal Security Agency has been deemed a privilege by all who participated. Despite the innumerable difficulties of the task it has been performed without any serious hitches, and in a way that would prove a credit, I believe, to the Government as a whole. I should like to pay a tribute to all who worked so devotedly on the staffs of our various divisions, but also to General DeWitt and the officers of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, who at all times showed a sympathetic understanding not only of our problems of administration, but of the social problems of the evacuees whom we were assisting, and to the representatives of the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank, who had an even more arduous task to perform. From top to bottom the spirit has been one of broad social sympathy and a devoted desire to protect individual and family security insofar as it was consistent with military necessity. Particularly on behalf of our entire organization I should like to pay tribute to the Japanese themselves, who often at great sacrifice complied not only willingly, but in the main understandingly, with the regulations that have so disastrously disrupted their lives.

U. S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
DISTRICT NO. 5
112 FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES IN THE

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM WEST COAST

June 2, 1942

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DISTRICT #5, U. S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES IN THE JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM WEST COAST

Authority

The medical and public health activities of this office in the Japanese evacuation from the West Coast were undertaken at the request of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding, Western Defense Command, U.S. Army, in a letter dated March 28, 1942, addressed to Senior Surgeon W. T. Harrison, District Director, District #5, U. S. Public Health Service, which reads as follows:

"March 28, 1942.

"Senior Surgeon W. T. Harrison,
Director, U.S.P.H.S. District #5,
112 Federal Office Building,
San Francisco, California.

"Dear Doctor Harrison:

"In connection with the establishment of Assembly Centers, Reception Centers and the operation of Civil Control Offices for Japanese evacuees in the Coast States, you are authorized to employ necessary medical and nursing personnel, purchase medical and surgical supplies, and provide necessary hospitalization for the sick. In carrying this out, under your supervision maximum use will be made of the professional services of Japanese doctors and nurses available, except that they are not to be used in Civil Control Offices.

"It is desired that you promptly submit for my approval, a budget estimate for the period ending May 1, 1942, covering items and services listed above.

"Upon submission of your budget estimate and approval by this headquarters you will be reimbursed for expenditures made in connection with the above.

"Very truly yours,

J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

General Policy

After a number of conferences with officials of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, it was decided that, as far as it could be controlled by the U.S. Public Health Service, the following general principles would serve to guide all activities in connection with the evacuation:

(1) Every effort would be made to prevent the spread of communicable disease during processing at the control stations, during transportation from the control stations to reception or assembly centers and within the centers themselves.

(2) Every person suffering from a condition which made evacuation actually or potentially dangerous would be recommended for exemption from evacuation until such time as his condition had so improved that available transportation to, or residence in, the center would not constitute a hazard to his health or life, or the health or life of others.

(3) All medical and institutional care required by Japanese would be supplied at public expense and, if possible, in public facilities. Exceptions to this principle were: those persons in private hospitals or their homes, at the time the area was posted, too ill to be moved and those persons in private hospitals, at the time the area was posted, with types of illnesses expected to be of short duration such as childbirth, lobar pneumonia, or the acute exanthemata.

(4) Within the limitations of the authority granted and funds made available to the U.S. Public Health Service to equip, staff, and operate the center hospitals and infirmaries, and to purchase medical care outside the centers, the highest type of medical care and attention would be supplied to evacuees throughout the entire process.

(5) The available county health departments would be requested to undertake the provision of public health service within the centers, acting as agents of, and responsible to, the U.S. Public Health Service through the State Departments of Public Health.

Description of Activities

Medical Inspection Prior to Induction

Every evacuee, prior to induction into a reception or assembly center, was inspected for the presence of infectious disease that might be communicated to others with whom he would associate and for conditions that would make it actually or potentially dangerous for him to be transported to, or to live in, a center.

The inspections were carried out or supervised by officers of the U.S. Public Health Service experienced in maritime quarantine inspection. When the number of inspections to be made was more than could be handled by U.S. Public Health Service officers, the assistance of State, county and city health officers and, in a few instances, of private physicians from the county medical societies was enlisted. In every case, the assistance of health organizations and medical societies was made available when requested.

Medical inspections were usually begun one or two days prior to entrainment and were done in the control stations. The inspection included the general appearance of the individual, the eyes and conjunctival sacs, mouth and throat, hands, and such areas of the skin as could be seen without an actual disrobing of the individuals. When a person was suspected of disease, he was taken to a room affording greater privacy, the necessary clothing was removed, and a more thorough examination was made. All examinations of female cases were made in the presence of a nurse or other female attendant.

In practically all instances evacuees who were ambulatory and not actually ill on the day of inspection appeared at the control station at scheduled hours for medical inspection. Those unable to appear were visited in their homes by the inspecting physicians. In the case of those individuals ill in hospitals on the inspection day, certification of the attending physician or hospital as to the patient's condition was often accepted as proof of illness.

When the movement from control station to assembly center was short, as for example from a center in Los Angeles to Santa Anita, inspection was carried out on arrival at the center and prior to induction. Cases of illness detected on arrival at a center and before induction were handled in the same manner as if detected at the control station.

In two train movements the inspection was carried out at the railroad station just prior to the movement of the trains. The handling of the inspections in this manner was unavoidable because of last-minute change in plans by W.C.C.A. authorities as to the destination and mode of travel of the evacuees. Each of these inspections was done by an officer of the U.S.P.H.S. and the physician chosen to accompany the train to the reception center.

Medical Care Supplied Prior to Induction

Medical care of the type and quantity required by the patient was supplied to each evacuee found ill at the time of inspection or becoming ill during processing or transportation. While the quality of the care supplied varied somewhat from one community to another because of differentials in the general quality of medical care available, in every case Japanese patients received medical care at least equal to that available to the average of the other racial groups of the same community.

The most common type of case found ill at the time of inspection was pulmonary tuberculosis already in a public or private sanitorium. These

cases were transferred, if their physical condition permitted it, to the most easily available and best public tuberculosis sanitorium in the community. Mental cases in sanatoria were recommended for exemption from evacuation so that they might remain under psychiatric supervision.

Cases of childbirth found in the hospitals at the time of inspection were allowed to remain in those institutions since the duration of the confinement was expected to be less than two weeks. In most such cases the financial arrangements between the patient and hospital had been completed before the evacuation orders were posted.

Cases of pregnancy of eight months or more were not allowed to accompany either bus or train evacuation convoys. Every such case was recommended for exemption until she and the baby were declared able to travel by the physician in charge of the case. If suitable facilities were available, the woman was admitted to a public hospital at the time of inspection as an ambulatory patient. While it would have been less expensive to have allowed the woman to remain in her home until the onset of labor, there was no written provision for the exemption from exclusion of members of families to care for such cases remaining at home. In a few cases where no hospital facilities were available, it was recommended that the pregnant woman and an adult member of her immediate family be allowed to remain at home.

The acute exanthemata, measles, German measles, mumps, chickenpox, etc., were isolated and recommended for exemption until the period of communicability was past and the patient able to travel. As in pregnancies, these cases were admitted to available public hospitals if possible. While there is little medical reason for admitting uncomplicated cases of this type to a hospital, it was made necessary by the military necessity of removing all Japanese from their homes.

All other types of conditions were handled in the same general manner as described for specific types of illnesses mentioned above. Short-term illnesses already hospitalized when their area of residence or hospitalization was posted were usually allowed to remain in hospitals at their own expense; long-term illnesses and illnesses occurring during processing were placed in the care of public hospitals at federal expense. If hospitalization was available, every case unable to be evacuated for any reason was admitted to the hospital. Of necessity, a few were allowed to remain at home when no hospitalization was available in the community. Negotiations are now under way for the removal of such patients from their home communities to public hospitals in other communities.

From the beginning of registration in each control station until the last convoy was under way, a nurse was on duty at the control station and a physician assigned to the duty was easily available to the station.

Registered physicians and nurses accompanied each convoy from the point of entrainment to the reception or assembly center. When the movement was by bus convoy, a U.S. Army ambulance was usually supplied by the Surgeon's office of the Sector Command, at the request of the U.S. Public Health Service. The physicians accompanying the convoys were instructed to secure whatever hospitalization was necessary and available for any

evacuee becoming ill enroute.

Cases convalescing from hospitalization, cases of advanced senility and other cases requiring special travel accommodations were moved largely by Pullman car supplied by the Quartermaster Corps of the U.S. Army on the issuance of a certificate of necessity by officers, or other representatives, of the U.S. Public Health Service.

The Japanese evacuees could not have received the excellent medical attention which they have received through the efforts of the U.S. Public Health Service alone. Most other agencies concerned with the evacuation were involved when cases of illness were found. Almost without exception these agencies, without question, followed the recommendations of, and supplied services requested by, representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service. Agencies deserving particular mention in this connection are the Public Assistance Division of the Social Security Board, the U.S. Employment Service and the Provost Marshals and Quartermaster Transportation Sections of the U.S. Army.

Other agencies, not responsible for any phases of the evacuation, that gave unlimited service as requested were the State Departments of Public Health, the County and City Departments of Public Health, County Hospitals, and County Medical Associations. County Hospitals bore most of the load of accepting patients certified by the U.S. Public Health Service, even when the conditions were of a type not hospitalized ordinarily in those institutions. In a similar manner, the County and City Departments of Health assumed almost complete responsibility for any phase of the medical side of the evacuation, as requested, and gave full attention to it, even when their regular duties had to be temporarily suspended.

Outside Medical Care Supplied to Patients From Centers

All the medical attention required by evacuees in the centers cannot be supplied in the center hospitals and infirmaries. This situation arises first from the fact that the centers were designated as temporary and only temporary hospital facilities were supplied.

Second, the temporary infirmaries in the smaller assembly centers have been planned for only emergency and obstetrical service. In no center, because of their temporary nature, were facilities planned to handle chronic cases or elective types of surgery.

The third reason complete medical care cannot be supplied to all cases of illness arising in the centers is that the equipment and supplies to be provided had not arrived at the time a number of the centers were opened. This will be discussed fully in a following section of the report.

As a result it has been necessary to move certain patients out of the centers to other hospitals where medical care of the type and quantity required can be provided. In some cases patients have been transferred from centers with limited medical facilities to other centers better equipped. More frequently, patients have been taken by ambulance from the center to outside medical facilities of the type required, and either treated as outpatients as, for example, in cases requiring pneumothorax treatments for

sputum-negative pulmonary tuberculosis, or have been admitted as inpatients in hospitals. Such care is continued until the patient is able to return to the center.

In every instance, except for the center at Manzanar, arrangement has been made with the County hospital in the community in which the center is located to treat those cases that cannot be treated with the medical facilities available within the center. For the center at Manzanar, arrangements have been made with the Los Angeles County General Hospital to accept those patients that cannot be treated within the center.

The County hospitals have agreed to accept those patients referred to them by the Japanese physicians or the County health officer responsible for the medical care within the center, and to give them the necessary medical and surgical treatment at a rate not to exceed $3.75 per patient day. In addition to this, these County hospitals have agreed to sterilize the surgical goods used in the infirmaries, since they are not equipped with steam sterilizers.

Due to the limitation in the number of Japanese physicians, it was not possible to place in each center a specialist in each branch of medicine and surgery. Accordingly, specialists are being chosen from the Caucasian physicians of the communities around the centers to act as consultants to the Japanese medical staffs. These consultants will be employed by the Federal government on a fee basis. They will not be allowed to charge or receive remuneration from the Japanese evacuees.

Public Health Supervision of Centers

The health departments having jurisdiction in the communities where reception or assembly centers are established have been asked to be responsible for public health work in the centers themselves, acting as agents of the U.S. Public Health Service. They have been asked particularly to see to it that the centers comply with all Federal, State and local public health laws. Consultants in the various specialties will be taken into the centers by the health officers, but such consultants will have no administrative authority over the centers and will be consultants only to the health officers.

In this capacity the health officer of the county is responsible, in the centers, for the control of communicable disease, the registration of births and deaths, the administration of venereal disease, tuberculosis, infant, preschool, and pre-natal clinics, for sanitation, and for the quality and quantity of medical care in the center hospitals and infirmaries.

For the smaller centers the regular staffs of the health departments will be able to carry on this work along with their other duties. For the Santa Anita and Pomona Assembly Centers, however, with a final combined population of some 25,000-30,000 evacuees, a full-time health officer, two public health nurses, and a sanitarian have been appointed and additional public health nurses will be supplied. All these persons are Caucasians, have offices in the centers and are responsible through the County and State Department of Health to the U.S. Public Health Service.

Active immunization against typhoid fever and smallpox for all evacuees is begun as soon as practicable, usually on the day following induction into the center. This will be followed by immunization programs against diphtheria and pertussis.

A major problem in all centers has been and continues to be sanitation. That so few epidemics have occurred from insanitary conditions has been due to the heroic efforts of the management of the centers, the County Health Departments and the Japanese medical staffs.

Many problems of sanitation arose from the fact that the Japanese assigned as cooks, waiters, dishwashers, janitors, maids and orderlies had, at the time they assumed their duties, little or no conception of sanitation and public health as it relates to those positions. This problem was attacked at once by the sanitation personnel of the health departments. With the assistance of the center management, classes were organized, supervisors were appointed and the workers were given intensive training in the rules of sanitation applicable to their respective types of work. The Japanese were generally very receptive to this instruction and remarkable improvement has been shown in sanitary practice.

Another type of problem in sanitation arose immediately from the inadequacy of sanitary facilities provided in the centers. A comprehensive report on this will be made as soon as a survey, now being completed by a sanitary engineer of the U.S. Public Health Service and by the county health departments, is completed. Some of the insanitary conditions found and still existing in many centers are:

(1) Inadequate dishwashing facilities. These vary from those centers opened before any hot running water was available, through those where the dishes are still washed in movable zinc tubs by hand, to Santa Anita where inadequate mechanical dishwashers were provided.

(2) Lack of complete screening. This is generally the situation in barracks, hospitals, infirmaries, toilets and kitchens.

(3) Improperly-placed, poorly-constructed, and insufficient number of toilets.

(4) No bathing facilities for babies.

(5) Improper garbage storage.

(6) Inadequate refrigeration.

(7) Floors and walls of barracks, hospitals, infirmaries, kitchens and mess halls that are not fly-tight.

(8) Insufficient crockery and dishes.

(9) Tin cups with rolled margins which make adequate cleaning impossible.

(10) No toilets or hand-washing facilities easily available to the cooks and waiters.

(11) Inadequate disposal of laundry and kitchen waste waters.

There is little that the U.S. Public Health Service can do directly about the above insanitary conditions. The undesirable conditions have been called to the attention of the W.C.C.A. and the management of the centers repeatedly. Until they are corrected, epidemics of gastro-intestinal and other types of disease must be expected.

Epidemics in Centers

Outbreaks of gastro-enteritis have occurred in a number of camps. The first one, occurring at Santa Anita on the night of April 6, was determined to be probably due to the consumption of improperly cooked and stored salmon loaf. This mild epidemic involved some 85% of those who consumed salmon loaf at the evening meal that day. Cases had 2-6 stools during the night but no cases were seen or reported with vomiting or prostration. By lunch time on April 7 the epidemic appeared to be over. There were no deaths or cases ill enough to require hospitalization.

In the Fresno Center a more serious epidemic of food-poisoning occurred on May 20. The menu in all the mess halls for lunch was frankfurters and macaroni salad. By the middle of the afternoon many illnesses were reported. The symptoms were prostration, vomiting, and some diarrhea, although the latter was not common. It was thought also that there was an unusual evidence of irregular pulse among those affected who were in the extremes of age. There were no deaths and all persons recovered in twenty-four hours.

Investigation showed that the 295 persons affected all ate at one mess hall. Two-hundred five other persons eating there were not affected. Little data were compiled on the distribution of the two groups among those eating or not eating a particular food.

However, it was found that the macaroni salad had been prepared as follows: The macaroni was cooked the previous day, was washed and allowed to remain outside the refrigerator until lunch time on the 20th. A small refrigerator was available, but it was crowded with other foods. No evidence of disease among the cooks or waiters or other unusual procedures were brought to light.

There can be little doubt that the salad was the cause of this epidemic.

More typical of the type of epidemic of gastro-enteritis occurring repeatedly throughout the centers is the series of cases of diarrhea at the Owens Valley Reception Center April 7-15. The table below shows the number of persons who had diarrhea on specified days by the number of the mess halls in which the individuals had eaten the previous day. It should be noted that the menu was common to all mess halls during that period.

At the time of the recorded epidemic above there was no refrigeration

for food in the center although there were some 3,000 evacuees there. There was also no running hot water and all dishwashing was done in tubs in water heated on the stoves.

Refrigerators and hot-water heaters for the kitchens were installed during the two-week period following the above-reported epidemic, and there have been no major epidemics since in that center. From the investigation of this epidemic, there can be little doubt that it was due to the lack of food refrigeration or inadequate facilities for washing dishes, or both.

DIARRHEA AT OWENS VALLEY RECEPTION CENTER
APRIL 7-15, 1942

MESS HALL NO.	APRIL - 1942								
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2	13	0	63	0	5	3	0	0	0
3	1	0	3	0	0	32	35	0	1
4	1	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	0
5	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Cases	20*	0	66	0	5	64*	35	0	2

*Some cases had eaten at more than one mess hall on preceding day.

The same type of epidemic of gastro-enteritis from the same cause has occurred in a number of centers. That there have been no more serious epidemics of gastro-intestinal disease is due to the constant vigilance and heroic effort of the health departments and resident medical staffs and probably, considering the very inadequate sanitary facilities provided in the centers, to a great deal of good fortune.

Measles and German measles have occurred in all centers. An epidemic of each of these diseases occurred in California simultaneous with the evacuation process. It was inevitable that cases would appear in the centers. The greatest number of cases of one disease in one center was at Santa Anita, where, at one time, 58 cases of measles were under the care of the health department and resident medical staff.

No other type of epidemic has occurred.

Medical Facilities and Care Provided in the Centers

Hospitals and Infirmaries

At the centers located at Manzanar, Santa Anita, and Pomona, hospitals have been established in which all medical, surgical, and obstetrical cases, except those requiring very specialized treatments and diagnostic equipment, can be treated.

In each of these locations, at the request of the U.S.Engineering Department, aid was furnished by officers of the U.S. Public Health Service in laying out the floor plans for the hospital buildings and suggestions as to sizes and locations of these buildings were made. Because of the time elements involved in construction of the buildings, it was necessary to operate the hospitals in improvised quarters, but at the present time adequate facilities are available at the centers at Santa Anita and Pomona. However, at Manzanar, on May 25, 1942, seventy-six patients were confined to a very inadequate, improvised, ten-bed hospital building and five of the standard barracks buildings. In view of the fact that the barracks buildings are not provided with running water and toilet facilities, adequate care of the patients confined in them has been and still is very difficult.

On the other hand, in the rest of the assembly centers, infirmaries to care for simple medical and surgical cases and uncomplicated obstetrical cases have been provided. The buildings provided for these infirmaries vary in number from two in the smaller centers to five at the Tanforan Center. These buildings were constructed by the U.S. Engineering Department and are adequate in size and number. However, they are very poorly arranged for the segregation of the various types of patients encountered in a population made up of men, women, and children. Not only is the arrangement poor, but adequate shelving and cabinets were not considered in the building plans.

These facts have produced many problems for the medical staffs of the centers since, in most of the centers, illnesses requiring hospitalization have appeared soon after the centers were opened. The necessity for structural changes in the infirmary buildings have hampered, to a certain extent, the medical staffs in furnishing medical treatment. In most instances, the changes necessary are at present under way. At a few centers, because of inadequate material, workers, or authority, only a few of the required rearrangements have been made, although they were requested by the Japanese physicians and U.S. Public Health Service representatives.

Equipment and Supplies

At Manzanar, Santa Anita, and Pomona, the equipment and supplies were selected for the hospitals by an officer of the U.S. Public Health Service and were purchased by the Office for Emergency Management. Except for a few small items, these materials were on hand when the first physician arrived and were adequate in quantity and variety to furnish the necessary medical care. In these three centers, utilizing this equipment and supplies, 6,750 persons have been treated from the day of their opening until May 15, 1942. This number includes the outpatients treated and 376 patients treated as inpatients. Of the latter group, 29 were operated upon and 19 were obstetrical deliveries.

Equipment and supplies for the infirmaries in the other centers were to be supplied by the Medical Administrative Corps of the Western Defense Command. The U.S. Public Health Service was asked to submit a list of the equipment and supplies required for these centers. An initial list was submitted on April 2, 1942. Upon the opening of the first of the infirmaries, it was found that the initial list of supplies and equipment would be inadequate, and, on May 4, 1942, a supplemental list was furnished by the U.S. Public Health Service to the Medical Administrative Corps. By May 25, 1942, most of the supplies and equipment appearing on the list submitted on April 2, 1942, had been delivered to the centers, but some of the essential items necessary for the care of the patients had not arrived.

On May 25, 1942, only a few of the items appearing on the list submitted on May 4, 1942, had been delivered to the center infirmaries, and most of the essential items had not been supplied. Practically no dental equipment has been delivered to date.

In most instances, the camp managers have supplemented the supplies on hand by local purchase, so that the medical staffs in the centers have been able to carry on their work. However, managers were not able in some cases, because of lack of funds or the fact that the necessary items were not available in the community, to furnish the necessary materials on an emergency basis. In many cases, the County Health Officers have loaned needles and other material to the camp managers so that the physicians could carry on their work. Other items, such as surgical needles and scalpel handles were loaned by the County Hospitals in the community in which the center is located.

Because of the specialized nature of medical equipment and supplies, the Procurement Division of the W.C.C.A. requested the U.S. Public Health Service to review and to approve the requests for medical equipment and supplies submitted by the Japanese physicians to the center managers. The arrangement was set up so that the County Health Officer, representing the U.S.Public Health Service in the center, an officer of the U.S. Public Health Service who made regular calls at the center, or the District Director of the U.S. Public Health Service would approve each request for equipment and supplies before it was presented to the W.C.C.A. Procurement Division for purchase. To date, this plan has been followed, but none of the medical equipment and supplies, requested by the Japanese physicians and approved by a representative of the U.S. Public Health Service, have been delivered to any of the centers.

All of the factors referred to above have thrown an unusual burden upon the medical staffs of the infirmaries. This has resulted in several instances in dissatisfaction among the physicians and discord between the medical staffs and managers. The physicians feel that they are powerless in obtaining what they need for the care of their sick. The managers feel that the physicians are unreasonable in their requests for emergency purchases of supplies. There is a very urgent need for an improvement in the methods of procurement and delivery of medical supplies and equipment to the assembly centers.

Professional Personnel

The hospitals and infirmaries in the various centers are staffed

entirely by Japanese professional personnel. These professional people have been carefully selected by the U.S. Public Health Service and assigned to the centers. The doctors, dentists, and nurses were assigned before the centers were opened and, in most instances, were the first evacuees to arrive at the centers. In several instances, professional personnel chosen for one center were evacuated to another along with the other members of the community in which they lived. This has resulted in an uneven distribution of the professional personnel. At the present time, a survey of the medical staffs of the various centers and adjustment of these shortages by transfers of persons from one center to another is being made. This produces some problems inasmuch as some of the people do not wish to leave the center in which they are now living. Also, the fact that some of the professional people have large families, which must be transported with them when a transfer from one center to another is made, creates a rather large transportation task.

In general, there was a shortage of Japanese physicians and nurses in affected areas at the time of evacuation. This shortage would be felt much more acutely except for the fact that several Japanese doctors and nurses have voluntarily come in from the East and offered their aid in the medical care of their people.

Fourth year medical students and internes are being utilized in an effort to relieve the burden upon the physicians, and student nurses and nurses' aides are also relieving the registered nurses. In the majority of the centers, the registered nurses have begun classes for the training of nurses' aides. There are sufficient dentists, laboratory technicians, and pharmacists available among the Japanese evacuees.

At each center, one of the Japanese physicians has been designated to assume charge of the activities of the hospital staff. The equipment and supplies issued to the hospitals and infirmaries, their upkeep, and replenishment have been made his responsibility. He is responsible for the proper medical care of the population of the center, and his activities are under the direct supervision of the County health officer and officers of the U.S. Public Health Service, who make frequent visits to each center.

Activities

Under the supervision of the County health officer, the Japanese physicians will vaccinate against smallpox and immunize against typhoid the entire population of each center.

In those centers provided with hospitals, major surgical cases, medical cases, and obstetrical cases will be treated. No elective surgery will be performed, however. Those cases requiring specialized treatments and exceptional diagnostic equipment will be referred to a designated public institution able to provide such services.

Those centers that are equipped only with infirmaries will treat simple medical and surgical cases and uncomplicated obstetrical cases. Major surgical, medical, and complicated obstetrical cases will be referred to the County hospital in the community for treatment.

The County health officers will aid in the organization of special clinics, such as pre- and postnatal, venereal disease, child welfare and

hygiene, and tuberculosis. The clinical work in these clinics will be carried out by the Japanese physicians.

The dentists will be responsible to the Japanese physician-in-charge for the treatment of emergency dental conditions, but no elective dental care will be given.

The Japanese physicians will aid the County Health authorities in establishing sanitary inspecting groups, who will make routine reports through the County health officers to the center management on the sanitary status of the center. However, the Japanese physician may make recommendations to the management directly in cases in which immediate action is required.

Daily reports of the activities of the hospitals or infirmaries will be made to the center manager by the Japanese physicians. Weekly and monthly reports of these activities will be made to the District Director, U.S. Public Health Service.

Only one type of diet was planned for the entire population of the centers. Since small children and infants are not able to tolerate the type of food furnished, the medical staffs of the centers have had to assume the responsibility for the planning, preparation, and distribution of formulae and diets for these groups. This tends to tax the kitchen facilities of the infirmaries. The solution for the problem of feeding expectant mothers and others requiring special diets but not requiring hospitalization has not been found.

Statistical Report

Patients Hospitalized or Ill at Home at Time of Evacuation

In the table appearing below are shown for Oregon and Washington and for California, by counties, the number of patients, by classes of conditions, found in hospitals or in their homes or placed in hospitals during processing, too ill to be evacuated and number of deaths. The data are as of May 27, 1942 unless otherwise stated.

The data are shown by counties in California since it was on that basis that the organization of medical inspection was set up. While there may be omissions of County names, all evacuations in California are included as of the dates shown for the respective counties in which the control stations were located.

The list of hospitalized cases does not represent the number of patients hospitalized at any one time. With the exception of the mental and tuberculous, most of the patients have been discharged at the time of this report. The discharge dates depend on the progress of the patients and, as a result, no reliable data on the number of patients in hospitals at this time are available. Such data can be compiled only as reports of discharges are received.

DISPOSITION OF ILL JAPANESE EVACUEES DURING EVACUATION, AND DEATHS, BY CLASSES OF DISABILITIES, FOR CALIFORNIA BY COUNTIES AND FOR OREGON AND WASHINGTON

(All data as of 5-27-42 unless otherwise stated)

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
ALAMEDA	0 - Acute Surgery 23 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity (3) 1 - Acute Com. Disease (1) 0 - Cardio-vascular 1 - Mental 4 - Other 29 - Total	NONE	1 - Suicide
BUTTE - GLENN - TEHAMA - SHASTA - SISKIYOU	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 1 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 1 - Mental 0 - Other 2 - Total	NONE	NONE
CONTRA COSTA	1 - Acute Surgery 3 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 3 - Other 8 - Total	NONE	NONE

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
FRESNO	1 - Acute Surgery 8 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vasoular 1 - Mental 5 - Other 16 - Total	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 2 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 1 - Other 4 - Total	NONE
IMPERIAL	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 1 - Total	1 - Acute Surgery 1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 3 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 5 - Total	NONE
KERN	0 - Acute Surgery 3 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 1 - Mental 0 - Other 5 - Total	NONE	NONE
LOS ANGELES (4) (May 14)	3 - Acute Surgery 146 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 35 - Maternity 40 - Acute Com. Disease 43 - Cardio-vascular 11 - Mental 52 - Other 330 - Total	NONE	NONE

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
MADERA	0 - Acute Surgery 1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 1 - Mental 0 - Other 2 - Total	NONE	NONE
MENDOCINO - TRINITY - DEL MONTE			
MERCED	0 - Acute Surgery 5 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 6 - Total	NONE	1 - Cardio-vascular
MONTEREY	2 - Acute Surgery 3 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 3 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 1 - Other 9 - Total	NONE	2 - Cardio-vascular

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
ORANGE	0 - Acute Surgery 2 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 8 - Acute Com. Disease 1 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 3 - Other 15 - Total	NONE	NONE
RIVERSIDE	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 3 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 1 - Other 5 - Total	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 2 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 2 - Total	NONE
SACRAMENTO	1 - Acute Surgery 4 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 8 - Maternity 29 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 1 - Mental 16 - Other 59 - Total	NONE	2 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Stillborn
SAN BENITO	0 - Acute Surgery 3 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 1 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 4 - Total	NONE	NONE

COUNTY	Patients, who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
SAN BERNARDINO	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 2 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 3 - Total	NONE	NONE
SAN DIEGO	0 - Acute Surgery 10 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 3 - Maternity 6 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 3 - Other 22 - Total	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 47 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 47 - Total	NONE
SAN FRANCISCO	3 - Acute Surgery 1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 1 - Acute Com. Disease 1 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 4 - Other 11 - Total	NONE	NONE
SAN JOAQUIN	4 - Acute Surgery 21 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 4 - Maternity 1 - Acute Com. Disease 2 - Cardio-vascular 2 - Mental 2 - Other 36 - Total	NONE	1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Carcinoma

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
SAN LUIS OBISPO	0 - Acute Surgery 6 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 3 - Maternity 3 - Acute Com. Disease 3 - Cardio-vascular 2 - Mental 3 - Other 20 - Total	NONE	NONE
SAN MATEO	0 - Acute Surgery 9 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 1 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 10 - Total	1 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 1 - Total	NONE
SANTA BARBARA	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 13 - Other 13 - Total	NONE	NONE
SANTA CLARA	0 - Acute Surgery 5 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 3 - Mental 1 - Other 9 - Total	NONE	1 - Cardio-vascular

COUNTY	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, where allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
SANTA CRUZ	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 1 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vasoular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 1 - Total	NONE	NONE
SOLANO	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 2 - Maternity 2 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 4 - Total	NONE	NONE
SONOMA	0 - Acute Surgery 5 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 1 - Other 6 - Total	NONE	NONE
STANISLAUS	1 - Acute Surgery 2 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 1 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 2 - Other 6 - Total	NONE	NONE

COUNTY	Patients, who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
SUTTER-YUBA	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 3 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 1 - Other 4 - Total	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 11 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 11 - Total	NONE
TULARE	NONE	NONE	NONE
VENTURA	1 - Acute Surgery 1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 2 - Total	0 - Acute Surgery 0 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 2 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-vascular 0 - Mental 0 - Other 2 - Total	NONE

FOOTNOTES:

(1) Includes pneumonia.
(2) Members of families allowed by Provost Marshal to remain with patients at home not included.
(3) Infants born in hospitals or homes not included.
(4) Data on cases in private hospitals not available.
(5) Diagnoses not available.

STATE	Patients who, at the time of evacuation, were allowed to remain -		DEATHS PRIOR TO INDUCTION, BY CAUSE
	In Hospitals	In Their Homes	
OREGON	1 - Acute Surgery 14 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 0 - Maternity 0 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Cardio-Vascular 19 - Mental 1 - Other 35 - Total	NONE	NONE
WASHINGTON	8 - Acute Surgery 51 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis 6 - Maternity 3 - Acute Com. Disease 35 - Mental 4 - Cardio-vascular 8 - Other 115 - Total	1 - Acute Surgery 8 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis(1) 8 - Maternity 9 - Acute Com. Disease 0 - Mental 1 - Cardio-vascular 2 - Other 29 - Total	1 - Pulmonary Tuberculosis

(1) For check-up. Released to Puyallup 5/9/42.

June 2, 1942 - C.F.B.

Medical Services in Centers

The combined report of medical activities of all the assembly centers is shown below. This report indicates that the general health of the entire group is very good. The total number of patients given treatment was 9,484. Of this number, 7697 were outpatients with, for the most part, only minor complaints. There is an understandable tendency on the part of members of the group to take even very small injuries to the infirmary for treatment, whereas at their home they would have ordinarily treated themselves.

There were 602 patients with conditions serious enough to warrant center infirmary inpatient care. Only 96 patients had illnesses sufficiently serious to require outside hospital care.

The immunization program in regard to smallpox and typhoid fever is proceeding satisfactorily. The diphtheria immunization program will get under way when the smallpox and typhoid fever programs are completed.

It is understandable that the figures shown in regard to the number of evacuees in the centers and the number of vaccinations given are only approximate. At the time these figures were compiled, the centers were being rapidly filled, and the vaccination program has of necessity been speeded up. At this time the proportion of persons vaccinated is much greater than in the figures shown below.

REPORT OF MEDICAL ACTIVITIES OF ALL ASSEMBLY CENTERS
AS OF MAY 15, 1942

NUMBER OF CASES AND WHERE TREATED

Type of Case	Center, Infirmary or Hospital	Outpatient or Special Clinics	Quarters	Local Hospital	Total
Medical	369	4,939	844	49	6,201
Surgical	37	613	11	8	669
Obstetrical	31	306	3	12	352
Contagious Disease	144	209	210	5	568
Injury	3	340	16	7	366
Venereal Disease	1	26	4	0	31
Dental	1	647	1	0	649
Other	16	617	0	15	648
Total	602	7,697	1,089	96	9,484

STATISTICS

Number of infirmary beds in use as of date of report 294
Number of individuals in center as of date of report 70,733
Number of individuals immunized for typhoid fever. 38,211
Number of individuals vaccinated for smallpox. 43,524
Number of individuals immunized for diphtheria 0

	In Center	In Local Hospital
Number of live births	22	11
Number of stillbirths	2	0
Number of deaths.	2	2

Causes of death - Brain Hemmorhage
Cerebro vascular accident
Heart failure
Heart disease, coronary

STATEMENT OF EXPENDITURES

Equipment for Hospitals

The equipment and supplies for the hospitals at Manzanar, Pomona, and Santa Anita were selected by an officer of the U.S. Public Health Service and were, or will be, paid for by the Office of Emergency Management. The cost of this equipment and supplies was:

HOSPITAL	COST		
	PAID	TO BE PAID	TOTAL
MANZANAR	9,122.32	194.00	9,316.32
POMONA	0.00	12,500.00 approx.	12,500.00
SANTA ANITA	19,774.27	6,000.00 approx.	25,774.27
TOTAL			47,590.59

Other Expenditures

No statement of other expenditures can be made at this time. They include the employment of professional personnel, hospitalization outside the centers, travel expenses, and communications. While all these types of expenditures were at pre-determined rate, vouchers covering such expenditures are just now being received and audited and, consequently, cannot be totaled until such auditing is complete.

REPORT OF BUREAU OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE WCCA PROGRAM

June 3, 1942

I. Function Assigned to Bureau of Public Assistance

When the Department of Justice, in February 1942, requested the assistance of the Federal Security Agency in the movement of aliens from prohibited areas, it was on the basis that resettlement involved processes basically associated with the social services, and that the Federal Security Agency already had been designated to make available to States and localities the services of specialists to assist in the planning and execution of State and local programs in the field of health, welfare, and related activities. The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, one of the agencies within the Federal Security Agency, was assigned the function of social planning, inasmuch as it was the Division within the agency whose normal function was that of offering professional services in the field of public welfare.

In accordance with the President's Executive Order No. 9066, providing that the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army was authorized to use any and all Federal agencies to help expedite evacuation, the Federal Security Agency, and the Bureau of Public Assistance within that agency, was again called upon to render assistance in the program. In the initial planning with the WCCA, the need for social planning for people was emphasized. During the phase of voluntary evacuation, it was pointed out that every effort should be made to stimulate persons and families to utilize all available resources in completing relocation plans. During the period of controlled evacuation, the need for interpretation to and direction of individuals in relation to their family problems and the utilization of all available social resources was recognized. Therefore, when called upon by the Headquarters of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army to assist in the operation of the evacuation program under its auspices, the function to be exercised by the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board was relatively clear; namely, that of offering the technical services in the field of public welfare, which is its normal function, and relating these services to the total program, the general policies of which were planned by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

Specifically, the functions accepted by the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board in the total evacuation program were (1) provision of social service staff to work as members of teams in local WCCA service and control offices, (2) formulation of policies and procedures in accordance with which the social service staff was to assist aliens and citizen Japanese affected by military orders in making new family plans or in making adjustments to the general evacuation, and (3) consultation and advice on the social aspects of evacuation plans formulated by military authorities.

In relation to this general function, the Bureau of Public Assistance social service staff assigned to WCCA service and control offices was expected to perform the following activities:

1. To provide general service to individuals requesting information with respect to the effect of specific orders on them or on their families.

2. To assist families or individuals seeking such service in the development and execution of sound plans for their relocation outside the prohibited or restricted zones.

3. To issue financial assistance to facilitate voluntary evacuation of families and their relocation when they were unable to finance sound plans entirely from their own resources.

4. To interpret the regulations governing evacuation to the individual and families concerned, and to make certain as far as possible that they were properly equipped, either from their own resources or by purchases from our funds to continue normal family living on the minimum basis within the assembly centers.

5. To provide cash assistance to the Japanese to be evacuated if they were in need, both for the necessities of life and also for expenses of travel involved in the process of evacuation.

6. To cooperate with the other agencies participating in the Wartime Civil Control Administration in rallying to the help of those to be evacuated all the available community organizations and resources.

7. To provide consultative service to the WCCA and the WRA in administering special institutional care and special service that will be needed by the evacuees while they are residing within the assembly and relocation centers.

II. Staff Organization

To assure the orderly operation of the particular part in the evacuation program, the Bureau of Public Assistance staff made adjustments in its normal regional organization to provide for a central operating office, field offices, and a field supervisory service. The Public Assistance staff which consists of a regional representative, two assistant representatives, and seven social service analysts normally functions in a consultant and supervisory relationship to State welfare agencies which are the operating agencies in the public welfare field, therefore, the Bureau staff in this region called upon the services of State and local welfare agencies to staff the local WCCA service and control offices

The Regional Office of the Social Security Board was used as the central operating office of the Bureau of Public Assistance staff. Under the general supervision of the Regional Representative of Public Assistance, one of the Assistant Representatives was placed in charge of social service operations of the evacuation program. Recruitment of staff, formulation of policy and procedure, and planning for field supervision of representatives in the local WCCA service and control offices was done from the Regional Office.

In each WCCA service office, at least one, and in some instances two or three social workers were assigned to represent the Bureau of Public Assistance in its team function. A total of 65 persons were assigned originally to WCCA service offices in Washington, Oregon, and California. Most of this staff was retained until June 1, 1942. - - - - - - - - Of this staff, 25 were recruited directly by the Regional Office staff of the Bureau of Public Assistance, 4 were transferred from State departments of social welfare, and 36 were transferred from county welfare departments. The Public Assistance analysts on the Regional staff and four additional Public Assistance staff members

transferred from other Regions acted as Area Supervisors. Each Area Supervisor was assigned a specific territory in which he was responsible for the supervision and operation of the social service staff in the local WCCA service and control offices. The field staff, therefore, received instructions and guidance from written materials in a Manual prepared and released by the central office, supplemented by conference and discussion with the Area Supervisors. Toward the end of May, one member of the Bureau of Public Assistance staff who had formerly functioned as one of the Area Supervisors was assigned to WCCA Headquarters office to effect liaison between that office and the Bureau of Public Assistance.

III. Preparation for Work

Shortly after the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board was called upon to assist in the evacuation program, it arranged conferences with the Directors of the several State agencies included in this Region to explore the possibilities of their participation in the program and to acquaint them with the general purpose and scope of the program, so that throughout each State there would be general public understanding of the plan formulated by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. At this time, it was agreed that State agencies would make available to the Bureau of Public Assistance either from their own staff or from the staffs of county welfare departments, personnel who could function as Bureau of Public Assistance team representative in the local WCCA service offices. It was also agreed on the basis of a State plan that county welfare departments would assume the responsibility for offering any interim aid which might be needed by individuals affected by War Department orders. The county departments had already assumed this responsibility as designated representatives of the Bureau of Public Assistance in connection with persons affected by Department of Justice orders, and this new responsibility required only slight modification of plans formulated earlier.

Before assigning any of its team representatives to local offices, members of the Bureau of Public Assistance staff in the Regional Office prepared written instructional material for their use and guidance. This material consisted of a Manual of Operations which explained the general purpose and scope of the WCCA program, the Bureau of Public Assistance's part in that program, the organization of the social work staff, procedures and policies covering action in individual case situations, and policies in accordance with which financial assistance was to be given. Copies of these manuals have been furnished WCCA Headquarters. During the course of operations, supplements to this material were released in the form of numbered memoranda and in the form of a brief Manual of Operations for Control Station Offices.

Prior to the opening of any of the control station offices, conferences were held again with Directors of State welfare agencies for the purpose of reviewing operations up to that time and of making more detailed plans in connection with this third phase of the evacuation program. At this time, a further agreement was reached with respect to the delineation of functional responsibilities between the Federal staff of the Bureau of Public Assistance and the staff of State and county agencies. It was agreed that the State agencies would assume responsibilities for the direct operating phase of the controlled evacuation and that the Bureau of Public Assistance staff retain the over-all responsibility for supervision through Area Supervisors including liaison responsibilities with other Federal agencies and WCCA Headquarters. The State agencies agreed to furnish for each control office a staff member to function as Public Assistance Supervisor and to recruit either from county welfare departments or

other social welfare agencies additional social service staff as needed. The social service staff in each of the civil control offices, including the Assistant Supervisors who were recruited from the local WCCA team offices and the additional social workers recruited from county welfare departments and/or other agencies in the community were under the supervision of the Public Assistance Supervisor, a State employee. It was agreed that expenses incurred by the State and county departments in rendering this service would be reimbursed through the submittal of a claim to the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, which Bureau would then request reimbursement from the War Department.

Complete figures on the total social service staff engaged in all 99 exclusion projects are not available at this time, but the following is the number used in 69 control offices, which have reported completely.

County employees	231
State employees	43
Personnel from the WCCA team offices on the Federal payroll for a temporary period	52
Employees of private social agencies	6

The above is an unduplicated count of the number used in 69 evacuation projects. Many of the same persons worked in a number of different control stations.

To assure the proper functioning of the Public Assistance section of a control office, the Regional Office staff of the Bureau of Public Assistance arranged on Saturday, April 11, 1942, training meetings for all staff expected to work in civil control offices. These meetings were held in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland. In San Francisco about 65 persons were present at the meeting; in Los Angeles, 35; in Seattle, 50; and in Portland, about 30.

At these meetings, complete kits of material for the use of workers in control station offices were made available to all persons attending the meetings. These meetings were all-day meetings and all four cities followed the same pattern. The meetings opened with a brief explanation of the WCCA program and the part the Bureau of Public Assistance was called upon to play in it. Members present were then given an opportunity to read and study the written materials distributed, and the meetings reconvened early in the afternoon. At this time control station office procedures and instructions for completing the social data cards were discussed in detail and problems presented during the first controlled evacuation were also discussed. Questions raised from the floor were answered and the meeting was closed with a summarization of the day's meeting and a reemphasis on the specific functions of Public Assistance in the evacuation program.

IV. Activities of the Public Assistance Staff

In accordance with the general functions outlined for them, the Public Assistance staff, since March 16, 1942, has been engaged in interviewing and registering persons affected by evacuation and other orders released by the War Department, in offering to these persons a family counselling service, in

granting financial assistance, in assisting in the formulation of a relocation plan, and in planning for the situations of unattached children.

Between March 17 and May 23, 1942, the number of families interviewed in WCCA service offices for whom a social data card was prepared was 10,144. The total family registrations in control offices completing operations by May 11, 1942 was 13,156. Information service was rendered to a large additional number of persons for whom no social data cards were prepared. The approximate total amount of assistance given during this same period was $19,985.55. Of this total amount of assistance, $7,677.46 was authorized in 45 control offices, and $12,308.09 was expended in WCCA service offices. This amount expended in WCCA service offices includes $2,108.95 expended for transportation of advance work parties and medical detail to assembly and/or reception centers.

Of the total number of families interviewed, individual relocation plans were made for approximately 125. Six of these families were German, one Italian, and the rest Japanese. To facilitate the relocation of families, financial assistance was given for travel expenses, maintenance en route, transportation of household and personal effects, and other identifiable expenses incident upon moving. Approximately $10,199.14 of the $12,308.09 spent in WCCA service offices was expended for this purpose. The formulation of a relocation plan involved discussion and consideration of the plan with all members of the family, on occasion necessitating home visits; correspondence with out-of-State agencies with respect to the feasibility of the plan, including community attitudes toward aliens and citizen Japanese and verification of the family's suggested plan. To insure the well-being of the family and the fact, insofar as it could be determined, that dependency in another State would not be created, financial assistance in relocating was contingent upon the capacity of the family to establish itself economically at the point of relocation, and the availability at the point of relocation of community resources such as medical facilities and adequate housing.

The majority of these relocation plans (92) were made by workers in the WCCA service offices during the period of voluntary evacuation. All plans necessarily had to be made more hurriedly than is usual in making a re-location plan. In most instances it was possible to secure complete verifications of a relocation plan, and these would seem to be reason to expect that these plans should not be reasonably successful. In instances where complete verifications were not possible, however, there may be some question as to the feasibility of the plan over a long period of time. It would seem possible that at some future date, the families relocated without full and complete study and verification of the plan, may become financially dependent upon these new communities, or may request admission to a Reception Center.

The States of relocation of families to whom financial assistance was given, and the number of families moving to those points is presented below:

State of Relocation	No. of Families
Colorado	35
Wyoming	3
Massachusetts	4
Montana	5
Connecticut	1
Ohio	3
New York	5
Idaho	7
New Jersey	1
Utah	9
Missouri	6
Iowa	3
Illinois	8
Pennsylvania	1
Nebraska	2
Minnesota	5
Texas	5
New Mexico	1
Michigan	1
Washington	
Spokane	10
Pullman	3
California	
Hanford	2
Winters	1
Fowler	1
Newcastle	1
Dinuba	1
Parlier	1

Of the six German families relocated outside Military Area No. 1, two went to Chicago, two to Denver, one to Boston, and one to Philadelphia. The one Italian family relocated in Connecticut.

It is considered that one of the most important services rendered by the Public Assistance staff is a service that cannot be tabulated statistically nor explained in terms of money expenditures. The greatest demand upon the Public Assistance workers was for an interpretation of individual family positions in relation to the whole evacuation plan. This service was rendered not only to families and individuals affected by these orders, but also to organized groups and welfare agencies within communities, to the end that a clear understanding of the program would relieve any tension and anxiety with respect to it. Observations of the control station operations would seem to indicate that the degree of ease of operations in these stations was in direct proportion to the community relationships established and the preliminary work of all team members in the particular communities. Especially noticeable has been the effect on the individual evacuee of the understanding, but not sentimental manner, in which his individual situation was considered and in which information was given by the Public Assistance staff. It was observed that individuals who early expressed apprehension and fear in connection with the evacuation program were relieved of their tensions after a brief, clear, and objective presentation of the effect of orders on them as individuals.

In the control offices it is believed that the greatest contribution of the Public Assistance staff was in the area of interpretation and information. Here again, when evacuees were given some picture of what they might expect in assembly and reception camps, many of their tensions and anxieties were relieved. Financial assistance was also given in these offices primarily for the purchase of articles that evacuees were required to take with them to assembly and reception centers, and in some instances, for transportation of families living in outlying districts from their homes to the control station office. Additional services rendered by the Public Assistance staff in these offices included the arrangement and payment for ambulance service for those persons unable to take the trip to an assembly or reception center in a train or bus, and arrangements for, and payment of, transportation of medical and nursing personnel accompanying the trains to assembly or reception centers. The amount of money expended for these various services up to May 25, 1942, is as follows:

Purchase of articles to be taken to reception or assembly centers.	$6,392.79
Transportation from homes to control station offices.	752.26
Ambulance service.	232.00
Lodging and meals.	45.90
Transportation of exempted persons	321.61
Advance Work Crews & Delayed Evacuation.	2,132.75

Considerable time was spent by the Public Assistance staff in studying and recommending plans for the group of unattached children which was early presented to its attention. In Los Angeles and San Francisco, meetings were arranged with the two Japanese orphanages to interpret the WCCA program to them and to arrange a plan for the evacuation of those institutions. For this work the services of a special consultant from the U.S. Children's Bureau was made available to the Regional Office Public Assistance staff.

As was evidenced under the Department of Justice program, attention was again, under the WCCA program, called to the fact that individualized service is required for special groups even in a mass program. Aged persons, those in sanitariums and hospitals, unattached children, children in institutions and boarding homes, maternity cases, and cases of mixed marriages all needed special services. Considerable time is required in handling such cases, and when the situations were known sufficiently in advance, it was possible to formulate a fairly satisfactory plan. In other instances, when the situations were called to the attention of the Public Assistance staff at the last minute during a controlled evacuation the most that could be done was to take expedient steps to relieve the immediate situation.

Many and varied are the problems presented in individual cases. The most serious situations developed about families of mixed blood, the ill, the handicapped and unattached children. In the case of the ill and the handicapped who were not able to leave during a period of controlled evacuation, apprehensions, fears, and anxieties were expressed by the individuals and their families with respect to even a temporary separation. Problems were presented too, in making

transportation arrangements to Assembly Centers at the time when persons earlier exempted from evacuation because of illness, were released from hospitals. These problems were most acute when one family member left in one hospital happened to be a young child. The most difficult situations revolved about children of mixed marriages, particularly in instances when the children were only 1/16 of Japanese and had been reared as Caucasians in a Caucasian community. The prospect of having to make adjustment to life in a Japanese community gave rise not only to fears on the part of the family, but in a few instances also caused a break-up of family life.

Once evacuation had been determined upon as a military necessity, there was general recognition given to the importance of the manner in which it was carried out. The services we were able to provide in the way of cash assistance, but even more importlantly in personal service for those for whom the evacuation orders presented a grave crisis in their personal and family affairs aided genuinely, we believe, in the retention of morale among those evacuees and in their acceptance of their fate without loss of confidence in the integrity of American democracy and of the spirit of neighborliness and good will toward them by their Government and their fellow citizens.

Prepared by the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, Region XII - June 3, 1942.

To give a brief statistical summary of the activities of the Public Assistance Staff, there are presented below two tables. Table 1 summarizes the activities of the WCCA Service offices. Table 2 shows the activities in Civil Control Stations in which removal operations were completed by May 11, 1942. The assistance expenditures shown in this table do not include disbursements of $1,936.29 made in connection with transportation of exempted persons and/or advance work crews, to May 11, 1942.

Table 1. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN OPERATIONS OF WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION SERVICE OFFICES FACILITATING VOLUNTARY EVACUATION, MARCH 23 TO MAY 23, 1942.

	Number of Service Offices	Number of Cases Registered	Cases Receiving Financial Assistance	Amount of Assistance
TOTAL	49	10,144	168	$10,199.14
Arizona	1	76	-0-	-0-
California	41	8,692	113	6,911.39
Oregon	2	978	3	153.67
Washington	5	398	52	3,134.08

Table 2. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN OPERATIONS OF WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS COMPLETING REMOVALS BY MAY 11, 1942.

STATE	Number of Operations	Cases and Persons Registered and Evacuated				Cases Receiving Financial Assistance	Amount of Assistance
		Cases	Persons				
			Total	Aliens	Citizens		
TOTAL	46	13,156	48,945	16,852	32,093	286	$4,816.59
Arizona	2	75	224	83	141	-0-	-0-
California	35	10,608	40,419	13,547	26,872	256	4,415.56
Oregon	2	578	1,725	717	1,008	10	46.54
Washington	7	1,895	6,577	2,505	4,072	20	354.49

The above data reflect only an interim summary of activities completed by the designated dates. A complete and detailed description and summary is to be presented again at a later date.

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT SERVICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE JAPANESE EVACUATION

The United States Employment Service has been responsible for a number of important and varied aspects of the Japanese evacuation program. Chief among them have been those of organization and management of WCCA team offices, Service and Control Stations, and USES limited function WCCA offices. In addition to the above administrative functions, the USES has been responsible for the recruitment of preliminary work crews for the operation of Assembly Centers and Reception Centers, the recruitment of workers for private employment opportunities outside Assembly Centers, the recruitment of police officers for assembly camps, the development of a proposed method for the occupational classification of the employable Japanese in assembly camps and reception centers and the collection of contraband from persons of Japanese ancestry.

The most important function of the USES in the evacuation program has undoubtedly been that of the organization and management of Control Stations for evacuation operations and the initiation and development of procedures for these operations. These Control Stations were set up where the Western Defense Command has required that all persons of Japanese ancestry were to be evacuated from a defined area. To date, approximately 100 of these stations have been established. These stations have been the centers for the registration and processing of Japanese evacuees; that is, for the disposing of property by fair and equitable means, for medical examination prior to entrainment to assembly and reception centers, and for advice, information and assistance necessary for the maintenance of family security and general morale.

Participating in the activities of the control stations have been the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, the agency responsible for the registration of the Japanese and for providing advice, information and financial assistance to those evacuees needing these services; the Farm Security Administration responsible for the disposal of farm property; the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco responsible for the disposal of non-farm property, the United States Public Health Service, responsible for medical examination and general public health problems, both for the evacuees and the general public in the evacuation movement, and the United States Employment Service, responsible for the over-all operation of the station.

The second major function of the USES has been that of the operation and management of WCCA team offices. These offices have been established to provide services to persons of Japanese ancestry prior to evacuation and to Italian and German aliens for problems created by curfew regulations. WCCA offices are comprised of representatives of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Farm Security Administration, and the United States Employment Service. Each Agency performs similar functions to those performed in control stations. These include general advice, information and assistance to persons of Japanese ancestry, and German and Italian aliens, providing assistance in the disposal of farm and non-farm property, and in providing work opportunities to members of the above groups who have employment problems as a result of curfew regulations.

All USES offices in California, Oregon, Washington, and in the Military Area One in Arizona have also been responsible for what might be termed a limited phase of team office operations including the issuing of travel permits to

persons of Japanese ancestry and to Italian and German aliens. Under the terms of the curfew regulations, the above groups must be at home between 8:00 PM and 6:00 AM, and cannot travel a distance greater than five miles from their homes, except in the course of their regular employment. Even in the latter case, travel has been restricted if outside the normal commuting area. Under regulations prescribed by the Western Defense Command, applications for travel permits for a change of residence, for business purposes or for emergency situations can be obtained from USES offices. In addition to the latter function, all USES offices have also issued forms relating to exemption from evacuation or curfew. For the period from March 29, when the freezing order was issued, through May 22, 1942, the USES offices reviewed the qualifications of persons applying for exemption. This policy was changed on May 22, 1942, and the present procedure is to issue application forms to all applicants. However, the offices continue to provide advice and information to applicants in relation to the possibility of securing exemption and aid applicants in completing the forms for forwarding to the local Selective Service Boards.

With the establishment of Assembly Centers, the Assembly Center Division of the WCCA requested the USES to recruit non-administrative Japanese workers for Center operations. These workers were recruited for 18 Assembly Centers over a period of approximately one month with about 3,000 placements being made by the USES.

The USES was also requested by the War Relocation Authority to provide preliminary work crews for their Centers. Two preliminary work crews have been recruited for the latter organization for the Parker Reception Center administered immediately by the Office of Indian Affairs, and the Tule Lake Center, administered by the War Relocation Authority itself. Approximately 400 placements were made by the USES for these Centers. As additional relocation centers are established, the USES will recruit preliminary work crews for the temporary assembly centers for the Authority.

Probably the most important phase of USES recruitment in the entire evacuation program has been that of providing private employment opportunities to evacuees in assembly camps and relocation centers. This work has been conducted under rules and regulations prescribed jointly by the War Relocation Authority and by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and to date, approximately 500 placements have been made by the USES. Recruiting is now being conducted in nearly all Assembly Camps and it is expected that many more Japanese will be made available for private employment particularly in agricultural work within a very short period of time. The USES has been named as the official recruiting agency for private employment of evacuees outside the camps.

Less noteworthy from a quantitative point of view but of considerable importance has been the function of the USES in recruiting police officers for assembly centers. These non-Japanese officers are responsible for the interior security of the centers. The entire order for policemen, numbering about 300, has been placed with the USES. The number of placements is not known as yet but is probably considerable.

The USES has also been requested by the War Relocation Authority to perform a complete occupational classification of all employable persons in assembly camps and reception centers. It is expected that this work will begin by about July 1st. Although plans are not completely developed, the USES will

provide one Senior and one Junior interviewer to each camp. The USES staff will train qualified Japanese within the camps to perform the classification under USES standards and under the direction of the above employees. The War Relocation Authority has indicated that it will provide complete reimbursement for this work. This occupational classification will be of considerable importance from two points of view—first, that of enabling the War Relocation Authority to obtain maximum productivity in relation to the occupational skills of the evacuees, and second, that of providing the USES with information on the occupation characteristics of individuals registering for private employment.

Another function of the USES conducted in all offices under the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command was that of the acceptance of contraband from persons of Japanese ancestry. Although the USES was responsible for the operation for only a short space of time, it was an important function inasmuch as the USES was the only Agency with a network of offices immediately prepared to handle the program.

Each of the operations mentioned above will be discussed in more complete detail in the following statement. Included will be a review of the method of administration of the program together with a description of the staff functions as performed by the administrative organization.

1. CONTROL STATION OPERATIONS

At the inception of the evacuation program the Federal Security Agency was delegated the responsibility by the WCCA of establishing, operating, and managing control stations for each of the evacuation projects. The Regional Director delegated the above function to the USES. As the attached plan of operation indicates, the USES has been responsible for the following functions in each of these control stations.

"ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND GENERAL DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES"

"The manager of each WCCA station will be a representative designated by the U. S. Employment Service of the Federal Security Agency to perform that function. He will have complete responsibility for the organization, management and functioning of each station. He will:

"1. Lease the space to be used for stations and will procure supplies and equipment for the operation of stations excepting that equipment which can be furnished by the separate agencies.

"2. Issue such disbursing orders as are necessary for providing space, equipment and transportation of equipment.

"3. Be responsible for the general organization, management, arrangement and procedures of the office."

In addition

"4. All section heads of the various agencies, with the exception of the Army, will report to him when questions of policy concerning another agency develop. He will then arrange for disposing of the problem.

"5. All instructions on the evacuation arrangements will be issued by him to the section heads. No section head will proceed on any other evacuation instructions.

"6. All official information in relation to the operation of the station will be released by the manager.

"7. He will be responsible for insuring the successful operation of the station as far as the civilian agencies are concerned.

"The manager will be assisted by the following, each of whom is responsible for the appropriate functions of his section:

"1. Supervisor of Farm Security Administration
"2. Supervisor of Federal Reserve Bank
"3. Supervisor of Public Assistance
"4. Representative of the U. S. Public Health Service

"Each of the supervisors and representatives will have the staff necessary to perform the functions appropriate to the section.

"The Sector Commander will provide the official Army representative at the stations. This representative will be responsible for all Army functions in the office and for providing information to the office manager on transportation and embarkation arrangements.

"The Sector Commander will be the only Army representative issuing official information to the manager on the arrangements for the evacuation."

On April 23 in a directive issued by the Assistant Adjutant General by command of General DeWitt, the functions of control station managers, as well as the functions of the various agencies, were further delineated. This directive, issued to all Sector Commanders and all civilian agencies of the WCCA further stressed the managerial function. The directive states:

"The manager of each Control Station will be named by the Federal Security Agency. This manager will receive instructions with reference to the evacuation project from the representative of the Sector Commander at the Control Station and will be responsible for the distribution and execution of these instructions by Supervisors of sections within the Control Station.

"The several civilian agencies will control the services rendered by their representatives at Control Stations, but insofar as the coordination and operation of the installation as a whole is concerned, supervisors of sections will receive their instructions from the manager of the Control Station."

A copy of this directive is attached.

The manager of the station, in carrying out the above functions in each of the 100 stations that have been established, has usually required the services of approximately ten assistants in each normal evacuation operation of

approximately 1,000 persons. This number has varied in accordance with the size of evacuation projects. Several control stations, for example, processed only about 50 evacuees in remote rural areas, while one station processed approximately 3,300 evacuees in one operation. Usually the manager has required the assistance of two monitors, five receptionists and two persons responsible for the operation of a control desk. The manager has also been aided by an assistant manager in most cases.

Usually the USES manager hired additional personnel for the performance of his WCCA duties. The only cases where exceptions were made were at the administrative levels of area and control station operation.

Once an evacuation area was established, a control station manager was designated by the headquarters administrative staff of the USES in WCCA headquarters. The manager designated, in most cases, was usually the local office employment manager in the particular area. Where exceptions were made to this rule, the agreement of the State Director of the USES was obtained.

The manager, upon being selected, immediately leased space, supplies and equipment for the operation of the control station. In all but a few cases, where the number of evacuees to be processed was so small that regular USES operations would not be affected, space was secured outside USES local offices. Two notable records were achieved in this respect. The first was that in only one case following notification to administrative USES headquarters in WCCA that a station should be established was it necessary to wait more than 24 hours for the actual establishment of the station. The one exception occurred over a week-end and the space was secured within 48 hours. That this record is notable is shown by the fact that a large number of control stations were set up in remote rural areas, in some cases more than 1,000 miles from the USES administrative headquarters in the WCCA. The second achievement was that in approximately 50% of the areas where control stations were established, rent was obtained free either from public spirited citizens or organizations. In many cases, services and supplies of all types, such as ambulances, desks, decorations, police escorts, station wagons, buses, were donated. The complete record in this respect cannot be made available until the final review of operations can be made. However, it is safe to say that the program was operated most economically in consideration of the fact that approximately 100 stations were set up and 100,000 Japanese were evacuated to assembly camps in a period of approximately two months. Present estimates indicate that the USES control station costs will not exceed $75,000--that is, for the USES part of the program.

The administrative headquarters of the USES in the WCCA has been operated by an Assistant Regional Representative under straight line authority delegated by the Regional Representative. Each State Director of the USES in California, Oregon, and Washington also aided in facilitating ease and rapidity of operation by permitting direct contact between local offices and administrative headquarters. Actual operating experience, however, showed administration worked more effectively if area headquarters were designated. Consequently, four of these with an area supervisor in charge of each were organized in Southern California, Northern California, Oregon and Washington.

In addition to the above operating organization, two major staff functions were also conducted. The first was that of the ordering, preparing and delivering of forms and supplies for the operation of stations. That this was one of the most important and crucial functions in the operation of the entire

program can best be realized by the fact that orders for the printing of the forms were not filled on a current operating basis until approximately 75% of the evacuees had been placed in assembly camps. The reason for this situation for the most part was that printing plants in the area were rushed with war orders. Despite this problem and despite the fact that the obtaining of forms was a particularly important aspect of the registration and processing of the evacuees, no delays in control station operations as a result of a lack of supplies occurred. The function was performed by the Executive Assistant to the Regional Director of the Social Security Board.

Another important staff function was that of payroll disbursement. Approximately 1,000 different workers were placed on the WCCA payroll by the USES during the two-month period. Despite the large turnover in staff, workers with very few exceptions were paid within two weeks following the termination of their work. The employment was necessarily of short duration as new crews usually had to be recruited for each area evacuated. This function was performed by a member of the Accounts and Audits staff of the Social Security Board.

Supplemental instructions in relation to the operation of each control station were issued by USES headquarters in the WCCA. These supplemental instructions related to preliminary work crews, operating procedures and statistics, embarkation arrangements, etc. Copies of each of these are attached.

Also attached to this memorandum is a tabulation of the essential data relating to the establishment and operation of each control station, including the exclusion order number, the project planning number, the address of the control station, the general prohibited area, and the number of heads of families and individuals registered in the evacuation. The tabulation shows that the Northern California sector was responsible for operation and management of control stations under 43 exclusion orders; Southern California Sector for control stations under 31 exclusion orders; the Washington Sector for control stations under 18 exclusion orders; the Oregon Sector for control stations under 6 exclusion orders and the Arizona Sector for the operation of control stations under 1 exclusion order. In respect to the latter, it should be stated that the Regional Representative of the USES in Denver, Colorado, facilitated contact between the Director of the State Employment Service in Arizona and the USES headquarters in the WCCA.

2. WCCA TEAM OFFICES

The USES is also responsible for the organization, administration and management of WCCA Team offices. However, one exception was made in this respect where WCCA Team offices were established in Federal Reserve Banks. Since the Federal Reserve Bank was responsible for the normal operations of the bank and for activities of persons within the bank, the responsibility for management was turned over to the representative of the latter agency in WCCA offices established at Portland, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles. However, the USES was responsible for management of all other WCCA Team offices, there being 40 in California, 5 in Oregon, 5 in Washington, and 1 in Arizona. The function of these offices was as follows:

1. Issue forms relating to exemption from evacuation and curfew regulations.

2. Issue travel permits under curfew regulations.

3. Provide advice and assistance to Italian and German aliens and to persons of Japanese ancestry in the disposal of property, in cases of financial and social distress, and in cases where employment opportunities were needed.

WCCA team offices usually have been composed of representatives of four different agencies. These are as follows: The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, providing the social work functions; the Farm Security Administration, providing advice on farm property problems; the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, providing advice on non-farm property problems, and the USES, which has been responsible for the issuing of travel permits, the issuing of exemption forms, and providing advice on employment opportunities.

At the inception of the program, a representative of the Provost Marshal of the Western Defense Command was usually present in major WCCA team offices. The latter representative usually interepreted regulations relating to the issuing of travel permits and exemption forms. However, soon after the beginning of the program the Provost Marshal's representatives were removed.

3. USES LIMITED FUNCTION WCCA OFFICES

All USES offices in California, Oregon and Washington also served as what might be termed limited function WCCA offices. These offices were assigned the responsibility of issuing travel permits and issuing forms relating to exemption from evacuation and curfew. The other functions indicated above, normally performed by WCCA team offices,were not conducted in the limited function offices because there were so few persons of Japanese ancestry or so few German or Italian aliens in the area that it was not necessary to have all representatives of the team offices present. The limited function offices, in situations where the advice of other agencies was necessary, referred the applicant to the nearest WCCA team office. Since there was a sufficient network of the latter within all areas, no serious inconvenience resulted.

The major operating information in relation to the functions of WCCA team offices is attached to this report. As an indication of the volume of work handled in both WCCA team offices and USES offices during the period. California operations alone, from March 25 through May 16 are of particular interest. The data show that approximately 100,000 persons contacted the above offices for services or information during the period. The services provided by the various agencies are indicated as follows:

Referrals to Federal Reserve Bank Representative	14,763
Referrals to Farm Security Representatives	19,985
Referrals to Public Assistance Representative	21,835
Referrals to USES Representative	4,746
Travel permits issued	26,261
Total individuals requesting service	96,576

Operating data for Oregon and Washington, together with the location and personnel of all WCCA offices in California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona are attached to this report. Attached also is a list of all USES offices, each of which performed some aspect of WCCA functions.

4. RECRUITMENT OF PRELIMINARY WORK CREWS IN ASSEMBLY CAMPS

Attached are instructions to control station managers in regard to the recruitment of preliminary work crews for assembly centers.

Usually, preliminary work crews were recruited during the registration period of evacuation, normally the first two days of evacuation operation. However, in a number of cases, it was found necessary to recruit preliminary work crews prior to the establishment of an evacuation area. The evacuees or potential evacuees were usually willing to volunteer for preliminary work crews because employment could not be guaranteed to all employables at the centers.

The preliminary work crews for the most part were composed of cooks, bakers, dishwashers, stenographers, common laborers, and such skilled occupations as carpenters, electricians and plumbers. A total of 125 workers was requested in each order and with a very few exceptions most of the occupation classifications in each order were filled. The only exception related to the difficulty in securing Japanese cooks in rural areas. As indicated above, approximately 3,500 placements were made by the USES in this activity.

The recruiting procedure usually followed in the control station was to have the social worker inform evacuees that work opportunities were available at the centers. If the evacuee indicated that he was willing to accept work in a particular occupation classification, he was referred to an employment service interviewer. The interviewer then reviewed the record of the applicant and selected him for the crew if qualified.

In some cases, an order for a particular assembly camp was placed in two or more control stations. In these cases, it was necessary to designate the central or the major control station as the central clearance point. This operation worked very satisfactorily, clearance usually being effected by telephoning at periodic intervals. Once an order had been filled, arrangements for transportation for the groups concerned were completed by the central clearance manager at the station designated as the central clearance point.

5. RECRUITMENT OF PRELIMINARY WORK CREWS FOR RECEPTION CENTERS

The USES was also requested to recruit preliminary work crews for the permanent reception centers. This order was more difficult to fill in the sense that larger numbers of workers were included as well as a greater number of occupations. Doctors, nurses, dentists, laboratory technicians and X-ray technicians were recruited in this order. In this case there was a shortage of doctors and nurses but the remainder of the order was almost completely filled for the Parker Reception Center and the Tule Lake Reception Center. Recruitment for Tule Lake was conducted in two assembly centers, the Portland, Oregon, and Puyallup, Washington, centers. Recruitment for Parker Dam was more difficult because applicants were interviewed over a wide area comprising most of the southern counties of the State of California. In this case, it was found necessary to obtain additional doctors and nurses in the urban areas of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Some of the latter workers had to be transported more than 700 miles to the place of employment. Approximately 400 placements were made in the two centers.

The USES will also be responsible for recruiting preliminary work crews for other reception centers as they are established.

6. RECRUITMENT OF EVACUEES FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

As farm labor shortages developed, particularly in the Inter-mountain Area of the Pacific Coast, resentment against the use of Japanese labor subsided, in fact changed to an active and incessant demand for its use.

Previous to the first of May, the Western Defense Command held the position that the Japanese could be employed, providing certain safeguards and employment conditions were met by the States, the employers, and the USES. These conditions were concisely stated in the memorandum released on May 5, 1942, by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, WDCA. A copy of this statement is attached.

On May 13, Mr. M. S. Eisenhower, Director of the WRA, authorized the Regional Office of the WRA in San Francisco to set up a plan providing for the recruitment and placement of Japanese evacuees in private agricultural work.

In response to this authorization, a memorandum of understanding outlining the general procedure was developed between the WRA and the USES. A copy of this memorandum, which has been somewhat revised in operation, is attached. Also attached is copy of memorandum relating to the procedure from Mr. Eisenhower to Colonel Bendetsen.

In response to the Army, WDCA and WRA regulations mentioned above, the States of Montana, Idaho and Oregon have submitted and have approved plans for the use of Japanese evacuee labor. These requests represent the following clearance orders for sugar beet workers:

MONTANA	American Crystal Sugar Company	1,000 workers
	Utah-Idaho Sugar Company	100 workers
IDAHO	Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and Amalgamated Sugar Company	2,000 workers
OREGON	Amalgamated Sugar Company	400 workers
		3,500 workers

The USES of Washington has opened recruiting programs for the Utah-Idaho and Amalgamated Sugar Companies in the Puyallup center.

The USES of Oregon is at present recruiting for the Amalgamated Sugar Company at the Portland assembly center.

The USES of California is at present conducting recruiting programs for all of the above-named sugar companies in the assembly centers at:

Marysville	Merced	Tanforan
Sacramento	Turlock	and
Stockton	Pinedale	Santa Anita

To date about 500 workers have been recruited and dispatched to the sugar beet fields.

The Western Defense Command, WRA, and the USES are now preparing a revised outline of the procedures to be followed in the recruitment and referral of Japanese evacuee labor to private employment.

7. OTHER USES ACTIVITIES

a. Recruitment of Police for Interior Security Sections of the Assembly Camps

An order for 300 policemen for the Interior Security Sections of the Assembly Centers was also placed with the USES by WCCA headquarters. In this case local offices of the USES worked directly with the Chief of Interior Security in each center. The Interior Security Section has agreed that all placements for this position will be effected through USES offices.

b. Occupational Classification of Evacuees

The USES has also been requested by the War Relocation Authority to perform an occupation classification of all employables in the Assembly and Reception centers. Plans are now being developed to initiate the project by July 1 and it is expected that one senior interviewer and one junior interviewer will be assigned to each camp. The interviewers will train qualified Japanese in the centers for classification work. The review will be performed by the USES personnel and the USES occupation classification methods and codes will be used.

It is expected that this operation will be of extreme importance to the War Relocation Authority in achieving maximum productivity in terms of skills of evacuees and of value to the USES in relation to the private employment recruitment phase noted above. The occupation information will be invaluable in providing advice on the skills available among the Japanese.

c. Acceptance of Contraband Property in USES Offices

On March 28, the Commanding General ordered all Japanese citizens to relinquish all contraband property prior to midnight of March 31. The USES was requested to receive this property in all local offices. The USES offices were advised that receipts in triplicate should be provided for contraband, that the name of the depositor should be printed or typed, that there should be a brief description of the article, stating whether new or old, and that a declaration of value should be signed by the depositor. The receipts were to be numbered serially, the depositor retaining the original, the second being forwarded to the Alien Property Custodian in San Francisco, and the third being retained in the local office. To each article was to be attached an identifying tag or sticker which contained the name of the USES office where the article was accepted, the date when the contraband was deposited, the name of the depositor, the serial number of the receipt, the depositor's declared value of the article, and the statement "Property of Alien Property Custodian." In offices where contraband was collected, a van and storage company designated by the WCCA headquarters was notified. The latter company collected the articles and provided the local office manager with duplicate receipts for the contraband. The local office manager retained one copy and the other was forwarded to the alien property custodian in San Francisco.

The total number of items of contraband collected was not large but included some very valuable equipment such as short wave radios, cameras, etc.

CONCLUSION

A review of the above functions of the USES in the evacuation program reveals a rather wide variation of activities, all of which were important responsibilities. Some of these functions, such as the operation of control stations, issuing of travel permits, collection of contraband, are widely at variance with normal employment service functions. However, the fact that the USES and particularly the local managers performed these functions economically and effectively indicates the ability of the organization to conduct operations which are not normally part of their responsibilities but which were of importance from a military viewpoint.

In addition to demonstrating the flexibility of the organization, the operation shows two important aspects of the ability of the USES to meet an important public function. The first of these was the managerial ability called for in each of the control station operations. The management of control stations and WCCA offices was a task that involved not only the administration of a difficult operation but also the coordination of approximately five different agencies working under necessarily nerve-wracking conditions. Moving 100,000 people from their homes to an unknown situation was a trying experience for all concerned. Yet, in very few cases was there a refusal on the part of any Japanese to report to a control station for registration and processing. This record speaks well for the treatment of Japanese in the control stations by all the public agencies concerned. In addition, and this record was even more noteworthy, there is yet to be received in WCCA headquarters one letter of criticism in relation to the operation and management of a control station from any private citizen or organization in the entire area. This record is remarkable, inasmuch as Japanese evacuation operations were reported on the front page of nearly every newspaper on the West Coast for a period of two months.

Reference has been made to the coordination aspect of the work. This function was facilitated by the cooperative spirit shown by each of the separate agencies. Some of the organizations had even more difficult problems in working through State and County organizations. That different Federal, State, and County agencies can work effectively together is shown by the results.

All the functions discussed above were conducted under the direction of the Western Defense Command and more particularly under the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Property, Security and Regulations Division of the WCCA. The cooperation, understanding and efficiency of the military personnel in all phases of the work was of the highest order.

The USES staff believes that they have made two distinct contributions in this effort. They have aided in solving a threat to the military security of this country and they have aided in providing safety to the Japanese people.

June 5, 1942.

Archival documents
July, 1942

WPD 370.05 MDC (6-20-42)

July 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Suggestion Fort Peck, Montana be used for Japanese Evacuation Center.

I. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

1. That the attached letter for the signature of the Secretary of War be sent to Senator James E. Murray stating approved projects now exist for accommodation of 8,000 evacuees in excess of total requirements and that the question of possible substitution of evacuee centers is being referred to War Relocation Authority for action.

2. That a letter for the signature of the Secretary of War be sent to the War Relocation Authority stating that the Army already has approved projects with a capacity of 8,000 in excess of that required and further action is referred to War Relocation Authority.

II. MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. Senator James E. Murray of Montana in a letter to the Secretary of War incloses letter from the Senator to Mr. Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority. Senator Murray requests that one of the Japanese Evacuation centers be located at the Army's military establishment at Fort Peck, Montana.

a. That this location is owned by the Army and is equipped with all facilities necessary for the accommodation of the evacuees.

b. That the presence of these evacuees would assist greatly in overcoming the shortage of field labor for the harvesting of the Montana best crops, which have already suffered a loss of 50,000,000 pounds of sugar because of the lack of labor.

c. That the construction of Fort Peck Dam is such that sabotage would be next to impossible since it is merely a massive earthen dam without vulnerable electrical installations.

COPY FOR
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

2. Western Defense Command, in reply to radio request from Operations Division, stated that approved projects already exist for 119,000 evacuees which is 8,000 in excess of contemplated requirements.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incl.
1-Ltr to Senator Murray from SO.
2-Ltr to Mr. T.J.Dee, WRA from SO.

JUL 9 - 1942

APPROVED.
By order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff

By G. F. SCHULGEN
Lt. Col. G.S.C., Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S.

JUL 10 1942

OUT

OUT

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

OPD 370.05 WDC (6-20-42)

July 6, 1942

Honorable James E. Murray,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Murray:

Your letter of June 20, 1942 inclosing a copy of your letter to Mr. Eisenhower, Director of War Relocation Authority, requesting that one of the Japanese Evacuation Centers be located at Fort Peck, Montana has been investigated.

At present the Army has approved projects for a total of 119,000 evacuees which is 8,000 in excess of the accommodations required. In view of this condition, the question of substitution of the Fort Peck site for one of those already approved is being referred to the War Relocation Authority for decision.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War

JUL 10 1942

OUT

OUT

T.T.H.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

COPY FOR
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

File
7-14-42
WLD

OPD 370.05 WDC (6-20-42)

JUL 9 - 1942

Director of War Relocation Authority,
Barr Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Director:

The War Department recently received a request from Senator Murray of Montana to consider locating Japanese evacuees at Fort Peck, Montana. Projects for the accommodation of 8,000 evacuees in excess of total requirements have already been approved, according to information made available to the War Department. I am informing Senator Murray of this condition and further, that the question of substituting the Fort Peck reservation for one of the projects already approved has been submitted to you for any action you consider desirable.

I understand that Mr. Uts of your office discussed this matter with Colonel Wittkop of the War Department General Staff on July 6, 1942.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War.

JUL 10 1942
OUT

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

ORIGINAL DISPATCHED FROM
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

COPY FOR
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 - 1

FILED
JUL 8 1942
Return to the Secretary's File Room

July 6, 1942

Honorable Mon C. Wallgren
United States Senate

Dear Senator Wallgren:

On May 27 we wrote you with regard to correspondence you had had from Mr. Floyd Olson regarding the operation of lands evacuated by aliens and indicated that we would send you a further reply as soon as more complete information was received.

It might be helpful to review some of the facts leading up to the evacuation of the Japanese families in the State of Washington and the steps which have been taken to assure continuity of agricultural production on the land formerly occupied by them.

Mr. L. I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration at San Francisco was directed by General De Witt's orders to handle the agricultural phases in Military Area No. 1, which includes the State of Washington. The evacuation of the agricultural portion of Military Area No. 1 is now almost entirely completed. Information received from the Farm Security Administration shows that there were 849 Japanese operated farms in the State of Washington. These farms were largely concentrated in two areas, one in the Yakima Area, and the other in the district on the eastern side of Puget Sound extending in both directions from the town of Kent. In the Yakima Area, as of May 15, 112 substitute operators had been provided on 112 farms and in the Auburn-Kent-Sumner Area 622 substitute operators had been provided. The total acreage registered was 17,625 acres for the State of Washington and as of May 15 substitute operators had been provided for the management of 16,450 acres.

As you know, Mr. Hewes was empowered by General De Witt and provided with funds to make loans to subetitute operators taking over Japanese operated lands when such financing was not available from regular channels and when the furnishing of these funds would provide for the continuity of agricultural production. As of May 15, 211 applications for a total of $1,389,567 had been submitted in the State of Washington. Of this total, 190 loans in the amount of $660,745 had been approved, and 8 loans in the

amount of $603,166 had been rejected. There were in addition 13 loans in the total amount of $125,658 still in process in the regional office of the Farm Security Administration at San Francisco.

It is understood that there was considerable uncertainty at one time in handling of the evacuation in the State of Washington, predicated to some extent on the fact that certain interests in the State were inclined to feel that the evacuation of Japanese farmers would result in a serious economic dislocation. Consequently, there was a certain amount of local opposition to the evacuation. The Farm Security Administration was in no way responsible for the fundamental policies and decisions leading up to the evacuation proclamation.

It should be borne in mind that the type of agriculture practiced by the Japanese in the Auburn-Kent-Sumner area in the State of Washington falls under the general heading of market gardening rather than under general agriculture. Furthermore, the cultivation methods of the Japanese market gardeners were quite different from those generally followed by American operators. An example of this is the fact that on very small acreages, i.e., 10 acres and under, it was not unusual to find as many as 5 vegetable crops being simultaneously operated. It is true that these technical peculiarities of Japanese vegetable farming present a real problem because of the difficulty of securing substitute operators who can adequately continue where the Japanese left off. Undoubtedly, these difficulties will continue and will eventually result in a shift in the pattern of cultivation. However, agricultural experts tend to agree that the total volume of production will not be affected although the pattern will undoubtedly change.

It would appear unfortunate, in view of the fact that the Japanese evacuation in Military Area No. 1 was grounded upon military considerations and was deemed necessary in order to enable the military to carry out its responsibilities in time of war, that any private interests should have taken this opportunity to attempt to create a situation whose main effect would be to create disunity and lack of respect for the several agencies whose employees are doing their best as loyal government employees and patriotic American citizens to accomplish a difficult and extremely complicated task.

It is not felt that the criticisms or the general attitude reflected in Mr. Olds' letter to you is typical of public opinion generally in the State of Washington.

Sincerely,

Secretary's File Room

(Signed) Paul H. Appleby

Acting Secretary

AD/VAF/ms/June 16, 1942

cc: L. I. Howes, Jr., Region IX

July 7, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

I am informed that that patriot in California, Governor Olson, is hatching up a new project which I fear will make trouble with the Japanese.

As you know, the Army has been conducting the evacuation of these Japanese through a series of temporary assembly camps where they are first assembled and held until they can be located in the relocation centers further in towards the center of the country. The assembly camps are in California at various places. In the beginning of this agitation the Californians were hell-bent for rushing these unfortunate Japanese out of the State anywhere provided it was not California, and the Army had considerable difficulty in seeing that great injury and injustice was not done under pressure of that feeling. Now Governor Olson has discovered that the harvesting season is coming for some of the Californian fruits and that it may be profitable for Californians to keep these Japanese huddled up in these assembly camps to be used cheaply on this harvesting.

These assembly camps are merely improvised structures where there is considerable danger of overcrowding and epidemics. I do not think that he should be allowed to blow first hot and then cold without any reference to the safety or welfare of these unfortunate people or the permanent settlement of a great national problem.

I suggest therefore that you keep this situation in mind in case the Governor approaches you on the subject. I think we should go on with our permanent relocation of the evacuees.

Faithfully yours,

Secretary of War.


The President,
The White House.

HLS:ECN

Signal Corps, United States Army

War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Received at



WB182 94 DLC

CHEYENNE WYO JULY 8 1942 318P

HON HENRY L STIMSON

SECRETARY OF WAR

AT A CONFERENCE HELD IN SALTLAKECITY ON APRIL SEVENTH MR RISENHOWER AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT ASSURED THE GOVERNORS THERE ASSEMBLED THAT NO JAPANESE WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO THEIR STATE EXCEPT UNDER FEDERAL SUPERVISION AND MAINTENANCE. I AM ADVISED THAT THREE JAPANESE FAMILIES TODAY REPORTED AT WORLAND WYOMING HAVING ARRIVED FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AND THAT SAID JAPANESE ARE NOT UNDER FEDERAL SUPERVISION THE STATE OF WYOMING IS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO PERMITTING JAPANESE TO COME WITHIN OUR BORDERS EXCEPT UNDER FEDERAL SUPERVISION PLEASE ADVISE ATTITUDE OF WAR DEPARTMENT ON THIS QUESTION

NELS H SMITH GOVERNOR OF WYOMING.

720P

Telephone conversation between Colonel Tate and Colonel Bendetsen on July 9 1942 at 2:45 P.M.

T: Hello, Karl. I've got a telegram here from the Governor of Wyoming, Nels H. Smith.

B: Yes, I know Governor Smith.

T: Well, here is what he says. "At a conference held in Salt Lake City on April 7, Mr. Eisenhower, as a representative of the War Department assured the governors there assembled that no Japanese would be brought into their state except under Federal Supervision and Maintenance. I am advised that three Japanese families today reported at Worland, Wyoming having arrived from the State of Washington and said Japanese are not under Federal Supervision. The State of Wyoming is unalterably opposed to permitting Japanese to come within our borders except under Federal Supervision. Please advise attitude of War Department on this question." Signed, Mr. Governor. What are you going to do with that one.

B: Of course, Mr. Eisenhower is not a War Department representative.

T: Well, that's the first thing, yes but the Japs are still there.

B: I don't know where they came from. They might have come from Eastern Washington. The Federal Government said that we couldn't stop a Japanese from Utah from going into Wyoming or a Japanese from Military Area No. 2 of Washington State from going into Wyoming. I don't know how we can stop it, we don't know where they came from. May be they came from Utah. May be has a right to be opposed to it, but let him be, he has to take them.

T: I'd like to burn his ears off but I don't know how to do it.

B: I think you ought to. Give me a little time on that one will you?

T: All right if you can think of something good and strong and yet sympathetic.

B: There are lots of Japanese. Japanese-Americans in the intermountain states who are as free as the birds. They can go into Wyoming any time they please and if Governor Smith makes a move on it why then he will pay for it.

T: In what way?

B: There will be some way of retribution. I can't off-hand tell you.

T: We'll cut off his WPA, all right?

B: May be they came from Spokane. I'm looking at a map right now and I see about 3,000 of them in Spokane. They can move, however I'll tell you this much my policy in granting permits, as you know when a Japanese in a Center has a chance to relocate himself in private employment and everything is all right at the other end and we have assurance that he is employed from the employer and he is cleared with the F.B.I. etc. then the Japanese if American born, we let him go. In many cases. We do it every day. I think it's a fine policy, don't you?

T: Yes, if they get out of the Area, and you find a place where they can go without being crucified.

B: That's right. Now, my policy is in no case are they given permits to go to the inter-mountain states because of the attitude of patriots like Smith unless the Governor and the local officials agree to it. So I'm pretty sure that unless somebody slips badly witnout referring to his headquarters and we are the only place that issues them.

T: Chances are that they came out of an Area that you are not now evacuating in.

B: I'm going to check that part of it. If somebody got out, what was it Worland?

T: Worland, Wyoming.

B: I'll raise particular hell about it because it is contrary to the policy but in general Governor Smith's position is simply ridiculous. In other words, as you know there are hundreds of thousands Japanese over which we have no more control than we have over the men on Mars right at the moment. That is I think that that is a broad statement but you know what I mean.

T: I know what you mean. But give it some thought, Karl and if you can help me out on a reply to this thing put him on the defensive, I'd appreciate it.

B: I'll certainly do so. Good-bye.

T: Right. Good-bye.

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU Assistant Secretary of War

July 20, 1942

HONORABLE NELS H. SMITH
GOVERNOR OF WYOMING
CHEYENNE, WYOMING

YOUR POINT OF VIEW REGARDING JAPANESE ENTERING WYOMING IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS. NO JAPANESE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO WYOMING BY ACTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WAR DEPARTMENT HAS MADE NO COMMITMENTS WHATEVER REGARDING THIS. STOP. MR. EISENHOWER HAS NEVER BEEN A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT STOP THERE ARE NUMBERS OF AMERICAN BORN JAPANESE WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN AND ARE NOT NOW UNDER FEDERAL SUPERVISION AND MAINTENANCE IN NEIGHBORING STATES. THEY HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED ONLY FROM SOME HIGHLY STRATEGIC AREAS WHICH ARE IN POSSIBLE INVASION OR RAID ZONES BUT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SUCH PERSONS AS WELL AS THE AMERICAN BORN MEMBERS OF ANY OTHER RACE ARE AS FREE TO ENTER OR LOCATE IN YOUR STATE AS THEY ARE INTO ANY OTHER INTERIOR STATE. IN THE INTEREST OF OUR OWN NATIONALS IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE I FEEL THAT ALL PUBLIC OFFICIALS CARRY A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY TO GUARD AGAINST ACTION WHICH MAY INVITE REPRISALS AGAINST ANY THAT ARE SO HELD.

HENRY L. STIMSON

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

SIGNED

John W. Martyn
Administrative Assistant to the Sec. of War

COPY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

~~SECRET~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 1-3-80
Signature- C. B. Baldwin
(per JHL)

July 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Presidential approval was given on March 13th to a directive proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which would authorize the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to evacuate to the mainland of the United States for internment in concentration camps Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands, either United States citizens or aliens, who were considered by appropriate authorities in the Islands to constitute a source of danger.

It has been found that this procedure is not feasible, as through application for a writ of habeus corpus any United States citizen can obtain release from custody. Consequently, agreement was reached by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that family groups of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated to the mainland for resettlement, rather than internment. Tentative arrangements have been made with the War Relocation Authority for the resettlement of up to fifteen thousand persons.

We now wish to recommend that the directive approved on March 13th, 1942, be rescinded, and that the following be substituted therefor:

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

"No United States citizen of any derivation whatsoever, either naturalized or native-born, now residing in Hawaii, and considered by appropriate authority in the Hawaiian Islands to constitute a source of danger to our national security, will be transferred to the continental United States for internment. Such individuals will be interned in the Hawaiian Islands under authority vested in the Military Governor. Further, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is authorized to evacu-

~~SECRET~~

ate to the United States, for re-settlement in areas to be established by the War Relocation Authority, up to fifteen thousand persons, in family groups, from among the United States citizens of Japanese ancestry who may be considered as potentially danger-ous to national security."

Approval of the foregoing by the President is respect-fully requested.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

E. J. KING
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OK
F.D.R.

. Roosevelt Library
CLASSIFIED
DMR 5200.9 (9/27/58)
DATE- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl S. Spicer

THE OREGONIAN.

PORTLAND, OREGON

July 15, 1942

Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:--

Because of your friendship with Justice Douglas I thought these clippings on him might interest you. I have just had a grand fishing trip with him in the Wallowa Mountains. We got to Hell's Canyon - 6,100 feet deep. Some gash!

I am leaving shortly to report for Army duty. I want to thank you again for your efforts for me and for your many kindness. I hope that I any work I do may justify the bother to which I have put you.

With every good wish.

Respectfully,

/s/ RICHARD NEUBERGER

PS - I wrote an article for the June issue of FREE AMERICA Magazine in which I pointed out, among other things, the efficiency with which the Japanese migration on the West Coast has been handled. The article was placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Appendix for July 7 by Senator Lister Hill of Alabama.

rln

ASW 014.311 W.D.C.
Classif. No. JJMcC P - Douglas, William O., Justice
7-15-42

RECEIVED
WAR DEPARTMENT
SECRETARY'S OFFICE
1942 JUL 15 AM 8:21

July 15, 1942

My dear Judge:

I have your letters of July 8 and July 10 enclosing copies of some of your correspondence with General Dewitt.

You have called to General Dewitt's attention factors which he may or may not have heretofore had in mind about the likely characteristics of a great conflagration in the city, and you have asked that he advise the city of the plans he has for its evacuation. I do not think it would be profitable for me to take up either with you or General Dewitt the detailed methods by which the city of San Francisco might be evacuated in the event of a great disaster there.

Even if I did not know General Dewitt, I would believe that any officer in the Army chosen for such an important position as that of our Western Defense Command would have had behind him such a record of good judgment, training, and experience as to make it most likely that he would be competent to deal effectively with such problems as you present to him. However, I happen to have the advantage of personally knowing General Dewitt. I have worked with him very closely in connection with the Japanese evacuation and other matters affecting the West Coast and I have come in contact with him in other and earlier phases of his Army career. For character, decision, and consciousness of his duty and responsibility, I know of no Army officer in whom I would place greater confidence. To suggest that General Dewitt has a "Pearl Harbor approach" to any of his problems is unfair and inaccurate. He has thought of more dangers that might threaten the West Coast than even you with your alert mind have thus far conceived of. I know this because I have seen his dispatches.

I do not know what General Dewitt's plans for the evacuation of San Francisco are, and I have no intention of asking him. I do have a knowledge that he will act promptly and decisively in any emergency within the means that are available to him.

May I suggest that it would be much more helpful to General Dewitt, in the midst of his heavy responsibilities and great demands upon his time, that if you think he is not going to be able to act promptly enough to meet the necessities of a situation, you with

COPY FOR MR. STIMSON

the talent that you have at your disposal work out in consultation with the civilian defense authorities, if they have not already done so, a plan for the evacuation of the city of San Francisco, and submit it to General DeWitt or to his Staff for their help and guidance. He or they can readily relate it to their own plans and, no doubt, obtain great help from it. Such a step I am sure would be much more constructive than to write to the General letters, the tone of which is not too good, particularly when you refer to rumors that he may be slow to act because he and his family are not exposed to the same dangers as other residents of San Francisco.

Even to suggest this is not worthy of either you or the citizens of San Francisco. The dangers to San Francisco and all of the West Coast are great. Successful raids on that Coast can materially impair our war effort at a time when it needs to be greatly increased rather than diminished. But one of the things you have most to be thankful for is that you have an officer of the character and experience of John DeWitt to cope with these dangers.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

Honorable William Denman
United States Circuit Court of Appeals
Ninth Judicial Circuit
Post Office Building, San Francisco

P.S. I have sent a copy of this letter to Harry Hopkins, Mr. Stimson, Jim Forrestal and Welles.

TPE CONFERENCE TO BE HELD
HERE 11:30 - THURSDAY - APR 30TH

CHESTER ROWELL
+ JUDGE WM. DENMAN
ET. AL.

For The Secretary, Mar
from Judge Denman

COMMONWEALTH CLUB PLAN

Disjunction of Military Command in Total War
in the Pacific States

The Commonwealth Club of California presents a proposal concerning that part of total war in the Pacific Coast States which consists of fighting off raiding commandos, parachutists, and fifth columnists attacking means of communication and plants for war production, power, lighting, water supply, and the like.

We propose that the War Department, without further legislation, exercise its power to persuade or conscript the men of organizing ability to create and command an army for such internal warfare out of the rank and file already conscripted, who are outside the standards set for combat service.

It assumes that such an internal army in California or any Pacific State could be organized in coordination and without substantial interference with the training of combat troops--certainly less than the states would cause in attempting a competitive organization at the same time.

We assume it to be axiomatic that if the federal government, with the power of conscription and commandeering, cannot organize such an army, it is a mere political evasion to attempt to place the responsibility on the states. They can neither effectively conscript nor commandeer (granting they could do so at all) around the edges of the federal exercise of those powers.

On behalf of Californians, it protests against the plan of the War Department of divided command of fighting men, as we understand it to be declared by General DeWitt on March 11, 1942, when he called on Twelfth District individuals, municipalities, and states to provide organizations to defend areas and plants vital to war efforts and stated: "If we yield to pressure to provide federal troops for guarding numerous important installations, we shall not be fulfilling obligation to build a mobile army prepared to carry our fight to the enemy."

The Shaming of the White Man to the Yellow and Brown. The California Coastal Fog Bank.

Our protest assumes that the twenty-five to forty mile wide coastal fog bank extending some 500 miles from below Cape Sur to above Cape Blanco will make its customary return for the period from late May to September.

It is willing to assume that the Navy knows as much about the varying drifts of a fleet or of plane carriers in the currents in that fog as do the Japanese naval men who have been studying it in their fishing boats for a couple of decades--or the bootleg skippers who used it as a screen.

It assumes the Army and Navy is doing its best to minimize the number of raiding planes or commandos which have broken through all defense heretofore.

We assume that all in authority know the propaganda value to Japan for the Chinese and East Indians of a successful

raid on the Pacific States, destroying our essential plants and in all likelihood including the burning of one or more of our coast cities. That is, the shaming of the white man beginning with the bombing of the "Panay" through the victories in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean which would culminate in striking him even across the Pacific on the American continent.

All our so-called "social gains" are embodied in our youth. A captive private just out of the high school shrieking in the torture of a slow public bayonetting to impress the Malay and Chinese of our inferiority is an incident of Japanese propaganda also impressive to Californians. Though some of our politicians ignore it, we knew what war in the Orient means before the weeks of the rape of Nanking. We know of the efficiency of an intelligent, determined and powerful people unified for a conquest of both shores of the Pacific by force in all its forms.

Incidentally we know, contrary to the impression of one high in authority, that the California sportsmen have several hundred thousand sporting rifles and shotguns available to federal commandeering for the purpose of arming such federal forces. The location of these arms is disclosed through the licensing system.

We also assume that no general officer will contend that what is immediately necessary for internal warfare in the Pacific Coast States must be provided for Illinois, Colorado and North Carolina. Even after Bataan there are academic political dreamers who are still thinking of equality in state rights--

that is, as if Vicksburg, Manassas, Bull Run, Seven Pines, and the Monitor and Merrimac were all identical in strategy and tactics.

Analysis of Proposal of Divided Federal and State Command in California

Legalistic Military Futilities

Our protest considers the War Department plan of disjunctive command, as it is in California, from two standpoints.

(1) Assuming the State had not been castrated by federal conscription (which holds apart even the combat rejects) and to have the power (which it has not) to conscript the best of its citizens and to commandeer rifles, shotguns and pistols to arm them to repel its raiding enemies, the disjunction from the federal command of scattered military units under various state commands would not work.

We are informed that it took two years to obtain unity of command of the British Army and Navy in the defense of the coast of the British Isles. If California now had an army or several small armies of its own, efficiently officered, we still could expect the destructive lack of unity shown in Britain.

(2) Legalistic futility. Our second consideration of the Army's proposed disjunctive command concerns what we regard as its legalistic futility. It assumes that the private owners, cities, water districts, counties, and the state will convert their peace-time obligation and function to maintain public

order into military effectiveness for battling with raiders.

It is a condition the Japanese will seek to destroy in California--not a thesis on constitutional obligations.

(a)* A California State army with a tragically pathetic commander in chief. California has a State guard, beginning to be organized, consisting of children and elderly men, persons necessarily outside the draft. This army has an upper limit of 7,000. But 5,000 of the limited eligibles have enlisted. It makes medical provision only for traumatic injuries. That is to say, if a Los Angeles boy contracts pneumonia in guarding the Golden Gate bridge, he may return home 400 miles away for nursing and treatment at his own expense.

This for repelling attacks on plants requiring somewhere in the neighborhood of 50,000 fighting men to defend them!

California has a governor, in a campaign for his reelection, whose warlike character and political capacity is evidenced by the following facts. In January last, he asked his legislature for an army of 25,000 but was unable to procure appropriations for more than 7,000. This was in a session after Pearl Harbor and the bombing and destruction of Repulse and the Prince of Wales. That legislature adjourned in January. Since then the Japanese have taken Malaya, Singapore, Batavia, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Rangoon, and much of Burma, and they have driven the European as far toward the South Pole

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* The statements in this subsection (a) concerning the governor have not been authorized by the Commonwealth Club. They are those of a member of his party who helped to elect him.

as suits their present convenience. The 500 mile long summer fog bank is but a month away. With this, the certitude of the bombing plane, the parachutists and the commandos.

The State and its legislators are shuddering under this menace. Yet, within a fortnight, the governor has stated that he will not convene the legislature and ask for a State army adequate at least in number.

Our war (sic) governor has publicly stated his reason. It is that if he calls a session, California will not create any larger force than was given in last January, and all that would happen would be political accusation and recrimination. This, obviously, before his campaign for re-election. The governor is right. There would be bitter comment on his delay from Batavia to the coastal fogs.

(b) Individual plant soldiers to fight the Japanese troops or fifth columnists. Despite General DeWitt's call on the individual utility owners to provide their bodies of fighting men to repel attacks on their plants, they regard this as a federal or state function. They think of their rates, established by the State, which provide no funds to fight Japanese.

The example of one association of water supply plants is sufficient. In each is one deputy sheriff, presumably above the conscription age. As a Californian put it in his vernacular, "A swell time for that flabby dewlapped deputy outside the great power house, when he lifts his coat lapel and shows his sheriff's

badge and says to half a dozen Jap parachutists with tommy guns, 'Come along, you fellows. You are under arrest.'"

(c) Cities and counties discuss bond issues for soldiers and police for next year. San Francisco is fire conscious remembering its conflagration of 1906. It expects and dreads another, and after a laggard political year, has proceeded vigorously to organize its fire wardens.

Despite this, the city is relying on part-time volunteers to fight parachutists or commandos seeking to throw bombs in their telephone substations. These substations are essential to communications to fight the not unlikely 500 simultaneous fires from the 10,000 incendiary bombs from one plane carrier dropped on its wooden buildings, in its daily northwest trade winds.

Maybe six months or a year from now we will vote a bond issue. Our politicians discuss it with an eye on the taxpayers' vote. But whether for our starving evacuees from a burned city or for future additions to our police, we are not sure. To the low-grade politician what Sherman said about war is true. It so puzzles one about votes.

Conclusion

It is time to forget politics and conduct a total war. Babbling candidates should drop the old slogans. We cannot meet the weapons and tactics of the Japanese and Germans with part-time "home guards" and "embattled farmers." The blue lumps over their armpits from their first shot with military rifles are so painful!

It is a time for federal soldiers who will stand day and night around a great power plant waiting for the most dangerous of fighting--the surprise attack of determined soldiers. Discipline for that dreary and trying service must have the federal guardhouse for the recalcitrant and the federal army's esprit de corps for the high spirited.

Telephone conversation between Colonel Tate and Colonel Bendetsen on July 30, 1942 at 12:15 P.M.

B: Did you get any word from the State Department?

T: Not yet. They are mulling over the questions. Go ahead with everything that you plan to do.

B: Just go ahead, huh?

T: Yes, in accordance with our original conversation on the thing and it certainly won't be ground lost. I sent you a copy of their letter down here, did you get it?

B: Yes. For the first time we have gotten official recognition of what we are doing.

T: So go ahead along that line and as soon as I get the answers to these questions you put to me, I'll telephone you.

B: We are preparing a report this morning [redacted] and some of the information they want would probably influence that report but I hope not very much because if we go ahead with it we won't have time to do it over again.

T: I'm hoping to be able to get that answer by tomorrow.

B: That's all I have this morning in particular. I just spoke a minute ago to Mac about the matter of priorities. He said he would keep right on it but he thinks that possibly the Boss will have to go before the Board.

T: Yes. Now, I've got something else here. You published under date of June 19th certain instructions relating to the conduct of this national Student Relocation Council. Mr. McCloy is not very keen about your instruction No.9. It reads a member of the International Internal Security in each Center will be present during all meetings and interviews held by the National Student Relocation Council and will so detailed by the Chief of Internal Security in each Center. He raises this question. If these people are accredited by you to go in and talk with these students that he can't see any need for having an Internal Security man sit right at his elbow while he interviews a student.

B: The point is that we don't as far as accrediting them by us is concerned we are letting them in because it is a part of a program that has official sanction but as far as our personal approval of these people are concerned they don't have it in all cases even though they have gone through the Intelligence Service we find that they have some objection to them. The point is we just don't trust them. We don't rust them for a number of reasons - that they are trying to mix Student Relocation with their own views of social reform at the same time that they are doing that and at the same time that apparently that we are working hand and hand on the matter they see fit that they point to the fact that this program is unnecessary. We therefore feel

that it requires pretty careful supervision because we just don't know what they are talking about.

T: What action on their part has led you to believe that they are getting in the social reform phase of it?

B: A great many things. In the first place they have put out a circular which would plainly indicate that they feel that this was wholly unnecessary and mean to tell the evacuees that.

T: That's not correct, Karl, according to their statement here yesterday. They came into see Mr. McCloy and that lead off paragraph was an effort to lead off into their program. It wasn't intended as any reflection upon what the War Department has done.

B: Did they talk about the pamphlets that they got out?

T: Yes. They had a copy of it. Mr. McCloy saw it. Of course, they realize that perhaps there were some unintentional unfortunate words in there. It was not intentional on their part and Mr. McCloy merely raises the question why should there be an Internal Security man present when the man is interviewed.

B: Are they objecting to that?

T: They don't like it. No, because they feel that they are a recognized agency and that if their interviewers are investigated and passed then they ought to be allowed to hold their interviews.

B: You know of course, that at least on the West Coast their representation is pretty pinko.

T: Have you got any evidence to that effect?

B: I don't have it personally, no. I'm only now stating what I am advised.

T: That's not very helpful to Mr. McCloy.

B: I'm going to try to give you something that might be more helpful. We feel that they should not be intthere without some supervision. We have had a tough road to follow from the beginning on Public Relations. Our Public Relations has been very good because we have been very watchful. That's the only reason that they have been good.

T: Yes, but we've got to watch out that we don't turn these camps into so-called concentration camps, Karl and this looks like a step to deny these people the rights that they would normally have if they were not in the Centers.

B: That's true. But you know that we are beating the devil around the bush a good deal to keep up the fiction is all well good, true, we are doing everything that we can in that connection and we are much awake to that

particularly in our Public Relations. Certainly we are well aware of the necessity for that. At the same time we have found that if we don't be careful, keep in close touch with everything that is going on, their representation there maybe someone else should be present there besides that but we don't do that because we find that we get behind the 8-ball because we don't know what is going on. Now, one illustration. They wanted to prepare a questionnaire for these people. They didn'tlike it very well when we insisted on seeing it first. When they brought in the first draft of it we found that many of the questions just didn't have anything whatever to do with Student Relocation. They were trying to find out what the evacuees were thinking about this program. So we said no, that we didn't think that type of questionnaire was at all appropriate to this and we asked them to take them out. They did so but rather reluctantly.

T: They raised the point on the clearance on this publicity. They say that they have had certain things into to WCCA for clearance and that they have been there for 2 weeks and they haven't gotten a clearance yet. The main thing that Mr. McCloy is anxious to see done, Karl, is that they be given the right to find the students, make the arrangements to move them out without too much handicap put upon their actions as provided for of course, that these people are acceptable to you people out there.

B: I'd like to make this point, Ralph, that I think is very important and unless you are very close to it, it is apt to appear less important. There's a very cogent necessity for complete separation between what we do and what is under our jurisdiction and what War Relocation Authority does. In other words, private employment, for instance, is something within War Relocation Authority's jurisdiction. I don't mean by that that we are not to cooperate 100% with War Relocation Authority because as you know, I think that we have to but I do mean that from the view point of the public, the viewpoint of whose responsible for what, we've got to maintain that line of cleavage. It has been a difficult thing to do. I think student relocation is something that is not for the War Department to get into. Should not have any part of it.

T: That's right. I won't question that at all. Neither does Mr. McCloy but we have the Japs now and we are going to have them until October. The school season opens in September. Now we have got to give them as much help as possible. While we have got the Japs on our hands we've got to get the program underway.

B: Mr. McCloy in his consent to a sound and well-conceived program, he didn't consent to whatever they wanted to do you know.

T: No, he consented to the program.

B: A program conceived and well-regulated. That is what he consented to. In order to carry out Mr. McCloy's own statement that's why we have kept in such close touch with it whether to be able to say whether it is or is not sound, well-conceived and well-regulated. Now he said specifically that it was not to apply to aliens. Well, we have had a good deal of discussion with them on that. They insist that it should include aliens.

T: How can you get an alien in that age group?

B: There are lots of them. Some of them come as students and stay here. Got a lot of aliens in that group.

T: I feel that you are correct in that understanding what Mr. McCloy considers the program to be. It's to be students-citizens.

B: we can't very well be in a position to assure anyone that this is a well regulated and well- conceived program unless we keep in close touch with it.

T: Of course, primary responsibility for any program along that line is WRA.

B: That's just it. I agree with you that the Primary responsibility for such a program is War Relocation Authority but under the present conditions it looks like it is War Department's.

T: It's only because we've got the people under our control. If this thing could be carried out in the normal routine way....

B: We have a substantial majority of them at this time.

T: That's right. Unless you have some good reasons why they shouldn't go in there under those conditions, why of course he would like to consider relaxing that regulation.

B: Let me report to you on it further, Ralph.

T: I wish you would because I would like to present all the facts on the matter that you've got. That doesn't necessarily mean that he wants to direct it now but let him have a look at the reasons why you put that regulation in there.

B: Fine. Good-bye.

T: All right, good-bye.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California

July 20, 1942

Subject: Request of Commanding General, Second Air Force, for evacuation of all Japanese and all enemy aliens from theState of Washington, Military Area No. 2.

To: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. War Department

1. By telephone Friday, July 17, 1942, the Commanding General, Second Air Force, recommended the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 2 of the State of Washington (Tab A). By telephone Saturday, July 18, 1942, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, requested the Commanding General, Second Air Force, to supply evidence of the necessity for Japanese evacuation in writing (Tab B). By confidential teletype dated July 19, 1942, the Commanding General, Second Air Force, submitted his request setting forth the information contained in the telephone conversations cited above (Tab C).

2. Neither the telephone conversations cited above nor the teletype (Tab C) establish any connection whatever between the incidents referred to and persons of Japanese ancestry. No basis is established for the action recommended. The incidents described do require the establishment and maintenance of further security measures such as those set forth in the teletype (Tab C).

3. Attention is invited to the development of relocation projects for housing 35,000 Japanese in Arizona within a radius of 40 miles and in some cases virtually adjacent to large air corps installations. These projects are the Parker (near Poston, Arizona on the Colorado River) and Gila (on the Sacaton Indian Reservation along the Gila River, 35 miles southeast of Phoenix), both of which were established with War Department approval. Further, the Army Air Forces and the War Department approved establishment of the Beardsley, Arizona, relocation project (since abandoned for other reasons) for 15,000 Japanese evacuees immediately adjacent to the Thunderbird Field.

4. Attention is invited to the fact that the Commanding General, Second Air Force, objected to the establishment of a relocation project within 150 miles of any air corps installation and specifically objected to the establishment of both the Black Canyon and the Gooding, Idaho, project, although he was overruled by the Army Air Forces and military clearance accordingly was granted by the War Department for the establishment of the Gooding project.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
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ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
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CONFIDENTIAL

(To Chief of Staff re request of CG 2nd Air Force
for evacuation of all Japanese and all enemy aliens) July 20, 1942

5. The net voluntary movement of Japanese into the Spokane area since the inception of the evacuation program has been relatively small in comparison with other areas. (Tab D)

6. Action such as that recommended by General Olds would demand parallel action in all other states having Japanese communities near vital installations.

7. Commanding General, Second Air Force, requests the removal of all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry. By War Department directive (Tab E), no mass evacuation of enemy aliens may be undertaken for the present by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and any action involving collective evacuation of enemy aliens requires specific War Department approval Further, collective evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry can only be undertaken with specific War Department approval (Tab F).

8. In view of the security measures now being taken by the Commanding General, Second Air Force (Tab C), for the protection of Geiger Field, the opportunity for sabotage and other fifth column or subversive action should be materially reduced over the condition previously obtaining. Some opportunity should be afforded to determine whether such measures will ensure against the recurrence of incidents of the nature described.

9. I have advised the Commanding General, Second Air Force, of the reference of his recommendation to the War Department (Tab G).

10. If any evidence of attempted sabotage or of fifth column or other subversive action on the part of persons of Japanese ancestry is developed, I would recommend the evacuation of all such persons not only for the protection of war installations, but also to prevent direct action against them. Consequent upon such a course would be the necessity for similar action in other Western Defense Command states, as well as in some localities beyond the Western Defense Command - principally Colorado (Tab D). The information thus far submitted by the Commanding General, Second Air Force (Tabs A and C) does not formulate the basis for a recommendation that his request be approved.

/s/ J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding.

Telephone conversation between Colonel Tate and Colonel Bendetsen 7/21/42 at 8:45 P.M.

B: The day before yesterday or as a matter of fact Friday, the Commanding of Second Air Force, General Olds at Spokane telephoned General DeWitt and said that there had been some crashes and that their cruise had been lost accordingly. Also, that there had been some suspicious incidents occuring around some of his fields, principally Gyger Field at Spokane. One incident involved the beating up of a sentry. There was no indication as to who beat the sentry up whether it was Spike Brown or who. He called up General DeWitt and said that he wanted to recommend that all Japs be immediately evacuated from Eastern Washington on account of these incidents. At a conference then, the following day, I recommended that the Commanding General call on General Olds for a written statement and evidence that might be taken into consideration in determining on the advisability of the course he recommended. That was done. General Olds then sent in a confidential teletype to the effect that I have just described. Now, there is no relation established between the two incidents at Gyger Field and any Jap. It might have been anybody. It probably happened because I don't think the security measures he had taken were all they ought to have been but in his second telegram he said that he was now taking certain security measures which plainly indicated that he hadn't taken them before. Three of the incidents were caused, well, one of them was caused by the insertion of a tool into the honeycomb of a super charger. Now that is an inside job. I don't think that a Jap could get close enough to a plane to do that, if he could then something is wrong with the security measures at the field.

T: Yes, that doesn't make sense.

B: The other two crashes were unexplained completely although the pilots had long hours of experience. One 18,000 hours. Well, there is more flying then there was. At anyrate, Myers recommended to the General to present no case to the evacuation of Japanese or enemy aliens up there, that anti-sabotage measures would be still required and properly taken should prevent sabotage from any source including Japs or enemy aliens who are probably no better sabotagers than our citizens.

T: It looks [redacted] to me that he ought to set up a good C.S. system.

B: Yes, and as a matter of fact many of his employees have never been checked because of the [redacted] in our checking system, you know. Therefore, I recommended in view of ~~our last~~ the fact that the migration ended at Spokane Area since our program started is not as great as apparently General Olds thought but General DeWitt forwarded the recommendation to the War Department with the statement that the case so far made out shows no connection between the two and that it does not formulate any basis upon which to recommend an approval as General Olds request. That I believe, if it was signed, the General indicated to me that he agreed with the recommendation, went forward to the War Department today by mail. Sent a radiogram to General Olds the action taken. I think probably it was approved. I haven't heard yet but if it hasn't gone forward today, I think probably it will tomorrow.

T: That will go down to Operations.

B: Probably to Sherrill, unless he leaves by then.

T: Yes.

B: He coming out to Sacramento, you know.

T: I didn't know that.

B: Yes, he is going to be a BG and be in charge of a school there. We have a new Chief of Staff above all Armed Forces now.

T: Oh, Leahy. I saw that today in the press.

B: I think possibly you will be interested in the thing that I have just told you. You might want to be on the look out for it.

T: I'll speak to him about it and ask him to let me in on it. Well, I think you have taken the sound action. I haven't anything more.

B: That's all I have.

ASW 014.311 W.D.C. - General
(Basic papers: 000.5 Sabotage)

Telephone Conversation 7-21-42

Between: Colonel Bendetsen
Colonel Tate

Re: Due to the fact that there has been evidence of sabotage which caused plane crashes, General Olds is requesting evacuation of Japs from Eastern Washington.

7-21-42

B: I have another thing but it can wait.

T: I have about 4 or 5. The first one. Where is the answer to Gerry Voorhis?

B: It's on the way.

T: What do you mean. Coming through the mail?

B: Yes.

T: All right. Second one. The Alien Property Custodians' Office called and wanted to know if we had a record of any boats that the Japanese owned at the time we moved them out of the West Coast Area. That included any type of boat. Do you know whether you have any such information?

B: Yes, we have in some cases. Not complete summaries. I'll give you what we've got.

T: Do you know who owns them and what type of boat they've got and everything.

B: Yes. To the extent that we've got the information, we had it so registered.

T: Would the Navy have anything on that?

B: Yes. I run it down for you.

T: Let me know where they might find that information, will you Karl?

B: Right.

A... ...
... 72 ...2

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM

AG
G-OPD 370.05 WDC (7-20-42)

SUBJECT: Request of Commanding General, Second Air Force, for Evacuation of all Japanese and All Enemy Aliens from the State of Washington, Military Area No. 2. Date July 29, 1942

TO	___ C/S	___ G-1	___ G-2	___ G-3	___ G-4	___ Air Staff		
	X TAG	___ OPD	___ USW	___ ASW	___ ASWA	___ CG	_____	Army
	___ AC	___ BLP	___ BOWD	___ ExRA	___ NGB	___ CG	___	Army Corps
	___ INF	___ FA	___ CAV	___ CA	___ ENGR	___ CG	___	CA
	___ ORD	___ QMG	___ CSO	___ SG	___ FIN	___ CG	_____	DEPT
	___ GHQ	___ JAG	___ CWS	___ IG	___ B/PR	- - - - - - - - - - - -		

FOR	___ S/W directs	___ Comment or Concurrence	___ Necessary action
	___ Draft of reply	___ Remark and recommendation	___ Information for reply
	___ Direct reply	___ Inviting attention to	___ ___ Ind. approved
	___ Approved	___ See notation of_____	___ Primary interest
	___ Disapproved	___ Information	___ Notation and return
	___ File	___ Consult_____	Noted_____
	X C/S directs:		

By	___ Spcl Msgr	___ Radio	___ Air Mail	___ Immed. Action Ltr	___ Letter	.....

That the attached communication (ltr to C/S from CG, WDC dated July 20) with Tabs A-G be returned to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command by confidential indorsement substantially as follows:

1. ~~The~~ action ~~of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command,~~ in response to a request by the Commanding General, Second Air Force for the evacuation of Japanese, is approved.

2. The proposed basis upon which further evacuation of Japanese from the Western Defense Command may be initiated is concurred in by the War Department.

ACTION TAKEN: 7-31-42. 1st Ind. to CG, WDC. MNE/evh-1705.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

1 Incl.
Ltr to C/S frm CG, WDC
7-20-42 w/Tabs A-G.

WAR DEPARTMENT AGO
MISCELLANEOUS DIVISION
JUL 30 11 29 PM '42

Received.
M-7

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
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FILE JUL 31 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Request of Commanding General, Second Air Force, for evacuation of all Japanese and all enemy aliens from the State of Washington, Military Area No. 2.

AG 014.311 (7-20-42)MS-E 1st Ind. MNE/evh-1705.

War Department, A.G.O., July 31, 1942. - To: Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

1. Your action in response to a request by the Commanding General, Second Air Force for the evacuation of Japanese, is approved.

2. The proposed basis upon which further evacuation of Japanese from the Western Defense Command may be initiated is concurred in by the War Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. TUM[illegible]

Adjutant General.

7 Incls.-n/c
#1-Cy of transcript of tel. conversation between Gen. DeWitt & Gen. Olds, 7-17-42.
#2-Cy of transcript of tel. conversation between Gen. DeWitt & Gen. Olds, 7-18-42.
#3-Cy paraphrase radio. to CG, WDC 7-19-42 fm Gen. Olds.
#4-Map showing "Net Voluntary Movement of Japanese, Western Defense Command Area, March 12 to June 5, 1942.
#5-Cy ltr, AGO, May 22, 1942, AG 014.311 (5-20-42)MC-F to CG, WDC.
#6-Cy memo, April 26, 1942 to War Dept. Classified Message Center.
#7-Paraphrase of radio. 7-20-42 fm DeWitt to 2nd Air Force.

BASED ON: OPD 370.05 WDC (7-20-42), July 29, 1942.

COMPARED: evh/kls.

Misc. Br._____Ext. 5515.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958
NNMW by ___ date 5/4/65
by TAB par 925.

CONFIDENTIAL

HSB/JCH/mow

HEADQUARTERS LOWRY FIELD
Army Air Forces Technical Training Command
Denver, Colorado.

July 30, 1942

SUBJECT: Japanese Evacuees residing near Lowry Field, Colorado.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reports received at this Headquarters indicate that several families of Japanese have recently been evacuated from California, and are at the present time residing near this Post, as shown by extracts of reports from the Denver Police Department, attached hereto.

a. Attention is invited to the fact that Japanese aliens have been, and now are occupying a residence located at 1231 Locust Street, Denver, Colorado, 13 blocks from the 11th Avenue and Syracuse entrance to Lowry Field, 11 blocks from the nearest boundary of Lowry Field, and 40 blocks from the Municipal Airport.

b. Attention is also invited to the fact that Japanese aliens have been, and now are occupying residences located at 1763 and 1775 Xenia Street, 19 blocks from the 11th and Syracuse entrance to Lowry Field, 8 blocks from the nearest boundary of Lowry Field, and only 6 blocks from the Municipal Airport.

2. It is believed that the same analogy should be used in this area as on the West Coast, namely, that enemy aliens or evacuees should be prohibited from vital defense areas.

3. It is recommended that enemy aliens and evacuees from other defense areas be prohibited from residing nearer than a three mile radius of Lowry Field.

H. S. MURWELL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

2 Incls:
Incl #1 - Report 4/23/42 (in quad)
Incl #2 - Report 7/29/42 (in quad)

8-7-42
File - G.H.Q.
1736
8/19/42 Ltr Sent

96
4 G 014.311 Undated (7-30-42)

EXTRACT FRO DENVER POLICE REPORT OF APRIL 23, 1942 ON
JAPANESE EVACUEES LIVING NEAR LOWRY FIELD

RE: S. SUGIOKA and Family
Present Address 1231 Locust St.
Telephone Emerson 9056

JAMES SUGIOKA was interviewed and furhished the following information:

FATHER, S. SUGIOKA, AE Registration #2698634, was born in Hiroshuma, Japan May 12, 1879. Travel permit was issued from Hollister, Calif. to Denver, Colo. on 3/26/42, showing 37 years and 9 months residence in the U.S.

MOTHER, KANEHO SUGIOKA, AE Registration #2664879, born Matsuyama, Japan on April 20 , 1884. Length of residence in US 36 years, 6 months. Travel permit from Hollister, Calif. to Denver, Colo. issued 3/26/42.

ELDEST SON, JAMES SUGIOKA, born Aug. 25, 1906, Hollister, Calif. A graduate Elec. Engineer, occupation electrical contractor, formerly operated amateur radio short-wave station at Hollister Calif., call letters W6JU2. Has card from American Legion Radio Emergency Network, Hollister, Calif., issued Jan. 11, 1939.

DAUGHTERS, Mrs. Arlie C. Yokoyama, born Oct. 11, 1914, Hollister, Calif.
Mary T. SUGIOKA, born Jan 27, 1916, Hollister, Calif.
Gertrude K. SUGIOKA, born Feb. 10, 1918, Hollister, Calif.
Dora M. SUGIOKA, born Feb. 24, 1923, Hollister, Calif.

SONS. Kenneth SUGIOKA, born April 19, 1920, Hollister, Calif.
Edgar SUGIOKA, born Jan. 18, 1926, Hollister, Calif.

The above persons are at present living at 1231 Locust Street, Denver, Colo. Approximate date of arrival in Denver from California was April 4, 1942. Enemy Alien Registration Cards and travel permits apparently all correct.

EXTRACT FROM DENVER POLICE REPORT OF JULY 29, 1942
on
JAPANESE EVACUEES LIVING NEAR LOWRY FIELD

DEN-ICHI IWATA (male)

Born in Tanaka Wakayama, Japan, September 18, 1878. Alien registration No. 2521893. Description: 5' 4"; weight 120#, hair, gray. Index finger off at first joint on left hand. Has been in the United States 35 years. Traveled from Mountain View, Santa Clara County, California, to 2026 Hudson Street, Denver. Neighbors "raised so much Cain" that they moved to 1763 Xenia. Pays $50 per month rent. Is a Nurseryman or farmer.

CHAIKO IWATA (female)

Born in Mountain View, Santa Clara County, California. Birth certificate. Local registry No. 233. Travel permit from Santa Clara County to 2026 Hudson - 1763 Xenia.

HARI IWATA (female)

Born Mountain View, Santa Clara County, California, March 22, 1931. Local registry No. 22.

These people have a Buick town sedan. Do not know license number as son had car at work.

MASAJA IWATA (male)

Born Aug. 7, 1919. P.O.Box 186, Mt. View, Calif. Father is Don Yemon Ivata. Mother is Jui Nishara (maiden name) Place of birth, Dist. 4358. Local reg. No. 38. (At birth was attended by midwife Mrs. Chiyo Amenuija, 529 N. 6th St., San Jose.

SUMI IWATA, (Female)

Born April 10, 1924. O'Connor Sanatarium. San Jose. County of Santa Clara. Father is Zineman Ivata. Mt. View, Calif., who was born in Japan. Mother was Mui. Died April 13, 1924. Birth was attended by Dr. J. I. Beattie, M.D. Santa Clara, Calif. Place of birth, Dist. 4360. Rec. No. 705, Local Reg. 124.

CHIYO NISHIMA.

Born Kamiato Wakayama. Born March 1, 1905. Been in U.S. 19 years, 11 months. Height 4'1". Weight 110. Hair black. Black mole on back of right hand. Registration No. 2414418.

Inclo #2

Police Report 7/29/42 (continued)

GUNZO SUOIHARA (male)

Was born in Herashima, Japan, March 4, 1884. He has been in the United States 43 years. Former address, 1829 Dwight Way, Berkeley, Calif. Alien registration No. 7523368. He had a travel permit from San Francisco to 1944 Larimer Street, Denver, Colo. Moved from that address to 2135 Arapahoe and then to 1775 Xenia. Description: 5' 3"; weight 128; hair, black and gray. Moved to present address on July 22, 1942. His son bought the property. (Has wife and four children in Japan)

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KAZUFO SUOIHARA (female)

Born January 13, 1919 at Kobe Hyogo, Japan. Former address 1829 Dwight Way, Berkeley, Calif. Alien registration No. 7523367. Description, Height, 5' 3"; weight 110#; hair, black. Very thin features.

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JOZO SUOIHARA (male)

Born January 14, 1916, San Francisco, California. Birth Cert. Dist No. 3801. Local register No. 412. Bought this home at 1775 Xenia, from Mrs. Amy Stiece, 5/15/42 - moved in 7/22/42. Paid $6350 with ($3800 mortgage against it). He has a Dodge sedan; color, gray, Colorado license 1-91044 - all clear.

Son and father were food importers - firm names, - GUNZO SUOIHARA, JOZO SUOIHARA and K. NAKANISHI (who lives at 1943 Larimer, Denver, Colo.) The business is now under the supervision of the United States Treasury Department. Certificate change of residence and notice of travel permit, 4/21/42 to all four of them, authorized by Commanding General of Western Defense and for the Army. Signed by Delores Christy. (Operated in California under name of Pacific -----, Inc. 100 Sacramento St., San Francisco, Calif.

Copy 8/19/42

July 22, 1942

Dear Senator Holman:

I have your letter of July 15 in which you enclose a telegram received from two unions of the American Federation of Labor, Bates, Oregon, protesting the use of Japanese labor by the Forest Service in the Bates, Oregon, forest area.

Our West Coast people have advised me that the Japanese referred to in the telegram are not under the control of the Army. I assume, therefore, that they have come from an area outside of the zone of evacuation along the West Coast.

As you know there are a number of Japanese, citizens and aliens alike, located outside the restricted zone established along the West Coast who are at liberty to travel and to work wherever their labors are desired. Control over these people is exercised by the civil authorities in a manner similar to that which obtains for all other civilians.

Inasmuch as the War Department has no jurisdiction over the Japanese outside the restricted West Coast area, there is little the Department can do about the protest of the Carpenters and Joiners Unions. I can only suggest that the matter be presented to the Forest Service office.

Sincerely,

Secretary of War.

The Honorable,
Rufus C. Holman,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

OASW:RHT:MGB

Prepared A.S.W.
Mailed O.A.S.W. 7/24/42
Papers to.....

copy sent C&R asw

June 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Congressman:

I have your letter of June 23rd in which you enclose the article on Japanese evacuation which appeared in the June issue of the "Maryknoll" magazine. I read this article with great interest and I appreciate the tribute Father McCarthy has paid to the Army in its handling of this thorny problem.

Inasmuch as the supervision of the centers in which the Japanese are now housed is under the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, I am sending your letter along to him to obtain his views on the proposal that priests be authorized to reside with the Catholic people in the Assembly Centers. I do not know how far he has gone already in this matter. As soon as I hear back from him, I will communicate with you further on this subject.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

The Honorable
John W. McCormack
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

CASW:RHT:MAM

Prepared A.S.W.
Mailed O.A.S.W. 6/30/42
Papers to Gen. Bendetsen.

Army inspections of assembly centers
July, 1942

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California
Telephone KLondike 2-2611

Copy & Route
to [illegible] for
Comments

July 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Col. Ira K. Evans

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Tanforan Assembly Center

1. The first impression the visitor receives is one of order and neatness. It seems hardly possible that 8000 people are housed in this small area. There was much less milling around than might be expected. People were either busy on specified jobs or occupied with household tasks.

2. The executives all had a most intelligent attitude toward the management of the Assembly Center. They seemed to cooperate well with each other and with the Japanese in each of the various departments.

3. BUILDINGS

a. The Central Storeroom. The central storeroom was in good order. The perishable products were of excellent quality. Good cooperation with Marketing Centers was reported. Large quantities of canned goods were on hand. There could possibly be substitutions made with fresh vegetables. The canned meats should not be used at all.

b. The Butcher Shop. The butcher shop was in good order and clean. The workers were skillful. This was very interesting because the men had not been in this type of work before. One was a medical student. The man in charge of the butcher shop is competant.

(1) The ice boxes were clean, but there was a good deal of water from dripping.

(2) The trimmings of fats from meats are being put to use for purposes of frying and the making of soap. Bones are used for stock. There is evidently no wastage from this source. The bones are later sold along with the disposal of garbage. In conjunction with the present plan of saving, egg crates and burlap sacks are also turned into salvage.

4. MESSES

a. THE WORKERS' MESS

[illegible]

(1) This mess was clean. The food looked and tasted good. The rice was well cooked according to the dishpan method worked out for this kitchen. The plates were amply filled (cafeteria style) and practically everyone ate all that was on his plate. That this was enough food was evidenced by the fact that bread on the table was hardly touched.

(2) The women workers have put jars of green branches on every table. This made the dining room look attractive.

(3) Japanese meals were served both at noon and night in this mess hall on July 3.

(4) There were several comments that the equipment was inadequate. Apparently the Japanese use a great many more cooking utensils than Americans. It was noticed that for the evening meal 11 dishpans and 11 ration pans were used for the preparation of one main dish for supper.

b. FAMILY MESS

(1) In the family mess halls one section is reserved for children, usually the mothers and fathers eat with them. The vegetables for the children were cut in very fine pieces and the type of food was right.

(2) In one of these mess kitchens there were uncovered pitchers of milk with a good deal of scum and dust on the top. This was the only place where any of the food was cared for improperly. There was bottled milk for all of the children.

(3) The cloths used for wiping the counters and wiping off dishes were dark in color and did not look clean.

(4) In one mess hall the menu was very starchy - noodles, macaroni and potato salad. The dessert was canned peaches. The main dish was creamed hard boiled eggs. The other messes had better balanced meals than this one particular mess. Too much tea was being used. It was tied too tightly in bags that did not allow full utilization of its strength.

c. DISHWASHING

(1) The dish washing is not entirely satisfactory and there seemed to be no-one to supervise it; in some cases the water had not been changed and it would hardly be possible to get the dishes clean. Many of the people brought their own dishes and knives and forks. This plan works all right when each family washes its own dishes and carries them home, but the dish water should be cleaner.

5. SPECIAL DIETS AND BABY FORMULAS

a. The diet room and the open counter on which the special diets are served were close to the men's toilet. There was a most disagreeable odor. The dietitian said that the Center Manager was trying to find a place for this work in another building. The dietitians have no stove, so all of the cooking must be done in the big workers' mess kitchen.

(1) The food given on the 150 special diets looked very nice. The chief dietitian, Mrs. Obata, is a graduate of the University of California. Her assistants for the most part were girls who have had 2, 3, or 4 years of Home Economics in college. They served the food neatly and even paid some attention to the color of the foods. The people who came for their special diets carried their dishes wrapped in clean towels.

(2) The special diets were for hypertension, diabetic, soft, and ulcer. The dietitian implied that the large number of hypertension cases was due to the food and the life in the camp. The reply to this was that hypertension is developed over a period of years, and undoubtedly the same people would be suffering from it if they were not in the camp, although it may be aggravated by the excitement and change involved in this new kind of life.

(3) The formulas for the babies are prepared in a fairly well equipped kitchen in one of the hospital buildings. The woman pediatrician said that they were using the formulas given to the women by their doctors previous to the time they came to the Assembly Center.

(4) The diet kitchens need some special equipment. Mrs. Obata had personally purchased puree sieves from Sears Roebuck and had donated them to the diet kitchen.

6. GENERAL COMMENTS.

a. The use of bulk milk for the adults is questionable, although the County Superintendent of Public Health said that he approved it.

b. There seemed to be a minimum of waste. There was some uncovered garbage outside of two of the mess kitchens. Undoubtedly the fact that there is a committee on foods working with Mr. Fogarty helps in the supplying of food that the people like. Many of the Japanese said that they liked the food and had plenty to eat.

c. It would be interesting to have a nutritional analysis made of the menus for one month to compare with the U. S. Army standards for feeding the soldiers and the standards for civilians as set up by the Nutritional Committee of the National Research Council. This analysis could be made in the Washington office.

d. The people seemed to be making a fairly good adjustment to conditions in addition to being well fed. There appeared to be adequate hospital and nursing care. There was also a recreational program that will probably be expanded as time goes on.

e. The conviction after spending one day in one Assembly Center is that a very intelligent job is being done by the Army officers and civilian officials in charge of supervision.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I. Barber

Mary I. Barber
Lt. Joseph W. Brearley

Joseph W. Brearley (Lt MC)

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 19, 1942

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Portland Assembly Center

TO : Lt. Col. Ira K. Evans

1. The first impression of this Center is pleasing. The grounds were clean and the attitude of the people was good.

2. The administrators all commented on the splendid co-operation they have received from the Army. They said that when the Japanese were first brought into the Center they were frightened, but are now relieved to feel that they are so well taken care of.

3. GENERAL MESS

a. At this Center the feeding is all done under one roof. The service is a combination of family and cafeteria style. The foods served cafeteria style are the ones that need to be controlled as to the amount eaten.

A large mess of this type presents the difficulty of keeping the foods warm. However, the eaters did not seem to care whether the food was hot or not. There was a serving table in the center of the room on which extra food was placed so that anyone could have seconds without going through the line.

A large mess of this type is not as good as a smaller mess in the matter of feeding children. There is a great deal of noise and confusion which diverted the children's attention. Small high-chairs have been provided, which helped them to eat more conveniently than where they had to sit on the regular benches.

One section of the mess hall was reserved for little children and their parents. Breakfast was served one hour later for the smaller children.

b. There were no screens on the building and flies came in from the slaughterhouse next door. Apparently nothing had been done to prevent this condition. It would be advisable to have fly traps and fly paper since it is not feasible to purchase screens

wd #5

for this Center which will be evacuated in a few weeks.

c. An Advisory Board works with the Director of Housing and Feeding. These people have no vote or special authority, but the plan is excellent because it is of help to the mess officer to have suggestions as to balance of Japanese and American food.

d. The dishes looked bad. They were gray and cracked. The dishwashing in this Center is not very satisfactory, due to an insufficiency of hot water. Dishes have to be washed between the first and second feeding and they are put on the table wet, which was unappetizing and insanitary. It would be advisable to take more time to wash the dishes after the first feeding and to do a better job even if the people had to wait a little longer before coming in for their meals.

4. FOOD

The aim of this Center is to provide nourishing food that is acceptable to the Japanese. This means a combination of American and Japanese dishes. Usually one Japanese meal is served each day.

The food was of excellent quality. The steward expressed appreciation of the cooperation given by Lt. Col. Ira K. Evans and the marketing center.

The food was well cooked. The standards of cooking are slightly better than usually seen in an Army mess, because the food was not over-cooked.

Butter was served with each meal, with an allowance of one pound for 100 people. In some Centers butter is being served but once a day. It is desirable to serve it two or three times because of its food value.

Both dark and white bread were served, a combination in the proportion of one part dark to two parts white.

This is the only Center where the amount of sugar is controlled. Each morning each person is given a small envelope of sugar which is the ration for the day.

Some type of baked pastry is served once each day. This is of good quality.

The fish to be used for supper was soaking in water and lemon. This seemed a poor way to handle fish unless it was not up to par.

5. KITCHENS

The kitchens are not up to Army standards in cleanliness. This was true in most every kitchen in every Center visited.

The ranges were consistently dirty.

The walk-in ice box was poorly arranged and not too clean. Cans of sliced onions uncovered were in the same compartment with the milk. The duck boards were very dirty and wet. However, a return visit to this mess hall showed that the refrigerator had been cleaned. The onions were still there uncovered, but other conditions were improved.

The garbage cans in the rear of the kitchens were not covered and the trash cans not well-kept. The garbage was being sold. There was no sale of surplus grease or bones. It seems that a food establishment of this size would have surplus grease for salvage.

6. BUTCHER SHOP

The butcher shop was well managed, but greatly handicapped by not being protected against flies. Request has been made for an enclosed or screened room, which is very necessary.

7. HOSPITAL

Food from the main mess hall is sent to the hospital. It is served to the patients from a small kitchen. Special diets and formulas for the babies are well taken care of in the hospital.

8. GENERAL COMMENTS

The use of bulk milk is questionable, although this seems to be the general method throughout the Centers and is approved by the Health Department.

There seemed to be little waste and the people ate most all of the food put on their plates.

There seemed to be adequate hospital and nursing service and special thought had been given to the young children.

At this Center the people looked happy and seemed satisfied.

They were willing to talk with us and in their quiet way were most enthusiastic about the way they were being treated.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I Barber
MARY I. BARBER
Food Consultant.

J. W. Brearley
J. W. BREARLEY
1st. Lieut. QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 21, 1942

SUBJECT: Visit to Puyallup Assembly Center

TO : Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

1. This Center is divided into four areas. The whole appearance of the grounds in all the areas was good. They were free from papers and other refuse. The people, as has been the case in all the Centers, look clean and happy.

The attitude of the people in the Puyallup Assembly Center was pleasing. They were willing and even seemed glad to talk about the food and the surroundings.

The administrative staff spoke highly of the cooperation of the Army and the marketing centers. Perishables are received twice weekly.

The guards at this Center were more strict than in other Centers, probably because of the way the areas are divided.

2. FOOD -

Area "D". 2400 people are served in this mess. The food is excellent in quality and the cooking was good. Unusual care was taken by the girls who served to see that the plates were made attractive. The service was slow in this mess, due to a bottle-neck in the feeding line. It was suggested that two lines could be set up. There was ample space for additional people and there seemed to be no reason why they could not all sit down at the same time. A second line would prevent hundreds of people from standing around waiting for the first group to finish feeding.

The pastry products are made daily in the bake shop of this area and distributed to the entire camp. This was the only place on our tour that we saw this procedure being carried out. The products were delicious and the cooks used recipes, so that there was some standardization in their methods and the results.

The food in this Center seemed to be more American in flavor than at Tanforan or Portland.

A special section of the mess hall was reserved for people

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July 21,1942

Re: Visit to Puyallup A.C. - July 8, 1942.

on special diets and for children. 370 persons were being served here. High chairs were provided for the children.

The special diets were served from one counter by young women. The food was excellent and served attractively.

The children were served from another counter. Smaller plates were used and smaller portions given, so there was little or no waste. Both adults on diets and the children there had all the milk they wanted to drink. This was served in quart bottles.

Area "A". There are six kitchens in this area, each serving 500 persons. We visited this area after the meal had been served. Cafeteria style of service is used. The cooks had built mixing-bowl stands that were very useful and efficient.

3. KITCHENS.

The kitchens were not up to army standards in cleanliness, although the cooking was probably superior to the army, especially in so far as the vegetables are concerned.

The ranges were dirty. This was noticed in every mess visited in all Centers, with but one exception. The stewards should be instructed to pay special attention to the ranges so as to keep down the replacement of parts. In fact, better kitchen police is advisable in nearly all of the Centers.

4. BUTCHER SHOP.

Storage rooms and refrigerators were clean.

5. HOSPITAL.

The hospital mess was excellent. The food was cooked and served in this kitchen for all the patients.

6. COMMENTS.

Subsistence is well handled. Standards are better than in some of the other Centers, and apparently the majority of the people were well satisfied.

There was no indication that surplus fats or bones were being salvaged. No soap was being made.

In two areas the garbage was being hauled away for hog feed. In the other two it was taken to the city dump. It would be

July 21,1942

Re: Visit to Puyallup A.C. - July 8, 1942

well if an adjustment could be made so that fats, bones and garbage could be sold.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I Barber

MARY I. BARBER
Food Consultant.

J.W. Brearley

J. W. BREARLEY
1st. Lieut. QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 21, 1942

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Santa Anita Assembly Center - July 14 and 15, 1942.

TO : Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

1. The appearance of this Center is really beautiful, due to the fine buildings, trees and flower gardens. The grounds are well kept. A small vegetable garden project has been started. Spinach and radishes are grown for use in the Center.

The Japanese seemed less friendly and less courteous than at any other Center visited. They looked less happy and seemed reluctant to talk about either the food or their adjustment to this type of life. There was no spontaneity in their manner.

The administrators spoke of many problems in the management of the personnel. The idea seemed to be to cater to the desires of the Japanese. As an example, the Japanese objected to wearing buttons that would admit them to an assigned mess hall, in fact, they would not wear them. They were not forced to wear them and another system is being tried. They are now given meal tickets which must be punched as they enter the mess for their meals. This will probably slow up the feeding lines. Another example of their uncooperative attitude is the refusal of the men to remove their hats in the mess halls, although requested to do so.

The stewards mentioned a fairly long list of food dislikes, and indicated that these foods are not being served. Perhaps occasional servings would develop a liking for them. Two Japanese stewards act as advisors to the administrative steward. One Japanese meal is served daily. Several typical Japanese recipes are used. The amount of rice is approximately 4000 pounds a day. Contrary to reports in other Centers, potatoes are well liked.

Despite an apparent tendency toward Japanese food customs, the people in this Center seemed more Americanized than in any other Center. Possibly this is the Hollywood influence.

2. <u>FOOD</u>

Milk as desired is provided. Menus are based on Army menus

Ind #3

with adaptations to suit local conditions. The meals were well balanced. The food was of good quality, with plenty of fresh vegetables and fruit.

The vegetable preparation room is most efficient for handling large supplies of vegetables. Vegetable preparation is done in a second room and delivered to the kitchens in G.I. cans, lined with wax paper.

Mess No. 2. This is one of the most sanitary kitchens, with a screened porch on either side where the people eat. A special line was provided where the children received their food. The main dishes were the same as for the adults. In addition, jelly sandwiches, apples and half-pint bottles of milk were dispensed to be carried home for the afternoon lunches for the children. No high chairs were provided, so the children were unable to eat neatly at the table. Their physical discomfort affected their appetites.

The food was very good and well served.

Butter is served only for breakfast, at which time the bread is spread with melted butter. It would seem advisable to serve butter three times a day.

3. KITCHENS

The kitchens are not up to Army standards of cleanliness. The ranges were dirty.

The meat refrigerators were clean.

All grease, also the garbage and bones, both raw and cooked, are sold. The amount of waste reported is too high.

4. MILK STATIONS

The milk stations established throughout the Center are an excellent plan. They were clean and refrigerators held bottles of milk for the babies. These stations are under hospital supervision.

5. HOSPITAL

The kitchen in the hospital was clean. The dietitian was warned to try to follow operating-room standards. Many of the food products were uncovered and the place was generally messy.

July 21, 1942

Re: Report - Santa Anita A.C. - July 14 and 15, 1942

There are no cribs for the children. While there one child had a rather bad fall.

The hospital cook had had training in a Japanese hospital and understood how to make custards and other recipes suitable for the diet of sick people. The dietitian was young and inexperienced, so the cook rather than the dietitian was running the hospital mess.

6. COMMENTS

There should be better facilities for the children so that they can be more comfortable. High chairs should be provided.

Cribs should be provided for the little children in the hospital.

There should be better supervision of waste.

There was an excess amount of miso in the stock room. If possible, this should be distributed to the Centers that are out of this product.

There were school classes being carried on all over the Center. It gave the appearance of not being well organized, although this may not be the case.

Fly traps should be provided for every mess.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I. Barber
MARY I. BARBER
Food Consultant.

J.W. Brearley
J.W. BREARLEY
1st. Lieut. QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 21, 1942

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Merced Assembly Center - July 17, 1942

TO : Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

1. This Center makes a very good first impression on the visitor. The attitude of the people seemed right. They looked happy and contented and were more than willing to talk.

The recreation in this Center seemed especially well organized. Some Japanese sports and dance programs were encouraged. Talent shows were given . There are many baseball teams. It seemed as though the people had plenty to think about other than being detained in the Center.

2. FOOD

A school for cooks is held twice a week by the chief Japanese steward. This is an excellent idea. At this time the menus for the next few days are discussed and instructions for cooking are given.

"J" Mess. The meal in this mess was only fair. It included dry lima beans which were not eaten well, at least fifty per cent of the beans served were later put in the garbage. There is an excess of dry lima beans on hand. However, some other way of cooking them should be found, or smaller amounts prepared and served from time to time.

The messes are equipped to serve 160 persons. The fact that between four and five hundred people are being fed at each mess means that there are nine sittings a day. There is little time to clean up between meals and this probably is responsible for the fact that the kitchens were not in better order. There is practically no storage room in the kitchens, so there are a great many cartons and utensils on the floor.

The pitchers used for milk, tea and lemonade still had the paper labels on the outside, indicating that they had never been properly washed.

wd to 7

July 21,1942

Re: Visit to Merced A.C. - July 17, 1942

The garbage cans were uncovered. Milk bottles are not thoroughly cleaned. The stoves are not in a satisfactory condition. Garbage at this Center is given away.

Butter is placed on the table at every meal. Mid-morning and afternoon feedings are given to the children up to six years. No special provision is made for the children either in type of food served, or high chairs, so that they are not eating comfortably. The meal that we saw was poorly eaten and a great deal of the food was spilled both on the children's clothes and on the floor. Too large portions were given to the children.

"I" Mess. This mess won the contest for cleanliness this month. The kitchen was clean and the stoves in much better condition than in the other messes.

The garbage cans were in a screened enclosure.

The cooks took pride in their work. The eaters looked happy and satisfied.

There were no high chairs, nor any special food for the little children.

"H" Mess. The ranges were clean, the food good and the cooks and workers proud of their accomplishments.

There are no high chairs, nor special food for the children in this mess.

3. COMMENTS

There is a shortage of dishes; soup plates being used instead of plates, which means that the food all runs together and looks untidy and unappetizing.

There was an excess supply of rice on hand. The stewards said that they were going to serve rice three times a day and would ask to have further issues cut, if necessary. The Japanese themselves expressed a preference for rice three times a day.

In this Center it would be desirable to bring all of the messes up to the standards of the contest winners.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I. Barber

MARY I. BARBER
Food Consultant

J. W. Brearley

J. W. BREARLEY
1st. Lieutenant QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 21, 1942.

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Stockton Assembly Center, July 18, 1942

TO : Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

1. This is an attractive Center due to the trees. There were screens on the doors and windows of the apartments.

Some fairgrounds equipment was piled in the stalls. This may be a fire hazard and it detracted from the looks of the Center. I believe there was no other place to put this equipment.

The Japanese at Stockton seemed happy and their attitude was good.

2. FOOD

The one meal that was observed was unusually well prepared and served. There was no adaptation, however, for the little children. The only articles for them to eat were milk and bread. There were no high chairs for the children and they seemed very uncomfortable and unhappy.

The cooks took pride in their work. The salad was nicely garnished and the dessert, a fruit cobbler, had a tender crust.

3. KITCHENS

The kitchen connected with the hospital, where all special diets are prepared, was dirty. The refrigerator was poorly arranged. The food had been left in paper wrappings and the meat was stacked next to the ice. Bacon and frankfurters were stored directly under the butter.

The flies were bad.

4. MESS NO. 8

The kitchen was neat and the food covered. There were curtains over the dish cupboards.

md #4

The steward had arranged a display of ready-to-eat cereals on the back wall of the mess hall. It might be advisable to permit the mothers to use these individual packages for the children's lunches at times when the food in the regular mess is not suitable for them to eat.

The food was well prepared in this mess. The ranges were clean.

The cook reported that there were eight cans of garbage daily from the service of 500 people. This seems out of all proportion and should be investigated.

5. MESS NO. 3

The ranges were in fair condition. There was a shortage of cups, spoons and plates. Tablespoons are badly needed.

6. BUTCHER SHOP

The butcher shop was clean, however, fly traps are needed. Chucks and rounds of beef are supplied rather than quarters. It would seem that the price of quarters of beef would be less expensive than chucks and rounds. This situation should be investigated.

7. VEGETABLE ROOM

This room was clean and the work was well done here.

8. CENTRAL SUPPLY WAREHOUSE

This warehouse was in especially good condition, in fact, the best that was seen at any assembly center. The man in charge took great pride in his department.

9. COMMENTS

The cost of ration at this Center was 48¢ for June. This is high in comparison with other Centers. The amount of garbage and the type of beef purchased may be contributing factors.

Miso from Santa Anita could be used at this Center. There is an excess of rice, coffee, and soy sauce. The steward has requested that no further supply of these products be issued. The suggestion is made that if the supply has not already been stopped, it

July 21, 1942

Re: Stockton Assembly Center - July 18, 1942.

should be discontimued.

Cups, plates and tablespoons are needed at all messes visited in this Center.

It is recommended that a request be made to the Subsistence Branch of the Quartermaster Corps, Washington, D.C. for its manual on the care and use of refrigerators.

It is recommended that fly traps be provided on all of the messes.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I Barber

MARY I. BARBER
Food Consultant.

J W Brearley

J. W. BREARLEY
1st. Lieut. QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to California Quartermaster Depot

1. On a recent visit to the California Quartermaster Depot, I contacted Captain J. H. Rankin, and he spent some time explaining to me the set-up of the Depot and how the different Post camps and stations were supplied. In all probability the function of this Depot is going along very nicely, and difficulties arising as they do from time to time are quickly ironed out.

2. However, in our conversation about supplies, the question was asked of Captain Rankin as to how the supplies were made to the WCCA and WRA. Captain Rankin explained this procedure very thoroughly, and the operation is very smooth with but a few exceptions which may be studied from both sides. The supply of Japanese foods is very low, and many foods are not available at all on the markets. If Japanese foods are wanted and are found in quantities large enough at a right price, they are purchased. The supply of rice in some instances has seemed to cause a bottle neck. Rice is on requisition to the Chicago Depot by this area, and at times causes great delay in time and shipment, when it could be purchased locally. In our visit to WCCA Centers it was found that some had on hand more rice than could be used for some time, and in two Centers more than enough to last until time of evacuation to WRA Centers. It is believed that automatic supply, if properly controlled, would work out very well; but where a large amount is on hand at a certain Center and no notice is given in time to stop the next shipment, it would seem to place too much stock on hand. On the other hand, if rice had to be requisitioned and stewards are watching their supply, the procurement by the California Depot could be made locally without handling, and time and transportation would be saved. It would be well to have rice put on the same basis as flour for this Depot.

3. In the supplies to Post camps and stations, although I did not go into this very thoroughly, it seems that Ogden Depot could possibly supply the Minidoka and Delta Relocation Projects. Ogden Quartermaster Depot is very much closer than the California Quartermaster Depot.

4. The above suggestions are from an outside viewpoint, and have no intentions of upsetting a well-formed routine. However, they may be discussed as a possibility to better operation for all concerned.

wd # 2

Memo To: Lt.Col.Evans

July 22, 1942

5. In further discussion with Captain Rankin the remark was brought up on requisitions. The Depot being a very busy place, it would be well to have all Center Managers bear in mind to have requisitions in promptly so the Depot will not have to hurry any requisitions and stand chances of probably mistakes.

6. It is believed that cooperation on a whole, however, is working well under the conditions and length of time in operation.

J. W. Brearley
Lieutenant, QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

SUBJECT: Report of Market Centers

1. The visit with Lt. Galladay at the Market Center was one of interest. The procedure of supply to the Regular Army and WCCA Centers is very well handled.

2. After visiting several of the WCCA Centers and making inquiries as to the supply of fresh food by the Market Center, good cooperation was reported throughout each Center.

3. The difficulties encountered at the beginning of supplying WCCA Centers were many, involving hard work and long hours. The system of direct operation with Managers of mess and lodging has worked very well, and now operations are well under control.

4. The persons responsible for the close cooperation in such a short period of time deserve much praise for a task well done.

Respectfully submitted,

J. W. Brearley

J. W. BREARLEY
First Lt., QMC

8-22-42
book wd #8

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

July 23, 1942

SUBJECT: Survey of Japanese Assembly Centers

TO : Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans

1. The object of the trip was to make a survey of the Japanese Assembly Centers, with special observance directed to subsistence and procurement methods; the kinds, amounts and variety of foods served and their nutritional adequacy for the groups fed; and the management of mess halls, stockrooms, disposal of garbage, etc.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans, Civil Affairs Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, outlined a tour to cover a certain number of the Centers, and gave the history of the part that the Army has played to date in the Japanese Evacuation Program.

3. The project of moving, housing and feeding approximately 100,000 Japanese is one for which there was no precedent. The work has been carried on with almost incredible efficiency. The moving under Army authority was done quietly and with a minimum of disturbance of the people living in the communities, and without hysteria on the part of the Japanese. Undoubtedly, respect for soldiers in uniform and the unquestioned authority of officers were responsible, together with the well-organized plans of the Civil Affairs Division.

4. The problems of building the Assembly Centers, selecting the directors and administrative personnel, procuring supplies and equipment, obtaining workers from the groups immediately after they were moved, involved difficulties that could have caused much confusion and discontent. Visits to a number of Centers, each one differing from the other in location, convenience of messing facilities, and opportunities for special projects, revealed well-run communities with as contented a population as is possible under such circumstances.

5. Public opinion is divided on the Assembly Centers. Some people are antagonistic toward the Japanese and not in sympathy with a program designed to treat them kindly; some go to the other

-28-42
Envk
Wed H 1

extreme in their attitude. The publicity has been difficult, but has been skilfully handled by a man experienced in public relations work. Numbers of letters, both of approval and condemnation, have been received from individuals and agencies. All have been answered and in some cases key people have been taken through the Centers for a personal inspection.

6. The survey of several Assembly Centers showed that an intelligent and far-sighted job is being done. There are recreational, educational and health programs carried out by qualified Japanese men and women under the direction of the administrative staff. The leaders select and train assistants.

The hospitals are more or less adequately equipped, depending on the buildings available. The staff is more competent in some Centers than in others, depending, of course, on the number and ability of the doctors, nurses and dietitians living in the Centers.

Provision is made for special diets for the sick and for proper feeding of infants and little children.

7. The food supply is adequate. The menus are well planned and can be adapted to Japanese food habits and methods of cooking. In general the cooking, especially of vegetables, is better than in the usual Army mess. The standards of cleanliness are not so high as in the Army. It would be advisable to have better kitchen policing. All Centers are not fully equipped with feeding gear which makes proper dishwashing difficult. Suggestions for improving the physical facilities for feeding children and for improving kitchen sanitation are given in the reports on each Center.

8. There is excellent cooperation between the Army, administrators of the Centers, marketing centers, and the officer in charge of subsistence who visits the Centers, and others representing the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

9. The results of the Japanese program may have a tremendous influence on the future policies of the United States. There are opportunities for Americanization; for improving the nutrition and health of the colonists; for teaching new skills; and for gaining an understanding of Japanese psychology.

10. The United States Army has made a contribution during the first four months of the evacuation program that will have a

July 23, 1942

Re: Survey, Japanese A.C.

far-reaching influence. The officers in charge have ability and vision and have worked indefatigably to carry out the plans which will be used as a basis for managing the permanent Centers.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary I Barber

MARY I. BARBER,
Food Consultant

J.W. Brearley

J. W. BREARLEY,
1st. Lieut. QMC

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California
Telephone KLondike 2-2611

August 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army (THROUGH: Chief of Staff)

SUBJECT: Survey of Japanese Assembly Centers by Mary I. Barber, Food Consultant, and First Lieutenant J. W. Brearley, QMC.

1. At the request of the Civil Affairs Division submitted informally by Lieutenant Colonel Ira K. Evans, Assistant A. C. of S., Civil Affairs Division, to the office of the Quartermaster General, Mrs. Mary I. Barber and First Lieutenant J. W. Brearley, WMC, both of the office of the Quartermaster General, have conducted a survey of temporary Japanese assembly centers with particular emphasis on messing.

2. Consolidated report of the survey in a memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Evans, dated July 23, 1942, and report of the survey of California Quartermaster Depot of the Santa Anita, Stockton, Portland, Puyallup and Merced Assembly Centers and of the Central Marketing Center, have heretofore been submitted to you for perusal and in turn have been forwarded to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, for his information.

3. Herewith is a report of survey of the Tanforan Assembly Center conducted by Mrs. Barber and Lieutenant Brearley.

4. On the basis of the reports of survey received, the Operations Division of Wartime Civil Control Administration was directed by the undersigned to take necessary action to correct the deficiencies noted in the reports of survey. Submitted herewith, accompanying a memorandum to Major Durbin (previously Assistant Chief, Operations Division, now acting as Chief of that Division vice Lieutenant Colonel Evans) dated August 1, 1942, is a report of action taken by the Center Operations Branch of the Operations Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration.

5. It is recommended that these reports also be forwarded to the Chief of Staff in supplement to those previously dispatched.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Incl. - 2:

1. Report of Survey, Tanforan Assembly Center
2. Memorandum with attachment showing corrective action taken.

5-25-42

Archival documents
August, 1942–December, 1942

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California
Telephone KLondike 2-2611

THE ASST. SEC'Y OF WAR'S OFFICE
AUG 6 - 1942
WAR DEPT.

August 3, 1942

Colonel Ralph H. Tate
Executive Officer
Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ralph:

As stated in our telephone conversation this date, I am forwarding herewith copies of the proposed Public Proclamation No. WD 1 and Proposed Posting Instructions for Relocation Project Managers.

It is suggested that the printing of the posters, both in English and in Japanese, can best be handled through this office. Steps are being taken to have the Proclamation translated into Japanese.

Since the first contingent of Japanese to a Relocation Project outside of the Western Defense Command will be moved within a week, it will be necessary to expedite action on the Proclamation and the issuance of the necessary Posting Instructions.

Sincerely yours,

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Incls (2)
Public Proclamatior WD 1
Posting Instructions

AIR MAIL

Q & C 014.311 Japanese Proclamations & Curfew
K-Bendetsen
8-3-42

197-A

August 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE SUMNER WELLES: x20

I am rather inclined to think this should just be filed. As you know, the left wing CIO group is holding rallies all over the country urging a second front. x2546

This fosters a suspicion in my mind that these Japanese gentlemen may hold somewhat similar beliefs.

May I have your advice?

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Attachments: Let to the President 7-5-42 signed by Koji Arivoshi and Karl G. Yoneda, enclosing a number of petitions bearing the signatures of 218 American citizens of Japanese descent, now in the War Relocation Camp at Manzanar, California, urging the opening of a second front and the utilizing of the manpower of Americans of Japanese ancestry for front line duty in the U. S. Armed Forces. Also memo to MHM from FDR: "To ack. and say the President has been delighted to receive, etc." x4849

MHM:B:J

x4675-Misc.
x133
x25-Misc

MAC: To ack. and say the President has been delighted to receive, etc.

F.D.R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

197-A

August 13, 1942

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

Dear Marvin:

In reply to your memorandum of August 11, I agree with your point of view. I suggest that this not be acknowledged but be sent to the Secretary of War for his information with a statement that you did not believe it should be answered.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Enc.

x20

The Honorable
Marvin McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

197-A

August 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR: x25

The enclosures are self-explanatory and are for your information. Personally, I do not believe the letter should be answered, and Sumner Welles, to whom I talked about it, concurs.

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

Enclosures: Let to the President 8-5-42 from Koji Ariyoshi and Karl G. Yoneda, enclosing petitions bearing the signatures of 218 "American citizens of Japanese descent, now in the War Relocation Camp at Manzanar, California", urging the opening of a second front now for a decisive victory over the Tokio-Berlin-Rome Axis, and the utilization of the manpower of Americans of Japanese ancestry, now in evacuation camps, for front line duty in the United States Armed Forces.

MHM:B:J

Telephone conversation between Colonel Bendetsen and Lt. Hall on August 11, 1942

H: That proclamation has not been cleared by Justice yet. Mr. McCloy tried to get in touch with Mr. Biddle today but he was out but we are pushing that as fast and as hard as we possibly can. Now, the second thing. Your suggestion about clearing the requests for information as to whether evacuee wives want to be repatriated.

B: With internee husbands?

H: Yes. I've taken that up with Mr. Bannerman of the State Department and he agrees that it is a very good idea for it to be cleared through you.

B: That's fine. I think that will save a lot of confusion and I'm glad to hear that.

H: I also talked with Mr. Bannerman on the subject of having inspection for income tax and Customs purposes out there rather than in New York. Of course, I'm relative/new to this game and I think that I had better repeat the conversation I had with Mr. Bannerman to you. (see conversation with Mr. Bannerman on August 11, 10:35 A.M.)Your friend Switzer is that cleared up?

B: I think so.

H: We received a call from the A.G. today, they inform us that on June 22, 1942 last June - there was an order issued by the A.G. amending his previous orders and providing that he would continue on temporary duty with you until September 15 and apparently that order has been mislaid out there with you.

B: No, it did not. You see, we got that order all right but then very suddenly out of a clear sky, last Friday or so an order came from the War Department ordering him immediately to Fort Wachuka to report to the 95th Division or something like that for duty at once. It wasn't a question of having that other order mislaid it was just a question of the War Department issuing another order revoking the one you now site but I think it is all straightened out. G-1 here have been in touch with War Department personnel SOS I guess and I believe he is to be here until October 15, that is what we want and if we can get it that's fine. I understand G-1 is taking care of it so I think the best thing to do is to let the matter drop until we hear more from G-1 here.

H: Suggestion came over from Dillon Myer, Director of War Relocation reading as follows: (see letter dated August 10 attention of Colonel Tate signed Dillon S. Myer).

B: I can answer that right now. The answer to it is that the Assembly Centers are not going to be dismantled. The War Department is going to use them for troops.

H: I thought I'd let you know about that request. I was going to put it through ordinary channels here for an answer to be prepared for the ASW's signature but what I thought I'd let you know what was cooking.

ASW 014.311 W.D.C.
Classif. No. ASW 014.33

B: I think you ought to refer that to S.O.S. or for draft of reply. Their requirement section there probably the miscellaneous division McGinley can tell you all about that. Do you know him, Colonel McGinley?

H: Colonel McGinley in S.O.S.?

B: Yes, he is Chief of the miscellaneous section of operations, S.O.S. either he or he'll probably direct to the requirements branch if you want to deal direct otherwise you probably could just buck it over to S.O.S. but I know that the G-4 of the Ninth Service Command has the list out here. He just sent me a copy of it the other day and I sent it to our operations of WCCA for action, to having the evacuees do what might be done to get the Centers in shape prior to the departure for occupancy by troops. Dismantling of Assembly Centers is probably out of the picture.

H: We have received all your lists. Does that end the situation?

B: You mean on repatriation?

H: Yes, on the next shipment. Your last telegram was signed "End".

B: That's all we / We have of identifying the telegrams names on the telegrams you sent us. That's right. There are still some more people who are requesting repatriation that we are sending you. That is wholly separate from this list that you telegraphed us.

H: Now your signs warning the people that it was a Military Area. The signs that would go along with the proclamation that are to be posted at the Relocation Centers. Mr. Myer has two objections and he says that the whole thing was agreed upon on June 26 with a conference with you and a Mr. Brier.

B: Mr. Frier.

H: He's particularly objection to the requirement that signs be posted at 200 ft intervals instead of the original arrangement of 500 ft.

B: That's all right. This is only a suggestion to them anyway.

H: You don't give a hoot on that.

B: No, he can have it 500 ft. if he wants.

H: On the question of the use of barbed wire - they don't feel that there should be any requirement to use barbed wire.

B: That's a matter of policy to be decided by the War Department and the War Relocation Authority in view of the fact that the centers concerned are beyond Western Defense Command. Whether you use barbed wire is a matter of policy to mark the boundary is a matter of policy and I don't see why it has to be barbed wire, personally, anything to mark the edge is sufficient because it isn't going to keep anything or anybody in. It is not being a manproof fense anyway.

H: The barb wire wasn't supposed to be manproff.

B: It couldn't be very well unless you had a seven foot fense.

H: As far as you are concerned although it isn't a Western Defense Command responsibility that would be all right as long as something is used for markers.

B: Something which would support the job of the Military Police who after all should be given a chance to know what they are patrolling.

H: I suppose that will largely be given by experience. If there is trouble to begin with why then that is the time to change. It is just a question of how you are going to start out.

B: There should be some well defined boundary but it doesn't have to be barbed wire. the strands of barbed wire won't hold anybody in anyway.

H: No. I think they were anxious to avoid its looking like a concentration camp.

B: Sometimes they are a little over anxious on those things.

H: Are you particularly interested in labor in Relocation Centers are you?

B: Inside no - outside yes.

H: Mr. Myer was talking to Mr. McCloy today about some of these tent making propositions. Something that the people in these relocation centers could be doing that would be useful to the war effort. The matter stands right now, the people higher up here feel that the labor situation is full of so much unrest at the present time that if we start manufacturing jobs for Japs why we will have an awful kick-back.

B: True enough. We had that same difficulty on one project that we do have underway for the gamnishing of camouflage nets and I think that there is a stop, look and listen on all those things to avoid unnecessary tempests which are created by that. I think you've got to go easy and you've got to be sure that whatever labor projects are developed for evacuees within the Relocation Centers are those in fields where there is no reasonable chance that you will compete with any sizeable segment of any industry.

H: I think that's about the position we plan to take. Mr. McCloy feels that it is a question that really should go higher than the War Department.

B: I'd like to make this suggestion and urge it very strongly that you pass it on to Mr. McCloy. The War Department should not take a hand in that. War Relocation Authority is responsible directly to the President and it's obligation is to develop that policy. If we attempt to develop it we will naturally be inclined to receive the criticisms that might be given - just or unjust - whatever kind it is for poor policy if for example the policy becomes ppor because it is not properly administered. WRA is going to do the administering if they come to us and seek advise on what things the camps need that's one thing but the development of policy on employment within a relocation center is not War Department business. It becomes War Department business only to the extent that we can advise them as to what things we need made. Now the question as to whether they should or should not make it is

a matter for War Relocation to determine. Do you get me?

H: Of course, they take the position that it is up to us to let out contracts to these people. Not to refuse to let out contracts to these people. They are really making the policy of employing these people but we should not refuse to let out contracts.

B: Don't you see that the policy they make is merely one which puts the shoe right on the War Department's foot.

H: I think Mr. McCloy will be in complete agreement with what you said.

B: Don't fall into that trap. Our experience has been and I've mentioned this before to Mr. McCloy through Col. Tate and I repeat the assertion - that unless we are very careful to be sure that there is a complete separation of the fields of responsibility of the two agencies of the Government we will find ourselves getting the blame without a chance to do any administering. Just don't let them put that shoe on your foot.

H: I think that they are definitely trying to do it.

B: But outside of the Centers. We were running the Centers and they came to us and said under what conditions would you let labor out into the fields of private employment. I said that - that's up to you to announce not us. You are responsible for that. They tried to put the shoe on our foot for employment of evacuees in the fields, the very fields that we just evacuated them. Don't let it happen to the War Department back there.

H: I think you are absolutely sound on it.

August 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY:

Colonel Bendetsen has suggested the following press release in connection with Public Proclamation No. WD 1. I have planned to discuss the matter with Colonel Grogan.

"Washington, August -- , Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War today declared all territory embraced within the boundaries of certain War Relocation Centers as Military Areas.

The Centers, which will house persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from vital Military Areas on the Pacific Coast, are being completed in Cody, Wyoming; Rohwer and Jerome, Arkansas; and Granada, Colorado. The announcement of the action by the War Department came in the form of a Proclamation designated as Public Proclamation No. WD 1. By its issuance the same degree of external Military control now exercised over all War Relocation Authority Centers located within the borders of Western Defense Command will be extended to sites selected as Relocation Centers for Japanese evacuees for the duration of the war. Operation and administration of such Relocation Centers is the responsibility of War Relocation Authority, an independent Federal Agency responsible to the President.

Under the provisions of the Proclamation, no person of Japanese ancestry who resides within the boundaries of a Center will be permitted to leave without written permission nor, will any person be allowed within the boundaries of a Center without written permission.

By this rule the War Department is carrying out a policy, announced some time ago, that it would furnish protection for the Japanese within such Relocation Centers in the form of an exterior guard of Military Police; and that the same military guard also would serve as protection for the districts in which the Centers were located. The

War Department exercises no part in the administration and operation of War Relocation Authority Centers but under the provisions of the Proclamation will provide external guard to prevent entry or departure on the part of evacuees or others not authorized by War Relocation Authority.

The seriousness of the situation, and the need for protection, indicated by Secretary Stimson when he pointed out - "The United States has been subject to attacks and attempted invasion by the Armed Forces of Nations with which the United States is now at war, and in connection therewith, is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to establish safeguards against such enemy operations emanating from within as well as from without the national boundaries."

The Proclamation, addressed to the people within the States of Arkansas, Colorado and Wyoming and the public generally reads: --

(Public Proclamation No. WD 1)

JOHN M. HALL
1st Lt., F.A.
Acting Executive

OASW:JMH:MAM

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

43508

(SC)A17-10
(037000A/GRC)

August 19, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

G. I.

Hawaii

My dear Mr. President:

Admiral Nimitz has learned that representatives of some of the departments of the Government have been seeking to promote a relaxation of the Military Government of Hawaii. On this subject, Admiral Nimitz says:

> "The Japanese capacity to inflict damage in this area is still very great. I, therefore, recommend that the Navy Department oppose any change in status quo or any limitation of the authority of the Military Governor."

Admiral King has strongly endorsed this opinion of Admiral Nimitz and I should like to add my personal endorsement also to the view expressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

I am still very gravely concerned over the menace which is presented in Oahu by the large number of unquestionably pro-Japanese who are still at large on that Island. As you know, I have made several strong recommendations that this problem be tackled vigorously but, apparently, little if anything has been done. The assumption that the war in the Pacific is already practically won and that there is no longer any menace of significant proportions to the security of Hawaii is, to my view, extremely dangerous and unjustified. I sincerely hope that the powers now given the Military Governor of Hawaii will not be relaxed at the present time.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

x18

x400 Hawaii
x197
x4675

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

The President

The White House

Date- 3/5/59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

Telep Conv. Hull & Bendetsen
8-21-42

B: I think they will be glad to know that some firm steps are being taken.

H: I think it is reassuring they don't wake up don't wake up in the night so much. I understand that you have had alittle excitement out there at the aluminum plant - is that right.

B: I've been down here so close to the desk I didn't hear - tell me the news.

H: I haven't got any details on it except that some things have been hopping fast around here on it.

B: A take-over.

H: Apparently it has been suggested. It is an aluminum company - a factory preparing aluminum parts for use in the aircraft industry and without this factory's production being kept up we lose 100 planes a day or something like that or even more.

B: Is there a strike in the offing.

H: I don't know the details except that I do know the matter has been discussed in very high places toward the latter part of the afternoon.

B: I've been through a couple of those mills before - it is very interesting to me. I took over one last fall.

H: I suppose it does come under your jurisdiction to a certain extent.

B: The last one I took over I went 72 hours without sleep and one meal starting it off. I hope that doesn't hit us out here.

H: Your being quoted in Harpers magazine. We saw some advance copy of something that is coming out in September on the evacuation procedure. It pays high compliments to the Army and permits the quotation of the Colonel.

B: I'll have to watch for that.

H: It may be October - they are going to run two articles one in September and one in October.

B: I'll have to see what I'm saying now.

H: ~~That~~ It sounds just like you so I think it must be true.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

Aug 29 9 01 AM '42

RECEIVED

AUG 28 1942

MEMORANDUM for the President.

You referred to me a copy of a letter from Secretary Knox with respect to the martial law situation in Hawaii. Secretary Knox endorses Admiral Nimitz' recommendation that the Navy Department oppose any change in the status quo or limitation of the authority of the Military Governor of Hawaii.

The Army and this Department have recently concluded an agreement restoring to the courts in Hawaii their jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings except those involving members of the armed forces or persons engaged in any occupation or business under the direction of the Military Governor. Various other restrictions upon the jurisdiction and procedure of the civil courts are to be imposed, including power in the Military Governor to exempt persons from jury service. Our agreement avoids the imposition of military procedures in cases which do not involve security issues. The Department of Justice participated with us in working out the agreement which I have described.

This agreement does not meet all of the points which this Department has raised concerning the extent of military control of Hawaii. None of these points would impair military authority and control where necessary to ensure the safety of the Islands, as a matter of both internal safety and defense against attack.

I have directed Governor Stainback of Hawaii to take every precaution to make sure that no conflict arises between the military and civil authorities. Any differences of opinion which may arise will be the subject of discussion between the War Department and us.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
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Acting Secretary of the Interior.

XC

NATIONAL JAPANESE AMERICAN
STUDENT RELOCATION COUNCIL

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
20 S. TWELFTH ST., PHILADELPHIA, PA.
RITtenhouse 9372

Chairman
JOHN W. NASON

Executive Secretary
CLARENCE E. PICKETT

Director
ROBBINS W BARSTOW

WAR DEPT.
SEP 5 1942
ASST. SEC.

(100 0 0 4, 3 11

September 4, 1942

Colonel Ralph H. Tate,
War Department,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Tate:

There are some questions that have arisen several times in personal talks and therefore I take the liberty of addressing them straight to headquarters for an authoritative answer:

1.) Are Nisei students subject to the Selective Service Draft the same as other young men? Just what is their status with respect to the Selective Service Program?

2.) Are these Nisei students eligible to enlist in the V 1. Program and other reserve organizations of the armed forces?

I am sure there are a great many who would be glad to know the authoritative answer to these questions.

Very cordially yours,

Robbins W. Barstow

Robbins W. Barstow, Director
Japanese American Student Relocation

RECEIVED
SEP 11 1942

RWB:mcm
(dict. but not signed
by RWB)

(11) 9-4-42

ncb 9-14-42

Block 17-3-B

Heart Mt., Wyoming

September 6, 1942

Mr. Karl R. Bendetsen

Colonel G.S.C.

Asst. Chief of Staff

Civil Affair Division

San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:

I have put in Repatriation Request Form from Pomona Assembly Center in July of 1942, and I am wondering as to what has become of it.

My folks and relations are all in Japan and I am alone here--lonely.

If it is at all possible, I would like to take next ship of Spain back to Japan.

Please reply it as soon as posssible.

Sincerely yours,

Tsuneo Nakano

Tsuneo Nakano

1942

SEP 10 12 PM

OUT OUT

G-1 DIVISION
WAR DEPT. GEN. STAFF

WDGAP 291.2 Japanese (9-9-42)

Mr. Robbins W. Barstow,
20 South Twelfth Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Dear Mr. Barstow:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 4, 1942, addressed to Colonel Ralph H. Tate, relative to the application of the Selective Service Act to Nisei students.

All men in the United States within the prescribed age limits are subject to the provisions of the Selective Service Act. However, at the present time the Army is not accepting citizens of Japanese descent for induction or for enlistment in the reserve, although a limited number are being enlisted for special language requirements.

The V 1. Program applies to service in the Navy, not the Army, therefore I am unable to give you an authoritative answer. It is suggested that you address your question to the Secretary of the Navy.

I appreciate the opportunity tobe of assistance to you.

BY ORDER

JOHN M. HALL,
1st Lt., F.A.,
Acting Executive.

DATE SEP 10 1942
FROM: PERSONNEL DIV. G-1, G.S.
TO: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
FOR FILE

mail
9-11-42

WLD

wch 9-14-42

(WDGAP 9-4-42)

Telephone conversation between Lt. Hall and Col. Bendetsen on September 18, 1942 at 2:00 p.m.

B:...are have the impression that each repatriate's family can take $300 instead of each adult repatriate and just hang tough on that basis and they are going to prevent adult repatriates from taking out $300 a piece if they can until they get their instructions straightened out. Would you ask State Department to instruct Customs in turn to instruct their agent at Los Angeles in particular with all them in general with $300 per adult.

H: All right. I have one thing. I showed Mr. McCloy some of your recent releases out there in connection with the movement of evacuees from Assembly Centers to Relocations Centers and he noticed that you were referring to these evacuees simply as Japanese evacuees. He does not particularly like the grouping of American Japanese and Alien Japanese in the one category - Japanese because he feels that it builds up antagonism against the whole class whereas we ought to be careful to handle the situation so as to permit after the war is over those elements of American Japs who wish to continue to live here - to permit them to melt into our population.

B: I agree with that thoroughly - it is well taken. The proper phrase which we have ordinarily used is - P erson of Japanese ancestry. If you think that is all right we will adhere to that.

H: If it comes a question of getting bored with that why you can get out the the old citizen and ononcitizen or something like that again.

B: There are doubtless variations that could be turned to.

H: I got one more for you. We had a pathetic letter forwarded to us by the
6 President of the U.S. from a girl named Masako Tabuchi. She was at one point living at Stockton an Assembly Center 6-116-D Apartment number. She speaks of a poor old man living there at Stockton who is 70 years old.
"I have written to the Center Manager," she says "to ask for the immediate release of the 70 year old man to with-join his brother in Tule Lake, Relocation Center at Newell, but the officials here rather doubt the possibility of such transfer. He is frail and weak and he has absolutely no one to lean on. His wife is dead. Of course, there are hospitals, medicine, doctors and nurses but what good are they to an ailing mind and a lonely heart."
It all ends up.....(end)

October 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY:

You had better read all of the attached. There are four problems involved.

1. Additional reclassification of aliens.

~~Evidently~~ the Attorney General has been giving favorable consideration for some time toward exempting additional classes of aliens from the operation of alien enemy laws. The three classes which Ennis has proposed to Mr. Jaretzki are (1) persons with children in the armed forces, (2) Italians who entered the United States prior to July 1, 1924, (3) expatriates (refugees). Before going ahead with these changes the Department of Justice wants to be assured that General DeWitt will grant similar exemption to the same classes from the operation of his travel and curfew restrictions. Mr. Jaretzki has talked to Colonel Bendetsen on this and asked him to obtain General DeWitt's decision. Nothing has as yet been forthcoming, partly because of General DeWitt's absence and partly for the reason stated in this telephone conversation to the effect that Colonel Bendetsen would like to have comparisons from the other divisions of General DeWitt's staff before final decision is made. Colonel Bendetsen estimated that this will require an additional week. Ennis called me this morning and said that Mr. Biddle was pressing him on it and said that Mr. Biddle would probably call you to see if more immediate action could not be forthcoming. The primary reason for this is that the Attorney General wishes to clear it with the President and have it announced on October 12, which is a holiday dear to Italian's hearts.

Th The date July 1, 1924 is important only on the immigration law aspect. On that day additional restrictions were placed on the immigration of aliens. In other aspects the date is arbitrary. It would not be expected that Italians entering prior to that date would be any more loyal than aliens entering up to a few years later.

I do not know what basis will be used to determine who are and who are not expatriates. It might be advisable for you to push General DeWitt on this.

3. Responsibility for arranging transportation of repatriates to port of embarkation.

This second sailing of the Gripsholm was originally scheduled for September 1, at which time the large majority of the 300-600 repatriates involved were situated in assembly centers rather than in WRA centers. For that reason, WCCA at the request of the State Department undertook to arrange for transportation of these individuals. The situation has now substantially changed, and by November 1, it is expected that there will be no more evacuees under WCCA jurisdiction. It seems logical therefore that the responsibility for transportation of these individuals should be transferred from WCCA to WRA. If you agree, I will take it up with the State Department and then with Mr. Myer.

3. Canvassing of the desires of impending repatriates.

The original list prepared by the State Department was turned down by the Japanese Government, which substituted a list of their own. It has not as yet been determined whether the individuals on this list desire repatriation. It is proposed that WCCA accept the responsibility of preparing the necessary blanks and then forward them for distribution by WRA which will thereafter assume full responsibility. This problem is governed by the same considerations as the transportation question.

4. Undesirable aspects of Japanese Student relocation agencies

You apparently had a conversation on this subject, during your recent trip, in which you stated that you had not read material forwarded by Colonel Bendetsen on this subject. It appears that you sent this material to Mr. Myer on the date of August 10. Do you want it back?

FALL

CASW:JMH:MJM

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

Office of the Director

October 2, 1942

A14-3/EF37

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

For both Mr. Eisenhower and myself, I want to recommend that you take two actions designed to improve the morale of the American-citizen Japanese who were evacuated from the Pacific Coast:

(1) Two bills in Congress -- one aimed at depriving the Nisei of citizenship and the other proposing to "intern" them for the duration of the war -- have heightened the feeling that this may after all be a racial war and that, therefore, the evacuees should be looked upon as enemies. A brief public statement from you, in behalf of the loyal American citizens, would be helpful. I think WRA and the Justice Department would concur in this recommendation.

(2) Loyal American citizens of Japanese descent should be permitted, after individual test, to enlist in the Army and Navy. It would hardly be fair to evacuate people and then impose normal draft procedures, but voluntary enlistment would help a lot.

This matter is of great interest to OWI. Japanese propaganda to the Philippines, Burma, and elsewhere insists that this is a racial war. We can combat this effectively with counter propaganda only if our deeds permit us to tell the truth. Moreover, as citizens ourselves who believe deeply in the things for which we fight, we cannot help but be disturbed by the insistent public misunderstanding of the Nisei; competentent authorities, including Naval Intelligence people, say that fully 85 percent of the Nisei are loyal to this country and that it is possible to distinguish the sheep from the goats.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) ELMER DAVIS

Elmer Davis
Director

94

197

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR x 25
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY x 18
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL x 10

FOR JOINT RECOMMENDATION

F. D. R.

x 5015

Original letter from Hon. Elmer Davis, 10/2/42, to the President, recommending two actions to improve the morale of the American-citizen Japanese who were evacuated from the Pacific Coast, sent to the Secretary; copies sent to the Secretary of the Navy and the Attorney General copy retained for our files.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.

x 4849

+ 197-A

w draft of reply in file 7/8/43

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

ROUTE SLIP

DO NOT DETACH

SYMBOL	ACTION TAKEN		REMARKS
	BY [INITIALS]	DATE	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	N	10/9/42	
16-1	(Z)	10/9/42	(1)-Congress Bills, The proposals can never be consummated. We have tried + will be confronted with this difficult problem. The loyalty of the 2nd generation Japanese (U.S. citizens) can be promoted. Such legislation will make our future problems extremely difficult. I concur heartily with Mr Davis' proposals and globally of Naval Intelligence to handle the situation in toto. This is a problem which cannot be handled by those unfamiliar with the Japanese. A.H. Mechanic

(5)

ACTION COMPLETED_____

NO ACTION REQUIRED_____

INITIALS_____

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91

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10/12, 194-

MEMORANDUM FOR 16-I-2

16—12036 GPO

Capt. Zacharias asked me to send this to F-2, to be drawn up in finished form.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

L. Farra.

From Vice Dir of N.O.
To The Secretary

via 16-F
16

89

A14-3/EF37

Op-16-F-2
A8-5/EF37/EG
Serial No.3937516.
SC 107 34

October 16, 1942

4241

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Proposals of Mr. Elmer Davis concerning Nisei.

Enclosure: (A) Letter from Mr. Elmer Davis to the President, The White House, dated October 2, 1942.

1. The letter from Mr. Davis to the President appears to present three questions with respect to the Nisei, which require comment from the Navy.

2. The first concerns the bills now before Congress regarding which Mr. Davis wishes the President to make a statement. It would, of course, be highly improper for the Navy to make recommendations concerning these bills before Congress or enter into this controversy in any way.

3. The second is the matter of permitting the Nisei to enlist in the armed forces. So far as the Naval service is concerned, it is felt that permitting such enlistments would serve no useful purpose. It is not believed that the Nisei should be enlisted, nor that they should engage in work for the Navy except in a few special cases. These special cases would probably all come under the heading of naval intelligence in which field the individuals would be far more useful as civilian agents than as enlisted men.

4. The third point is Mr. Davis's statement that Army and Navy intelligence people and other competent authorities state that 85 per cent of the Nisei are loyal and that it is possible to distinguish the sheep from the goats.

OCT 15 42 PM

5. It is the concensus of opinion of the Division of Naval Intelligence that at least 85 per cent of the Nisei are loyal to this country and that it is usually, perhaps almost invariably, possible to distinguish the sheep from the goats. However, we cannot guarantee that such distinction will be one hundred percent successful. There may be a few exceptions.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
SECY'S OFFICE RECORD DEPT.
RECEIVED
OCT 17 42 PM

6. This office is in complete agreement with Mr. Davis' general thesis that everything practicable should be done to encourage the loyalty of an lessen the prejudice against the Nisei.

Op-16-F

Dictated Oct.13,1942
" by Lieut.Col.Boone
Typed by F.M. Sublett.

J.H. Newton, Acting.

Op-16-F-2

FORWARDED
NAVY DEPARTMENT
SECY'S OFFICE RECORD

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

OCT 29 1942

A
WAR DEPT.
OCT 30 1942
ASST. SEC.

Mr. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

The letter of October 20 from Mr. Walter W. Cribbins of San Francisco to Col Stanley Grogan concerning certain church group activities on behalf of the Japanese evacuees, which you forwarded under date of October 24, has been read with much interest. The enclosures which were transmitted have also been examined.

For sometime the activities of certain of the missionary and church groups have been of concern to us and the observations made by Mr. Cribbins help to confirm other reports reaching us about the potentially obstructive results of much apparently well-intentioned talk and activity. We are going into the subject currently and will appreciate any further relevant reports which may reach your office.

We are attempting to reach non-church groups with our program, and to this end have recently met in New York with national representatives of the private welfare agencies. Other meetings are scheduled or are being discussed.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer

Director



858
014.311 WRA-
Correspondence
E. Myer, director
11-2-42

October 24, 1942

Dear Mr. Myer:

I have a letter in which I think you might be interested. It shows the bent of at least one individual to the activities of some of the church organizations in connection with the Japanese evacuation.

I have an idea that if the entire goodwill campaign toward the Japanese is conducted by the churches, or institutions affiliated with the church, alone, it may not be as effective as if the Government as well as other lay interests took it up.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Room 812, Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Inc.:
Ltr. 10-20-42 Walter W. Cribbins to Col. S. J. Crogan
and attachments

re Galen Fisher, author of book criticizing policies of U.S. Army, its power vs. civil liberties, particularly in connection with its treatment of Japanese

OASW
JJMcC:JHS

10-30-42

October 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL BENDETSEN, COLONEL BOEKEL AND MAJOR MOFFITT:

I thought it would be a good idea if I gave you my conception of matters which are presently outstanding between the Western Defense Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

1. Repatriation. Dr. Dedrick is bringing you copies of letters received from War Relocation Authority and the State Department respectively which outline the situation as it now stands. Your advices and reactions to these letters are necessary before reply can be made. The general tenor of these letters is to the effect that Wartime Civil Control Administration's sole responsibility, beyond canvass, shall be the furnishing of guards to the extent that they are available. I appreciate that the Wartime Civil Control Administration is in no position to make commitments as to this until approximate date of sailing is fixed. In the meanwhile any information that you could give us would be welcome.

With respect to the canvass, it is unfortunate that the procedure requested by the State Department has resulted in ~~the~~ a state of unrest and apprehension. War Relocation Authority has taken the firm position that a definite commitment, to be publicized in Relocation Projects, should be made ~~that~~ at this

time under no circumstances shall there be any compulsory repatriation. This office has adopted a less determined attitude on the subject of involuntary repatriation, but has informed the State Department that immediate action by way of public announcement is essential for the maintenance of morale. The State Department has been informed of Colonel Boekel's conviction that nothing short of an expressed disavowal will remove the present fear of involuntary repatriation. Despite the urgency of this situation, which has been drawn to the attention of the State Department by both War Relocation Authority and the War Department, the State Department has thus far failed to arrive at a decision.

2. Hawaiian Shipments. The Secretary of the Navy has requested 4 months delay in the repatriation of any Japanese aliens coming from Hawaii. I believe that the War Department agrees that this restriction is wise and it is planned that these evacuees will be segregated from others who might be repatriated before 4 months.

War Relocation Authority is naturally anxious to obtain as much information concerning these evacuees as possible in order that they can make the most appropriate assignments. Steps should be taken to see that War Relocation Authority receives this information as it becomes available to the Western Defense Command.

From talking with Mr. Beasley, of the F.S.A., who has recently returned from Hawaii, it is indicated that the

shipments contemplated by General Emmons are primarily for the purpose of ~~protecting~~ relieving congested areas and hospitals and secondarily for military security purposes. We would be interested to know whether your representatives now in Hawaii reached the same conclusion.

3. Individual Exclusion Orders. Mr. McCloy questions the advisability of disclosing even the names of excludees. The Department of Justice does not release similar information in the analogous internment situation and have ~~indicated~~ suggested informally that unless there was some reason, which is not apparent, why these names should be disclosed, the information be withheld. There would be no objection and conceivable advantage to the periodic release of total number excluded during the previous period. If this change in policy is acceptable, explanation could be made to the press that the reason for the change was that the exclusion was not interded as a conclusive determination of the excludees disloyalty.

The Department of Justice indicates that the Western Defense Command is probably without power to require individuals already excluded to report to local FBI offices all changes of address. They now suggest that the objective by achieved in the form of a letter of request from the Western Defense Command to each excludee, that the excludee should furnish the FBI with

each subsequent address. They indicate that they feel that the Western Defense Command is the logical representative of the government to make this request. Your reactions to this suggestion would be appreciated.

I understand that you are currently considering the possibility of amending form of Individual Exclusion Order so as to provide for the doing of all things except departure within a certain number of days prior to date scheduled for departure. Ed Ennis has indicated that although he is in no position to commit the Department of Justice on this at this time, he sees no objection to such change. I think if a decision is reached to change the form of Individual Exclusion Order, it would be wise to take it up with the Department of Justice for their approval.

General DeWitt's recommendations as to form of circular to be distributed by the Department of Justice to the local U.S. Attorneys has been forwarded to the Department of Justice for their consideration. I have not as yet been advised of any final decision in this regard.

4. Denaturalization. I understand that General DeWitt is now in process of transmitting his comments on the proposed agreement between the War Department and the Department of Justice with regard to denaturalization. Mr. McCloy definitely feels that

since denaturalization removes a suspected individual from the orbit of activity for the duration, the War Department should not take toarbitrary a stand as to the restrictions to be imposed upon excludees returning for the purpose of defending denaturalization proceedings. The Department of Justice is either unwilling or without power to have the excludee confined or in custody, but is agreeable to any less stringent restrictions which the Western Defense Command wishes to impose.

5. Curfew. Alleviation of curfew. There is in the mails a letter from Mr. McCloy to General DeWitt suggesting the possibility of altering the beginning of curfew from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m.. Mr. McCloy feels that the problem of enforcement might well be made easier. Also it would afford needed opportunity for relaxation by enemy alien workers whose sympathies lie with the Allies. Mr. McCloy appreciates the necessity of keeping the civilian morale at a high pitch so far as invasion possibilities are concerned, but believes that the suggested change would not appreciably alter the morale situation or substantially increase the risk of subversive activities. There are the additional points that in all probability the great majority of dangerous enemy aliens have already been interned and also the fact that in all probability enemy aliens clever enough to be capable of doing serious damage are not substantially deterred by curfew or travel restrictions.

JOHN M. HALL
1st Lt., F.A.
Assistant Executive

1 Enc.

Enclosure #49

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

ASW 014.311 W.D.C. Secret

RECEIVED
WAR DEPARTMENT
1942 NOV 2 AM 8:38

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Vice President
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County Supervisors Association of California

ORGANIZED MAY 15, 1911

HEADQUARTERS, ROOM 5, HOTEL SACRAMENTO
Sacramento, California

J. H. HUNTER
Secretary

October 31, 1942

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The Honorable Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,
Department of War,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The attached resolution dealing with the alien situation in the matter of evacuation and concentration of all Japanese and their decendants, was unanimously approved by the County Supervisors Association of California in Convention assembled.

Respectfully submitted,

COUNTY SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION
OF CALIFORNIA

By J. H. Hunter
J. H. Hunter, Secretary

JHH JF

Enc

WAR DEPT.
NOV 9 1942
ASST. SEC.

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10-31-42

COUNTY SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA
HEADQUARTERS, ROOM 5, HOTEL SACRAMENTO
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

R E S O L U T I O N

IN THE MATTER OF URGING THE EVACUATION AND CONCENTRATION OF ALL JAPANESE AND THEIR DESCENDANTS TO ASSEMBLY CAMPS: UNDER SUPERVISION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

WHEREAS, since the 7th day of December, 1941, the United States has been at war with Japan; and

WHEREAS, during the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, the Japanese were aided and abetted by fifth columnists of the Japanese race living and residing in and about Pearl Harbor; and

WHEREAS, there are located in certain parts of California more Japanese than in all other states of the Union combined; and

WHEREAS, it is impossible to know those enemy Japanese who are loyal to the United States from those who are disloyal; and

WHEREAS, the State of California is one of the first States in production of essential products, and its products are absolutely and vitally essential to the successful war efforts; and

WHEREAS, the temper of the people of the non-restricted area has risen to such a point that it is becomming dangerous for loyal enemy aliens to reside in such territory; and

WHEREAS, many Japanese have moved into the open territory of California and are in our opinion a serious menace to that area; and

WHEREAS, by reason of this situation the natural resources of California are in the most critical situation of any part of the Union; and

WHEREAS, many Japanese persons residing in certain territories have been removed from certain areas, and have moved and settled in open territories without Federal supervision, these enemy aliens could and may do serious damage to the State of California and the United States.

In order that those enemy aliens and their descendants who are not disloyal, or may become disloyal, to the United States, may be taken to a point where they can do no damage to the State of California, and the United States;

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion of Supervisor Sanford D. Butts of Ventura County, seconded by Supervisor Roscoe L. Patterson of Tulare County, and unanimously carried,

BE IT RESOLVED, by the County Supervisors Association of California in Convention assembled in Hollywood, State of California, this 22nd day of May, 1942, go on record as urging GENERAL JOHN DEWITT of the 4th Interceptor Command that all alien Japanese and their descendants be forthwith evacuated to a Concentration Camp under the supervision of the Federal Government.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that a copy of this resolution be mailed to the President of the United States, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy and the Attorney General of the United States; and a copy to the two Senators representing the State of California in the United States and to each Congressman representing the Pacific Coast States in the House of Representat and the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District, and Gen. DeW' U. S. Army, Presidio, San Francisco, California.

COUNTY SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION OF
ROBERT W. LEFEVER, PRESIDENT

By J. H. Hunter, Secretary.

ASW 014.311 WDC General
(Basic Papers 014.311 EDC General)

November 16, 1942

Dear General:

Mr. Dillon Myer of the War Relocation Authority asked me whether it would be possible to get blanket clearance for the placement of, say, 2000 Japanese (mainly citizens) in the Eastern Defense Command. These people would in ordinary course be distributed generally throughout the Command as individual positions for them developed. They would all be cleared by the FBI and in each case the attitude of the particular community toward the Japanese would be tested before any positions would be filled.

As you know, the Japanese were removed from the West Coast, first, because of the proximity of the West Coast to the Japanese theater of operations and, second, because of the very large number of Japanese that were concentrated in that area, and thirdly, because of the fear that direct action might be taken against the Japanese as a result of the rather antagonistic attitude of the local population.. It has never been the theory that the individual Japanese was disloyal, or indeed as an individual potentially dangerous. The argument I have sometimes heard that if a Japanese was evacuated from the West Coast it must have been because he was potentially dangerous is not sound. It was a combination of geography, density of the Japanese population, and other factors, which determined the necessity for removal. This is evidenced by the fact that there are already a number of Japanese citizens and aliens in the Eastern Defense Command who enjoy free movement.

We are constantly attempting to avoid a tendency which would result in having the evacuated Japanese population frozen into permanent public charges, and as we feel that a scattering throughout the country of these people after they have been through the FBI checks would be a healthy step toward the solution of the Japanese problem, the War Department has sought to assist the War Relocation Authority wherever possible to work out a general replacement program. I think we are disposed here to go along with Mr. Myer's suggestion, but before giving him any indication of our attitude I naturally would like to have your comments.

Perhaps 2,000 is too many and perhaps it would be better to permit, say, 1,000 to come in and then re-examine the situation before any further number would be introduced. Maybe we would want to exact

11-16-42

references in addition to the FBI check, but the War Relocation Authority is anxious to set up a procedure whereby movements of substantial numbers of Japanese can be made without the prolonged delays that are involved in the study of each individual case by a number of different authorities. Will you let me have your thoughts?

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, Commanding
First Army and Eastern Defense Command
Governors Island, New York

JJMcC:jhs

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Through: Chief, Administrative Services.

Subject: Treatment of Koreans in Hawaii.

1. Mr. J. Kyuang Dunn and Mr. C. Ho Kim, respectively Secretary and Executive Chairman of the United Korean Committee in America, called at this office on November 18, 1942, and stated that they felt an unnecessary technical discrimination was being applied to Koreans in Hawaii.

2. Mr. Dunn stated that the identification badge for Koreans as issued in Hawaii was the same as the badge issued to Japanese except that the word "Korean" was printed on the badge in small letters. It was claimed that the possession of this badge precluded the use of skilled workers on projects where their services were needed, thus delaying the construction.

3. General Green and Col. Fielder of the Hawaiian Department were consulted by Mr. Dunn and are reported to have informed Mr. Dunn that the Hawaiian Department could do nothing until the technical status of the Korean had been clarified by the War Department.

4. Attached is a copy of a letter AG 014.311 (4-25-42) EA, Subject, "Soldiers of Korean Parentage", dated May 9, 1942, and a copy of the "Regulations Controlling Travel and Other Conduct of Aliens of Enemy Nationalities", with amendment, published by the Department of Justice.


5. In order that the Hawaiian Department be fully informed as to the treatment of Koreans within the Continental United States, it is recommended that copies of the attached documents be transmitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for his information and such action as he deems desirable.

NOV 24 42
391-R

For The Provost Marshal General:

B. M. Bryan,
Colonel, F.A.,
Director, Aliens Division.

19 A G O
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Received



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Removed Per
Executive Order 10501
~~RESTRICTED~~

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
SERVICES OF SUPPLY

Incls:
Copy of Letter AG 014.311 (4-25-42) EA.
Copy of "Regulations Controlling Travel and Other Conduct of Aliens of Enemy Nationalities".

AG 014.311 (11-21-42) Gen

Digests of newspaper editorials by
Western Defense Command
January 31, 1942–December 9, 1943

DIGEST OF NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL SHOWING PRESS ATTITUDE ON EVACUATION

UP TO JULY 23, 1942

TAB

Los Angeles, California. Herald Express, January 31, 1942.

Ounce of prevention worth pound of cure.

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, February 2, 1942.

Precautions taken by Government obvious necessity. When it gets into local hands, pressure group politics and personal headline seekers also get in. - Chester H. Rowell.

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, February 9, 1942

Realism must govern alien enemy issue. No infallible way of separating sheep from goats in mass order.

Los Angeles, California. Times, March 4, 1942

The only sensible method of dealing with whole problem is that ordered into effect yesterday by Lieutenant General DeWitt.

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, March 4, 1942.

Practical order to be accepted practically. The first lesson of General DeWitt's preliminary evacuation order is that when a practical man has a practical job to do he does it practically. In this he differs from a politician who makes a speech. We want no vigiliantism.

Portland, Oregon. Oregonian, March 6, 1942.

Bitter fact of war is, its force and betrayals make it necessary to issue Pacific Coast evacuation order.

Oakland, California. Tribune, March 11, 1942.

In war we must expect shocks, economic as well as military....but nobody can question the wisdom of actions and orders behind the jolts.

Reno, Nevada, March 11, 1942, The Journal

Japs must be removed to areas where they can do no harm.

The Dalles, Oregon. The Chronicle, March 13, 1942.

We are demanding something be done to exclude Japanese from vital defense areas.

Digest of Newspaper Editorials - Tab A

El Centro, California. Post-Press, March 15, 1942.

Displeasure in Tokyo, but everyone favors evacuation.

Long Beach, California. Sun, March 16, 1942.

Evacuation absolutely necessary. Many loyal Japanese Americans realize this. Americans, soldiers are suffering, too. In case of raid, Americans might not make distinction between loyal and other Japanese.

Orange, California. Orange County News, March 17, 1942.

Our security requires Japanese be removed, but in a way in keeping with the principles of humanity.

Oakland, California. Tribune, March 18, 1942.

Energetic measures taken by General DeWitt justified.

Vancouver, B. C. News Herald, March 19, 1942.

Clearing this coast of Japanese we are strengthening Canada's front line in Battle of the Pacific.

Glendale, California. Glendale News-Press, March 21, 1942.

Words of praise for General DeWitt and Colonel Bendetsen. - Carrol W. Parcher.

Portland, Oregon. The Journal, March 24, 1942.

All Japanese must be excluded even though a majority are loyal citizens. The loyal Japanese should not allow their citizenship to be marred by taking too long to arrange for evacuation. - Key Hartsook.

San Diego, California. San Diego Union, March 24, 1942.

The experience we have had with the Japs should cure us of the delusion that they can become responsible and loyal citizens.

Salt Lake City, Utah. Salt Lake Telegram, March 25, 1942.

News stories about evacuation say Japanese appear happy. Important thing now is to assure the safety of the nation on the home front. That's just as important to a loyal Japanese-American citizen as it is to any other American Citizen. The Japanese in America can well regard their evacuation as their part of the nation's victory effort - and with a grin and a "thumbs up" make it a demonstration of patriotism. Somehow we like that spirit. It is typically American.

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Digest of Newspaper Editorials. Tab A

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, March 29, 1942.

America cannot afford a Trojan Horse. - Franc Shor in This World.

Seattle, Washington. Post-Intelligencer, April 4, 1942.

In the evacuation of the Japanese from Bainbridge, there is a universal agreement that the Army did its job efficiently and humanely. The cooperation of the Japanese on the island was also notable. A second event was the manifest fairness of the trial, in federal court, of the first Japanese-American to face serious charges as a result of the war. Incidentally the defendant was acquitted by an all-Caucasian jury. We say "incidentally" because, no matter what the outcome, there would have been general agreement that court procedure was functioning efficiently and without prejudice.

Salem, Oregon. Statesman, April 10, 1942.

Japanese evacuees are receiving humane treatment; will be better off under Uncle Sam's wing away from scene of possible hostilities, than if they had been left here.

Los Angeles, California. Examiner, April 11, 1942.

The grateful compliments of the entire Pacific Coast, and particularly of California have been well deserved and are due to General John L. DeWitt and Tom C. Clark....We are fortunate that the men chosen for the job rightly interpretated the American spirit of tolerance and humanity and observed it with justice and impartiality.

Palo Alto, California. Times, April 13, 1942.

The mass movement is one of the most important details in this war's strategy, losing nothing in heroic quality by its purely preventive character. And General DeWitt, it's here!

San Francisco, California. Call-Bulletin, April 15, 1942.

When the final story of this chapter is written, it will be recorded that the American government has combined necessity with decency, with the utmost credit to itself.

Portland, Oregon. Oregonian, April 30, 1942.

They (the Japanese) are very fortunate to be under restraint in an orderly, democratic manner. It may not have been their fault, in any degree, that we were betrayed by their nation and their race. But the time for trusting without precaution is past.

Portland, Oregon. Oregonian, May 13, 1942.

There is a pledge implied in their retained privilege (that of

absentee voting) and they cannot be so blind as not to perceive it. Stern necessity has placed them where they are but if they will, they are still American.

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, May 18, 1942.

The disloyal ones among them - there are disloyal ones and it is because of inability to quickly weed them out that all the Japanese have had to go - will take the oath perhaps most loudly of all. From the loyal one, the oath is not needed. From the disloyal, with fingers mentally crossed, it will mean nothing. If it did, we could safely take the oath from all the Japanese and let them all come back.

Los Angeles, California. Times, May 19, 1942.

What arguments were presented to the President by the military authorities of this district have not been made known, but to assume that General DeWitt, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army and Naval Intelligence were motivated by race prejudice, greed for land, or popular hysteria, as this letter calmly does, is just silly. And, it was the arguments of this group that plainly impressed the President.

One has but to recall the original objections of the administration, as voiced by Attorney General Biddle, to removal of the Japs, to realize that it was not popular clamour that influenced the President, but very cogent evidence submitted by the military command. The implication that the President would be swayed by race prejudice, greed, or hysteria is no compliment. His instincts are in the other direction....The exclusion was a military measure and was recognized as such, and as necessary, by the Japanese themselves, who submitted to it with more good sense than is displayed by the signers of the petition. These Japanese knew that there were traitors to the United States in their midst and further that complete identification of all of them was impossibly difficult.

Dallas, Texas. Herald Times, June 6, 1942.

The removal is perhaps the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war. This huge transplanting of population was essential.

Redwood City, California. Tribune, June 24, 1942.

"Operating evacuation centers is not job for U. S. Soldiers," says editorial in answer George W. Savage, Inyo County publisher.

Inyo, California. Inyo Independent, June 26, 1942.

"We wonder if Mr. Eisenhower hadn't come to realize that the WRA is a hot potato, just a little too warm to handle with bureaucratic tongs. The WRA, with its social service approach to Japanese problems, plus its very evident examples of maladministration, already had two strikes on it.

The experiences we have seen at Manzanar since WRA took over are being repeated elsewhere."

Dallas, Texas. Times Herald, June 9, 1942.

The removal of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese extraction from the West Coast to interior points is, perhaps, the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war....Many of the Japanese who have been evacuated are American citizens by right of birth and are loyal to this nation, but there were too many of them in one locality....The evacuation of the Japanese as a war measure shows that it is not wholesome for the nation for any immigrant group to become too numerous in a particular locality.

San Bernardino, California. Sun, June 26, 1942.

In the face of reports that the large majority of Japanese in California evacuation camps approve of the army's decision that it was unwise to permit Japanese to reside on the Pacific Coast war zones, Mike Masaoka, national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, has made vigorous protest in New York....When Masaoka will point out how the United States Army can determine who is a good Japanese citizen and who is an enemy, the country might be interested in his protest....Miss Teru Masumoto offered resolution, narrowly defeated, that "as all loyal Americans, we support every measure that will help to insure victory for the United Nations, despite any personal hardships or sacrifices." --Among the opponents of her resolution were many white Americans who are interested in the technical questions as to how the United States government can restrain the movements of citizens, regardless of their racial inheritance. The army has taken a practical viewpoint of the Japanese situation on the Pacific Coast and adopted the only plan that seems feasible.

Los Angeles, California. Times, July 10, 1942.

"Now General DeWitt has let Governor Olson know that the Governor was talking through his well-used hat and that the Japs-rounded up at tremendous cost and trouble aren't going to be released for anybody. This is straight talk, that even an Olson should understand. If the Governor will get down to earth and join in the sensible efforts of various groups to recruit various available city workers....for emergency jobs in the fields, we can save the crops." - "As You Might Say---" ED AINSWORTH's column in Times.

Merced, California. The Sun-Star, July 6, 1942.

Releasing the Japs to work on the farm would, in large measure, undo all the government has done so far to provide that safety. Only Japs who volunteered would be used on the farms, and, obviously, if any

of them wanted to get outside the reception centers for purposes of sabotage or other acts of treachery, volunteering for farm work would provide him the opportunity to get out and do his dirty work. - "Jottings" by "Vic" Reich

Martinez, California. Gazette, July 14, 1942.

Governor Olson's pleas that Japs be returned here from internment camps to work in harvest fields has met with a cold reception from the war department. General DeWitt did a mighty fine job in removing Japs from important military zones. The job was done with the usual precision and thoroughness with which the army always goes about a task. And when it was completed everyone breathed easier. They felt that a menace to the safety of the entire Pacific Coast has been removed. It was with some amazement then that the people read several days ago that the Governor was advocating their return."

Boston, Massachusetts. Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 1942.

"The Army, which has smoothly, expeditiously and humanely handled the evacuation, and is carrying out the advance phases of the relocation is not officially concerned with the peacetime problem which will follow as night follows day....The probable outcome is that the Constitution will prevail rather than the unconstitutional opinions or desires of any group or even State. That is the normal and expected course of affairs. The Army, meanwhile, through its Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Wartime Relocation Authority, the completely civilian agency engaged in placing Japanese in groups where they may support themselves for the duration, are setting examples in smooth, harmonious functioning which may point the way for new postwar relationships between Japanese and the white population. The Japanese, both aliens and American citizens are being provided an opportunity to prove themselves willing and able to make serious sacrifices for this, the adopted land of some, the homeland of many more. As they continue to prove themselves, they will be proving also their right to the full and complete protection of the American Constitution, in peace or war, from this time forth. This war can conceivably put a definite end and answer to the domestic "Japanese question." The Wide Horizon - Beyond the War by Rodney L. Brink. A discussion of future peacetime disposition of West Coast Japanese.

Billings, Montana. Gazette, July 20, 1942.

Editorial comments on Columbiz's transfer of coast aliens inland, comparing it to evacuation of California Japanese. "Hard on the innocent, it is forced on them because of the difficulty of separating them from the guilty." Other examples of difficulties arising from mixed populations were also given.

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DIGEST OF EDITORIALS FOLLOWING MANZANAR INCIDENT OF DECEMBER 7, 1942, SHOWING NEWSPAPER ATTITUDE ON "LOYALTY" NINE MONTHS AFTER EVACUATION.

Long Beach Press-Telegram of December 8, in an editorial on the Manzanar matter says, in part: The riot "furnished a sufficient answer to those who have been questioning the wisdom of the Army's isolation of Japanese inhabitants of this country. All Japanese were moved away from potential war zones along the coast and placed under guard in camps of the interior for the good and sufficient reason that some of them were dangerous to the United States when this nation and Japan were involved in war, and nobody could tell certainly which of the Japanese were loyal to America and which were enemies at heart."

Continuing on the subject of loyalty, the editorial said: "The violent demonstration by pro-Axis Japanese at Manzanar does not provide the evidence whereby a complete separation of the sheep and the goats can be made, but it does prove beyond any doubt that a considerable percentage of the Japanese in this big relocation camp are loyal to Japan and consequently are enemies of the United States."

The San Francisco Chronicle, in an editorial December 8, discussing the Manzanar disturbance and good and bad actors among the Japanese, says in part: "We cannot select on the basis of the disorders because the bad actors are sure to plant their kind on the other side. There is no ready-made solution. As with other matters, we must make the best of it and increase protection inside the camps. This, of course, means more restriction, which the decent ones endure but find onerous."

The Portland Oregonian in an editorial of December 8, discussing the Manzanar disturbance and the question of separating good from bad said in part: "On the other hand, now that such an incident has arisen, perhaps it would be well to consider the wisdom of a division. There is great injustice in throwing together those who -- in the manner of brothers when they fall out -- are particularly bitter. Those who profess loyalty to America, especially if they are American citizens, should not be driven into close quarters with their enemies."

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The Los Angeles Times in an editorial of December 9, headed -- "Gen. DeWitt's Policy Vindicated Completely," said -- "Events at the Japanese centers at Manzanar and at Poston, Ariz., prove up to the hilt the necessity of Gen. DeWitt's order clearing all persons of Japanese ancestry out of the Pacific Coast military areas. The evacuation order, it will be remembered, was roundly criticised by uninformed Easterners and by some Westerners who should have known better. It is now clear that the feeling of too many Japanese was entirely unfriendly to the United States, and that considerable numbers of Japanese born here were included in the unfriendly group. ******For the safety of the Japanese themselves -- and the safety of Japanese loyal to the United States at least was entitled to protection -- the evacuation was wise and necessary."******

The Pasadena Star-News in an editorial of December 9, said in part: "All Japanese were moved away from potential war zones along the coast and placed under guard in camps of the interior for the good and sufficient reason that some of them were dangerous to the United States when this nation and Japan were involved in war, and nobody could tell certainly which of the Japanese were loyal to America and which were enemies.

The People's World at San Francisco, Communist paper in an editorial December 9, discussing the Manzanar matter, says in part -- "This whole situation bespeaks what The People's World advocated from the beginning, that time and consideration should be found for a systematic classification of the evacuated Japanese, along the lines used by England in dealing with aliens of enemy nationality, whereby those who are truly loyal to America and eager to help this country's war effort would receive recognition and treatment in accord with that fact."

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The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, in an editorial comment column of December 9, said in part -- "Riots staged by anti-American Japanese in Arizona and California camps lead to two conclusions. "One is that the army moved none too soon in its general evacuation of Japanese from coastal areas. "The other is that this country faces a real headache in any final disposition of the Japanese problem." The column continues discussion on the question of separating and picking out the trouble-makers.

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Various news items, letters to the editors, and editorial comment in the days following discuss the question of loyalty and disloyalty, and separation of the Nessei from others.

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