

# MUD AND BLOOD

INFANTRY

34th

VOLUME TWO



DIVISION

pages 65 - 135

## ACTIONS LEADING TO THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

*Fanatic Soldiers – Page 131*

In the middle of April, the 100th was ordered to move on thirty minutes' notice to a position directly next to no-man's-land. The 100th soldiers called their life at the Anzio front from then on their "Dracula days." During the day they slept, and at night they kept watchfully awake. The men passed the daylight hours dreamily watching bright yellow daffodils pushing up and butterflies dancing among them. It all seemed so unconnected with the ravages of combat. When the sun began to fall everything suddenly became active. All their nerves strained to detect signs of enemy movement, and the men were surprised to find how well they could see in the dark once they got used to it. Every night patrols went out. Kim usually wandered off into the dark by himself.

When Cassino finally fell in the middle of May, activity stepped up tremendously at the Anzio beachhead. The moment was ripe to crush the Germans. If the enemy's line of retreat from the Gustav Line were cut off by a sudden push, Rome would almost fall by itself. The opening of an all-out attack was planned for May 23. But there was one problem. The German defenses opposite the Thirty-fourth Division's position were strong. So far not one German POW had been taken there. It was thought that possibly a crack tank division was concealed there, but no one could be sure. The entire Fifth Army was concerned about finding out. General Ryder, under constant pressure from Fifth Army headquarters, was at the end of his tether. Patrols had gone out time and again, but all had ended in failure. An entire company backed by tanks had even been sent out, but they had been forced to withdraw without gaining more information. Naturally the 100th Battalion headquarters was well aware of the problem too.

"If you send me out," said Kim one day, "I'll bring back a POW."

"That's crazy," said Colonel Singles, refusing to take up the offer.

"I'll come back alive," replied Kim.

One reason why the earlier patrols had failed, he thought, was that they had gone out at night when the enemy was most on the alert. The other reason was that too many men were sent out on the patrols. The fewer men there were, the less noticeable they would be. Staff officers at

with the cold but at the same time quite thankful to be alive and out of the war.

It was just daylight when a heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire poured in on our positions. We were as well dug in as was possible, considering the rocky terrain, and casualties were not heavy. No attack was forthcoming immediately. At about 1000 hours an enemy column of infantry, in strength of about a company, was discovered moving parallel to our front along the left flank about 600 to 800 yards in front of the positions of Company "F". Company "F" had been in reserve initially but was one of the assault companies in the movement to the hills while Company "B" went into reserve. The riflemen of Company "F" were soon registering effective fire on the column and the 60mm mortars got onto them quickly with many effective hits. The Jerries were soon split up and dispersed toward their rear. About an hour after this action, the main hill of our group (on the right flank) was subjected to a heavy concentration of artillery. A great many smoke shells were mixed with the high explosive. This smoke was very dense and before long there was no visibility beyond twenty yards anywhere on the hill. Every man waited with fixed bayonet for the expected Jerry infantry. No attack materialized and the smoke soon blew away. We learned later that this smoke was laid down to enable a group of German infantry to advance up a draw between our battalion and the 1st battalion on our right. We had a strong outpost in this gap and did not expect a breakthrough to occur there. However, about 1500 hours, an alert radio operator called our attention to a group (about a platoon and a half) of infantry hurrying across a small plateau to our right rear approximately 500 yards from our CP. They were Jerries and were carrying heavy machine guns and mortars. They were moving rapidly in the direction of the most important of the OP's we had captured. This group, getting through our defenses, seemingly without detection and without warning, was a surprise and a reason for consternation. At this time the sound of American rifle and BAR fire was heard from the vicinity of the outpost in the draw. It was assumed that only then had the outpost detected the successful penetration of the group on the plateau. By this

time, the latter group, on the plateau, had also heard the fire from their rear and had stopped as if undecided as what to do. Fire began to fall among them, from the outpost, and they had several casualties before they decided on any course of action. They then started moving in the direction of our 1st Battalion. We had a line through the Regimental CP to the 1st Battalion and we immediately warned them of the approach of the enemy group. A section of HMG's, held near the Bn CP for just such a purpose, was sent to the vicinity of the outpost from where they opened fire on the enemy group. A squad of the reserve company was working around to the right rear to cut them off if they turned in that direction. Before many minutes passed the 1st Bn also opened fire on them and, receiving fire from two directions, they lost all organized movement and were milling around on the plateau. Finally, having evidently decided that less fire was coming from the direction of the 1st Bn, they threw down their weapons and marched, hands upraised, towards the 1st Bn positions. Some "trigger-happy" GI's knocked down a few more before firing finally ceased and they had a chance to surrender. Approximately thirty live prisoners were taken by the 1st Bn.

Shortly after the above action a sergeant from the outpost in the draw reported to the Bn CP and explained the situation as follows: The outpost had not been unaware of the penetration as was presumed but the Lieutenant in charge had selected positions to the flanks of the approaching enemy column and ordered fire held until enough of the column had passed as could be easily handled. The group which had first been observed on the plateau had gotten through before the outpost had opened fire on a following group. The heavy volume of fire from the flanks surprised the balance and dispersed those who were not killed or captured. The outpost then turned their fire on the first group. A few anxious moments had been caused by this action, but in the final analysis, more damage had been done to the enemy than would have been the case if the outpost had opened fire on the leading elements of the enemy column and given away the position. The Lieu-



tenant in charge had been wounded but chose to remain with the outpost during the action. Upon being ordered to the CP it was found that he had a machine-pistol slug through his leg and he was evacuated immediately against his wishes.

Artillery and mortar fire again fell heavily on our positions. This continued all night and our casualties steadily increased. A team from the A&P Platoon, operating mine-sweepers, cleared a path through the mines and booby traps which enabled us to evacuate the wounded although it was a slow, tedious job in the precipitous Italian mountains. Our dead were assembled during darkness and grouped a few yards off the main trail. A limited amount of water and rations were brought in during the night.

There was no increase of action at dawn. The enemy artillery and mortar fire was spasmodic. It would cease altogether for short periods usually after a heavy concentration lasting about ten minutes. The forward observers of our field artillery battalion and our cannon company were with us and were directing fire from our OP's. The artillery spotted long range targets now and then and kept their guns firing with good results. The cannon company's weapons were in position but were being saved for shorter range work particularly in event of another counter-attack. It wasn't long before they were needed. Two of our artillery forward observers were killed during the afternoon by enemy artillery fire.

At approximately 1700 hours a mortar OP reported an enemy column advancing up a draw directly toward our positions at a range of about 800 yards. The cannon company observer, from his OP, spotted the same target and soon our shells were whistling close over our heads and landing in the draw to the front. It was necessary that the trajectory just clear our own positions in order to effectively cover the draw. Occasionally a "short" would burst on our own hill. Within a very few rounds fire was adjusted on the draw and shells were landing among the enemy infantry. They had bunched up badly trying to gain concealment in


the draw. The fire of the cannon company was devastatingly effective and our own 81mm mortars began dropping fire to their rear to cut off retreat. This firing continued until well after dark inflicting tremendous casualties on the enemy. Screams of the wounded and dying could be heard between bursts of fire in the draw. That was the last attempt of the Jerries to take back the strategic hills overlooking the Volturno valley.

For two days following the above action we patrolled far to the front without regaining contact with the enemy. The Division on our left (the American 45th) had moved up and another regiment of the 34th Division closed in on the right, squeezing out the 100th Battalion. We were still receiving intermittent long range artillery fire. Orders were received to abandon the positions and return to the valley. The doughboys filed down the mountainside, jabbering in Hawaiian-English, happy that another mission was successfully completed and looking forward to "B" rations and a well earned rest.

\* \* \* \* \*

The above story of the completed mission by the 100th Battalion was pencilled on a pad of paper while I was hospitalized in Naples, Italy. With the assistance of Captain Lauren E. McBride this narrative was typed into a manuscript and published in the December 1944 issue of the Infantry Journal Magazine.

*Jim Gillespie*



May 12, 2003

The Honorable Ed Royce  
United States Congressman, 40<sup>th</sup> District  
305 No. Harbor Blvd., Suite 300  
Fullerton, CA 92832

SUBJECT: Colonel Young O. Kim's Medal of Honor

Dear Congressman Royce:

We respectfully ask your assistance to secure a Medal of Honor for Colonel Young O. Kim in recognition of his brave and unselfish actions on the battlefield in Italy during World War II. This award will involve the upgrade of a Silver Star that we believe warrants Medal of Honor status based on the enclosed documentation.

On November 5 and 6 in 1943 near the Volturno River beside Hill 600, on and around Hill 610, at the Italian front, then 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Kim led about 19 members of his platoon on a night patrol under battlefield conditions against seemingly insurmountable odds. From just after dusk on November 5 until mid-morning the next day, Kim led his small group of men in a series of actions that resulted in wounding or killing numerous German soldiers, capturing 30, and knocking out four or more enemy machine gun nests. The final action in this series during which Kim was wounded not only included the taking of some of these prisoners, but also contributed to the capture of an additional 50 Germans by the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 135<sup>th</sup> Infantry.

Without regard for his own safety, Kim demonstrated superb leadership and strategic expertise in the fulfillment of his night patrol mission and a firefight the next morning. He led two squads of his platoon to save countless American lives, and in the process, suffered only two casualties. One casualty was a soldier who failed to follow orders, and the second was Kim himself who was wounded in the course of taking 22 of the 30 German prisoners. With a bullet hole in his thigh, however, he persevered and personally led his men to win a battle and capture almost two dozen POWs.

As a result of these actions, Kim was credited with "saving the very existence of the 100<sup>th</sup>." His battalion commander, Major James Gillespie, said in his memoirs that Kim's actions "ensured the success of the entire 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division." And though officers at the battlefield recommended that he be awarded a Distinguished Service Cross, he was given a Silver Star instead. General Mark Clark, Commanding General of the U.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Army, apologized that it was not a higher award when he pinned it on Kim.

- continued -

Authority 735017  
By MD NARA Date 6/15/02

**RESTRICTED**

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY  
A. F. O. #464, U. S. Army

GENERAL ORDERS )

18 June 1944

NUMBER 102 )

**EXTRACT**

	<u>Section</u>
Awards of Distinguished-Service Cross. . . . .	III

**III AWARDS OF DISTINGUISHED-SERVICE CROSS.**


Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, a Distinguished-Service Cross is awarded to the following-named officers and enlisted men:

YOUNG O. KIM, (01309572), First Lieutenant, Infantry, United States Army. For extraordinary heroism in action, near Cisterna, Italy, on 16 May 1944. First Lieutenant KIM, accompanied by one enlisted man, voluntarily went on a patrol to secure information of enemy units and dispositions in a vital sector of the front. All previous patrols of combat strength had attempted without success to take prisoners in this well defended sector. First Lieutenant KIM and his assistant infiltrated approximately 800 yards through the enemy line of outposts. While observing enemy dispositions, he discovered a strong enemy outpost situated in a small ditch. To reach this outpost, First Lieutenant KIM and his assistant, in broad daylight, crawled 250 yards across an open field, exposed to enemy observation from the German main line of resistance on the commanding slope of their rear. Arriving at a point near the outpost, they surprised two Germans armed with machine pistols who were acting as security. By use of signs, First Lieutenant KIM warned the enemy to remain quiet. He retraced his perilous route with the two prisoners and successfully by-passed two enemy listening posts to arrive at his own lines. First Lieutenant KIM'S courageous and daring performance provided vital information and identification of enemy units in a critical sector of the front. Entered military service from Los Angeles, California.

IRVING H. AKAHOSHI, (30102373), Private First Class, Infantry, United States Army. For extraordinary heroism in action, on 16 May 1944, near Cisterna, Italy. Private First Class AKAHOSHI voluntarily accompanied an officer on a patrol to secure information of enemy units and dispositions in a vital sector of the front. All previous patrols of combat strength had attempted without success to take prisoners in this well defended sector. Private First Class AKAHOSHI and the officer infiltrated approximately eight hundred yards through the enemy line to outposts. While observing enemy dispositions, he

**RESTRICTED**





Sketch (in Major James Gillespie's Memoirs, P128)

## PROPOSED CITATION

### 2<sup>ND</sup> LIEUTENANT YOUNG O. KIM UNITED STATES ARMY

On November 5 and 6 in 1943 near the Volturno River beside Hill 600 on and around Hill 610 at the Italian front, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim led about 19 members of his platoon on a night patrol into enemy territory under battlefield conditions, knowing from the start that he and his men were greatly outnumbered. From just after dusk on November 5 until mid-morning the next day, Kim led this small group of men in a series of actions that resulted in wounding or killing numerous German soldiers, capturing 30, and knocking out four or more enemy machine gun nests. The final action in this series also contributed to the capture of an additional 50 Germans by the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 135<sup>th</sup> Infantry.

In the first action on a dark night in unfamiliar terrain, serving as his own first scout, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim led his men in killing or wounding 10-to-15 of the enemy and taking out a one-or-two machine gun crew. Next, he challenged an enemy soldier who was armed and only a few feet away, enabling one of his men to shoot this enemy and preventing him from delivering a supply of machine gun ammunition to a nest that threatened the 100<sup>th</sup> Battalion position on Hill 600. He then stood face-to-face with an armed enemy perimeter guard in the darkness, and again gave members of his squad a clear shot. With this enemy guard out of the way, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim ordered half of his men around behind a position he had identified as a machine gun nest and personally led the other half directly into the machine gun fire for approximately 10 yards. In this action, he led his men to capture one German machine gun and seven Germans.

Persisting in his mission to remove enemy machine guns from Hill 610, he led his men through a close encounter with what appeared to be a five-to-seven machine gun crew of approximately 50 enemy soldiers. He then led them back to capture the enemy soldier who appeared to have been the perimeter guard for the machine gun position already knocked out. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim took this POW 700 or 800 yards to Hill 600 and volunteered to continue his mission and prevent the enemy from re-occupying Hill 610.

Continuing this mission into the morning of Nov. 6, 1943 with less than two full squads under his command, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim led his men in a firefight with a 90-100 enemy rifle company. Wounded by machine gun fire and without regards for his own discomfort, he valiantly led his men to capture 22 POWs. Another 50 of these enemy soldiers were captured by the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 135<sup>th</sup> Infantry as they tried to flee the battle scene.

2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim demonstrated superb leadership and strategic expertise in the fulfillment of his night patrol mission and the firefight the next morning. He led two squads of his platoon to save countless American lives, and in the process, suffered only two casualties. One casualty was a soldier who failed to follow orders, and the second was Kim himself. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Young O. Kim's extraordinary valor and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect credit on him, his unit, and the United States Army.

now they were trying their best to help him. Blood was spurting from his chest and stomach. The blanket they spread over him was immediately soaked red. There was no way to save him.

The German's body was husky, but his face was that of a child. He kept looking up as if to ask for something. His lips moved as he tried to say something in a barely audible voice. His hands moving weakly seemed to point to his chest. Kim pulled a leather wallet from the soldier's chest pocket. Inside was a photograph of the soldier's smiling mother and father. He held it in front of the soldier's blue eyes, but they could no longer see anything. The American soldiers stood stock-still. A silence enveloped them, engraving the moment in their memories.

The troops rarely saw the faces of their German adversaries on the battlefield. All they usually saw was figures moving in the distance. And often the enemy was one they could not see at all, firing shells from far off. The Japanese American soldiers tried to ignore the fact that the enemy soldiers were human beings like themselves, with faces and eyes, with flesh and blood, with feelings and families. It was better not to know that they too were suffering the same inhumane conditions, that they too were forced to the same limits of endurance. On the battlefield it was better to point a gun at an enemy without a face. This was the first and last time that Kim saw the face of his enemy.

Lieutenant Ernest Tanaka, also in Company B, came forward to replace Kim. When he saw the accumulated blood dribbling out of Kim's shoe, he called for a stretcher. Kim ignored it. Without uttering a word he walked by himself back toward the aid station. Silently Takeba and Kaneko watched his figure recede in the distance. The next morning Kim was sent to a hospital in Naples.



**RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD**

For use of this form, see AR 600-8-22; the proponent agency is ODCSPER

For valor/heroism/wartime and all awards higher than MSM, refer to special instructions in Chapter 3, AR 600-8-22.

1. TO	2. FROM	3. DATE
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**PART I - SOLDIER DATA**

4. NAME Young Oak Kim	5. RANK Colonel (Ret.)	6. SSN 556-12-9004	
7. ORGANIZATION 100 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion	8. PREVIOUS AWARDS See attached list		
9. BRANCH OF SERVICE United States Army	10. RECOMMENDED AWARD Medal of Honor	11. PERIOD OF AWARD a. FROM 11/5/1943 b. TO 11/6/1943	
12. REASON FOR AWARD 12a. INDICATE ACH, SVC, PCS, ETS OR RET RET		12b. INTERIM AWARD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No IF YES, STATE AWARD GIVEN: Silver Star	
13. POSTHUMOUS <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No			

**PART II - RECOMMENDER DATA**

14. NAME The Honorable Ed Royce	15. ADDRESS United States Capitol 2202 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515		
16. TITLE/POSITION U.S. Congressman	17. RANK		
18. RELATIONSHIP TO AWARDEE United States Representative		19. SIGNATURE	

**PART III - JUSTIFICATION AND CITATION DATA (Use Specific Bullet Examples of Meritorious Acts or Service)**

20. ACHIEVEMENTS
ACHIEVEMENT #1 Decisively removed enemy forces from Hill 610, located perilously close to and overlooking Hill 600, and saved countless lives in the 100th Battalion, 133rd Infantry Regiment, through extraordinary actions in the battlefield.
ACHIEVEMENT #2 Removed four or more German machine guns.
ACHIEVEMENT #3 Captured 30 German POWs in three independent actions and enabled the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment to take more than 50 POWs.
ACHIEVEMENT #4 Killed or wounded numerous enemy soldiers.

21. PROPOSED CITATION Please see attachment.
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NAME Young Oak Kim, Col. (Ret.)		SSN 556-12-9004	
<b>PART IV - RECOMMENDATIONS/APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL</b>			
22. I certify that this individual is eligible for an award in accordance with AR 600-8-22; and that the information contained in Part I is correct.		22a. SIGNATURE	
		22b. DATE	
23. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO	b. FROM	c. DATE
d. RECOMMEND: <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVAL		UPGRADE TO: DOWNGRADE TO:	
e. NAME		f. RANK	
g. TITLE/POSITION		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
24. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO	b. FROM	c. DATE
d. RECOMMEND: <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVAL		UPGRADE TO: DOWNGRADE TO:	
e. NAME		f. RANK	
g. TITLE/POSITION		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
25. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO	b. FROM	c. DATE
d. RECOMMEND: <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVAL		UPGRADE TO: DOWNGRADE TO:	
e. NAME		f. RANK	
g. TITLE/POSITION		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
26. APPROVAL AUTHORITY	a. TO	b. FROM	c. DATE
d. <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVED		RECOMMEND UPGRADE TO: DOWNGRADE TO:	
e. NAME		f. RANK	
g. TITLE/POSITION		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
<b>PART V - ORDERS DATA</b>			
27a. ORDERS ISSUING HQ		27b. PERMANENT ORDER NO.	31. DISTRIBUTION
28a. NAME OF ORDERS APPROVAL AUTHORITY		28b. RANK	
28c. TITLE/POSITION		29. APPROVED AWARD	
28d. SIGNATURE		30. DATE	

## **PREVIOUS AWARDS**

DSC  
SS-1OLC  
LOM  
BSM  
PH-2OLC  
ARCOM-2OLC  
ACM  
EAME  
WWIIVM  
NDSM-1OLC  
KSM  
AFRM  
UNSM  
CIB-2  
French Croix de Guerre

## **ADDITIONAL AWARDS, HONORS AND DISTINCTIONS**

Moran Medal – the second highest award given by the Korean government for community service

Italian Military Valor Cross

Italian Bronze Cross of Military Valor

SECTION IV - NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE 135TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.  
(1 November 1943 to 30 November 1943)

MAPS: ITALY, Sheets 161 I and 161 IV, 1/50,000 - GSGS 4229

The regiment remained in the area NE of ALLANO for two days while the advance of the 133rd and 168th progressed through CAPRIATI. During these two days the men received their past two months' pay and got some well-deserved rest with the comfort of their blankets. The regiment was out of light artillery range for the first time since the 12th of October. Enemy activity was limited to a few reconnaissance planes and the bombing of artillery positions in our rear.

On 3 November plans for the movement of the regiment to an area between FONTEGRECA and CAPRIATI were prepared, and the battalions, in the order 1st - 2nd - 3rd, moved out after dusk for the 9-mile march. The CP opened in the new location in the vicinity of FONTEGRECA (143173) at 2315A.

The current plan was for the 133rd and 168th to cross the VOLTURNO the night of the 3-4 November, and secure the high ground on the north bank. On the 4th enemy bombs fell in the vicinity of the 3rd Battalion area. Antitank company cleared a number of S-Mines from their area. The location of enemy mines seemed to be peculiarly marked by felling a small tree in the direction of the fields. On this day the 3rd Battalion was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, in the vicinity of RAVI DELLA CAPPELLA (122125). The AT guns and Chemical mortars attached to the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, were to remain in position until the following day. The 3rd Battalion completed the relief at 1845A. The next morning the 3rd Battalion was ordered to patrol the S bank of the VOLTURNO north to the 27-grid line to determine enemy positions and installations and clear out any small pockets of resistance. One gun position was located and an enemy patrol of 10-men was observed moving NE toward MACCHIA. The area in rear of the Regimental CP was again bombed causing some casualties in the supporting artillery. During daylight of the 5th the 1st Battalion began the regiment's third crossing of the VOLTURNO under intermittent artillery fire just south of ROCCARAVINDOLA. That night the 2nd Battalion closed into an assembly area south S. MARIA OLIVETO receiving some enemy small arms and mortar fire. The following morning the 3rd Battalion crossed the river and closed at 0315A, 6 October, in the flat ground just S of ROCCARAVINDOLA.

On the 5th Lt. Lawson and a squad of the I & R platoon searched the body of a German Battalion Commander, killed the night before; his driver, motorcycle and side car and obtained an overlay showing the current German defensive positions in the sector. The information secured influenced the entire subsequent Corps' plan.

The Regimental CP forded the river, crossed through the mined area and opened at daylight in the vicinity of 095240. The Cannon Company succeeded in getting one platoon across the river but small arms and artillery fire prevented their going into position immediately. Antitank Company forded the river with one platoon and went into position at ROCCARAVINDOLA. The Antitank Mine Platoon removed 60 S-Mines surrounding the building occupied the or by the Regtl. CP. The 1st and 2nd Battalions suffered a number of casualties from personnel mines. Enemy aircraft was active over the area on the 6th but did no bombing or strafing of our troops. Artillery fire was intense and the 2nd Battalion was subjected to small arms fire in the vicinity of S. MARIA OLIVETO, which had not been cleared. The Germans seemed to have done an excellent job of mining the area. All likely avenues of approach and covered avenues of approach were heavily mined, and the canalized approaches to the enemy were effectively interdicted by artillery and mortar fire.

The 1st Battalion went up to relieve the 1st Battalion, 168th, in the vicinity of Hill 558 (085250) and were subjected to observation and fire, oddly enough from Hill 609, on the left flank. The 3rd Battalion sent patrols along the MONTA NOLA Road to the vicinity of Hill 351 (100280) and observed



the enemy occupying Hill 351 at the north of RAVINDOLA Gulch. While establishing communications across the river, Lt. Earnest G. Peterson was killed by artillery fire at the ford.

On the 7th November the 1st Battalion cleared Hill 358 and sent combat patrols to Hill 520 (090260). From the Regimental CP, Capt. Stacy succeeded in directing fire that blew out two mortar positions on Hill 518. The plan for the 2nd Battalion to follow in support of the 1st was changed, and on November 8 a task force under command of General Caffrey, which included the regiment, the 776th TD Battalion and the 191st Tk Battalion, was organized. The mission was to secure MONTAGLIA. The original plan for again crossing the VALTURA and attacking MONTAGLIA from the East was abandoned and plans made for an attack along the BOCCARAVINDOLA - MONTAGLIA Highway. Mine fields in the valley through this area were reported, and patrols had determined that unimproved roads and trails leading off from the main highway were mined.

On the night 7 - 8 November the 3rd Battalion moved under cover of darkness to the vicinity of Hill 351 (090260) and the 2nd Battalion moved into the vacated 3rd Battalion BOCCARAVINDOLA area, prepared to follow the 3rd Battalion at a thousand yards, containing Hill 231 on the left flank with one platoon and by Mortar and Machine Gun fire. At daylight the 3rd Battalion attack was preceded by an artillery barrage reinforced by the fires of the TD and Tank Battalions in the assault on the town of MONTAGLIA. They were unable to proceed far until our own fires were lifted, and by 1000A the 3rd Battalion had the high ground west of the town. After daylight broke the position of the Tank and TD Battalions were observed and they received intense Battalion concentrations with a minimum amount of casualties and damage to material, 2nd Battalion receiving the shorts.

The 2nd Battalion in their advance were held up by personnel mines but by 1500A they had passed through the west side of MONTAGLIA and taken up positions to the north west of town. The objective of the 3rd Battalion had been Hill 493. This prominence, however, actually controlled no terrain and the 3rd Battalion took up positions on Hill 364. They repulsed a minor counterattack and held for the night. During this operation the enemy appeared to be withdrawing west and North through FILIGNANO, after the defensive positions west of MONTAGLIA had been broken. On the evening of the 8th the 1st Battalion Aid Station had a shell burst on a tree limb directly above, it killed three and wounded 12.

On the 9th the 10th again took over the area in the vicinity of Hill 528 and Hill 607 and the 1st Battalion moved into position at the mouth of RAVINDOLA Gulch and believing two platoons of the 2nd Battalion in that area. 3rd Battalion action was limited to mortar, machine gun and artillery fire. The Regimental CP at 095285 was subjected to intermittent shelling of about 4 rounds every 15 minutes. That night a strong enemy patrol broke through 91st Company's security, killing the platoon leader, Lt. Bailey, and killing or capturing 11 men. The Anti Tank Company received a direct hit on one gun but lost none of the crew. In the 10th MONTAGLIA and the road south of it received three battalion concentrations and intermittent shelling throughout the night.

The 10th, 11th, and 12th were spent in patrolling north across the FILIGNANO and west towards MONTAGLIA and FILIGNANO. Routes through the mined areas were located by driving sheep and goats through the area, and the report of the large mine fields north of FILIGNANO was confirmed. It has been reported that the Germans had spent 2 months in mining this area. Patrols to the West made no contact, but on the 12th the patrol from 91st Company succeeded in making contact with the 204th Paratroop Regiment on our right. The 1st Battalion moved into position on Hill 364 and the 2nd Battalion moved into Hill 364 and Hill 365.

On 14 November 2nd Battalion moved back to the vicinity of Hill 520 (090260) and took up a defensive position supporting the road from FILIGNANO to MONTAGLIA. This position was precarious because Hill 1017 to the north and the western area



Of Hill 1036 to the South dominated the position and the Battalion was unable to make contact with the 50th Paratroop Regiment who were reported to occupy Hill 1017. A forward Regimental CP was set up in the vicinity of Hill 760 and an intermediary position in that vicinity was established by the 1st Battalion. They sent daily patrols forward of the OPI. The regiment was ordered to temporarily go into a defensive position and the Battalions were echeloned in depth from the OPI to MONTAQUILA. Counterattack plans for and breach that might be made through the forward position were prepared. On the 17th the 2nd. Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion and moved back into an assembly area at MONTAQUILA. On the 17th the Cannon Company fired 936 rounds on known and suspected targets on Hill 1100 (035294).

The balance of the period to November 28 was devoted to patrolling and after each four days the front line Battalion was pulled back to MONTAQUILA and the other two Battalions moved up to the next forward position. At four different times patrols made contact, and on two occasions prisoners were taken in the town of MANMILLA. Two of our patrols were challenged by German patrols in excellent English.

The position during the period was strengthened by our own vehicle and 1-3 mines placed by the Mine Platoon of the Antitank Company. The Regimental CP on Hill 1036 did some excellent fire direction and made accurate reports of enemy installations when the weather permitted observation. On the 26th a 30 man patrol from the 1st. Battalion made contact with the Germans on Hill 760, just west of MANMILLA and returned after losing one man in a fire fight. That day the 81mm Platoons of the 1st. and 2nd. Battalions were moved to the MLI to positions from which they could support the attack of the 168th on Hill 1100. The 2nd. Battalion weapons plus the 81mm platoons of the 1st and 3rd. Battalions and Cannon Company were to blanket the crest of Hill 760 and deny the enemy use of the draw west of Hill 760 and South of CERASUOLIO. For these supporting fires 1100 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition had to be carried by hand and by mules 6000 yards over a difficult, steep, rocky mountain trail. The rate of fire, beginning at 0600A 29 November, was to be one round of 81mm mortar every six minutes and for the Cannon Company one round every four minutes continuing until the fires were masked by the 168th or, lifted on order. During this operation 1400 rounds of mortar ammunition and 1500 rounds of 75 mm ammunition were fired. Still resistance in front of the 133rd. and 168th limited the advance and the 3rd Battalion was alerted for a motor movement via COLLI-SCAROLI for support of, and attachment to the 133rd; and the 1st. Battalion was alerted for movement via. POZZILLI-FILIGNANO or the LAVINOLA Gulch in support of the 168th. The 2nd. Bn. was attached to the 168th for emergency employment.

During this period, except for the time the 1st Battalion occupied Hill 558, the assault on MONTAQUILA by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and the occupation of the forward positions in the MANMILLA-SILVONE area, the majority of the men were able to have their rolls and hot meals. This was the first time the regiment in either the Tunisian campaign or the Italian campaign had had the assistance of mule pack trains. Trails through the mountains, mined areas were extremely hazardous and difficult. The recruited mule-skimmers, however, did a good job with this new type of transportation in spite of the fact that mule shoe nails and pack equipment were very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. On two different occasions the courage and valor of the individual skimmers in leading and controlling their mules under heavy shell fire prevented the mules from stampeding or losing their valuable cargoes of food and ammunition. At one time the peak of the mule strength was 74 and at that time 45 of them were "non-combatants" because of the lack of mule shoe nails.

Communication lines were extended and in necessity repaired the mile and a half closely. Signal equipment had to be packed over the hills and sharp side hills and sliding men and animals on the slippery trails frequently took out our own wire lines.

It was impossible to secure socks until the end of the month and considerable foot trouble resulted. On the Battalions coming out of the MANMILLA-SILVONE area evacuated 40 men in 24 hours for various degrees and stages of

"Trench-foot". During this period the Cannon Company performed excellently and fired during the month 2361 rounds of ammunition.

On the 21st. of November the first of the older men and officers, from the standpoint of length of service overseas, were to be rotated under the newly adopted rotation policy of  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1<sup>st</sup> of the command per month. On this initial roster there were 2 officers and 17 men.