

PART IV. COLLECTIVE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE RELOCATION CENTER

Miyamoto
11/17

CHAPTER I. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY

Introduction. The effort of this section is to describe some of the outstanding features of the social structure in the local community. Presumably, the analysis of structures attempts to define the major differentiated parts of a total framework and to note the relationship which each part bears to the rest. All that is indicated in this section is the skeletal framework of relationships in the community within which are drawn the detailed designs for living of individual persons and groups.

The task of defining the structure of a relocation center community is, unfortunately, not as simple as is the task for an anthropologist studying a pre-literate culture, or even of a sociologist studying a long established New England town; for the Tule Lake community is today only a few months old, and one might almost say that the community is as undifferentiated as a new-born infant and as equally lacking in organization. But the analogy exaggerates the fact; there is a considerable residue of old habits of social relationship which have been transplanted or translated for application to the life here. What we do observe is that the new environmental conditions of the relocation center tend to break down the order and direction of established relationships among various groups and cause a process of reshuffling to start by which these groups seek a more stable position than now exists. Furthermore, under these unusual conditions of life, it is not inconceivable that new conceptions of grouprelationship, non-existent or at least insignificant in other communities, may come to play an important part in this society. All this serves as a warning against accepting social structures in a relocation center too literally, and points to the greater need of attention to the condition of flux which is pre-eminently the characteristic of this community.

In the process that is taking place, of establishing a new social structure,

there appear to be two main factors which are, in a sense, operating as dialectical forces. On the one hand are those influences which are seemingly "objective" to the individuals of the community, such as the requirements of the new geographic environment, the available physical facilities, the WRA and governmental policies, and the military restrictions, to all of which the people must adjust; on the other hand are those influences which may be called "subjective" and are deeply ingrained parts of the individuals, such as their habits of action established in former experience. The critical problem of the evacuees is that they must telescope into an extremely brief space of time the adjustment of their "subjective" tendencies to the "objective" requirements. Thus, the "objective" pre-conditions of life in a relocation center set limits to the social structure that may be developed, and they play a significant part in the adjustment of evacuees, for immediate and conscious account of them must be taken. Unlike the normal community, opportunities for individual selection of the environment or of gradual adaptation to external conditions are extremely restricted. It is this which causes the relocation program to be a crisis in the lives of evacuees.

The Caucasian-Japanese Relation: A Semi-Caste Structure If the "untouchables" of India, the Eta of Japan, and the Negroes of the South are typical examples of outcaste groups, the Japanese in the United States¹ have not hitherto been a part of a caste structure. Indeed, under favorable circumstances there has been such free intercourse in social relationship between members of the two races that not even the faintest semblance of a caste relation could be noted in these instances. However, one may say that certain basic characteristics of a caste system, such as the hereditary distinction made between the two groups, were latently present, and it only required the evacuation to bring them more prominently to the foreground.

The one fact, above all others, which sets the Japanese off in a lower caste-like group is that persons of Japanese ancestry, and they alone, have been

¹ For the sake of brevity, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, are referred to as "Japanese" unless otherwise indicated.

subject to evacuation. At the Hearings of the Tolan Committee, the view was abundantly expressed that most Issei and Nisei were probably loyal to the united States, but it was the inability to tell the loyal from the disloyal which was a major factor contributing to the "military necessity" of evacuation. To cite but one illustration of this view, Governor Olson of California declared at the Hearings:

. . . . First, let me say, the distinction between the Japanese and the Italian and German is the difficulty of telling who is who among the Japanese. I think they realize that. I don't believe that difficulty exists among the Germans and Italians.²

It was on the ground that, "We cannot doubt, and everyone is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country. But the innocent ten in this time of war will perforce suffer for the guilty one,"³ that the evacuation was justified by the Tolan Committee. On the other hand, the same committee recommended that, "They (a hearing board) should examine all cases of German and Italian aliens on an individual basis."² There is no appeal for the Japanese; the fact of their national-racial characteristics condemn them to the evacuation centers. When the realization awakens among the Japanese that their hereditary traits are alone sufficient to determine their destiny, the psychology that arises is not different from that of out-caste groups anywhere. And it seems fair to assume that the majority of the American populace who have concerned themselves with the minority Japanese problem do not question the justice of removing certain privileges from the Japanese, a typical upper-caste attitude. To be sure, the tradition of a caste relation between these two groups of people is absent, but the psychology involved is similar in many respects.

The line of division between the two groups is well defined by the derogatory terms, "Jap", and "keto" (the hairy one), which each uses against the other to describe his feeling about the other. It is needless to mention what

²Tolan Committee Hearings, Fourth Interim Report, p. 141.

³Ibid., Committee Hearings, Preliminary Report and Recommendations, p. 15.

"Jap" means to most Americans today. The term "keto", like the term "Jap", is a non-discriminating reference to a whole group, and while it is applied generally to the whole Caucasian race, the reference in the Tule Lake Project is specifically to the white Americans. The term is primarily one of disdain, but also of hate, and reflects accurately the hostile attitude toward Caucasians which tends to prevail among the Issei and Kibei. Their view is that if the Japanese are subordinated beneath the keto, it is merely because of the stupidity and ignorance of the latter and the unjustified feeling of superiority which run through their strain. Among the Nisei the term keto is much less frequently used, but there is generally a distinction made between the White-Americans (hakujin) and the Japanese-Americans, the former being a group that is more the object of resentment than of disdain or hate. The difference in the attitude toward Caucasians between the Issei and Nisei is evident in many ways. It is evident in such an instance as when a group of Nisei brought some of their visiting Caucasian friends to the messhall for supper. One person there who knew the attitude of the chef in that messhall commented, "Better not bring too many white persons here. The chef (an Issei) doesn't like the keto. He's likely to (he'd want to) poison them." The general Nisei attitude, on the other hand, is one of friendliness to those Caucasians who will befriend them.

Three major Caucasian groups affect the lives of the Japanese evacuees most directly: the American public, the Army, and the WRA. Because American public opinion, especially of the Pacific Coast, influences the policies of the WRA and controls the future of the Japanese in the United States, the American public has a distant but nevertheless sure hand in the determination of activities within the community. The strongest influence of the American public upon the lives of evacuees comes through the fear of the WRA that any series of disturbing incidents in the project might arouse strong adverse opinion against the WRA administration of the projects and dislocate its whole program.

For instance, the chief objection which the administration had against the farm strike of August 16 was the dangerous effect it might have on American public opinion concerning the operation of WRA projects. Speaking before the City Council two days after the strike, Joe Hayes, assistant project director, declared:

Suppose the militia had come out and fired a few rounds of shots to disperse the people; some persons would have been killed and many others would have been wounded. There would have been hell to pay. The thing would have gotten into the news just as the trouble down at Santa Anita did, and the one down at Manzanar. And the newspapers would have magnified the thing beyond reasonable proportions. Do you know what I heard on one of my recent visits up to Klamath? One woman came up to me and asked if it were true that the reason beer is scarcer now in Klamath Falls than before is that a lot of it is being shipped into the project. We have to be careful what we do here, for people on the outside are willing to believe any story that sets around.¹

Similarly, when Mr. Newhall of the San Francisco Chronicle was scheduled to appear at Tule Lake to gather material for a feature article on this project, Mr. Sharrill's chief concern was that the construction crew strike was impending and that other disturbances were all too evident in the community.² Now that the WRA has defined its policy of relocation and is attempting to establish work opportunities outside the centers for the Japanese, it is especially desirable that a favorable view of evacuees be created among the American public. During his last visit to this project, Dillon Myer spoke before a special meeting of the City Council to clarify the new policies of the WRA most of which had to do with relocation, and the burden of his discussion concerned the need of cooperation between the people and the WRA to create favorable public opinion so that the relocation program might be facilitated.³

Nor is the American public far from the gate of this project; they are in the hinterland of the community watching it closely for any misstep that might be called to account. Quite recently, three members of the farm crew went beyond the zone of permitted travel to get beer at a tavern in Tule Lake. The constable of the town picked them up and confined them up and confined them in jail until they were released to officials of the Tule Lake Project. One of the three offenders repeated

¹Miyamoto Document, City Council Meeting, Aug. 18, 1942, p.5.

²Miyamoto Journal, September 4, 1942.

³Special Council Meeting, Dillon Myer on New Policies, Oct. 12, 1942

the offense only a week or two after the first incident, and was caught by an army officer in Stronghold Inn a mile or two from the center. Others have been caught as far away as Medicine Lake seeking pine trees for the Labor Day floats. In consequence, the Army and the WRA have changed the project area so that army guards are now stationed at distant points on the highway to prevent further vagrancy. The need for such restrictions were not directly conceived by the Army or the WRA, but rather developed as a result of pressure from people in the surrounding area.

The hostility of the local population, especially around the little town of Tule Lake, seems to have arisen from the fact that the WRA took over land, from the U. S. Reclamation Service, which was meant for the veterans of the first World War of whom there are a great number in this region. Since some thirty or forty thousand acres of extremely fertile land would have been given to these people had the reclamation program developed as it was originally planned, their feeling of resentment at seeing this land used for "Japs" is perhaps understandable. No incidents of open hostility have yet been evidenced by the local population against the evacuees---the presence of army corps, and the fact that the WRA is a governmental agency, have been deterrents against such action---, but they have taken every opportunity to discredit the WRA and the evacuee population here. Mr. Sherrill has been receiving letters from Washington which originated in Tule Lake and were addressed to the President of the United States charging that the present administration of the Tule Lake Project is incompetent and should be replaced by stricter authority. Complaints have been issued that the "Japs" are driving farm trucks at extremely high speed burning up precious rubber and purposely trying to wear down governmental property, that "Japs" are "yoo-hooing" white girls walking along the highway, that they are destroying game fowl illegally, and that they are openly practicing military training with long staves in preparation for sabotage.¹ Some of these accusations have been found true, but most of them are malicious rumors without a shred of truth. Since a few incidents that are true give basis to

¹Issei Meeting, Nov. 5, 1942, p. 1.

a thousand lies, the administration has shown considerable vigilance in attempting to curb any forms of behavior in the community that might find poor reflection in American public opinion. While the administration is acutely conscious of the unfavorable view of the project current in the surrounding populace, the people of the community who have little or no contact with that small segment of the American public are no more conscious of them than they are of the rest of the "keto".

The more significant American public as far as the evacuees are concerned are the groups with which they are likely to come into contact under the relocation program. Almost every student who has gone out on the Student Relocation program seems to be concerned with the Caucasian attitude he is likely to encounter on the outside and especially at the place where he enters school. One young graduate medical student who wishes to return to the University of Chicago Medical School where he spent several years of study declares:

Prior to evacuation, I wrote to some of my friends at the school asking about the general attitude towards Japanese in Chicago since the outbreak of war. They didn't encourage me to return, not that they were afraid I wouldn't get along on the campus where everyone knows me, but they didn't want to be responsible for anything that might happen to me on the street. After all, there are a lot of irresponsible people around who wouldn't think anything of beating up a fellow. I'm going to write to Dr. Tashiro and find out what he thinks of the situation there now.¹

If a person who has spent seven years in a city is concerned about the attitude of the people toward Japanese since the outbreak of war, one may understand the misapprehensions felt by those who are entering a strange city for the first time. The same question of the majority group attitude toward Japanese prevails among those who go out to the sugar beet fields and other outside employment in the adjacent states. Letters written to friends and relatives in the project by those who have gone out to the fields on the outside are a favorite weathervane to gauge public sentiment. The favorable tales of social relations between Japanese farm workers and Caucasians have encouraged the tendency toward relocation, but it is generally agreed that certain places, like Montana, Payette County in Idaho, and others, are undesirable places to go to.

¹Miyamoto Journal, Nov. 7, 1942, p. 2.

Personal contacts with the American public is necessarily quite restricted within the project, but it does continue to take place, especially on the economic and religious levels. It is said that some of the business enterprisers of the surrounding area, particularly of Klamath Falls, have profited considerably by the location of the Tule Lake Project in this locality, and there is a substantiation of the point in the willingness of laundry men, local agents of mail-order houses, grocery retailers, and others, to make the thirty-seven miles trip to this center. Contacts of this kind, however, produce little of lasting effect and is extremely casual to say the least. The personal relationships arising out of Christian church activity, however, is much more extensive and intimate. In the early stage of project development when no ministers from Tule Lake and Klamath Falls volunteered their service. At frequent intervals throughout the summer months, Christian young people's groups visited the project to hold joint services with the young people's fellowships in this community. On these occasions, the visitors would be invited into the homes of evacuees and entertained.

In the effort to improve public relations with the Caucasian population in the surrounding area, the WRA sometimes invites outside groups, such as the Kiwanis and Rotarians, to visit the center and mix formally with the Japanese. On these occasions the role of the Japanese is chiefly that of entertainers, for they are called upon to sing, dance, serve sukiyaki, act as guides on tours, and, in general, participate as public relations hosts to the Caucasians. The visitors are required to pay for their dinners. While the relations under these circumstances are quite cordial, very little interpersonal contact takes place, and the community at large is relatively unaffected by them except in the attitude they may develop upon observing white strangers driving around in large automobiles. The most permanent and intimate contact with Caucasians is that carried on with friends known in former communities who come to visit at the project, but these visits are so infrequent and affect such a limited portion of the evacuee population that their influence is probably of minor importance.

The American public is thus a group which evacuees must seriously take account of since its opinions directly affect the lives of Japanese in America, but because of the restricted inter-personal contact with it, it has little concretion in the thought of evacuees about it. One notes the hostility of Issei and Kibei, and even of many Nisei, against this ephemeral public which apparently was a potent factor contributing to the evacuation, but there is difficulty in directing one's feeling against a populace that stretches the breadth of a continent. One way in which the Issei are able to handle so large a unit in their thought is to oppose it with another equally large unit, the people of Japan, and one suspects that the feeling of identity with Japan which has been strengthened among a large portion of the Issei since their arrival here is at least in part explainable by their need to vent their resentment through some group large enough to cope with the American people as a whole. Another method of giving expression to their hostility is through action against that portion of the American people with whom the evacuees have contact, such as the administrative personnel of projects. Among Nisei, who feel little or no identity with Japan, the task of concretizing the object of their resentment has been much more difficult and many give up the effort and take on a fatalistic attitude about their situation, but others enter the hunt for the group or groups in the American public to blame for their present humiliating and unjustified position.

Out of the need to think of the American people in some way or another, several types of attitude have developed and prevail among the evacuees in Tule Lake. First, there are those who hold a belligerent attitude toward the keto and would wreak vengeance upon them, so they say, if ever they are given the opportunity. Second there are those who would prefer to avoid contact with the keto, at least to the extent that no inter-personal claims may be developed, for they hold in the back of their minds the possibility that Japan and the Axis may win the war and they should prefer to side with the winning nation. Most of the first two classes are Issei or Kibei, though Nisei are not absent from the latter category. Third there are the Nisei in particular,

and some Issei and Kibei, who have in their past experience developed many friends among the Caucasians, but have felt the injustices wrought by the American people upon them; and their inclination is to divide the American public between those who are their friends and those who are the ignorant masses who persecute the Japanese in America. The latter are the object of resentment; or more specifically, it is the vested interest groups, the leaders of the masses in the anti-Japanese agitation, as well as the followers who are the object of resentment. Among this class of Nisei are those who seek to enlist the aid of friendly whites in their effort to neutralize and overcome the anti-Japanese movement. Finally, there is a limited number who, because of maladjustment or an unusual degree of Americanization, find themselves out of place among Japanese and therefore disdain the group of their parental heritage and seek to identify themselves rather with the White-Americans.

The Army, of course, is a part of the Caucasian group and ⁱⁿ the minds of the Issei are categorically classed as keto. But the relationship of the Japanese evacuees to the Army, and as well to the WRA, has been much more concretely defined through recent experience than to the American society as a whole, and structurally their relationship has been canalized differently than in the latter case.

In the eyes of evacuees, the Army is the ultimate ruler of their destiny, the power behind all power which directs the puppet lives of Japanese evacuees. The Army is spoken of as a single unified command, yet it is sometimes difficult to conceive it as a unit, for there is the army that ordered and carried out the evacuation, there is the army that stands guard over the project, there is the army that threatens to induct the American-born Japanese, and there is the army that is fighting the soldiers of Japan. In general, the contact of the evacuees with the Army has been indirect and impersonal, and their conception of the Army has been influenced by their experience.

The most direct contact with the Army was had during the period of evacuation and in the assembly centers supervised by the WCCA under the direct control of the Army. Those who found the WRA relocation center a considerable improvement over the

assembly center were inclined to speak of their experience with the Army with redoubled bitterness. It was not uncommon in the earlier period of life at Tule Lake to hear criticisms of General De Witt or General "Hit Hit" as some outspoken persons were inclined to call him) and his policies. The fresh memory then of frequent baggage inspections, of occasional restrictions newly imposed on the evacuees, and of being herded about like cattle by military guards all contributed to an unfavorable view of the Army. But even in the period of the evacuation and of the assembly center, direct contact with the Army was relatively infrequent for it was generally represented by some civilian agency which did all the "dirty work", and the Army was rather cast in a favorable light by the quick action it could take whenever problems were presented directly to its officers.

Any criticisms that may have dwelt in the minds of evacuees during the first phase of evacuation, however, has tended to disappear with each month's stay at the relocation center, for the faults of the Army seem to have been eclipsed by the faults of the WRA. Especially has this been true recently when the difficulties experienced by the WRA in procuring goods for the project has led to considerable dissatisfaction and disorganization within the community, and in this frame of mind the people have tended to turn to the Army as their "Savior" from the disturbing situation. At the height of disorganization in the community in late August, people were heard to say, "Let the Army come in; perhaps it will be just as well."¹ Even on the floor of the council, a councilman who had shown himself a leader in past meetings and a person of responsibility in his actions recently declared, "Maybe it would be better if the army were to take over," and then, after a friendly rebuke from one of his colleagues for such an extreme statement, corrected himself by adding, "I meant to say that rather than take orders from civilians, I'd rather get ordered about by the Army."²

The favorable light in which the Army appears by contrast with the WRA on questions of procurement and organization of an evacuated population is perhaps

¹Farm Labor Strike, Aug. 16, 1942, p. 2.

²City Council Meeting. Taketa's statement, Sept. 22, 1942.

natural, for a civilian agency established during wartime and which attempts to compete with war industries in the procurement of goods and for national administrative attention to their problems is at a considerable disadvantage. Mr. Shirrell has repeatedly pointed out to the people the difficulties of procurement in wartimes, and he declared at his first public address on the problems of the project,

"One of the most difficult problems we have been confronted with is that of procuring goods for all your needs.because of the war, there are many things that are not available today which in normal times would have been available; and the means of transporting those goods which we procure is limited. The paramount concern of the United States today is to win this war, and war industries must take precedence over anything else in matters of transportation or of supplies."¹

Dillon Myer stressed the problem of getting priorities for the WRA in one of public statements here², and the apology of the WRA for inadequate supplies frequently includes the statement that this agency has no better than an A-9 priority rating at best. While these difficulties of procurement are being dinned into the ears of the evacuees, however, they are in a position to observe the miraculous power of the Army in procuring goods which are ostensibly off the market. The large cast iron stoves, for example, which are a distinct improvement over the flimsy wood stoves originally found in the apartments, were accessible only through the Army, a fact which is freely admitted by the WRA. It is common knowledge that much of the food sent us here is procured through the Army quartermaster. Thus, the people are led to the conclusion that the Army is an abundant provider by contrast with the WRA, and they feel themselves willing to forsake the freedom offered by the WRA for the promise of adequate necessities from the omnipotent Army.

Yet in another sense, the Army is recognized as the final arbiter of the evacuee's future. Under the immobilized condition within the relocation center, the people are acutely conscious of the idea of movement. A persisting wish which dominates the thought of evacuees, especially of the Nisei, is the desire to be freed from the restrictions of the project area. For the realization of this desire, however, there is always the need to gain permission from the San Francisco office

¹Miyamoto Journal, Aug. 29, 1942, p. 2-3

²Special Council Meeting, Dillon Myer on New Policies, Oct. 12, 1942, p. 1.

of the Western Defense Command, and there is, furthermore, the need to take account of zones which are prohibited to evacuee residence by military restrictions. The people who desire to relocate thus find their movement circumscribed by all manner of military restrictions, but much of it seems to be accepted with an air of helplessness as if it were the inevitable lot of evacuees. On the other hand, there are these evacuees, especially the Issei, who once having been temporarily relocated to this center are loathe to relocate again. There is a current rumor in Tule Lake, one which has persisted since the beginning of settlement here, that the people of this community will have to relocate again to some more inland point at a safe distance from the Pacific Coast. Mr. Shirrell has repeatedly denied the rumor and presented reasons to show its extreme improbability, but no amount of argument is adequate to displace the anxiety from the people's minds. To Mr. Shirrell's reasoning the people's reply is that even the project director cannot know the decision of the Army, and they present circumstantial evidence to prove that the Army has other thoughts in mind than to permit the Tule Lake Japanese to remain here. There seems to exist a feeling, which is not without its justification, that if the evacuees could place themselves in closer contact with the real source of authority, that much of the complications in their lives would be removed. And the higher authority is not the WRA, but rather the Army.

As far as relationship with the small unit of the local militia goes, contact between the evacuees and this body is so limited that the life in the community proceeds almost as if the local army post were non-existent. The soldiers are prohibited from entering the community except on special duty, and the evacuees are prohibited from entering the fenced-off area of the army encampment. Captain Patterson, head of the local militia who apparently has little love for the Japanese, seems to have issued strict orders to the soldiers that no social intercourse is to be carried on between them and the evacuees. One soldier expressed regret that he could not even exchange greetings with a Japanese girl whom he had known previously, but had to snub her in the presence of the Captain. A few soldiers who are on duty

at the post office inspecting postal deliveries or freight and others who work with Japanese wardens as sentinels at project boundaries probably develop some acquaintance with the evacuees, but no other legitimate opportunities of social exchange exist. The conception of the military police in the community is that these "tough Texans" hate the "Japs" whom they have to guard and that they are an extremely ignorant lot since many of them can neither read nor write, but these feelings of hostility are intermingled with feelings of pity and sympathy at the boring life they must lead in this out-of-the-way camp. The Issei attitude toward the American soldier, which has never been characterized by a very high regard for them, especially ^{by} contrast to their superior opinion about the Japanese soldier, is perhaps typified in the following observation of an Issei:

"These American soldiers are probably glad that the Japanese are here. It would be embarrassing for them to be out on the field of battle retreating all the time. Darashi-ga-naï na. (How sloppy they are.) But I guess it's a part of their duty to do this, although they don't like it. They'd probably rather be at home, but it's their duty to be here."¹

Although the Army contributes to the material well being of the community, its influence upon the social environment is entirely restrictive. Moreover, the flow of influence between the Army and the evacuees is strictly unilateral, from the Army to the evacuees. But the people recognize the authority of the Army and accept it, at least for the present---certainly, the attitude of the people toward the Army is much less critical than toward the WRA. This point of view is clearly reflected in the oft-repeated view of a certain influential element among the Nisei, that the only reason for accepting evacuation is because of the "military necessity" requiring it.

The main relationship between the evacuees in the Tule Lake Project and the Caucasian Americans is, of course, with the administrative personnel of the WRA located here. From the point of view of the Issei, the WRA personnel is indistinguishable from the rest of the keto, and if the Caucasian Americans of the Pacific Coast are the keto who usurped the hard-earned possessions of the Japanese,

the WRA Caucasians are keto who are profiting by administering a dispossessed people.

Much has already been said of the WRA; here we need only indicate the structural relation of the WRA to the evacuees. From the beginning the WRA has emphasized the policy of conducting the projects in a democratic way, of giving to the evacuees all the responsibilities they are capable of assuming. The evacuees were to have full self government in the establishment and management of governmental services; they were to assume those positions in the WRA work corps for which they were best fitted. But despite the WRA's declared sympathy for democratic control and operation of the project by the people, the fact is that the people are so dependent upon the administration for most of their basic needs and the supervision of all departments that very little actual self government exists. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the WRA administers the work corps and therefore determines work opportunities, and the maximum wages achievable, that it is the commissariat of food and clothing supplies, that it directs the extent and condition of available housing facilities, that, in short, the WRA administers directly over a wide and important portion of the evacuees' lives. The WRA unquestionably has put forth effort toward administering the project as democratically as possible, but the actual nature of the relationship between the administration and the people which is necessarily the outcome of the relocation situation is a direct contradiction of the democratic ideal. Out of this relationship has evolved the conception in the community that the WRA is the "provider" and the evacuees the "recipient" of goods. A dominant philosophy that has characterized the community from the beginning of resettlement is that the people should try to get everything they can from the WRA, an attitude which is comparable to that found among ~~the~~ labor unions in their relation to employers. The administrators of the project have been bitterly disappointed and disillusioned by the "people's unwillingness to assume more personal responsibility," but as long as the administration retains control of the purse strings of the community, it appears unlikely that any increased awareness of personal responsibilities can be created among the people.

The superordinate-subordinate relationship between the Caucasians and Japanese is most acutely felt by the evacuees in their relation to the WRA personnel, for the relationship involves direct personal contact. Every Japanese, even the best trained and most experienced, is under the administrative control of one Caucasian or another, and the unfortunate aspect of the situation is that in many instances the subordinate Japanese are more capable than their superiors. Particularly is this the case on the farm where any number of men experienced in the management of large farms or were successful operators of their own small farms are under the supervision of the Caucasian farm supervisor, A. R. Kallam, who has shown no evidence of being more capable than the Japanese farm workers under him. Many farmers from Northern California claim to have known him when he was farming around the Delta Region, and they speak with disdain of his lack of success in operating his ~~own~~ own farm enterprises. Other comments about Kallam indicate the general attitude which prevails even today but was particularly dominant at first.

Comments were being made that water is needed in this patch or that. These farmers knew where water was needed. "These keto wait to irrigate all the fields at once instead of doing one field at a time. These keto do the culverts and ditch gates without testing for elevation. The ditch gates might be at a point lower than the rest of the field where it's ineffective."¹

"Kallam goes ahead planting without getting the irrigation prepared. The cabbages and onions are practically all burnt because they didn't have the water ready at the time of planting. Those shoots should have come right up if they'd been watered right after planting, but Kallam doesn't plan for those things.

"Kallam did not come out to the field today. He is very unpopular among the farmers nowadays. They wish he were out of here. Most of the foremen agree that Kallam is the downfall of the whole farm, and that he doesn't know how to farm anything but sugar beets and barley. Someone put up a turnip shaped like a nude and wrote a tag on it saying "This is Kallam" and nailed it on the wall. Remained there all day."²

Farmers blame Kallam for not being prepared beforehand to harvest the crops. He should have been prepared with shock nails, sacks, trucks, etc. They say that everything is left until the last minute."³

¹Najima Notes, July 17, 1942

²Hisatomi Notes, September 2, 1942

³Hisatomi Notes, September 3, 1942

Since the position of the evacuee farmers does not permit them to compete with Kallam for the same managerial office, there is no violent feeling of jealousy about his superior position. In fact, most of the farmers are inclined to ^{the} view that that the project farm is not their farm, and that they shouldn't work too hard or assume much responsibility when they get only \$16 per month wages. On the other hand, they take a certain pride in their knowledge and experience at farming and they dislike working under ineffective conditions. Perhaps nothing would raise the morale of farm workers more than to have their opinion consulted in the conduct of the farm, but no effort has been made to organize the farm workers on a democratic basis. The criticism of farm supervision, of course, is not limited to Kallam alone, but is also directed against Hudson, the marketing head, and Eastmann, chief of the agriculture and industry divisions.

In the medical field where there is an acute consciousness of professional status, it is perhaps to be expected that friction will arise between the evacuee doctors and the Caucasian administrator, and the only condition under which disagreements could be avoided is through the choice of a Caucasian supervisor who is unquestionably the superior of other doctors on the project. One doctor (Japanese) who had been connected with a well-known hospital until recently replied when he was asked his opinion ~~xxx~~ of Dr. A. B. Carson, Chief of Medical Service in Tule Lake,

"He's all right. But the trouble is, so many of the Japanese doctors are superior to him in medical knowledge. Some of them have had more training and more experience. It's hard for a man in his position to command the respect of doctors under him."¹

It was following the difficulties of the Iki-Harada case and the proposal of the WRA to transfer some of the Japanese doctors to equalize the medical service in the various projects, that the most pointed criticisms of the Caucasian administration of medical service in this project developed. For some time, since the first establishment of the base hospital, the Japanese doctors had been repeatedly requesting, or demanding, certain equipment which they felt was absolutely necessary for the offering of adequate medical service to the evacuees. When Dr. Carson left the project for three weeks, accompanied by his secretary and Dr. Iki, to set up the

¹Miyamoto Notes, June 23, 1942

base hospital at the Hart Mountain Project, Dr. Harada was appointed temporary head of the hospital. His first move was to requisition all the material which the Japanese doctors had been demanding for some time, but which Dr. Carson, for his own reasons, had not submitted for procurement. For the requisitions to be accepted by the project administration, however, they required the signature of Miss Graham, the head nurse, perhaps an arrangement made to check just such requisitions as were submitted by Dr. Harada. The attitude of the Japanese doctors to this arrangement was:

"It's an insult to have a nurse placed over a doctor. I've never heard of doctors taking orders from nurses; it's just not done. How can the nurse know what doctors need? Miss Graham was in no position to judge whether or not a certain requisition ought to go through or not."¹

Although almost all the doctors on the staff here are Nisei and understand Caucasians perfectly well, such incidents as these have split the relation between the Caucasians and Japanese on the medical staff perhaps as widely as in any department on the project. One doctor characterized Dr. Ueyama, who is said to be one of the best doctors among Japanese from the Bay Region, as "allergic to Caucasians."

Another doctor further enlarged on this point:

"Dr. Ueyama is one of the bluntest fellows I've ever met. He's absolutely tactless, and says whatever he thinks..... He's pretty rude to the Caucasian staff these days. He won't even speak civilly to Miss Graham, the head nurse. Not that the Dr. is impolite, but rather that one can see his dislike of Caucasians in his behavior."²

One final illustration may be drawn from the problems that have developed in the post office where some dozen Nisei are employed under the supervision of Mrs. Wallace, the attractive young wife of an army corporal stationed here. Considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed in the community as well as among the workers about the lack of adequate organization in the office. Work assignments have not been properly made, the Nisei workers are too young and do not sufficiently recognize the responsibility of their position, packages have been lost and even stolen, and yet

¹Miyamoto Notes

²Iki-Harada Case, Sept. 17, 1942. p.3 and p. 5.

Mrs. Wallace fails to impose strict regulations within the office so that such mishaps would not recur. Recognizing that there is a lack of trained personnel among the Nisei to operate the post office efficiently, the situation is not improved by placing in the supervisory capacity a girl who is so young that she herself does not fully realize the responsibility of her position. According to an older woman who spent several months working in the post office as ex officio head of the Nisei workers, Mrs. Wallace still likes to have a good time herself and hence is not strict when the young Nisei workers get out of hand at the post office, she is an expert jitter-bugger and frequently is absent on Monday mornings after over-exertion the night before, and has only gradually come to an awareness of how extremely responsible the task of handling other people's mail and packages is. The disorganization in the post office appears to become more and more acute, and the expectation is that the Christmas rush will snow under the delivery department of the post office. A few of the older girls working there now look with despair upon the situation, and declare among themselves that one capable Nisei with organizational ability could do much to improve the circumstances. Recently, when the City Council asked Mrs. Wallace to appear at their meeting to answer questions about the condition of the post office, Mr. Shirrell informed her that she need not appear since he had not been informed of the council's action, and instead raised her pay which is said to have been about \$12.50 a month. Some of the Nisei workers who have been exerting themselves to keep some order within the confusion are a little upset to think that Mrs. Wallace has had her pay increased despite her inability to organize the post office efficiently.

The difference in class level between the administrators and the evacuees is especially emphasized by the difference in wages. One bookkeeper in the finance accounting section was constantly demoralized by the fact that in the books she kept, young Caucasian truck drivers getting \$80 per week would be listed beside Japanese workers getting only \$12, \$16 or \$19 a month. ~~Professional Japanese workers~~

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~~getting only \$12, \$10, or \$19 a month.~~ Professional Japanese workers who were accustomed to getting hundreds of dollars a month on the outside consider the \$19 a month (plus, of course, their basic subsistence) laughable, though, to be sure, none of them refuse to accept their monthly penance. Their resentment becomes most apparent in those circumstances when criticism is directed against them from their supervisors for their lack of industry at their work. Said one young stenographer of her "employer":

"Mr. C. makes me mad. He kept me working until 5:30 yesterday evening just because he changed his mind about a letter he was writing. I copied the thing five times. Then he complains that we're not willing to work hard enough and says all the Caucasian staff are working even on week-ends to keep the project going. What does he expect from us when we only get \$16 a month." ¹

Frequently, there is a feeling among the Japanese workers that they are doing more and showing greater efficiency in their work than is true of the Caucasians who are so much better paid.

Such discrepancies in the ability shown and the compensation paid are, however, forgotten during the routine work day while the workers pursue their tasks side by side with their supervisors. Rather do these discrepancies offer another basis of the general resentment against the situation in which the evacuees find themselves, which get overt expressions of hostility only

1. Miyamoto Notes, Aug. 7. 1942.