

Isseis felt that for the good of the community it was best to cooperate in a matter of this sort. The Niseis definitely felt that something terrible was going to befall them because they had not agreed to cooperate with the Office of War Information. They wanted to hold another meeting and discuss the matter over again without the interference of the Isseis. A special meeting of the Council in the afternoon was hurriedly planned.

D. Councilmen's Decision

If the morning meeting dominated by Isseis was ruled by a spirit not unlike insolence, the afternoon meeting of councilmen was dominated by fear. Underlying the discussion was a fear that unless more cooperation was shown to the Office of War Information there would be reprisals against the Japanese people in general and that the Niseis would have to shoulder most of the burden of such results. Up to this point councilmen had avoided a direct clash with Isseis, but this time the older people came in for rather severe criticism. The decision made in the morning was reversed by the Council, and as a result of the meeting the blocks were called upon again to vote on the Broadcast Affair.

The chairman, Gerry Wakayama, opened the meeting with the remark that in the morning the Isseis were against the broadcast and now he wanted to hear the opinion of the Council. He had evidently spoken to Mr. McEvoy about the morning's results and probably blamed the Isseis for making such a decision. He was told by Mr. McEvoy that even if this matter did not go through, he would not hold this against the Niseis.

Two councilmen said that their block was for the broadcast if both the physical and spiritual sides of the picture of the camp were

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given or if the script used could be first approved by both Isseis and Niseis. Then said one of the speakers: "The Second Generation should think about this matter because if we give the impression that we are not going to cooperate something terrible is going to happen later. This broadcast should be backed up by the people here because it will be for their benefit. They will receive better treatment."

The position of the councilmen and other Niseis was well summed up by Yoshimi Shibata. He said that even though the broadcast was an important international problem, emotion rather than reason had ruled in the morning meeting. The Isseis had control of the meeting and Niseis had no voice in the matter. He felt that this problem was just as much the problem of Niseis as it was of Isseis. He did not feel that under the circumstances Niseis should necessarily agree with Isseis in their decision on this vital matter. He brought out Mr. McEvoy's reasons for asking for a broadcast:

1. Because of past brutality in the Far East.
2. To avoid future brutality in the Far East.
3. Because reports on the treatment within the relocation centers are erroneous.

He said that if we did not broadcast and Japan retaliated by mistreating American soldiers, the sentiment of the public against the Japanese people here could be aroused and conditions made worse for us. He brought out the fact that the condition of the Japanese and American prisoners could be improved by broadcasting the true condition within this Project. Above all, he asked that the councilmen reason this problem out and not become emotional as the Isseis had been in the morning.

Walter Tsukamoto then got up and made a more impressive and emotional appeal. He took a more extreme stand against the Isseis and in support of cooperation with the United States Government.

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Roughly he said: "There was no one in my block that was against the broadcast if they could tell the truth. There was a feeling that they should not be responsible for the suffering of American prisoners. I was surprised this morning. The Issais felt that they are patriots. They felt that they were doing something loyal to Japan and did not give a thought to the citizens here or their children. They didn't think of the retaliation on the part of the American public. I don't think these people were representative of the Issais. They are breaking down rule and order. Those people are being looked upon as heroes here. The record should be kept straight that the Council merely acted as mediator. I am 100% opposed to their decision. None of us have been beaten or starved. The only right we have been deprived of was by being evacuated. All other rights are given to us, and I think that we should be grateful for these things. The great majority of the American people are trying to be fair with us. We should not forsake our Government. Responsible government men are not in full accord with the treatment we are being accorded."

It was clear that Walter did not have the support of all of the other councilmen. One man brought up the fact that there was no way of knowing whether the things that Mr. McEvoy said about Japan were true or not. He said that if a broadcast were to be held, someone should be allowed to listen in to make sure that the true message was sent out.

Walter retorted that they would not have come to the people if they wanted to twist information around. He saw no reason why the truth should not be broadcasted.

Koso Takemoto then got up and opposed Walter. Koso calmly brought out the fact that broadcasts by prisoners in Germany, for

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instance, were thought to be false and forced. He stuck to the realistic view that, while it was all right to cooperate with the Office of War Information, care should be taken to insure that the information released was used against the Japanese. "I am not against telling the truth if the proper means are taken to be sure that the truth is extended," he said.

This opinion that care should be taken to see that the broadcast would not be changed prevailed, and it led to a discussion of the conditions under which the broadcast should be allowed.

Mr. Shibata, in the meantime, asked for a roll call to see how the blocks had voted last night. He suspected that some blocks had changed their vote under the pressure of the atmosphere of the morning's meeting. Of those blocks that were represented it was discovered that 30 had voted "yes" on condition, 2 yes, 23 no and two were undecided. This result was just the opposite to the one obtained from the morning meeting where the answers were supposed to have come from delegates of the blocks. The morning result had been 32 no, 25 yes on condition, and 4 undecided.

An analysis of the result of the roll calls revealed that the wards were for the broadcast in the following wards:

Wards VII, V, VI, III, II, I, IV.

One interesting note on sectional differences is the fact that people from Pinedale who are located in wards VII and VI are toward the head of the list. This has been found to be true in other issues. Pinedale people have been willing to cooperate more willingly than any other group. Wards II and III, which are populated by people from Walerga are less cooperative, but tend to follow in the middle. Ward IV (Arboga) and Ward V (White zone) are less

predictable. Ward I is the most interesting because of its contrast to Wards VI and VII. In spite of the fact that they are from the same Northwest, Ward I tended to be uncooperative in community matters. It is of interest that Ward I had the most undecided votes and made the greatest number of changes in answer to the roll calls in the morning and in the afternoon. In the morning there were 2 "yes," 5 "no" and 2 "undecided." In the afternoon there were 5 "yes," 1 "no" and 1 "undecided." Ward I seems to be characterized by lack of unity and harmony.

Since it was discovered that the majority of the blocks were in favor of the broadcast under certain conditions anyway, the Council proceeded confidently with its plans to find out what conditions should be asked for of Mr. McEvoy and what conditions would be granted by him. In the meantime Mr. McEvoy was sent for.

After some discussion the following four conditions under which the broadcast would be permitted were suggested:

1. A script be approved by both Isseis and Niseis.
2. The Japanese be allowed to choose their own men to participate in the broadcast and they be allowed to say the truth.
3. The broadcast be listened in by representatives of the colonists.
4. The broadcast be handled through the Spanish Ambassador.

Somebody then moved that the personal opinion of the councilmen be taken to find out just where they stood on the matter. After the vote was to be taken, Walter got up and demanded a roll call.

It was curious that the high pressure method which was objected

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to in the morning meeting was being employed in a similar manner to make the councilmen vote for the broadcast issue. With the implication that anyone who voted against the broadcast would be considered disloyal citizens, councilmen were not free to vote no even if they so chose. On top of that the conditions were not considered at all, and the councilmen asked to vote either yes or no. There was hesitation on the part of some, but most of them answered yes. There 48 yes, 3 no's, 1 who refused to vote, and 7 who were absent. After the vote was taken, Walter triumphantly got up and said: "I suggest that that be given to Mr. McEvoy as the Council's opinion."

Mr. McEvoy arrived on the scene, and he took the spotlight until the meeting was over. First he read a teletype that he had sent out to Washington, D.C. asking about the citizenship bill and also affirming the loyalty of the Nisei. He also read a confirmation of the fact that no bill depriving Niseis of the citizenship had passed the House of Representatives. On hearing this Walter got up and said that there were still two more bills before the House. He said that councilmen, as leaders of the Niseis, should be vigilant against any future action.

The four conditions were then explained to Mr. McEvoy. To two of the conditions he objected. First, about the Spanish Ambassador, he asked why he should be asked to stand between two groups of American citizens. The third party would imply, he said, that the Japanese here were under the Japanese flag, since a third party was used only in dealing with representatives of any enemy power. It would also take too much time. He wondered if he couldn't get a group of Isseis and Niseis who were sympathetic to the United States cause to put this program over.

Mr. Imazeki, editor of the Dispatch, pointed out that Isseis probably felt like enemy aliens here. Mr. McEvoy came right back and said that if they felt that way why didn't they go back to Japan. He made it clear that he believed that if they were not loyal to the United States they should be in a concentration camp. This sort of assumption which would seem grossly unfair to most Japanese was the same one under which Mr. Shirrell seemed to conduct his business, and one which was at the root of many of the misunderstandings and conflicts that occurred within the Project. Whereas in the morning meeting Mr. McEvoy had been careful to be as polite as possible, with the Councilmen he seemed to be taking a more dominating attitude.

Concerning the approval of a script by both Isseis and Niseis, Mr. McEvoy said that this could be arranged. He suggested a small group with which he could work. After some discussion, three Isseis and three Niseis were decided upon. From the Council, Messrs. Tsukamoto, Tsuda and Takemoto were chosen. There were some discussions as to how to choose the Issei members to serve on this committee. It was finally decided that a representative from each block would be chosen to meet and decide upon the three Issei members of the committee to approve the script.

Mr. McEvoy also said that the committee would be free to include whatever they pleased, as long as it was not subversive material.

A snag was hit when the most important condition -- that of listening to the broadcast--was presented. Mr. McEvoy pointed out that the permission of the Army would have to be gotten for this, and he hinted that the Office of War Information wanted as little to do with the Army as possible. He said that he thought it would not be done, but that he would try. Mr. McEvoy was not too convincing in his desire to please the colonists on this point. Other neutral agencies friendly to the Japanese could have been

asked to listen in to the broadcast for the people. Mr. McEvoy suggested this himself, but he was not convincing enough, and did not satisfy the councilmen on this point. A question was asked whether there was any assurance that these records would be used again at some other time against the Japanese people, but no satisfactory reply was presented by Mr. McEvoy.

At this point, Mr. John D. Cook, head of the Information Division, stepped up and tried to explain why these gentlemen were here. He had written scripts for the radio, and probably felt that this was a good opportunity to parade himself before the councilmen. The chairman, however, told him that he was out of order. Mr. Cook said that as an advisor to the Council, he had some right to speak. The chairman bluntly insisted that Mr. Cook was out of order, and refused to let him speak.

Another person pointed out that the type of broadcast for domestic and foreign consumption would be different. It would be all right to make records for broadcasts to the Far East, but he questioned the wisdom of allowing a domestic broadcast based on the same recordings. Mr. McEvoy said that different programs would be used for domestic and foreign broadcasts, but to make the matter simple, he would limit this coming broadcast to the foreign one only.

With two of the four conditions found not acceptable, the discussion was brought to a close. Councilmen were instructed to return to their blocks to call a meeting to determine the stand of the people in that block on the broadcast issue in light of the two conditions granted. The answer was to be brought back to the regular Council meeting to be held that night. Also, an Issei representative was to be sent to another messhall that same evening



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where they would choose three members of the script committee. The hope of the Council, of course, was that the people in the blocks would vote for the broadcast. They seemed to have overlooked the fact that one of the most important conditions was eliminated.

#### Conclusion

That evening right after dinner or shortly after, meetings were held in various blocks to reach a final decision on this matter. The councilman from the block presented the two conditions under which the broadcast would be done. In some blocks there was very little discussion because the minds of the block people were already made up. In other blocks there were heated arguments between Isseis and a few Niseis who spoke in favor of the broadcast. Some councilmen tried to present the Nisei side of the picture, while others did not bother with it at all and let the people in the block make the decision as they wished. Issei representatives were sent from each block to attend a meeting to elect three members of the script committee in case the broadcast was to be given.

At the meeting of Issei representatives a few Isseis got up and made emotional speeches on why the broadcast should not be held. Mr. Oshima and Mr. Fukuyama, the councilmen who were appointed to take charge of this meeting, were evidently called upon to answer for the Council reversing the decision reached by the Isseis in the morning. A few persons were arguing in little groups why the broadcast should be held. Then a messenger arrived from the Council meeting being held at the same time conveying the message that the broadcast would not be held and that it was

unnecessary to chose a script committee. The results had been

- 33 definitely no
- 16 yes, with conditions granted
- 1 definitely yes
- 4 undecided
- 8 absent at time of vote

When this was announced a triumphant shout went up and everybody struggled out of the meeting.

A sizeable group of Isseis went over to the messhall where the Council meeting was being held and listened in to the proceedings. This was the first time that there was more than one or two Issei visitors at a Council meeting. The Council was clearly under suspicion in the eyes of some of these Isseis. At the same meeting Sumio Miyamoto got up and said that there was no percentage in the job of a councilman. All he did was to go to a Council meeting to report what was discussed at a block meeting and then go back and hold another meeting with the block people. As it was, the power of the Councilman was not clearly defined. When he asked the chairman for a clarification, Mr. Wakayama shrugged his shoulders and remarked that he was in the same boat. Members of the Council had begun to feel the helpfulness of the Council to make decisions when they took each problem to the blocks to be decided upon. This was one of the important repercussions of the Broadcast Affair.

When the Council again took up the Theater Project which had been momentarily forgotten because <sup>of</sup> the broadcast issue, it selected an investigation committee to make a report. When the report was given, Koso Takemoto suggested that this matter too be taken back to the block because it was an important issue. But the majority of the councilmen were in favor of deciding on the matter in the Council, and the Theater Project was approved. This brought down the wrath of the Isseis on the Council, and

further helped to widen the split between Isseis and Niseis.

The citizenship rally held by Niseis a week after the Broadcast Affair was settled was another manifestation of the growing split between the Isseis and Niseis. Although this rally was planned as a result of the rumor about the citizenship of Niseis being taken away and was not very successful as a rally, the broadcast issue probably gave it some impetus.

Several weeks later when the Community Council began to work on the new Community Charter, the election of Councilmen was arranged so that councilmen would no longer be responsible directly to the block but to the ward. These were repercussions which followed the broadcast affair and which can be considered to have been caused by it at least in part.

### III. Analysis

The most significant aspect of the Broadcast Affair was that it made the split between the Isseis and Niseis obvious. Up to this time most of the dissatisfaction had been directed toward the Caucasian personnel, and there was an attempt made by both Isseis and Niseis to keep together as Japanese. "We're all Japanese, there should be no differences between Isseis and Niseis" were common assertions. When the broadcast issue was settled, Howard Imazeki was reluctant to print the details of the result. He feared, for one thing, that it would not be a good thing to have such a thing publicized on the outside and he did not want to write an editorial on the matter because, he said, he did not want to be the one to cause the split between Isseis and Niseis.

Two factors, which cannot be separated, seem to have operated to cause the open break between Isseis and Niseis. The one was

the loss of respect for Isseis by many Niseis because of the manner in which the broadcast issue was settled. While it is true that the issue was of a nature which required the two generations in general to take opposing sides because of their sense of loyalty to different countries, the problem could have been settled amiably, it is believed, either for or against the broadcast. The one thing that angered many Niseis was the fact that at the general assembly outbursts of dissatisfaction and consideration of Japanese interest dominated the meeting, and no consideration was given to the welfare of the Japanese in America, especially the welfare of the Niseis. The Isseis who spoke did not handle the matter as parents who had the future of the Niseis in mind. This was partially due to the fact, of course, that the meeting was dominated by the type of Issei who was less likely to give concessions to the Nisei point of view. The more compromising sort of Issei found it difficult to get up and air his views on the question. The same sort of thing happened at most block meetings. After the issue was settled many Niseis claimed and many Isseis acknowledged that the Broadcast Affair had been mishandled by Isseis.

The other factor was the fear of Issei control over community matters through their control of block meetings. The broadcast issue served to make Niseis aware of the fact that Isseis were deciding many of the issues. Since the Broadcast Affair was handled in a manner which was detrimental to the future welfare of the Niseis, they were put on the defensive against Issei control of community matters. Up to this time there had not been complaints among councilmen and other Niseis about the fact that the block meetings were controlled by Isseis. This fear of Issei control resulted in the Theater Project not being taken back to the block, and the Community Charter

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making four councilmen responsible to a ward instead of to the block. In some blocks this fear of Issei control lead to the organization of the Nisei in the block in order to present a more solid front against the Isseis.

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The so-called "agitators" were active in the farm strike and other divisional strikes and in block meetings when such issues as the coal situation were brought up in block meetings, or appeared in Issei entertainments. The height of emotional *satisfaction* however, was probably reached during the discussion of the broadcast. Japan was winning obvious victories at the time and the spirit of the allied forces was low because of lack of victories. These people had the pleasure of defying the Office of War Information and sending them home without any concrete results. Somewhere between the Broadcast Affair, the Theater Project controversy, and the messhall strike that followed one after the other, the activities of these so-called "agitators" declined. They seemed to have lost the support they formerly had among the people, and the role of "agitator" became less desirable within the community. What this decline was due to is difficult to say. It may be that the Broadcast Affair served to point out to the people just how these people were controlling some community activities and that it would not be for the good of the community to allow this control to continue any further. Fear of the F.B.I. stepping in and making wholesale arrests may also have served to quiet these people down somewhat, giving the quieter type of Issei and Nisei more opportunity to voice their opinions. - At any rate, the Broadcast Affair, together with the Theater Project Controversy, will stand out as landmarks in Issei-Nisei relationship in the history of the Tule Lake Project.

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Sources: J.S. Journal Sept. 28, 29, 1942  
Council Minutes " 28, 29, 1942  
Interview with F.M.

### Analysis and Conclusion

A hypothesis that results from the study of mess activity is that the cause of major conflicts between colonists and the Administrative staff is the feeling of insecurity, helplessness, their injustices on the part of the colonists in the face of present conditions and unsympathetic response from Administrative officials. Threats of violence and general lawlessness seem to be a result of the same underlying feeling of insecurity. The fact that Japanese evacuees have taken up tactics commonly employed by labor unions, organizations which they have usually despised, leads one to question what characteristics the colonists and the labor union members have in common. A study of the organizational set-up of mess activities brings out clearly the general pattern of Administrative organization within the Project. First, there is an extreme centralization of control over many activities formerly controlled by individuals. At the top of this system of centralization are the Caucasians who have rights and privileges far exceeding those of the interned colonists. This split between the Japanese and the Caucasian staff added to the sense of insecurity on the part of the colonists. The levelling of social differences among the Japanese again have left the Japanese without means of maintaining self-respect by ordinary means available on the outside. This again probably contributed toward a feeling of unrest among the colonists, perhaps of resentment toward the Caucasian staff in the superior position.

More important than these, it seems, have been the attitudes of the Caucasians toward the evacuees. The lack of sympathy for the Japanese and an assumption of an air of superiority on the part of the Administrative staff seem to be a major source of friction. A comparison of the attitude taken by Mr. Shirrell or Mr. Pilcher and Mr. Elberson makes this very clear. Mr. Elberson has been rather sincere in his belief that he is here to help the Japanese people. While Mr. Shirrell has always voiced a desire to help the Japanese people, he has never been able to sympathize with them to the extent that Mr. Elberson has been

able to do. Mr. Shirrell has been concerned with siding with the majority of the staff members in maintaining his "face" as Administrator, and has been too quick to blame the Japanese themselves for conflicts which arose between colonists and the Caucasians.

Pilfering seems to be general within the Project and perhaps inherent in the conditions of camp life. While the larger issues which have ended up in strikes have been caused by conditions peculiar to the Project, many of the smaller difficulties are due to conflicts between individuals, conflicts which have existed even on the outside. The low status of mess hall work and the type of workers which attracts it of interest. These and other points brought out by the study of mess activity have made the writing of this section worthwhile.

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SOURCES:

J. S. Journal  
Council Minutes  
Tulean Dispatch  
Reports, Minutes of meetings on mess activities  
(borrowed from Mr. Taketa)  
Interview with Mr. Taketa and Mr. Sakamoto,  
Senior Steward of Block 25